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TO THE
DEATH OF AUGUSTUS

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

ITALIA.
Roman Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50 100
Statute Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50 100
ROMA
Passus Romani
0 500 600
MARE TYRRHENUM (INFERUM)
MARE ADRIATICUM (SUPERUM)
MARE SARDOVM
MARE AFRICVM
MARE IONIUM
MARE SICULUM
AFRICA
GALLIA CISALPINA
Transpadani
Cispadani
VENETIA
HISTRIA
DALMATIA
LIGURIA
ETRURIA
UMBRIA
PICENUM
LATIUM
SAMNIUM
APULIA
LUCANIA
CALABRIA
BRUTII
SICILIA
CORSICA
SARDINIA
Sinus Ligusticus
Sinus Tarentinus
Alpes Poeninae
Alpes Graiae
Alpes Cottiae
Alpes Maritimae
Alpes Carnicae
Alpes Iulia
Alpes Rhaeticae
Alpes Penninae
Apenninus
Mons Vesulus
Mons Garganus
Aetna M.
Eryx M.
Nebrodes M.
Mons Pincius
Mons Capitolinus
Mons Aventinus
Mons Caelius
Mons Esquilinus
Mons Quirinalis
Mons Viminalis
Campus Martius
Tiberis
Pons Sublicius
Pons Aelius
Pons Milvius
Pons Mulvius
Porta Salaria
Porta Pinciana
Porta Flaminia
Porta Asinaria
Porta Appia
Porta Latina
Porta Ostiensis
Mausoleum Hadriani
Pantheon
Thermae Constantini
Thermae Diocletiani
Castra Praetoria
Circus Flaminius
Theatrum Pompei
Forum Romanum
Amphitheatrum Flavium
Aqua Claudia
Aqua Virgo
Aqua Appia
Via Appia
Via Latina
Via Flaminia
Via Aemilia
Via Salaria
Via Cassia
Via Aurelia
Via Clodia
Via Valeria
Via Tiburtina
Via Praenestina
Via Labicana
Via Ostiensis
Via Portuensis
Via Triumphalis
Via Lavicana
Via Nomentana
Via Collatina
Via Gabina
Via Tusculana
Via Latina
Via Appia
Via Campana
Via Popilia
Via Annia
Via Egnatia
Via Traiana
Via Herculea
Via Domitia
Via Aurelia Vetus
Via Aemilia Scauri
Via Aemilia Lepidi
Via Postumia
Via Flaminia Minor
Via Flaminia Militaris
Via Cassia Nova
Via Cassia Vetus

A SHORT
HISTORY OF ROME
TO THE
DEATH OF AUGUSTUS

BY

J. WELLS, M.A.

WARDEN OF WADHAM COLLEGE, OXFORD

WITH THREE MAPS AND FOUR PLANS

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PREFACE

My excuse for adding another to the large number of school books already existing, is that at present no satisfactory small Roman history exists in England; that this is so most schoolmasters will agree.

My aim has been, as far as possible, to keep out unimportant details, and to lay stress on the broad principles which make the interest of Roman history. I hope that these will not be found too difficult for schoolboys in fourth and fifth forms, for whom the book is primarily meant. It may also be useful in the highest forms, when preparing for an examination on the outlines of Roman history, and in pass examinations at the universities.

There are three points to which I wish especially to refer. First, the chapter on the mythical history is scanty to baldness: this was inevitable, for while it could not be omitted, it was impossible to treat this part of the subject fully, in the archaic style which is most suitable to it, without giving it too much space.

The second point is more practically important. In chapters xi. and xii. the constitutional developments of the third and second centuries have been described by anticipation: this seemed the best course, as the

changes after 287 B.C. were mainly unconscious, and grew naturally out of the arrangements of the 4th century. In form teaching, these chapters might be passed over rapidly at first, and revised carefully after chapter xxv. had been reached.

Thirdly, I have tried to make a special feature of historical parallels. Almost all of these come from Greek or English history, which most schools read, at least in outline, before they begin that of Rome. To a boy with a taste for history, these parallels will be interesting and useful; the ordinary boy need not be troubled with questions on them.

As far as possible all quotations and technical terms, when first used, have been printed in italics; but in this matter, and in the arrangement of Roman proper names in the Index, consistency has been sometimes sacrificed to convenience.

For a considerable part of the history I can claim some knowledge of the original authorities; in other parts Mommsen's and Ihne's histories, and the handbooks of Professor Pelham and Mr. Shuckburgh, have been especially used. If I have borrowed unduly without acknowledgment, I must apologize, and here express my obligations once for all.

Kiepert's Atlas has been followed in the spelling of geographical names, and Mommsen (last edition) for all others. To the latter writer I owe a large part of my interest in Roman history; and if I seem sometimes presumptuously to differ from the greatest of living historians, my excuse is that Mommsen is inclined to overrule the testimony of the ancient

authorities for his own theories. As a rule, in these cases his view has been given in a footnote, for the benefit of examinees, who may well think it the safer to follow. For dates I have used Fischer's *Zeittafeln*, a book sadly needing a new edition.

I am under obligation to many friends for kind help in revising. I must especially mention my old schoolfellow, the Rev. R. Powley; Mr. F. Haverfield, of Christ Church; Mr. L. Whibley, of Pembroke College, Cambridge; and, above all, Mr. H. D. Leigh, of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. To them I owe the correction of many slips, and the supplying of many omissions. The faults of the book are my own; but they would have been much more numerous had it not been for the kind help of friends.

Wadham College, Oxford,
July 31st, 1896.

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION

In this edition there have been added four battle plans; for permission to reproduce that of the battle of Cannae, I have to thank the courtesy of Mr. J. L. Strachan-Davidson, of Balliol College, and the delegates of the Clarendon Press. I have also introduced about a dozen new paragraphs and notes (*e.g.* on pp. 68, 150, 163, 181, 207, 212, 260, 268, 289), and an appendix (No. VII.) on Augustan Literature. In these scanty limits no attempt has been made to give any details; I have only tried to give the main characteristics of authors and of various literary forms, and especially to show the bearing of the literary history on the political developments of Rome.

Wadham College
December, 1903

PREFACE TO THE ELEVENTH EDITION

In this and previous editions since the fifth I have corrected a few points. I have now added three new paragraphs on Roman Religion (on pp. 17, 76, and 126), embodying ideas borrowed from Mr. W. Warde Fowler's most interesting book, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People* (Macmillan and Co., 1911). I only wish that space allowed me to borrow more freely. Of course, Mr. Fowler must not be held responsible for the way in which I have tried to express his views.

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INTRODUCTION

THE GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION OF ROME AND THE RACES OF ITALY

Advantages of the Site of Rome.—The greatness of Rome, as of all other important cities, was largely due to its geographical position; it was favourably placed at once for internal development, and for relations to the world outside.

1. **A Natural Fortress.**—Its site was well guarded, its seven hills were a natural fortress, while Janiculum was an outwork which defended the passage of the Tiber, and barred attack on the side from which attack was most likely to come. But the city was no mere hill fortress; placed as it was in a fertile plain, it had plenty of room to expand. In this respect, as in others, the position of Rome may be compared with that of Athens.

2. **Well situated for Commerce.** — Nor was the site less advantageous for foreign development. Rome commands the Tiber, the one considerable river of Italy proper, which was navigable at any rate for small boats, and received its most considerable tributary, the Anio, just above Rome. At the same time, the fact that Rome was fifteen miles from the sea, made her secure against piracy. To this natural advantage Rome owed her distinctive position as a city; she "was not," as Mommsen says, "a commercial town like Carthage or Corinth, but the distinction between her citizens and the Latins generally, is pre-eminently the distinction between citizen and rustic." She was the natural emporium of Latium.

3. **In the centre of Italy and of the World.**—Again, no city could be more favourably placed for the conquest of Italy.

Standing in the very centre of the peninsula, Rome was able to separate her enemies on the north from those on the south, and in her campaigns she had always the advantage of being able to move her troops on the "inner lines"; *i.e.* by the shortest possible routes. In fact, Rome is, and always has been, the natural capital of Italy.

Her central position also aided her in the conquest of the world. Civilization, at that time, gathered round the Mediterranean Sea, and Rome was in the central peninsula, which divides that sea into east and west. In this respect her position may be compared with that of London, standing midway between the Old World and the New.

It is the task of Roman history to describe how this city on the west coast of Italy succeeded in conquering all the rest of the peninsula, and then used the strength of Italy to conquer the world; the latter success was comparatively easy, when once the former had been accomplished. It will be necessary therefore to sketch very briefly the nations with whom Rome came in contact in Italy, and their geographical position.

Natural Divisions of Italy.—Italy, till quite a late period in history, did not include the valley of the Po. Its boundary was the Apennines, and not the Alps; or it might rather be said, Italy was the region occupied by the Apennine range and the plains enclosed between it and the sea. Of these plains, the most important were those of Etruria, Latium, and Campania on the west; of Lucania on the south; and of Apulia on the south-east. Those on the west are by far the most important; for their harbours are better, and the commercial intercourse of Italy was as naturally directed westwards as that of Greece was eastwards; in fact, it might be said that the Hellenic and the Italian peninsulas turn their backs on each other, and do not come into contact till quite a late period of their history.

Mixture of Races in Italy. I. The Iapygian.—In Italy there was a considerable admixture of races, belonging probably to three main stocks; *i.e.* the Iapygian, the Italian proper, and the Etruscan. The Iapygians were found in Calabria —*i.e.* in the heel of Italy—and probably also in Apulia. They seem to have been the earliest inhabitants of the

peninsula, and to have been driven southwards before successive hordes of invaders, as the Britons were driven by the English into Wales and Cornwall. They play no part in the history of Italy, and before they came into contact with the Romans, had been very largely Hellenized by the Greek settlements on their coasts.

II. The Italians Proper. A. The Latins.—The great bulk of the population of Italy belonged to a race which may be called Italian, to distinguish it from the earlier inhabitants, and from later comers. Of this race there were two great branches, the Latin and the Umbro-Sabellian. The former seem to have first moved southwards, along the west coast of Italy, and to have occupied the plains, which were afterwards Latium, Campania, and Lucania. In their southern settlements they were conquered more than once, and received a large admixture of other elements; but in Latium they held their own, and it is on her position as head of the Latin race that Rome's greatness is based. Latium proper consists of a district of some 700 square miles, between the Tiber, the spurs of the Apennines, the Alban Mount, and the sea. The very name is significant—it is the "plain country"—as opposed to the mountains of Central Italy, or to the Volscian highlands which separate it from Campania; hence its triumph in Italy is the triumph of organization and law over isolation and disorder. At what period the Latin League was founded we do not know, but there seems no reason to doubt that, from very early times, the thirty cities of Latium were associated for purposes of defence and of common worship; it was a Federal league such as existed in Boeotia or in Aetolia. No doubt the original head was Alba, which is marked out by its strong position as the natural centre of the Latin plain, so long as defence was all-important; here, on the Alban Mount, the Latin "festival" continued to be held, down to the latest times. At some early period. however, while Rome was still governed by kings, the headship passed from the town best suited for defence to the town marked out for expansion; Alba was superseded by Rome, and between that city and the Latin League the ties were drawn ever closer, till headship passed into empire, and empire into complete union.

B. The Umbro-Sabellians.—The bulk of the Italian tribes seems to have begun to move southward, in successive waves of immigrants, at a later period than the Latins; in fact, their latest settlements belong to historic times. Tradition related how generations of warriors were sent out to seek a new home for themselves; so the Samnites pushed on into the centre of Italy, led by an ox, and the Picentines into the valleys on the east coast, led by a woodpecker. These tribes occupied the whole of East and Central Italy, and penetrated to the west coast in Campania and in Lucania; but the race, as a whole, had no unity in itself, and even its various communities were bound together only in the loosest form of organization. If, as is probable, the Volsci belonged to this race, then we must suppose that the Oscan branch of it was the first to move and to establish itself to the south of Latium proper, especially in Campania and on the high ground between Latium and Campania, where it was afterwards hard pressed by its Sabellian kinsmen.

III. The Etruscans.—The district north of the Tiber was occupied by an entirely different race, the Etruscans, or, as they called themselves, the Rasena. Who they were is one of the puzzles of history; ancient writers said that they came from the East, and connected them with the Lydians, and archæological evidence tends to confirm this tradition. Their importance lies in the fact that they isolated the great district north of the Tiber from the rest of Italy, and so enabled Rome to be the undisputed head of the plain country. The Etruscans themselves were comparatively weak, for they settled as a conquering race in a region where the mass of the population was alien to them—at any rate, in Southern Etruria; hence they offered less resistance than the Sabellian races to Rome and the Latins.

Greek Colonies.—Finally, all round the south and south-west coasts of Italy were the Greek colonies, which here, as everywhere, fringed the shores of the Mediterranean. But the Greeks had little power of assimilation; though they introduced the elements of their civilization, yet they did not succeed in Hellenizing the Italian peoples, except in the extreme south-east.

A

SHORT HISTORY OF ROME

TO THE

Death of Augustus

CHAPTER I.

THE TRADITIONS OF THE REGAL PERIOD

Importance of Rome's Mythical History.—The story of the Romans, like that of all great nations, begins with myths. These cannot be accepted as history, but it is necessary briefly to record them for two reasons. The Romans themselves believed them, and thought them important; and the genius of Roman poets and historians has made them an important part of the literature and art of the world.

Aeneas and the Alban Kingdom.—The hero Aeneas, after the fall of Troy and the wanderings described by Virgil in his *Aeneid*, reached at last the shores of Latium; he found the country ruled by a king called Latinus, whose daughter Lavinia he married. After a fierce war with her old suitor, Turnus, he succeeded in establishing himself in Latium, where his descendants ruled for three hundred years; their capital was Alba Longa, which was founded by his son Ascanius, or Iulus. Early in the eighth century B.C. his descendant, the rightful king, Numitor, was dispossessed by his brother Amulius. The latter, in order to secure himself, exposed the twin children, Romulus and Remus, which his niece, Rhea Silvia, bore to the god Mars; but

they were suckled by a wolf, and reared unknown to the king. When they grew up they slew the usurper, and restored the throne of Alba to their grandfather.

Foundation of Rome: Romulus.—They themselves resolved to found a new city. The honour of giving his name to this was secured to Romulus by the omen of twelve vultures which he saw on Mount Palatine, and Rome was founded. (753 B.C.) Remus was killed by his brother for jumping over the new wall.[1]

Romulus, in order to secure a population for his new city, opened an asylum, to which, as to the cave of Adullam, all the discontented and outcast of the country resorted. To obtain wives for his warriors, Romulus invited his neighbours, the Sabines, to a festival, and then carried off their daughters. In the war which followed, success was long doubtful. The Sabines captured the Capitol through the treachery of Tarpeia, the daughter of the commander, who opened the gate on condition that she should receive what the enemy "had on their left hands." Indignant at the treachery by which they profited, the Sabines threw her, not their bracelets and rings, but their shields, and crushed her under the weight. This was commemorated ever after by the Tarpeian Rock, the place of execution of Roman traitors. In the end peace was restored through the mediation of the captured Sabine women, and the two nations, the Romans and the Sabines, were united. After this followed a period of long and successful war, by which Romulus extended his territory; he was at last taken up to heaven by his father Mars, and was worshipped as a god under the name of Quirinus.

Numa Pompilius.—He was succeeded by the Sabine, Numa, whose long reign was one of unbroken peace: as a symbol of this, he closed the temple of Janus, the double-headed god, whose gates were always open in time of war. (This temple is said to have been closed only three times in Roman history.) Numa, taught by his wife, the nymph Egeria, gave the Romans law and organised their religion. He was considered the founder of Roman civilization, as Romulus was of Roman military power.

[1] These traditions are embodied in Macaulay's *Prophecy of Capys*.

Tullus Hostilius and Ancus Marcius.—His successor, Tullus Hostilius, was an exact contrast to Numa, for he was constantly at war. His most famous struggle was against the mother city of Alba; this was decided by the single combat of the three Roman Horatii against the three Latin Curiatii. The victory thus won had a tragic result in Rome. The survivor of the Horatii slew his own sister for mourning one of the Curiatii, who was her lover, and was only saved from death by "appealing" to the Roman people, who refused to allow the execution of one whose bravery had saved Rome. Alba was soon afterwards razed to the ground, and its population brought to Rome. Tullus finally was killed by lightning, and was succeeded by the grandson of Numa, Ancus Marcius. The reign of this king was mainly peaceful, but he also extended the Roman territory and the boundaries of the city. He founded the seaport of Ostia, at the mouth of the Tiber, and included the Aventine Hill within Rome, in order to give room for the increasing population.

Tarquinius Priscus.—After his death a king of an entirely new family succeeded. Tarquinius Priscus, an Etruscan refugee, but descended from a Greek family, was appointed by Ancus to be the guardian of his sons. Tarquin supplanted them, and secured the throne for himself. His conquests were very wide. He subdued the whole of Etruria, and brought thence to Rome the curule chair and the rods and axes, the emblems of sovereignty (*Imperium*). He also carried out great works in Rome, especially the draining of the low valley between the Palatine and the Capitoline Hills, by the great sewer, the Cloaca Maxima, which still runs below the Forum. He, moreover, increased the number of the nobles, and added one hundred members to the Senate.

Servius Tullius.—After a long and successful reign he was murdered by the sons of Ancus Marcius, and was succeeded by Servius Tullius, a man of low birth, who had won his favour and the hand of his daughter. The reign of this king was mainly peaceful, but he extended the power of Rome by a treaty with the Latins, who henceforward appear as her constant allies. He also surrounded Rome with a great wall, parts of which still exist.

His most important work, however, was the organization of the people on the basis of landed property, and not of birth. He founded the *Comitia Centuriata*, which was henceforth the chief assembly of the Roman people, both for peace and for war; but the old assembly, the *Comitia Curiata*, still existed, with special powers.

Tarquinius Superbus.—These changes gave great offence to the nobles. Tarquinius Superbus, the son of Tarquinius Priscus and son-in-law of Servius, conspired with his wicked wife Tullia, and, putting himself at the head of the discontented citizens, murdered Servius and seized the throne. His reign was that of the typical tyrant. He oppressed the people at home, and extended his dominions abroad by war and by marriage alliances; his most important conquest was Gabii, which was betrayed to him by his son Sextus, who had treacherously won the chief command in that city.

Expulsion of the Kings.—But Tarquin's pride and cruelty brought about his fall. An outrage on a Roman matron, Lucretia, committed by his son Sextus, raised all the people against him, and Tarquin, with his family, were expelled. (510.)

In their place the Roman people elected two magistrates (*consules*[1]), holding office for a year only, who shared the royal power between them. The first two consuls were L. Junius Brutus, the nephew of Tarquin, who had led the revolt, and L. Tarquinius Collatinus, the husband of Lucretia. Thus Rome was delivered from kings in the same year in which the despots, the Pisistratidae, were expelled from Athens.

The story as to the Regal period of Rome comes to us from Livy and from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who had taken it in their turn from the older Roman annalists; it seems to date back, pretty much in its present shape, to the period just before the second Punic War. It cannot be accepted as history, though there may easily be some fragments of truth embodied in it, and though it is likely enough that it presents a picture (however distorted) of what may have actually happened.

Perhaps we may detect the following elements of falsehood in it:—

[1] Very probably their original title was "praetors."

(1) There is a constant tendency to exaggerate the extent of the Roman conquests.

(2) The story was developed at a period when all literature at Rome, including the writing of history, was Greek, and so there are many Greek elements intruded; *e.g.* the story of Aeneas and the Greek origin of the Tarquins.

(3) The Greeks also introduced stories borrowed from their own history, *e.g.* the last Tarquin behaves like the typical Greek tyrant, and the very same acts are attributed to him as to Periander of Corinth, *e.g.* the symbolic message sent to Sextus at Gabii by striking down the tallest poppies.

(4) Many of the stories are obviously invented to explain names and customs: *e.g.* the story of Tarpeia is an attempt to account for the choice of the Tarpeian Rock as the place for executing traitors, and the carrying off of the Sabine maidens is probably invented to explain some relics of the primitive "marriage by capture" which survived in Rome.

Note on the festival of the Septimontium. (See p. 11.)

The more trustworthy evidence for the early history of Rome is that drawn from religious festivals (*cf.* p. 17). The Romans were the most conservative of nations, and religion is the most conservative of the forces which mould national life. In this festival, held on December 11, the inhabitants of "seven mountains" contended for the head of a sacrificed horse. The "seven *mountains*" (parts of the Palatine, Esquiline, and Caelian) are unimportant in later history, and are to be carefully distinguished from Rome's "Seven *Hills*," Palatine, Capitoline, Quirinal, Viminal, Esquiline, Caelian, and Aventine. Another ancient festival, the Ambarvalia, held in May, shows how small was the original Roman territory; the priesthood of the "Arval Brothers" then "perambulated the fields," and on the west side, they only went to the sixth milestone.

CHAPTER II.

THE REAL HISTORY OF THE REGAL PERIOD

Real History of Rome under the Kings.—The stories recorded in the last chapter are full of improbabilities and of miracles, and there is no evidence of their existence in their present shape before 300 B.C., *i.e.* more than two centuries after the events described; but it is possible from existing remains, such as the old walls, and from survivals of custom, to infer in outline the history of Rome under the kings.

The Romans a Mixed Race.—Two or three points stand out clearly. In the first place, the evidence points to the fact that the Romans were a mixed race; with the Latin stock, to which they mainly belonged, were mingled foreign elements, the most important of which were the Sabine and the Etruscan. It seems probable that the Sabines—*i.e.* the hill tribes to the north-east of Rome—at some early period conquered the city; they were too few to alter the Latin character of the people, but their influence may be compared to that of the invading Danes or Normans in England. It must not be forgotten that the Sabines were closely akin to the Latins, just as the Danes and the Normans were to the English. The Etruscan element at Rome belongs to a later period. This mixture of races is only another instance of the general rule that it is the mixed nations which play the most prominent part in history. Athens in Greece, and England in modern Europe, furnish obvious comparisons.

Rome at first an unimportant Latin town.—The second great feature in Roman history in the early period is the evident unimportance of its conquests: it is clear that Rome's territory extended but a few miles either to the north or to the south; the only real growth was down the Tiber, for the foundation of Ostia may certainly be placed during this period.

Thirdly, Rome, even at this time, is clearly becoming the champion of the Latin race against the Etruscans on the north; it is this close connection with Latium which is the great feature of Rome's foreign relations during the first four centuries of her existence.

The Development of Early Rome.—In one very important respect Mommsen's view as to the early history of Rome differs from the traditional one. He denies that the Romans were in any real sense a mixed race, and though he admits that the tribe of the Tities represents a Sabine element, he considers this quite unimportant. However this may be, three stages of Rome's growth can be traced. The earliest settlement was on the Palatine, *Roma Quadrata;* its boundaries were still known by Tacitus (Ann. xii. 23), drawn *per ima montis Palatini.* This community later united with neighbouring villages on the Caelian and the Esquiline (*i.e.* the "outer quarters"); the union was commemorated by the festival of the Septimontium (see note on p. 9). Finally Rome became a city of importance when the community thus formed by the "seven mountains," combined further with another settlement (perhaps Sabine) on the Quirinal and the Viminal hills. The Capitol was occupied as a common citadel, and the centre of the new community's life was the Forum, lying between the Palatine and the Capitoline; the *pomoerium* or sacred boundary was extended to the limits which it retained till the time of Sulla. This last extension was traditionally assigned to Servius Tullius, who was said to have built a wall surrounding Rome, which included even the Aventine. Archaeological evidence proves the surviving fragments of the "Servian Wall" to belong to the fourth century, but it may well have been built on the lines of an older wall.

Gradual growth of Rome.—In all this one point of great importance stands out. It is most true that "Rome was not built in a day." If there ever were a king named Romulus, his importance would be very slight, for the real work of founding Rome was gradual. Out of the union of families had grown up the tribal settlements, and when these in turn united, the *civitas* was formed, probably at first being a mere hill fortress, and only afterwards a definite place of habitation. Rome's greatness was founded on the fact that, owing to her

favourable natural position, and especially her commercial importance, she passed through the stages of growth from the tribal community to the real city, more rapidly than her neighbours.

The Etruscan Conquest of Rome.—But the story of Rome, during the later part of the regal period, is obviously different in character from that of the earlier part. Tradition represents the last three kings as foreign in birth, and as succeeding to the throne in unconstitutional ways; it also represents their conquests as wider, and their splendour at home as greater. This tradition is confirmed by the magnificent remains of this period; the Cloaca Maxima and the "Servian" Wall are works worthy of powerful princes.

Now, we know from other sources that the Etruscans were at this time at the height of their power. The origin of this mysterious people is a most disputed point, but they were certainly not Italian; perhaps they came from the North. Their power, in the sixth century B.C., extended from the valley of the Po to Campania; hence it is almost certain that the resistance of Latium must have been for the time overcome, and that, in the story of the Tarquins, we have an account of a real Etruscan dominion in Rome.

It left behind a marked influence on the Roman religion, especially in the science of divination (*i.e.* of the *haruspices*); it left behind, too, the symbols of authority in the curule chair and the rods and axes of the lictors;[1] and probably it affected the population in part, for there was always a "Tuscan quarter" in Rome.

Roman History begins with the Regifugium. — But the national spirit was too strong for the invaders, and the expulsion of the Tarquins represents a real rising of Latins against foreigners; it seems to represent also an assertion of the rule of the Roman nobles against the kings, who had been strengthening their power by giving privileges to the mass of the people. The analogy of Greek history would

[1] Of these the consuls had twelve each; each consul by turn was senior for a month, during which his lictors carried the rods and axes. I have followed the traditional account in deriving the symbols of authority from Etruria (*Dion. Halic.* iii. 61); but Mommsen says that the purple mantle and the ivory sceptre were borrowed from the Greeks.

lead us to expect that in Rome, as at Athens, monarchy gave way to aristocracy, even though in the Italian city unprivileged as well as privileged seem to have united in the actual overthrow of Tarquin. For this, as for other reasons, Roman history begins with the "regifugium"; henceforth there is no break in the national life, or in the constitutional growth, and though for centuries we know little that is definite, yet what we do know—after the first generation, at any rate—is comparatively certain, and not mere conjecture, however well grounded.

Powers of the King.—But although the events recorded as to regal Rome cannot be accepted, save in the broadest outline, yet it is possible to state, with practical certainty, something as to the constitutional arrangements of this period.

At the head of the state stood the King, who was supreme in all the business of the state. He commanded the army in war, and could make agreements with foreigners; he had the power of life and death, and he alone could summon the burgesses to the comitia, and address them or give others the right to do so. But his power was limited in practice by the fact that it was usual for him to ask the advice of the Senate, *i.e.* the council of the elders, and in constitutional theory by the necessity of consulting this body and the people as to any change in the laws of the state. He was, too, not a hereditary monarch, but was elected by the Senate and confirmed by the people.

Perhaps the office was open to any Roman, and certainly in the traditions as to the kings, there is little trace of hereditary succession; but it is more probable that, as among our Saxon forefathers, each new king was elected from among those connected by blood or by marriage with his predecessors.

The Senate.—Side by side with the king stood the council of elders (the Senate); they were 300 in number, and were appointed by the king, though probably they originally represented the clans (*gentes*), from the union of which the state had developed. Their chief powers were the appointment of the king, and the giving of counsel whenever he consulted them; they were in fact the royal council (*regium consilium*); but in virtue of their old position as representatives of the clans, they were also the guardians of the traditions of

the state, and no change in its laws was valid, unless it had received the sanction of the Senate (*patrum auctoritas*).

Comitia Curiata.—The assembly of the burgesses was in some respects the sovereign power; their consent was necessary for the election of the king, and for changes in the laws, and they had the right of pardon when the king allowed a criminal to appeal (*provocare*). They voted in their assembly, not as individuals, as in the Athenian ecclesia, but as groups. These groups (*curiae*) were thirty in number, ten for each tribe, and were no doubt used for other purposes as well as for voting.

Other divisions of the Roman people.—The curia then is the administrative unit of the Roman people. The three tribes are of no political importance, and their names, Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres, are very obscure in their origin; probably this division goes back to the very beginnings of the Roman state.[1]

It has been supposed that each curia contained ten gentes, and each gens ten heads of families, but this theory is without authority and improbable in itself; it confuses the curiae, which were artificial divisions, with the natural divisions of the gens and of the family.

The Patria Potestas.—The latter institution plays a very great part in the development of Roman life and law. No nation has ever grasped more clearly the unity of the family, or given more absolute power to its head. The *pater-familias* is absolute master, not only of his slaves and dependents, but of his wife and sons, whom in theory he could sell or put to death, though he was limited by religious penalties; his authority ceases only with life. This authority, however, is purely in private matters; in public, father and son were equal as citizens, and the latter as magistrate might command the former. This devotion to strict law, even in their family arrangements, is characteristic of the Romans; a people so reared was fitted to develop that system of law, which has become the basis of almost all modern codes, and which is the most important contribution made by Rome to the progress of the world.

[1] The name *tribus* is probably connected with *tres*, and implies that the first political division which the Romans recognized, was a "third."

The Clientes.—The Roman burgesses were of two kinds, privileged and non-privileged, patricians and plebeians. The latter in their earliest form, were strictly what they were called, *i.e.* "*clientes*," dependents ("listeners") of their superiors. Some of them no doubt were refugees from other cities, while others would be emancipated slaves; but they were all alike in being *de jure* non-free, and in requiring to be represented by their patron in all legal matters. Gradually, however, their position improved; in a commercial state like Rome, it was impossible to keep in so dependent a position the numbers whom trade attracted; and the plebeians were also increased wholesale by the removal of conquered populations to Rome, *e.g.* according to tradition, in the reign of Ancus Marcius.

The Clientes become Plebeians.—Hence, a great change took place in their condition, and they became able to plead and do business in their own right, though they were still rigidly excluded from intermarriage with the full citizens (*conubium*), and from all office. This change of position is marked by the change of name; the "dependent" becomes the "plebeian," *i.e.* "a man of the multitude." Of course there were still many plebeians who were dependent on individual patricians, *i.e.* who were still clients in the strict sense; but the majority were the dependents of the state only. There seems no doubt that the plebeians were admitted into the Comitia Curiata,[1] though they cannot have had much influence there, as they were at first excluded alike from military service and from the burden of taxation.

During the latter part of the regal period, the position of the plebeians still further changed. The new dynasty that was ruling in Rome was careless of old distinctions, and needed fresh military strength for its wars; hence we find a new organization of the people on the basis of property, in which both orders, patricians and plebeians, were included. No doubt it was originally for military purposes; in it the people were arranged in *centuriae*, which took the place of the old *curiae*, but which were based on

[1] This view has the great mass of evidence in its favour, and is accepted by Mommsen. Many distinguished scholars, however, refuse to believe it, and it is full of difficulties.

distinctions of age and wealth, not of birth. The whole people was divided into two divisions, *seniores* and *juniores*; *i.e.* the reserve corps and the fighting corps of the state; these divisions again were sub-divided according to wealth. The arrangement was as follows:

(1) The wealthiest members of the state served in the eighteen centuries of the Equites, *i.e.* as cavalry.

(2) Those whose property was assessed at more than 100,000 asses[1] served as heavy-armed troops, in eighty centuries, forty of seniors and forty of juniors.

(3) There were twenty centuries (ten of seniors and ten of juniors) for each of the classes with property over 75,000, over 50,000, and over 25,000 asses respectively. In these sixty centuries, the equipment and the position in the army varied with the property of each class.

(4) Thirty centuries (divided as before) were made up of those with property between 25,000 and 11,000 asses; these served as light-armed troops.

(5) All with property below 11,000 asses formed one century of *proletarii*, and did not serve, while there were four centuries of musicians and workmen.[2] (*Cornicines et fabri.*)

Hence there were one hundred and ninety-three centuries in all, of which the knights and the wealthiest class, though containing far fewer members, had an absolute majority.

Mommsen's account of the Servian Constitution.—Such is the traditional account of the Servian Constitution. Mommsen considers that it was due to Greek influence, and that the first class were those who, having a hide and upwards of land, were alone compelled to appear in complete armour, and formed the army (*classis*); the landowners who had $\frac{3}{4}$, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, and $\frac{1}{8}$ of a hide formed the other five classes. He believes that the number of the centuries actually corresponds to the division of the land at this period; *i.e.*, that

[1] The original Roman as was a pound of copper, but it was reduced during the first Punic War, and on several occasions after. It is impossible that the traditional figures can be right; no doubt they express, in terms of the later depreciated asses, a rating which was made in land or cattle.

[2] There is great dispute as to the classes in which these four voted.

those who had a hide of land were about half the whole number of landowners. This equal distribution of property seems very improbable.

Importance of the Servian Constitution.—But whatever the exact arrangements of the Servian Constitution, and whatever its date, its political importance is very great. It was adopted also as the basis of taxation, and the new military organization, according to the invariable principle of antiquity, which gave political rights in proportion to military service, was gradually adopted as the main political assembly of the state, superseding in great part the Comitia Curiata.[1] Probably this change was not completely made till the establishment of the Republic, but popular tradition ascribed it to King Servius and his love of the people; and the laws of Servius Tullius were to the Roman plebeians an ideal of lost privileges, like the laws of King Edward the Confessor in England after the Conquest. To King Servius also were ascribed the thirty "tribes,"[2] which later on were the basis of division in the third assembly of the Roman people (the *comitia tributa*), but which were at first only the local divisions of the landowners, arranged for purposes of military service, and afterwards for taxation.

Early Roman Religion.—The religion of Rome during this period was already taking an organized form; the so-called Calendar of Numa has been pieced together from the inscriptions of the Fasti (dating from the first century of the Principate), in which it is marked out by being written in capitals. The main feature of its list of forty-five festivals (all but two on *odd* days of the month) is that they are those of an agricultural people, in whose life war is already playing a large part. It is noticeable that, except in the Lupercalia, the element of primitive barbarism is almost excluded. Whoever drew up this Calendar (the Romans attributed it to Numa) had already the ideas of self-restraint, dignity, and order, which marked Roman religion to the end.

[1] No doubt this would happen first in the declaration of war; it would be natural, on this matter, to consult the people arranged in the form in which they actually served in the field.

[2] This number is uncertain; there were only twenty in the early period of the Republic (p. 17). These local tribes, in which both patricians and plebeians were included, are to be carefully distinguished from the three original tribes (p. 14), which were hereditary. In the thirty tribes, only landowners (*assidui*) probably were included.

CHAPTER III.

THE EARLY DAYS OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE STRUGGLES OF THE ORDERS (510–449)

The beginnings of the Republic.—It has been already described how the Tarquins were expelled from Rome, and stress was laid on the fact that Roman history, as opposed to mere conjecture from tradition, begins with the Regifugium. (p. 12.) But the event is even more important in another way. Although the principles of the Roman constitution date from the regal period, it is with the Republic that they begin to operate continuously. Self-government on the part of the citizens, all that the Romans meant by *civitas*—may be said now to come into being. It was not that the privileges of the mass of the people were extended; they may even have been limited, for the Senate of the Republic was at first a purely patrician body, and the magistrates also were chosen exclusively from that order; but it was inevitable that a liberty which was enjoyed by half the state should gradually be extended to the other half. The Romans, above all other nations, understood the art of governing others; hence the importance of the period in which they begin to govern themselves.

Efforts for the Restoration of the Tarquins. 1. At home.—During the early years of the new Republic constant efforts were made for the restoration of the Tarquins both in Rome itself and by the surrounding powers. In the very first year after the Regifugium, a conspiracy in their interest was formed by the young nobles; it was betrayed by a slave, and the ringleaders were put to death. Among them were the

sons of the Consul Brutus, the liberator, and he, in the true spirit of a "Roman father," ordered their execution.

2. Abroad. Porsena, the Etruscan.—But the attempts at restoration by foreign powers were much more serious. Of these there were two, one made by the Etruscans, the other by the Latins. The former, which took place in the year 507, was led by Porsena, king of Clusium, who advanced with a large army, stormed the Janiculum, and so had the northern approaches of Rome at his mercy. Tradition varies as to what followed. The Romans said that Porsena was prevented from following up his success by the heroic defence of the Pons Sublicius, where Horatius Cocles and two other Romans held the whole Tuscan army in check till the bridge had been broken down. Porsena then tried to starve out Rome, and nearly succeeded; but alarmed by the self-devotion of Mucius Scaevola, who penetrated right into the Tuscan camp in order to kill the king, he finally gave the Romans terms; they were to restore the private property of the Tarquins, and to yield all territory on the right bank of the Tiber. Hostages were given for the fulfilment of these terms, one of whom, a maiden named Cloelia, escaped from her captors, and swam back across the Tiber to Rome. Her countrymen at once restored her to the Etruscan king, but he was so pleased with her heroism and with Roman good faith, that he refused to keep her prisoner, and, moreover, made the conditions of peace much easier.

Etruscan Victory over Rome.—It is clear, however, that this tradition conceals the real facts of the case. Porsena certainly did not restore the Tarquins, and he seems to have failed to enter Rome; but the people were compelled to surrender their arms, and to give up so large a part of their territory that the number of the tribes was reduced from thirty to twenty.

The Etruscans, however, were not able to keep Rome in this state of dependence. Within two years we find the Romans engaged in a war with the Sabines, in which they claim to have won great victories. The only fact we can be sure of is, that these hostilities with their hill neighbours on the N.E. kept the Romans more or less continually busy throughout this early period.

Latin War: Roman Victory at L. Regillus.—The second attempt at restoration was of a different kind; the attacks of Etruscans and Sabines were those of hereditary enemies, while the Latins were kindred peoples and natural allies; but among them the Tarquins had a strong party, and the united force of Latium seems to have attempted their restoration in 496. So serious was the danger that the Romans appointed a dictator. This magistrate, who is mentioned first in 498, had absolute power in his own hands for six months, and appointed his own subordinate, his master of the knights (*magister equitum*). The final battle was fought near L. Regillus; it was especially remarkable, the Romans believed, for the appearance of Castor and Pollux, with whose help they gained a complete victory. From this time onwards the Tarquins ceased to trouble Rome, and her power began to rise. In the very next year the great Claudian family emigrated from among the Sabines to Rome, and a new tribe was added to the state. (495.) The Claudii themselves were received among the patricians.

Renewal of Latin League.—Finally, in 493, Rome once more recovered her natural place in Latium: the consul Spurius Cassius renewed the old league with the Latins. Rome and the Latin towns united on a footing of equality, for they needed the protection of union against the Etruscans on the north, and the Sabine, the Aequian, and the Volscian hill tribes on the north-east, east, and south. In 486 the league was joined by the Hernici, themselves a hill tribe, but needing the protection of the dwellers in the Latin plain against their more powerful neighbours on the north and south-west. By alliance with this people, the league of the plain drove a wedge of territory into the hostile ring which surrounded them.

Summary of Years 510-449.—The events of the next half-century divide themselves naturally into two parts, the efforts of the Latin race to hold its own against its neighbours, and the party struggles in Rome, which paralyzed her efforts and weakened the Latin league, of which she was the natural head.

The last must be described first, for until union had

been, to some extent, secured at home, real advance on the part of the Romans abroad was impossible.[1]

Position of the Plebeians.—For the moment the expulsion of the kings had united all parties in the state, but the plebeians soon found that their position had changed for the worse, and that it was easier to bear the rule of one man than of a class. They might seem to have gained by the fact that their votes in the *Comitia Centuriata* were given for the election of the consuls; but, in practice, they could be, and always were, outvoted by the wealthier centuries. Nor was the whole mass of the less privileged citizens united. Many of them were, in one sense, still "clients" (cf. p. 15), *i.e.* they had direct relations with special patrician families, to whom they owed certain duties, and from whom, in turn, they received protection. The position of these may be compared to that of the mediæval vassals; they seem to have usually sided with their patrons against the mass of the unprivileged class.

Disadvantages of the Plebeians.—The inequality of the plebeians showed itself in three ways.

(1) **Political.** They were without some of the rights of citizens. Of the *publica jura*, they had the right of voting; *i.e.* the *jus suffragii*, but not the right of holding office, the *jus honorum*. Of the *privata jura*, they had the right of contract (*jus commercii*), but not the *jus conubii*; a marriage contracted between a patrician and a plebeian was null and void in the eyes of patricians, and all children born of such a union were plebeians.

(2) **Religious.**—This inequality was confirmed by religious sanctions: the plebeians could not hold office, because they were excluded from the old religion of the State, and could not take the auspices, which consecrated every official act of a Roman magistrate.

(3) **Economic.**—Though some of the plebeians were rich, the majority of them were comparatively poor. Hence, in the hard struggle through which the Roman Republic passed in the first century of its history, many of them were compelled to borrow from the patricians. By the Roman law,

[1] MACAULAY'S *Lays of Ancient Rome* have made the struggles against the restoration of the Tarquins familiar to all Englishmen.

a debtor who could not meet his obligations was assigned (*addictus*) to his creditor as his bondman (*nexus*), and might be thrown into chains, or even put to death.

And this last evil was increased by the Roman land system. The domains which the State had acquired by conquest formed the *ager publicus*, and were the property of the citizens. If they were uncultivated, Roman citizens were allowed to "occupy" them on payment of a small rent. If cultivated, they were let on lease, while the pasture land was allowed to be used on payment to the State of a herd-tax (*scriptura*). All these methods of making profit from the land of the State were reserved by the patrician government for its own members, and it refused to listen to the demands of the plebeians, who formed the mass of the soldiers, that some, at any rate, of the territory which their swords had won should be distributed (*assignatus*) among them in small lots as their absolute property, and cease to be "public." Hence the inequality of rich and poor was still further aggravated.

It was the personal wrongs of the plebeians rather than their political inequality which brought their discontent to a head. As in Athens under Solon, the pressure of actual want forced the lower orders to combine for their rights. It is possible that the social troubles, both in Greece and in Rome, may be due to the same cause; *i.e.* the introduction of a money standard into the state, and the consequent unsettlement of all relations based on the old system of barter.

Lex Valeria de Provocatione. (509.)—In the very first year of the Republic, the plebeians gained a material guarantee for their personal rights by the law of Valerius Poplicola, the consul, which enacted that in criminal trials, where the life or the rights (*caput*) of a citizen were at stake, there should always be an appeal from the sentence of the magistrate to the whole assembly. This law was the Habeas Corpus Act of Rome; it secured the people from the arbitrary judgment of patrician magistrates, but the very fact that it was re-enacted more than once[1] shows how much it was evaded.

[1] *e.g.* in 449 and in 300.

The First Secession.—It was fifteen years before the people gained a further step. The circumstances that led to this advance were as follows; after the Latin war the pressure of debt had become excessive, and the plebeians saw with indignation their friends, who had often served the State bravely in the legions, thrown into chains and reduced to slavery at the demand of patrician creditors. War was raging against the Volscians, but the legionaries, on their victorious return, refused any longer to obey the consuls, and marched, though without disorder, to the Sacred Mount beyond the Anio. There they prepared to found a new city, since the rights of citizens were denied to them in the old one. The patricians were compelled to give way, and the plebeians, returning to Rome from the "First Secession," received the privilege of having officers of their own, tribunes and aediles.

The Tribunes of the People.—The tribunes were originally two in number. Their duty was to protect the people whom they represented, and to enforce their power of protection, they were invested with the right of veto (*intercessio*), by which they could stop the action of any magistrate. The veto of the tribunes may be described as the negation of the imperium of the consul. They also claimed the right of prosecuting before the plebeian assembly, those who had offended against the rights of their order (*e.g.* Coriolanus, p. 34); but it may be doubted whether this claim was recognised as legal by the patricians. In order that they might be always at hand to aid, they were not allowed to leave the city for more than a day, and their persons were made sacred and inviolable (*sacro-sanctus*) by a *lex sacrata*, which was solemnly sworn to by the entire people, and which declared "accursed" (*sacer*) any one who violated it. The offender was put outside the law, and his property consecrated to the gods.[1] There is much uncertainty as to the way in which the tribunes were at first elected. Probably they were chosen by the plebeian members of the *Comitia Curiata* (*i.e.* by the *concilia plebeia curiata*) voting in their

[1] Another explanation is given of the "sanctity" of the tribunes; *i.e.* that they were the ambassadors of the plebeians, and so sacred. This is ingenious, but it lacks authority.

curies, but without auspices, which were the mark of a patrician magistrate or assembly.

The two aediles had without doubt the charge of temples and public places, especially those that were used by the meetings of the people (*concilia plebis*), which had been organized in the struggle for liberty, and in which the new officers presided from the first, though the State did not at present recognize them.

The Agrarian Law of Sp. Cassius (486).—The next advance on the part of the people was made under a patrician leader. The consul, Sp. Cassius, who had in 493 renewed the league with the Latins, and who in 486 had brought the Hernicans into it, carried in the latter year an Agrarian Law, which gave the Plebs some share in the public land. It was, however, never put into effect; for in the very next year, Sp. Cassius was accused of aiming at royal power, and condemned to death. The charge may very likely have been well-grounded; success abroad and the leadership of the people at home were the foundations of most of the Greek tyrannies, and what we know of Cassius bears a strong resemblance to the career of the Athenian Pisistratus.

The Publilian Law.—Oppression on the part of the patricians had been only checked, and soon once more became unbearable. The anger of the people showed itself in the law carried by the tribune Publilius Volero (in 471) which enacted that the plebeians should choose their officers, voting by tribes, not by curies. Thus the power of the landless clients of the patricians was removed, and the vote confined to plebeian freeholders. Their resolutions (*plebiscita*) passed in their assembly were as yet only binding on themselves, but were soon to be recognised as laws (p. 26); the plebeians are henceforth a recognised order in the state.

The Plebeians' demand for a Code of Laws.—The tribunes at once began to use the position thus gained to secure further concessions. In 462, C. Terentilius Harsa proposed to limit the powers of the magistrates by reducing to writing all the laws of the state; hitherto justice had been administered according to traditional rules, the knowledge of which lay only in the breast of the magistrate, who enjoyed the same powers as the Homeric king; henceforth penalties were to be

fixed and not arbitrary. This change was vigorously opposed for eight years, and then as a compromise, a commission of three was sent to Greece, to inquire into the laws of the states there. In 451, a commission of ten (*decemviri*) was appointed to draw up a code, and during their term of office no other magistrates, patrician or plebeian, were to be elected; ten tables of law were published by them amid general approval, and in the next year two more tables were added by a second body of decemvirs.

The Twelve Tables.—The whole body of the "Twelve Tables" formed the basis of Roman law, and its importance cannot be overrated. On the one hand the tables were the foundation of Roman jurisprudence, and it was in developing and interpreting them that the Roman lawyers invented those methods, which have been the models of the whole world; on the other hand the publication of law at this time prevented it from acquiring any of those irrational developments,[1] such as are found in more elaborate codes obtained by other countries at later stages of their history (*e.g.* the laws of Manu in India). Thus the Roman people were set free for a natural development.

The Attempt of Appius Claudius at Tyranny.—But for the moment the second set of decemvirs seem to have aimed at making themselves a perpetual oligarchy;[2] led by Appius Claudius, they refused to resign at the end of 450, taking advantage of the fact that in these two years no other officers had been appointed, in order to leave the law-givers a free hand. The people, however, were roused to fury by the murder of Siccius Dentatus, and by an attempted outrage on Virginia (who was claimed as a slave by a client of Appius, and only saved by her father killing her). They once more seceded to the Sacred Mount, and by this step compelled the decemvirs to resign; Appius Claudius was impeached and committed suicide in prison. Much more important

[1] Cf. MAINE'S *Ancient Law*, pp. 18-20, where he points out that by false analogy, a usage that is reasonable and necessary generates usage which is unreasonable, *e.g.* in a caste system.

[2] I have adopted the traditional view of the second decemvirate; others see in their acts a premature attempt to secure rights for the plebeians by unconstitutional means, and think the stories of murder and outrage are inventions of patrician historians.

than the personal incidents was the charter of liberties which the consuls who were elected, L. Valerius and M. Horatius, succeeded in carrying: by these Valerio-Horatian laws it was enacted:

The Valerio-Horatian Laws (449).—(1) That henceforth no magistrate should be appointed, whose sentences were not subject to appeal to the people; this re-enacted and confirmed the Valerian law of 509. The importance of this, like that of the Great Charter in England, may be gathered from its frequent renewals.

(2) That the people should have their tribunes as before, and that whoever injured these officers, should be subject to a curse; this, too, re-enacted the old law.

(3) That the resolutions of the plebeians should have the force of laws (*ut quod tributim plebs jussisset, populum teneret*), *i.e.* of course if they received the *patrum auctoritas*.[1]

In this way the plebeian assembly was put on a level, as a legislative body, with the comitia centuriata; the people now had a recognised right to interfere in the affairs of the whole state.[2]

[1] It is a much disputed question who these *patres* are in Republican times. Two theories may be mentioned: (1) that of Mommsen, which is largely adopted, that the "patres" were the patrician members of the Senate; their *auctoritas*, or power of ratification, was necessary for all state acts, whether of legislation or of election; it gradually, however, became a mere form, as the number of patricians in the Senate decreased. It is to be carefully distinguished from the power claimed by the whole Senate, alike of patrician and of plebeian members, to be consulted beforehand on all measures of state. The first-mentioned power was original, and was one of ratification; the second was gradually acquired, and was one of preliminary sanction. (2) It is simpler, with many other scholars, to identify the "patres" and the Senate, and to suppose that this right of preliminary sanction claimed by the Senate in all periods of the Republic grew out of their old *auctoritas*, or power of ratification.

It may be noted here that Mommsen supposes that in the period before the Valerio-Horatian laws, perhaps in the year 471, there had been created a new assembly, the *comitia populi tributa*, *i.e.* a meeting of all the people assembled in their tribes, as opposed to the *concilium plebis*, which contained plebeians only. This comitia could be summoned by the patrician magistrates, *i.e.* by consuls and praetors.

[2] The old Roman records perished when Rome was captured by the Gauls (390 B.C.), and it must be admitted that all details are uncertain before this date. But the ultra-scepticism of Pais and others, who deny the genuineness even of the Twelve Tables, has not been generally accepted.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE ORDERS (449-367)

Advances of the Plebeians. 1. **Lex Canuleia, 445.**—The success of the plebeians during the previous half century had been so rapid and decisive, that it might have seemed as if the struggle would soon be over. As a matter of fact, it lasted for nearly another century, for, after a period of rapid advance (449–445), nothing further was done for almost two generations. No doubt the cause of this was the life and death struggle with Veii. (*Cf.* p. 37.)

The first disability which the people removed by their new right of legislation was the social one, by which they were refused "conubium." This privilege was conceded to them by the law of the tribune, C. Canuleius, and the most vexatious obstacle to harmony between the orders was thus removed. (445.)

2. **The Military Tribunate.**—In the same year what appeared to be a great advance was made by the law which enacted that in future "military tribunes with consular power" might be elected in place of consuls, and that these might be either patricians or plebeians. But this apparently great concession was rendered fruitless in three ways: firstly, it rested with the senate to decide whether consuls or military tribunes should be elected, and the patricians continually succeeded in having the former and not the latter, *e.g.* in the very first year (444) the election of the military tribunes was declared irregular, and consuls were put in their place; secondly, even when military tribunes were elected, no plebeian was successful till the year 400; thirdly, a large part of the powers of the consulship was transferred to a new office, the censorship, the two holders of which must be patricians.

The Censorship.—Originally the duties of this new office

were to take the *census* of the citizens, and to assign to each his proper rating and his place in the state according to his property; but its powers were gradually extended to a supervision over the lives and morals of all, and to a general control of the lands and properties of the state. After 439, no censors held office for more than eighteen months, though they were still elected only once in five years (a *lustrum*).

Sp. Maelius.—The struggle for political privilege was now again embittered by actual want. In 440 there was a serious famine, and Sp. Maelius, a wealthy plebeian, came to the relief of the starving citizens. Whether he had political designs in this it is impossible to say; at any rate, the patricians accused him of high treason, and a dictator was appointed. Sp. Maelius seemed unwilling to submit to his jurisdiction, and was at once struck down by the master of the horse, Servilius Ahala. Though Ahala was afterwards banished, his deed is continually praised by Cicero and other Roman writers as a deliverance of the state from a tyrant. This charge of aiming at a despotism, as in the case of Sp. Cassius, and of M. Manlius later, is by no means improbable.

Steady Progress of the Plebeians.—After this, civil strife suddenly seems to have ceased, but the plebeians continued to make some progress. In 421, the number of quaestors, the financial administrators of the state, was doubled, and it was enacted that they might be plebeians; in 409, plebeians were actually elected to the office; this was especially important, as it was usual for ex-quaestors to obtain a seat in the Senate, where accordingly we first find a plebeian in 400; in the same year a plebeian was elected military tribune. The increased power of the plebeians was seen in the banishment of the patrician leader, Camillus, the conqueror of Veii (391), who went into exile on a charge of having embezzled part of the booty from that city. But Camillus' recall was soon brought about by the terrible disaster of the capture of Rome by the Gauls (p. 40), which happened in the next year, an which postponed the ultimate plebeian victory for nearly another generation.

Rome after the Capture by the Gauls.—This overthrow of Rome seemed for the moment to have undone all the progress which the people had made; they returned to find

their city burned and their land laid waste. A wild proposal was made, which, if carried out, would have altered the whole course of Roman history, for some of the tribunes suggested that the state should be removed to Veii, where a city ready to their hand was standing, and where a new start could be made. The effect of this removal would have been to make much easier the fusion of the orders, for the privileges of the patricians could not have been so firmly rooted in a new city; but it would have destroyed all the traditions of Rome, both religious and political, and especially the connection with the Latin race, on which, as a firm foundation, Roman greatness was being built up. It is creditable to the patriotism and good sense of the plebeians that they allowed themselves to be dissuaded from the change by the arguments of Camillus; the old city was rebuilt, though in a very hurried manner, and the life of Rome remained unbroken.

M. Manlius.—But this course, though far wiser in the end, produced for the moment great suffering; the losses caused by the sack of Rome fell especially on the poorer classes, and the plebeians were compelled to incur heavy debts in replacing their houses and farmsteads. The old severe laws as to debt were once more enforced, and discontent became general; it found a representative in M. Manlius, who had saved the Capitol from the Gauls, and who now came forward with his fortune and his eloquence to save the poorer citizens from their creditors. Unfortunately his zeal for the people was not above suspicion of self-seeking; he was accused of wishing to make himself a tyrant, and in the end he was condemned for treason, and hurled from the Tarpeian Rock. He is the last and the most formidable instance in early Rome of the would-be tyrant, who wished to rise by championing the people.

The Reform Proposals of Licinius and Sextius.—Foreign war postponed the inevitable conflict for a few years more; but in 376 the two tribunes, C. Licinius Stolo and Lucius Sextius, proposed a wide-reaching scheme of reform in the famous Licinian Rogations. Their object was twofold, (1) to remedy the existing distress, and (2) to place patricians and plebeians on a footing of equality.

To secure these ends, they proposed:

(1) That no Roman citizen should "occupy" more than 500 jugera[1] of the Ager Publicus.

(2) That all interest which had been paid should be deducted from the original debt, and the balance remaining should be paid in three yearly instalments.

(3) That in future consuls, and not military tribunes, should be elected, and that one of the consuls *must* be a plebeian.

The first proposal was intended to secure for the plebeians a fair share in the Ager Publicus, which their own swords had won. The second seems, to modern eyes, to be very revolutionary in character, and to strike at the root of all credit; but it must be remembered that among the Romans, as among the Greeks and the Jews, any payment of interest was looked upon as of very doubtful justice. The proposals of the Roman tribunes were much less sweeping than the Solonian "Seisachtheia," which had remedied, more than a century before, the economic troubles of Attica. The third proposal was intended to put the plebeians fully on a level with the patricians, by securing for them an undisputed share in the headship of the state.

Triumph of the Plebeians.—For ten years the struggle as to these proposals went on. The patricians tried to baffle the reformers by inducing some of their colleagues in the tribunate to veto the rogations, and by offering to make concessions as to the Ager Publicus and as to debts, if the constitutional change were dropped; but the plebeian leaders refused to allow the people to purchase material advantages by surrendering that recognition of their rights by which alone their position in the future could be secured. They even went a step further, and proposed a fourth rogation, transferring the custody of the "sacred books"[2] to a board of ten, of whom half *must* be plebeians. In this way the patrician control of the state religion was attacked.

As the patricians refused to give way, Licinius and Sextius vetoed the appointment of all curule magistrates, and the state was left without any government but that of the Senate

[1] A *jugerum* was about two-thirds of an English acre.

[2] These books had been bought—according to the legend—by Tarquinius Priscus of the Sibyl: they were consulted in times of great danger.

and the quaestors. Fortunately there was peace abroad, and so no harm ensued from this paralysis of business. Finally, the patricians had recourse to the appointment of a dictator, and Camillus was called upon to save the privileges of his order, as he had before saved the state; but he soon saw that concessions were necessary; the rogations were allowed to pass, and L. Sextius was elected the first plebeian consul. But the patrician majority of the Senate refused to ratify this election with its auctoritas (p. 26), and the struggle seemed as if it were about to begin all over again. Through the influence of Camillus, a compromise was adopted, and the judicial functions of the consuls were transferred to a new patrician magistrate, the praetor, while at the same time two patrician aediles were appointed to share the duty of the already existing plebeian aediles.

Union of the Orders.—Camillus then laid down his office, and dedicated a temple to Concord. By his judicious compromise he had secured Roman unity at home, as, by his victories, he had saved the state from enemies abroad.[1] Henceforth the two orders felt themselves one people. The few remaining privileges of the patricians were surrendered one by one, as will be mentioned below, with but little struggle, and Rome found herself able to devote her whole energies to the conquest of Italy, and the fight for the empire of the world.

Constitutional Character of the Struggle at Rome.—It was a good omen for Roman greatness that the long struggle of 150 years had been waged in so constitutional a manner. The plebeians had fought for an equal place in the eyes of the law, and they had fought according to law. No tumultuous risings of the mob, no assassinations of prominent opponents, disgrace their efforts for liberty; and the patricians had shown again and again that they possessed that quality which is essential to all classes that are to govern successfully, the wisdom to give way when further resistance has become useless.

Roman constitutional history during all this period shows

[1] The conduct of the Duke of Wellington in 1832 offers a remarkable parallel; the conqueror of Napoleon and the leader of the English aristocracy induced the House of Lords to accept the great Reform Bill, when he saw further resistance was useless.

no massacres like those at Corcyra during the Peloponnesian War, or those which disgrace the French Revolution. The constitutional struggle was waged with constitutional weapons.

Further Advances of the Plebeians. The Publilian Laws. (339.)—The remaining stages in the plebeian advance may be very briefly stated. L. Sextius was the first plebeian consul in 366. Ten years later C. Marcius Rutilus was the first plebeian dictator, and the same man became censor in 351. Finally, in 339, the laws of the dictator, Q. Publilius Philo, enacted:

(1) That one of the censors *must* be a plebeian.

(2) That the plebiscita should bind all citizens; this was a re-enactment of the Lex Valeria Horatia of 449.

(3) That the patrum auctoritas should no longer be needed for the ratification of laws passed by the people in any of their assemblies, but should be given beforehand. It soon became a mere form.

In 336 the first plebeian praetor was elected, and in 300 the Lex Ogulnia gave the plebeians a full share in the religion of the State by securing for them five places in the College of the Augurs, and four in that of the Pontiffs.

The Economic Difficulty.—The social difficulties of the State were less easy to remove than the political. The wealthy plebeians, as soon as they had secured their constitutional position, began to desert their poorer brethren, and the reformer Licinius himself was punished for a breach of his own law as to the public land. Hence, during the next half century of Roman history, complaints as to the pressure of debt are very frequent; but Rome solved this difficulty, for the time at least, by her policy of conquest. Her advance in Italy continually increased the Ager Publicus, so that it sufficed at once for "assignment" to the poor and for "occupation" by the rich; and the Roman empire required, to secure the conquered districts, ever fresh colonies, in which the poor plebeians found a new home and means of subsistence, in return for holding these posts as the garrisons of the mother city. In the following chapters will be sketched the foreign relations of Rome during the period of the struggle of the Orders, and the rapid growth of her power when she had become a united city.

ITALY (MIDDLE)
ROME'S STRUGGLES AGAINST THE AEQUI AND VOLSCI.
ETRURIA
SABINI
VESTINI
MARRUCINI
FRENTANI
Tarquinii
Falerii
Nepete
Sutrium
Alba Fucens
Veii
Fidenæ
AEQUI
PAELIGNI
ROMA
Tibur
Gabii
Præneste
Tusculum
MARSI
HERNICI
LATINI
Ostia
Ardea
Velitræ
Ferentinum
Norba
VOLSCI
Satricum
Setia
Privernum
Antium
AURUNCI
SAMNIUM
CAMPANIA

CHAPTER V.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF ROME DOWN TO HER CAPTURE BY THE GAULS (390)

Rome the Head of Latium.—The key to the foreign policy of Rome during the whole of the first century and a half of the Republican period is found in her position as head of the plain of Latium against the hill tribes which surrounded it on the east and south, and against the Etruscan aliens on the north. This position was recognised, as has been said, in the league concluded by Spurius Cassius in 493. Its importance is well shown by the fact that, to the very end of the Republican Period, the religious festival by which the league was consecrated (*Latinae Feriae*) was the first duty of the consuls on entering upon their year of office. This league was really due to the pressure of a common danger.

The Volsci and the Aequians.—It is impossible to describe in any detail Rome's wars of the fifth century B.C., but she certainly was continually at war. Her struggle with her hill neighbours, the Volsci and the Aequi, must be described first.

These people, though always coupled in Roman history, were different in character. The Volscians occupied the high ground to the south and south-east of Latium, but they were not mere mountaineers, and some of their towns were on the coast; *e.g.* Antium and Anxur. Hence they were more civilized than the Aequi, inclined to aim at conquest and not merely at plunder—in fact more formidable. The Aequi, on the other hand, were rough mountaineers, like their Sabine neighbours to the north, with whom they are often coupled; and the wars with them are more of the nature of border raids.

Rome Loses Ground against the Volsci (490–450).—At the beginning of the fifth century Rome's power seems to have been well established in the south of Latium. At any rate, Antium is mentioned in the early treaty with Carthage (509)[1] as dependent on Rome, and at the beginning of the fifth century, Rome was able to send colonies to Velitrae and to Norba (494–492), to guard the south-eastern approaches to Latium; but she was unable to retain this position, for during the first half of the fifth century she seems to have continually lost ground. In 463, the Volscian armies advanced to within three miles of Rome, and she quite failed to maintain the colonies which she had sent out in the previous generation. Perhaps it was in this long-continued struggle that many of the old cities in the southern part of the Campagna disappeared, and that the desolation began which went on increasing until the once fertile and thickly-populated region of the Pomptine marshes assumed its present form of a deserted and pestilential waste. The country could never have been healthy, owing to the lack of proper outlets for the surface water; but "malaria may, to a certain extent, be banished by thoroughness of tillage."

The Story of Coriolanus.—Only one incident in this half-century of warfare can be referred to—the story of Coriolanus.

According to the tradition embodied in Plutarch, which Shakspere has made the subject of one of his plays from Roman history, C. Marcius Coriolanus was a patrician who, in spite of his military services, was prosecuted by the tribunes and banished from Rome. He took refuge with his old enemies the Volscians, stirred them up to attack Rome, and in a single campaign swept the Romans out of South Latium, and advanced to within five miles of the city. Then filial feeling triumphed over his unpatriotic hatred. At the entreaty of his mother, Volumnia, he withdrew his army, and returned to Antium to die in exile. The story is full of difficulties, and is probably due to Roman

[1] The early date of this treaty has been disputed, but Polybius (iii. 22), who seems to copy it from an inscription, definitely assigns it to the first year of the Republic.

vanity, which was eager to attribute defeats and loss of territory to the bravery of a Roman deserter.

Encroachments of the Aequi in the East.—Nor was Rome more fortunate on her eastern frontier. The Aequi succeeded in occupying the town of Labicum, and so cutting the communications between Rome and the Hernici; and from their post on Mount Algidus, an eastern spur of the Alban range, they carried their raids far and wide over Roman and Latin territory. In 463 they are found united with the Volscians at the very gates of Rome. Here, too, Roman vanity gives us tradition instead of trustworthy fact. The story of Cincinnatus is well known. He was summoned from the plough to save the Roman army, blockaded on Mount Algidus (458), and by his vigour turned the tables on the Aequi, and compelled them to surrender. But this cannot be accepted as history. It is only in the next half-century (450–400) that the tide of success turns, and Roman dominion begins slowly but surely to expand. How weak Rome was during the first period can be inferred from the fact that, in 460, a Sabine, Appius Herdonius, actually seized for a time the Roman Capitol.

Rome Gains Ground after 450.—The causes of the change of fortune were probably twofold. In the first place, the Valeria-Horatian settlement of 449 had given some measure of unity to the Roman State, and so had restored vigour to its arms. In the second place, Rome now, as so often at other times, profited by her central position. The Sabellian tribes of the central mountain range were moving southward, and probably attracted some of the Sabine and Aequian warriors to join them in bolder enterprises elsewhere, and so to cease harrying Latium; while the capture of Capua (423) by the Samnites was only part of a movement which, by pressing on the rear of the Volscians in the valley of the Liris, distracted their attention from Rome.

It is true that in the year 446, we find the Aequi once more at the gates of Rome, but it is for the last time; in 418 they disappeared from Mount Algidus, and Rome recaptured Labicum; five years later she was able to restore to her allies, the Hernicans, their town of Ferentinum. So, too, on the southern frontier Rome began to advance; in 442, she planted

a Latin colony at Ardea, Velitrae seems to have been recovered about the end of the 5th century, and in 406, a bold advance, right through the Volscian territory, seized and plundered the wealthy coast-town of Anxur (or Tarracina).

Rome then at the end of the century had regained her position on the south and east; with her allies she held once more the plain of Latium, and had secured strong posts from which the hill country round could be reduced.

Wars with the Etruscans.—In her wars with the Aequians and the Volscians, Rome was at least fighting against peoples of Italian race, but the Etruscans beyond the Tiber, on her north frontier, were aliens; it is with them that Rome's most serious struggle was fought. As has been already said, the Etruscan power had been widely extended in the north and west of Italy, but in the fifth century it was beginning to decline, under the pressure of the advancing Gauls in the north and of the Greeks in the south; hence the bonds of the Etruscan confederacy were being loosed, and Rome as a rule had during this period to contend only with the cities of South Etruria, especially Veii. This city lay only about twelve miles from Rome, and was in size and magnificence fully equal to her rival; the Veientines also had a valuable ally in Fidenae, a Latin town which had received an Etruscan settlement, and which, lying only five miles from Rome on the left bank of the Tiber, provided Rome's Etruscan enemies with a post at her very gates.

Rome at first Unsuccessful.—The wars with these towns are like those with the Aequians and Volscians, impossible to follow in detail; Fidenae is said by Roman annalists to have been reduced no less than eight times; but in broad outline they correspond to the wars on the south and east.

In the first half century Rome hardly held her own. A war began about 483 and lasted intermittently for nine years, in which the most prominent event was the self-devotion of the Fabii. This great gens, according to the traditional story, took on itself the whole war against Veii; they occupied a strong post on the right bank of the Tiber, and for two years ravaged the territory of the enemy; but were then cut off in an ambush and perished to a man. The Veientines followed up their success by capturing Janiculum

(477), and actually threatening Rome, but three years later peace was concluded for 40 years. It can hardly be accidental that this year (474) was the year of the great victory won at Cumae by Hiero I. of Syracuse over the combined forces of Etruria and Carthage.

Rome's Successes against Veii.—This truce, strange to say, was observed unbroken almost to the end; it was only in 438 that hostilities broke out again. This war was embittered by the murder of some Roman ambassadors who had been sent to Fidenae, and so serious did the Romans deem the struggle against the two hostile cities, that they appointed a dictator; but the real honour of the campaign lay with his master of the horse, A. Cornelius Cossus, who slew the king of Veii, Lar Tolumnius, in single combat, and so rivalled Romulus in winning the "*spolia opima*."[1] Hostilities were renewed some ten years later, and this time Rome was decisively successful; Fidenae was taken and reduced so completely that she only once again appears as troubling Rome—in the year after the battle of the Allia (390). Veii received a respite by a truce for twenty years (426).

Final Struggle and Fall of Veii (406-396).—When this expired, the decisive struggle began; the siege of Veii is reported to have lasted ten years (which the precedent of Troy had fixed as the proper length for a respectable siege), and the story is embellished with all kinds of wonders; but the following facts stand out clearly.

(1) It was at this period certainly that the Roman soldiers first received pay; this was necessary, owing to the changed character of the fighting, for they were no longer serving a mere summer campaign, but were kept under arms through the winter also, in order to maintain the blockade continuously. Probably along with the introduction of payment, there went a change in the character of the drill; the genius of Camillus seems to have reformed the Roman army, and to have substituted for the old custom of fighting in close order with the pike (*hasta*), the essentially Roman feature of fighting in open

[1] The Spolia Opima were dedicated to Jupiter Feretrius by the leader of a Roman Army, who had slain the opposing leader with his own hand. The institution of the custom was attributed to Romulus, after he had killed Acron, king of Caenina.

order, while the front ranks were armed with the heavy javelin (the *pilum*).

(2) Again, it seems probable that Veii received some help in this final crisis from other cities of South Etruria, and even from Tarquinii.

(3) It may be accepted as a fact that the siege was finally decided by Roman engineering skill; according to tradition, Camillus entered Veii by a mine, which opened out near the temple of Juno in the citadel; there are many difficulties and improbabilities in the story, but it is closely linked in tradition with the great tunnel (*emissarium*)[1] which drains the Alban lake, and that tunnel still remains as evidence of the engineering skill of Rome at this period, and indirectly of the truth of the story as to Veii.

Rome Mistress of Southern Etruria.—The power of Etruria was broken by the capture of Veii; it is said that on the very day on which it was taken, the Gauls captured the great Etruscan town of Melpum in the north. At any rate Rome was never again in any real danger from Etruria, though for the moment she only secured her hold on the southern part of it; immediately after the fall of Veii, Falerii surrendered (394), won over, it was said, by the magnanimity of Camillus; the capture also of Sutrium in 390 gave Rome one of the keys to North Etruria.

Position of Rome at end of 5th century B.C.—The task of the fifth century was done, for Rome was mistress of all the plain country on both sides of the Tiber. Her influence had also spread into North Etruria, though her armies did not cross the Ciminian Forest (which divides South Etruria from North) till much later; in 391, she repulsed the attack of Volsinii, and in the next year her relations with Clusium brought her into collision with a new power, which for a moment seemed to overwhelm her in absolute destruction.

[1] Mommsen, however, says that the date of this tunnel is far earlier.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CAPTURE OF ROME BY THE GAULS, AND HER RECOVERY (390–376)

Rome and the Barbarians of the North.—The capture of Rome by the Gauls is an event which stands by itself. It may be said to anticipate the invasions of the northern barbarians, which, eight centuries later, were to change the face of Europe; but in the fifth century after Christ, Rome's strength was exhausted, she was politically a "mighty name," and nothing more; in the fourth century before Christ she was only just beginning to develop her strength, and her momentary fall was a mere accident, due to surprise. It left, however, an enduring impression on the Roman mind, and it was not till Caesar had conquered Gaul, more than three centuries later, that the Romans unlearned their panic fear of the northern barbarians. The Gauls had already, as has been said, established themselves in the northern parts of the peninsula, hence known for many centuries as Cisalpine Gaul, but they never succeeded in getting a firm hold south of the Apennines; the invasion of the Senones, before which Rome fell, and other later invasions, were mere isolated inroads. It is not the least of Rome's services to Europe that she brought this to pass; she checked the full tide of barbarism, and preserved the civilization of the classical world.

But for her organized resistance, Hellenic and Italian culture might have completely perished in the fourth century B.C., before Western Europe had become familiar with it. Rome guarded the culture of the old world, and spread it so widely, that, even in the darkest period of the Middle Ages, it still survived in part.

The Battle of the Allia, 390.—The attack of the Gauls on Rome is said to have been the result of an accident. Rome had sent ambassadors to warn the Gauls against attacking Clusium, for she was already assuming to herself the championship of Italy. These ambassadors so far forgot their duty as to fight against the Gauls; and the Roman people, instead of punishing their misconduct, elected them as military tribunes for the next year—390. Hence the Gauls diverted their attack from Clusium to Rome, and in the spring of 390 poured southwards down the left bank of the Tiber, where afterwards ran the Via Salaria. Rome had no conception of the greatness of the danger; her soldiers had never before encountered the rush of the northern barbarians, and, as the natural result of neglected precautions and inexperience, the Roman army, which was drawn up on the banks of the Allia, only eleven miles from Rome, was overwhelmed at the first onset of the enemy. It was the most disgraceful rout in Roman annals,[1] and its anniversary, July 18th, was always marked as a bad day in the Roman Calendar; the Roman army was scattered, and the city left quite without defence.

Successful Resistance of the Capitol.—Rome was never so great as when in despair. The people found refuge where they could, but the Capitol was occupied with a strong force, and the Senate took refuge there; the sacred emblems too were removed or buried; thus Roman government and Roman religion survived the capture of the city. This was occupied and burned by the Gauls, but their attacks made no impression on the citadel. Only once did they succeed in reaching the summit, and then the bravery of M. Manlius, who was awakened, it is said, by the cries of the sacred geese, saved the Capitol, and repulsed the Gauls with confusion and loss. Meanwhile their army was suffering severely from want of provisions, and disease; it was wasting away, as so many northern armies wasted away under the walls of Rome, during the long struggle of Popes and Emperors in mediaeval times. The Gauls finally withdrew with their booty, perhaps also carrying with them a heavy

[1] It can only be compared to the utter panic of the English regulars before the Highlanders in "the '45."

ransom for their departure, such as the Danes so often exacted from the English.

Rome had survived the shock, but she found herself without a city, with wasted territory, and with her power abroad apparently gone, compelled, as it seemed, to do all her work over again.

Roman Fictions as to the Defeat of the Gauls.—Such is the outline of the facts; but Roman tradition was not content with this; it was eager here, as everywhere, to vindicate the credit of Rome, and to glorify her great men. According to it, the Roman fugitives took refuge at Veii, and summoned the exiled Camillus to take the command, as the only man who could save the state. He, with true Roman respect for law, refused to act till the consent of the Senate to the reversal of his exile and his appointment as dictator had been obtained; then, gathering the Roman forces, he appeared in Rome just as the gold was being paid over to the Gauls. The Gallic leader, Brennus, had thrown his sword into the scale with words which have passed into a proverb, "*Vae victis.*" Camillus annulled the bargain, drove the Gauls in confusion out of Rome, and recovered the gold.

The real greatness of Rome is obscured by this melodramatic narrative of Livy, which cannot be accepted for a moment;[1] that she came successfully out of a storm which would have crushed a less healthy state, was due, not to surprise or accident, but to the wisdom of her government and the bravery of her citizens.

Rome attacked on every side.—For the moment, however, all the enemies of Rome thought the time had come when they might recover their losses, and free themselves from the influence of their humbled enemy. The Volscians and the Aequians invaded the Roman territory; the Etruscans recaptured Sutrium. What was most serious of all, some of Rome's own allies, the Latins, who had been so long faithful, were supporting her enemies against her, though no states had as yet openly revolted. Before describing how Rome

[1] It was patriotic indignation against the injustice to his Gallic ancestors which first induced the Frenchman, Beaufort, to inquire into the authenticity of the story, and so to found the scientific criticism of Roman history.

crushed these enemies, it is necessary to explain this change of attitude in Latium.

Changed Position of Latium.—The Latins had united in league with Rome on terms of equality; but things had altered very much during the century through which the alliance had existed. This was partly due to deliberate action on the part of Rome; the conquests of the Aequi and Volsci had been made at the expense of her allies, but when these were recovered, she claimed an equal share in them, as if they had been new acquisitions. And even apart from this, it is an invariable rule that, in an alliance between powers originally unequal, the inequality tends always to become more marked, however carefully the terms of the alliance are defined. This had been the experience of the allies in the Confederacy of Delos, where the position of Athens may be compared to that of Rome in the Latin League. The Latins now seem to have thought they might recover their independence; at any rate, their covert hostility soon passed into open war.

Rome Crushes the Volsci and the Aequi.—Rome was surrounded by a ring of foes, but she had in Camillus a great commander. Availing himself of his central position, he struck first south, at the Volsci and Aequi, and then north, recovering Sutrium. So decisive was the blow inflicted on the former, that Livy says the Volsci were "at length subdued" after seventy years of warfare; and, to make themselves still more secure, the Roman commanders, in 388, laid waste the territory of the Aequi so thoroughly that there is no mention of their rising again till 304. We are irresistibly reminded of William the Conqueror, and his breaking the spirit of English rebellion by his "harrying of the north."

Defeat of the Etruscans.—The struggle was renewed on the north frontier in 386, and the Etruscans were once more beaten. The firmness of the Roman hold is shown by the planting of two Latin colonies—at Sutrium in 383, and at Nepete in 373. These were sufficient to secure peace on the northern frontier for a generation, since the vigour of the Etruscan race was rapidly decaying. Rome was able, as early as 387, to secure her authority on the north of the

Tiber by adding four more tribes to her previous twenty-one; these occupied the former territory of Veii. As no new tribe had been added since 495, this advance is very significant.

Rome's Wars with the Latin Towns.—On the south, however, the vigorous Latin and Oscan cities required far more effort to win, just as, when finally they were won, they contributed far more than did Etruria to the strength of Rome. Antium, on the coast, had suffered but little from the Gallic inroad, and from 386 to 374 she was more or less constantly at war with Rome, as the head of the relics of Volscian independence, and as the ally of various Latin towns. Velitrae and Circeii, Latin colonies, revolted in 385; and in 382, Praeneste, one of the old Latin towns which had several others dependent on her, joined Antium against Rome. In the next year, the allegiance of the important town of Tusculum wavered for a moment; but the pro-Roman party there prevailed, the Tusculans sued for pardon, and received not only this, but, shortly after, the Roman civitas.[1] Tusculum becomes the first Roman "*municipium*."[2]

Rome's Policy of Expansion.—The importance of this cannot be over-estimated. It was the first step in that policy of expansion which was to make Roman, first the region round Rome itself, then all Italy, and then the whole Western world. It was because Rome could absorb in this way that, as her wisest statesmen saw, she was able to conquer and to hold the world. The revolted states were reduced, and Antium was compelled to sue for peace. The security of the Roman hold on this quarter is shown in the distribution among the plebeians of the Pomptine Land (383), won from the Volscians, and in the planting of a Latin colony at Setia in a strong position (382).

It was not till twenty years later (358) that Rome felt

[1] Mommsen thinks only the *civitas sine suffragio*, but the evidence is in favour of the view that the full citizenship was given.

[2] See p. 82. I have accepted the view that even in this period some municipia had the full Roman civitas. Others maintain that the term municipium is restricted, before the Lex Julia of 90, to communities that had only the *civitas sine suffragio*.

herself secure enough to enrol two more new tribes in what had been the Volscian territory; but the Roman god Terminus never stepped back, and so he was compelled to advance slowly in order to be sure. In the same year the alliance with the Latins and the Hernicans was once more renewed.

Renewal of the League with Latium.—Rome, however, did more than re-establish the old Latin League. No doubt her position of superiority was now formally recognized, and at the same time she probably closed the doors of the League against new members. It henceforth included two classes of towns:

(1) Thirty cities with the full Jus Latinum.

(2) Seventeen more, which had no right of voting as to the affairs of the League, though they shared in the Latin festival.

Rapid Recovery of Rome from the Gallic Inroad.—It is, at first sight, surprising how little Rome suffered from the Gallic invasion. For the moment she seemed to have lost all that she had won by the struggles of a century, yet she recovered it, and gained more, in one decade. The explanation probably lies in two facts; the first is that the other states of Central Italy were as much weakened by the Gallic inroad as Rome herself; the second is that their terror of the Gauls made the Italians more willing to unite for common protection, and union with Rome was the most obvious way of obtaining this. The fact that Rome was, in this century, a centre of Italian resistance against the Gauls, and in the next against the Carthaginians also, was certainly one of the bases of her power, even if this motive was not yet powerful in the period immediately after her capture.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FINAL REDUCTION OF THE PLAIN COUNTRY

Rome's Struggles with Old Enemies.—Rome had, fortunately for herself, a respite of comparative peace while the dispute as to the Licinian rogations was going on; but she had still to pass through several hard struggles with old enemies before she entered on her prolonged contest with a new foe in the Samnites, the most formidable opponent she ever encountered in Italy.

(1) **The Gauls.**—The Gauls were, for a long period, not content with their possessions in Northern Italy. Six times, between 367 and 349, they advanced into the neighbourhood of Rome, though always to be repulsed with loss. These inroads are probable enough in themselves, but their details are quite uncertain. Only the first, the second, and the last, need be mentioned.

The first (in 367) was defeated by the old Camillus, who was in command as dictator for the fifth time. Two years later he died. Only the outline of his life can be known with certainty, but he is the complete type of a Roman statesman—at home conservative, yet ready for compromise; in the field, as formidable by his careful organization as by his military genius; and, above all, firm in the presence of the gloomiest fortune. The second inroad (in 361) is famous for the single combat between T. Manlius and the Gaul, in which the Roman gained from the torques of his defeated foe the name of Torquatus. The last inroad (in 349) is marked by a similar combat, in which, also, the Roman champion Valerius gained his honourable name "Corvus" from the raven which settled on his helmet and

assisted him by flapping its wings in the face of his foe.[1] After these campaigns we hear hardly anything of the Gauls for fifty years.

(2) **The Etruscans.**—The renewal of the Latin League (in 358) has already been described. Two years later began Rome's last serious struggle with Southern Etruria, in which Tarquinii played the chief part. The war was marked by brutal ferocity in the massacre of prisoners on both sides, and ended (in 351) with a truce for forty years. But what is more important, is the treatment of Caere. This town had long been friendly to the Romans, and had sheltered their sacred emblems in 390; but now (353) the anti-Roman party among its citizens prevailed, and it assisted Tarquinii. It was reduced, and compelled to accept the Roman civitas, but without the public rights. It thus becomes the first instance of an unprivileged municipium,[2] as Tusculum is of one with full privileges. Rome's power in Italy was based on her nicely graduated system of concessions to her subjects and allies.

Before this, however, could be thoroughly established over the level country of Latium, Rome had to enter on her first war with the hill tribes proper (the first Samnite War, 343–1), and to suppress a revolt of her oldest allies, the Latins. Her victory in this last war forms the natural climax of her development during the preceding century and a half, while the interest of the first Samnite War is that it is the beginning of half a century of a new kind of struggle.

Internal Troubles at Rome.—It must, however, be noticed that Rome was still troubled by internal discord. All the patricians were not as wise as Camillus, and the Licinian law, that one of the consuls must be a plebeian, was, during the first twenty years, six times violated by the appointment of two patricians.

Still more important were the economic troubles. The wealthy citizens refused to observe the limits set on their "possession" of the Ager Publicus, and Licinius Stolo himself was punished for non-observance of his own law. A

[1] Of course, these stories are highly doubtful.

[2] Others, *e.g.* Gellius, call it the first municipium. (*Cf.* note on p. 82.)

series of enactments was passed, endeavouring to remedy the prevailing distress by legislation; in 357, the rate of interest was fixed at an uncia per as (*unciarium faenus*) *i.e.* at one twelfth; in 347, legal interest was reduced by one-half, and in 342, the Lex Genucia forbade it altogether. Of course this prohibition was useless, but it is interesting to see that the practical Romans had the same dislike of interest, as being "unnatural," as Greek philosophers, Jewish law-givers, and the Christians of the Middle Ages.

Mutiny at Capua.—In 342, during the first Samnite War, the trouble became serious; the Roman army at Capua mutinied, and part of it marched on Rome. The grievances seem to have been largely military, for to appease the discontent, it was enacted.

(1) That no Roman soldier should be dismissed without his consent.

(2) That no one, who had been a military tribune, should be reduced to the rank of a centurion.

It was also demanded that the pay of the cavalry, which was three times that of the infantry, should be reduced, but this demand was not conceded.

A man's position and pay in the army settled the amount of booty which he was to receive, and the settlement arrived at points to the method by which Rome escaped her economic difficulties, *i.e.* discontent at home was appeased by conquest and booty abroad.

At the same time, the exclusiveness of the patricians was checked by re-enacting the Licinian Law as to the consuls, and by further enacting that no one might hold the same magistracy again until after an interval of ten years.

Latin Demand for Equality.—The citizens of Rome were once more united, but her Latin allies naturally wished that they too might share her conquests; the recent submission of Campania (343) showed how important these were likely to be. Accordingly the two praetors of the Latin League came to Rome (341) with a demand either for complete equality or for complete independence; Rome's motto now, as always, was "*Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos*," and the demand was rejected.

The result was immediate war, a war in which Rome had against her all her old allies; fortunately her recent enemies, the Samnites, were quiet, probably because the Latins lay between them and Rome, and they knew and hated them with the bitterness which marks the relations of all neighbour states, especially in ancient times.

The Latin War.—The war was short and sharp; two great battles and a series of sieges ended it in two years; the battles were at Veseris, near Mount Vesuvius, and at Trifanum.

The former is famous for two stories, which, whether true or not, illustrate the spirit to which the Romans owed their victories. Before the battle, the consul, T. Manlius Torquatus, forbade all single combats; in a civil war, such as this really was, all intercourse with the enemy was dangerous. His son, no doubt eager to imitate his father's glories (p. 46), met and defeated a Latin champion, and paid the penalty of his disobedience with his life. In the actual battle, the plebeian consul, P. Decius Mus, turned the tide of success by solemnly devoting himself and the army of the enemy to the infernal gods, and then sealing the bargain by rushing on death. Discipline and self-sacrifice are the keynotes of the Roman system; the individual was nothing, the state was all in all.

Organization of Conquered Latium.—After the Roman victories, the Latin towns had to be reduced singly, and among them Pedum offered the longest resistance; but by 338 Latium was at Rome's feet. She settled her relations with it on those principles which governed her whole policy:

(1) A certain number of states received full Roman privileges;[1] four towns were put on the same footing as Tusculum, and became Roman municipia.

(2) The bulk of the states were compelled to accept the "Caerite franchise," *i.e.* they were not inscribed in any Roman tribe, and they had the duties of Roman citizens, without the rights of voting and of office; but the enjoyment of the private rights of intermarriage and of commerce was sure to draw them ever closer to Rome. The Roman law was

[1] Here again, as in the case of Tusculum (p. 43), it is disputed whether they received the full or only the partial civitas.

administered in these states by *praefecti*, representing the praetor.

(3) But in other respects these states retained their local self-government; and the more formidable cities, like Tibur and the impregnable Praeneste, were free from all Roman interference and remained allies as before. Neither now, nor at any subsequent period, did Rome imitate the folly of Athens, and embitter her conquered countrymen by demand of tribute.

(4) Rome's great principle, "*Divide et Impera*," was applied everywhere. The Latin League ceased to exist, except as a religious body; and the states were debarred from all intercourse, civil as well as political, with each other; no Latin could trade except with Rome. All Latium was thus centered in the sovereign city.

(5) The posts of danger were occupied by colonies; Antium (338) and Anxur (329) on the coast received Roman settlers, while Cales (334) and Fregellae (328) were founded as Latin colonies (cp. p. 83), to guard the upper waters of the Liris and the approaches to Samnium.

(6) Finally the Roman territory was once more extended by the incorporation of two new tribes in 332.

It must also be remembered that at this time the inhabitants of all these Latin towns had the right of becoming Roman citizens at will; any enterprising Latin who chose to migrate to Rome, was enrolled in a Roman tribe at the next census.

Principles of Roman Government in Italy.—Graduated privileges, local independence, close relations with herself, and mutual isolation, these were the main features of the system of government which bound Rome's allies to her in an alliance which grew so strong that no disasters could shake it. The same principles were applied to Campania, where Capua and other communities received the private rights of Roman citizenship; in this district we see another principle of Rome's policy, *i.e.* she everywhere conciliated the governing classes by grants of special privileges.

While Athens therefore had deadly enemies in the upper classes everywhere throughout her empire, Rome found in them her sure supporters; she knew that where "the few"

were secured, "the many" were less likely to revolt and less formidable.

All these arrangements took time to carry out, and were not completed till ten years after the Latin war was over; the last struggle for Latin freedom was the revolt of Privernum (330), which was soon suppressed. Rome was now undisputed mistress of the plain country and prepared for her hard struggle with the warlike mountaineers of Central Italy.

The part played by the colonies in the development of Roman power is so important that it is necessary to give some details as to the two main kinds.

The *coloniae civium Romanorum* were comparatively small, and were, as their name implies, composed of citizens only; originally only 300 heads of families were sent, but the number was afterwards much increased. These colonies were at first planted in towns already existing, of which the colonists formed a sort of garrison; they kept their rights as Roman citizens, and were governed from Rome. In fact, they may be compared to the Athenian κληρουχοι. The colonies on the sea coast were usually of this kind.

The *Latinae coloniae* were larger; sometimes as many as 6000 colonists were sent. These were either non-Romans, or poor citizens who were content to surrender their political rights for the material advantages of a land allotment in the colony.

The Roman constitution fully recognised the importance of the colonies: they could only be planted as the result of a formal law, and the settlement (*deductio*) of the colonists was a solemn military function.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRST (343-1) *AND SECOND SAMNITE WARS* (327-304)

Rome's Conflict with the Sabellian Tribes.—Rome's wars had been hitherto waged either against the Etruscans, who were entirely alien, or against peoples closely kindred to herself, Sabines, Volsci, and Aequi. The Samnites occupied a middle position between these two kinds of enemies; they were Italians, but belonged to the Sabellian,[1] and not the Latin family. While Rome had been consolidating herself, they had been pressing southward, especially on the cities in Campania; of these, Capua fell in 423, and all the towns in the district, except Neapolis and Palaepolis, shared the same fate. But the Samnite settlers in the plains lost their old national characteristics, and intermarried with their subjects; hence the Campanians became practically a distinct people. Other Sabellian races, the Lucanians and the Bruttians, had subdued the south of Italy, though they had not been able to dislodge the Greeks from the coast.

The Samnites.—The Samnites proper inhabited the great mountain block overhanging Campania, in which the Volturnus rises, and where the Apennines reach the height of 6000 feet. They were warlike mountaineers, and especially formidable in their own mountain valleys, but they were weak from their lack of organization. They were divided into four chief tribes, of which the Pentri in the north and the Caudini in the south were the most powerful, and, except for purposes of defence, they had little unity

[1] The Sabines, as their name implies, were Sabellian; but their territory was nearer to Rome than was that of the Samnites, and in the population of that city there was a Sabine element. (p. 10.)

In war they had common military chiefs, but in peace a senate, formed of the heads of the separate tribes, was their only government. In this lay their weakness against Rome. As soldiers, they were probably superior, and taught the Romans many valuable lessons, *e.g.* the characteristic weapon of the Roman legionaries, the heavy javelin (*pilum*) was borrowed from the Samnites; but in a prolonged struggle their lack of organization was fatal, for, while they could win victories, they never followed them up with energy. A further source of weakness to them was their position; they had enemies on every side, especially the Apulians and their own Lucanian kinsmen, who had suffered from the forays of the mountaineers, and who were ready to assist the Romans against them.

The First Samnite War (343-341).—The Samnites had first come into contact with the Romans in 354, when a treaty of friendship had been made; but in spite of this, the Senate, in 343, received the submission of the Campanians, who found themselves hard pressed by their Samnite neighbours. The first Samnite War followed, but of its details we know nothing. The Romans claimed to have won two great victories, of which that at Mt. Gaurus was the more important. Peace was concluded after two years, and the old alliance was renewed; but the Romans had gained this advantage, that their influence had now supplanted that of the Samnites in Campania.

The Samnites' Wars with the Greeks.—No doubt each side was the more eager for peace as other enemies were threatening. The Romans must have been aware of the disaffection in the Latin League, which broke out into open revolt the next year, while the Samnites were anxious to turn their attention to Greek enemies in their rear. In the year 338, Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, came to the help of the Tarentine League, and fell in battle against the Samnites. More successful was Alexander of Epirus, the uncle of Alexander the Great, who, in 332, crossed over from Greece to the assistance of his countrymen, the Tarentines. He gained several victories, and seems to have intended to found a Greek military kingdom in S. Italy, but assassination cut short his plans. He had proposed to form an alliance with

Rome, and in this lies his importance. In him first Rome came into contact with the Greeks of the mother country. It is significant that the Romans always used the name of "Greeks,"[1] and not that of "Hellenes," which the Greeks themselves used.

Causes of the Second Samnite War.—The struggle between Rome and Samnium was now to begin again in earnest. Once more its cause was difficulties in Campania. The Greek town of Palaepolis (a colony of the old Cumae) had injured the Romans, and, fearing punishment, had received a Samnite garrison. The Romans protested against the interference, while the Samnites replied by complaints as to the colony of Fregellae, which they said had been founded in their territory. No doubt both sides had grievances; each knew that war must come, and was preparing to meet it.

Institution of the Proconsulate (327).—The first campaign was against Palaepolis itself; it was compelled to surrender, but the siege lasted into the next year, and led (among the Romans) to a most important constitutional innovation. The consul, Q. Publilius Philo (who, as dictator, had carried the popular Publilian laws in 339), had his power (*imperium*) prolonged as *proconsul*. It was inevitable that, as Roman foreign affairs became more important, their magistrates should be longer in office, and more numerous.

Four Periods in Second Samnite War.—The surrender of Palaepolis was the beginning of the Samnite War proper. In this war fortune was most varying, and it is impossible to follow the course of events in detail, especially as the Roman annalists display their customary exaggeration, describing constant victories on their own side, which are often more than doubtful, and slurring over their defeats; but the war seems to divide itself into four chief periods:

(1) 326–321, in which the Romans barely hold their own, and are hard pressed.

(2) 321–314, in which the Samnites gain a decisive victory at first, and threaten the Roman influence in Campania.

(3) 314–306, in which the Romans regain their influence

[1] The Γραικοί were a people of Epirus.

in Campania; the war assumes a wider character, but the Romans everywhere prevail.

(4) 305–4, in which the Romans carry the war into Samnium, and finally compel their enemies to make peace.

First Period.—Rome, to begin with, had the advantage of alliance with the Lucanians and the Apulians; but she soon lost the help of the former people, while in 325, the rising of the Vestini, a tribe on the Adriatic coast, cut her off from communication with Apulia; however, a single campaign reduced the Vestini, and averted this danger. The Roman annalists assert that the war was now carried into Samnium, and they attribute great victories both to the dictator, L. Papirius Cursor, and to his master of the horse, Q. Fabius Maximus, who fought in disobedience to his superior's orders, and only escaped the punishment of death through his popularity with the army; even as it was, he had to resign his command. The story is only valuable as once more illustrating Roman discipline. The Samnites are said to have asked for and obtained a truce for one year, but this statement is extremely doubtful, for all indications point to the fact that the Romans were, on the whole, having the worse; in 324 the Apulians left their alliance, and in the same year Tusculum and two other Latin towns revolted. Rome was wise enough to make concessions; the proposal to punish Tusculum was rejected, and in 322, Fulvius, who had been consul at Tusculum, was made consul at Rome.

Second Period. Roman disaster at the Caudine Forks.—At any rate, at the beginning of 321, no impression had been made on Samnium, and that year saw one of the most terrible reverses which ever befel the Roman arms. The Samnite general, Gavius Pontius,[1] sent the Roman consuls false information that he was besieging the town of Luceria in Apulia; in their anxiety to save so important a place, the Romans incautiously tried to march through Samnium, which they believed to be deserted by the enemies' armies, and found themselves cut off in the narrow valley, called the "Furculae Caudinae." They were compelled to surrender

[1] His name is usually given as Gaius Pontius.

at discretion, and Pontius sent them "under the yoke,"[1] and then dismissed them without their arms; the consuls and all the other officers were also compelled to swear to a peace, by which the old alliance was renewed, while the Samnites were to receive back all Roman conquests, including Fregellae. Six hundred Roman knights were left as hostages.

It was impossible for the captives to bind their countrymen in such a way, and impossible for the people to accept the treaty; Pontius ought to have retained the whole Roman army as prisoners, if he expected to force the Romans to terms. As it was, the agreement was rejected, and Postumius and his officers were sent back to the Samnite, who refused, however, to accept them. Hence the only immediate result of the victory was 600 hostages left in the Samnite hands.

Further Samnite Successes.—But the indirect results were very great; the Samnites immediately gained Luceria, Fregellae, and Satricum; the first of these was the key to Apulia; Fregellae commanded the upper waters of the Liris, and the road which later was called the Via Latina; while Satricum was in the old Volscian territory, and near the coast-road from Rome into Campania. Satricum was recovered in 319, but otherwise the Romans made little progress for four years; they succeeded in regaining some allies in Apulia, but were mainly occupied in consolidating their strength; (318) two new tribes were formed in S. Latium and in Campania. Meanwhile the Samnites remained inactive; they had none of the persistency of their opponents, and so failed to utilize their successes.[2]

[1] This ceremony implied the utmost degradation; the whole army passed in single file under a spear, placed across two others which were stuck in the ground.

[2] The account of the war given by the Roman historians is very different; they assert that

(*a*) Luceria was recovered in 320;

(*b*) That great victories were gained in Apulia;

(*c*) And that the Samnites were compelled to ask for a two years' truce in 318.

But Luceria was certainly in Samnite hands in 315, and in that year the Samnites assumed the aggressive in Campania; hence it is difficult to believe in great Roman successes during the preceding five years. Probably the practical cessation of fighting was due not to the supposed truce, but to Roman exhaustion and Samnite inactivity.

The Samnites carry the war into Campania.—In 315 the war was renewed with vigour; the Romans captured Luceria, and next year secured it by a colony of 2,500 citizens with Latin rights. But the Samnites carried the war into Campania, captured Nola and other towns (including the colony of Sora[1] on the Upper Liris), and inflicted a severe defeat on the dictator Fabius at Lautulae. There was a formidable conspiracy in Capua against the Roman alliance, which was supported even by the Campanian aristocracy, and the Ausonians on the lower Liris showed signs of disaffection.

Third Period. Roman Victories and New Colonies.—In 314, however, the Romans were decisively victorious; they defeated the Samnites at Cinna, regained Sora and Fregellae, and crushed and almost annihilated the Ausonians. Roman influence was now restored in Campania, and established in Apulia; it was confirmed as usual by the planting of colonies, one of which, Interamna (312), commanded the upper Liris below Fregellae, and the other, Suessa Aurunca (313), strengthened the line of communication along the coast. This was now secured by the Via Appia, begun in the year 312 by the censor Appius Claudius; it was the earliest of that network of great roads, which from Rome as a centre were made, first through Italy and then through the Western world, and which served at once to maintain Roman military communications and to spread Roman civilization.

Commencement of the Roman Navy.—At the same time, Rome began to apply herself to maritime affairs, for it is at this time that we first hear of the appointment of *duumviri navales;* as her influence spread, she began at once to realize the value of "sea power," to maintain her own communications and to attack her enemies. It was long, however, before the Romans became really formidable at sea.

The Etruscans and the Umbrians attack Rome.—Samnium itself would now have been attacked at once, had not new enemies risen against Rome. There had been peace with

[1] When a colony like this is said to have "revolted to the Samnites," it meant that the original population rose and mastered the Roman colonists.

Etruria for forty years; but, in 311, the peoples of the Northern part of it, who were still independent, suddenly attacked the Roman colony of Sutrium, the "key of Etruria." Q. Fabius gained a victory over them there, and then carried the war into their country (310), by crossing the Ciminian Forest. It was a bold step, for the Roman arms had never penetrated so far North, but it was brilliantly successful, as the Etruscans were quite unprepared for the attack: two more victories at Lake Vadimo and near Perusia compelled the Etruscans to lay down their arms, and renew their peace with the Romans. The Umbrians too began to move in 309, but were decisively defeated at Mevania in the next year (308); these northern peoples had none of the desperate courage of the Samnite mountaineers, who had once more renewed the war, only to be decisively defeated by the dictator, L. Papirius Cursor, at Longula (309), and by Q. Fabius as consul in 308; he pushed into Southern Campania, and, by the capture of Nuceria, opened direct communication with Lucania.

Fourth Period. Revolt of the Hernici and the Aequi. The Samnites conclude Peace.—Once more a respite was given to the Samnites; in 306 Rome's old allies, the Hernicans, began to move, while their old enemies, the Aequi, were sending help to the Samnites. A single campaign crushed the Hernici; those towns which belonged to the Roman party, retained their old position, while the rest received the "Caerite franchise." Neglecting the Aequi for the moment, the two consuls of 305 carried the war into Samnium and took the capital, Bovianum; the capture itself meant little, for the towns of a mountain district are unimportant, but the Samnites were weary of the war; they were hemmed in on every side by Rome's allies, and they felt it hopeless to struggle longer against enemies who had risen superior to every defeat and to every combination formed against them. They therefore concluded peace (304), receiving honourable terms by which their independence was respected; but it was only a respite, for war began again in six years.

The Aequi Subdued.—The Romans meantime turned on the unhappy Aequi; this people was almost annihilated, and the colony of Alba was planted (303) between their territory

and that of the Marsi, near L. Fucinus. It commanded the Roman line of communication with the Adriatic, and its importance can be seen from the fact that 6,000 colonists were sent to it. In the year 299, two new tribes were formed in this region out of the lands of the conquered Aequi.

Rome's Alliance with the Marsi.—The Roman victories gained for them the alliance of the hardy Sabellian tribes, dwelling between the Aequi and the Adriatic, of which the Marsi were the chief. They had had little hostile collision with Rome, and their warriors were glad to place their services at the command of a city which was now clearly the most powerful military state in Italy; the states furnished contingents as the main condition of their alliance, which here too, as in Latium, was only with Rome herself, and was not permitted with any neighbour states. Henceforth the best soldiers of Rome came from this region.

Importance of the Samnite Wars.—The Samnite Wars were Rome's hardest struggle in Italy. The reason lay in the fact that the Samnites, though weak in organization (p. 52), were strong in tribal feeling. In most other districts of Italy, towns had been developed, and in this way the bonds of tribal unity had been weakened; Rome never had to meet the whole power of Etruria or of her Latin neighbours. But Samnium was in the pre-urban stage. It is noticeable that Rome's hardest struggles were with tribes (cf. also the Ligurians, pp. 140–1), where the ideal of municipal life was least familiar. Rome's policy of organizing municipalities everywhere was only one more application of her great principle of "*Divide et Impera*" (p. 49). The love of town autonomy, which Rome in her best days always encouraged, weakened national and tribal feeling. She pursued the same policy in the provinces; the municipal spirit was the greatest pillar of the Roman dominion, in them as well as in Italy.

CHAPTER IX.

THE THIRD SAMNITE WAR (298-290), *AND THE REDUCTION OF ITALY* (290-282)

Rome the Leading State of Italy.—Rome's persistency had worn down her most deadly foe; she was now indisputedly the leading state of Italy, and her wider responsibilities are clearly seen in the fact that, when the Spartan Cleonymus came to Italy, at the invitation of the Tarentines, he was met and repulsed by a Roman force in the territory of the Sallentines (302), far away in the south-east. But the Romans knew that the peace was only temporary, and rumours came that the dreaded Gauls were once more threatening in the north.

Rome Completes Her Ring of Colonies.—The territories of the Republic were already surrounded by a ring of colonies, Cales, Suessa, Interamna, Fregellae, Sora and Alba, while the frontier towards Etruria was guarded by Sutrium and Nepete; only to the east and north east was there a gap, which Rome now filled (298), by planting Carsioli among the Marsi, and Narnia (299), (originally Nequinum), in an impregnable position, near the junction of the Nar and the Tiber: this town held the line of what was later the Via Flaminia, and commanded the Tiber valley.

Roman Wars in Etruria.—Rome needed all her resources, for a formidable coalition was forming against her. Her relations with Etruria were uncertain; the aristocracy in all the towns were her friends, but the mass of the common people hated alike their own native masters and their masters' allies; hence in 301, the Romans were fighting at Arretium, where they restored the expelled nobles, the Cilnii, a family to which belonged, in after years, the famous Maecenas, the patron of Virgil and Horace. There were further hostilities

in Etruria, in 299 and 298; its inhabitants were attacked by the Gauls, but succeeded in diverting these dreaded enemies from their own to the Roman territories.

The Third Samnite War.—The Samnites, too, saw that Rome had now fresh enemies, and refused to obey her order and cease their ravages in Lucania; hence the third Samnite War began. Compared to the second, it was short and sharp, and entirely different in character: it was not fought to secure Roman influence in Campania or in Apulia, but first for very existence against the coalition, and then to crush Samnium; only once or twice do the Samnites take advantage of the absence of the Roman armies, to resume their attacks on the ring of Roman colonies that surrounded them.

During the first year of the war, 298, the Romans fought with some success in Etruria and in Samnium; the actual operations are not important, but it is interesting that they are recorded for us in the oldest extant Roman inscription of a non-religious character, the epitaph on the consul of the year, L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus.[1]

Decisive Campaign in 295.—In 296 the war took a wider range; Gellius Egnatius, the Samnite, conceived the bold idea of striking north with his army, and joining the Gauls, Etruscans, and Umbrians. The year 295 saw the decisive campaign; the alarm in Rome was great; four armies were raised, two to act in the front, and two to maintain the communications with Rome; the best general of the Republic, Q. Fabius Maximus, was compelled to accept his fifth consulship, and was allowed to nominate as his plebeian colleague, P. Decius Mus, with whom he had served often before in peace and in war; finally the alarm showed itself in the closing of the law-courts (*justitium*), while young and old, freed men as well as freeborn, were pressed into the legions.

Battle of Sentinum.—Fabius knew that it was safest to assume the offensive; he himself advanced over the Apennines into Umbria, while the foremost of the armies of communication pushed on into Etruria, and by its ravages compelled the Etruscans to desert their allies. The Umbrians too fell away; there was no doubt a Roman party in

[1] Perhaps the inscription in its present form is really later and belongs to the latter half of the third century B.C.

Umbria, and of all the great Italian tribes, they always made the least resistance to the Romans. The two consuls found themselves in presence of the enemy at Sentinum, near to the pass by which the Via Flaminia afterwards crossed the Apennines; Fabius on the right wing had the Samnites opposed to him, while Decius on the left faced the Gauls. The enemy advanced furiously to the attack along the whole line; the onset of the Gauls in their war chariots was especially terrible, and the consul Decius Mus had to restore the courage of his troops by a death of self-devotion, like that of his father against the Latins. In the end, Roman discipline triumphed everywhere, the enemy were defeated with great slaughter, and what was even more important, the Gauls gave up any further hostilities.

The Samnites Finally Reduced. — The war was now carried into Samnium, but the year 294 was one of very doubtful successes for the Romans. However, the chief towns of Etruria submitted, and, in spite of isolated risings there, the Samnites were left to bear the full weight of Rome's attack. In 293, the consul, Papirius Cursor, the son of the old dictator, gained a great victory over them. In the following year the Samnite, Gavius Pontius, probably the hero of the Caudine Forks, was taken prisoner and executed. Finally, in 290, the Samnites were compelled, by M'. Curius Dentatus, to sue for peace.

Samnite Hatred of Rome.—The long struggle was at an end, but the feeling of bitter hostility to Rome went on. It was shown in the help given by the Samnites to Pyrrhus and to Hannibal, and it only ceased with Sulla's harrying of Samnium two centuries later. The feud between plain and mountains was too deep-seated to die out easily.

Fresh Roman Colonies.—Rome, with her accustomed prudence, was meanwhile securing herself with colonies. Two bands of citizens were placed in posts of danger on the sea-coast at Sinuessa and Minturnae (296), and in 291 the huge number of 20,000 colonists, with Latin privileges, was sent into Apulia to Venusia, in order to secure the outlets of the passes on that side. Rome's influence was also extended eastwards by the final reduction of her old enemies, the Sabines. The consul of 290, M'. Curius Dentatus, gained

a second triumph in the same year for his victory over them. They received the *civitas sine suffragio*.

Defeats of the Gauls.—The wars of the next few years were unimportant, but in 284 the Gauls once more became threatening. The Senones invaded Etruria, and severely defeated the Romans at Arretium, but were terribly punished the next year (283) by the consul Cornelius Dolabella, who invaded their territory and almost annihilated them. This provoked their neighbours, the Boii, who advanced on Rome with their Etruscan allies, but were defeated at Lake Vadimo, in Etruria. Next year peace was made with the Boii.

The northern district, thus gained, was secured by the colonies of Hatria, in Picenum, and of Sena, further north. The former was a Latin colony, the latter one of citizens, as being in a position more exposed to danger.

Rome now had peace with the Gauls for nearly fifty years. The vigorous Italian Republic was able to ward off those Celtic invasions which, at this period, were devastating so terribly the Greek lands, and which ended in the formation of Galatia, in the centre of Asia Minor. Nor did Etruria ever seriously trouble Rome again. The popular party, from time to time, broke into revolt, but was always repressed. The most important instance is at Volsinii, where the commons (in 265) made themselves masters of the state, and behaved with the most outrageous cruelty, but were severely crushed by the Romans in the next year (264).

Causes of Rome's Success.—Rome had conquered by policy and discipline. She had suffered many defeats, but she knew how to recover from them, and to learn from them. It was in the hard school of the Samnite and the Gallic Wars that she developed the stubborn persistency which later made her triumphant over Carthage. One nation only remained in Italy which had not completely submitted to Rome —the Greek colonists on the coasts of the south. Some of these—*e.g.* Neapolis in Campania—had found in her alliance security and enjoyment of privileges, but the most important of the Greek cities, Tarentum, was bitterly jealous of the Latin republic. One more war was needed to reduce this State, and render Rome mistress of all "Italy"; but in this war, too, Rome had much to suffer and to learn

CHAPTER X.

THE CONQUEST OF THE ITALIAN GREEKS

Contrast of the Tarentine and the Roman Republics.—Tarentum, like Rome, was a republic, but of an entirely different character. Politically, it was an extreme democracy, in which all affairs were controlled by the assembly of the citizens, and where a flourish of rhetoric or a broad joke might decide the policy of the state. Socially, it was rich and luxurious, owing its wealth to its splendid harbour and its commerce, and to its manufactures.

Early Relations of Tarentum and Rome.—Rome and Tarentum had already come into contact with each other. Perhaps their first treaty was made before the second Samnite War, and about the year 300 the Romans had agreed not to send their ships round the Lacinian promontory into the Tarentine Gulf. The Greek democracy watched the Samnite War with varying feelings. On the one hand they knew that the highlanders of the centre were hostile to the Greeks in Campania; on the other hand, they found the Romans allied with their old enemies and neighbours, the Lucanians. Hence, their interest was that neither should conquer, and they arrogantly offered to mediate in the second Samnite War.

Roman Interference in South Italy.—When that war had ended victoriously for Rome, she was compelled to take up the organization of South Italy. The settlement of Venusia was important, not only as a post in the rear of Samnium, but as commanding the approaches to the south-east; and if Tarentum was jealous of Rome, all the Greek cities were not so, and Thurii, hard pressed by the Lucanians, applied for Roman help, which was vigorously given.

Tarentine Attack on a Roman Squadron.—No doubt the Roman fleet had co-operated in raising the siege of Thurii, and the Romans not unnaturally thought that the treaty of twenty years back was no longer binding. Hence, in the year 282, a Roman squadron of ten ships appeared off Tarentum. Technically the Romans were in the wrong, but the Tarentines proceeded with such recklessness as to transfer all the blame to themselves. Instead of warning the Roman admiral, and sending a protest to Rome, they attacked the Roman vessels at once, utterly defeated them, and killed the commander. They also took a considerable number of prisoners, who were either executed or sold as slaves. They then proceeded to attack Rome's ally, Thurii, where they expelled the Roman garrison and set up a democracy. Rome was not unnaturally weary of war, and attempted to negotiate; but the Roman envoys were mocked by the Tarentine Assembly, and Postumius, the leader among them, was grossly insulted, and his toga covered with filth. He warned the mob, which roared with laughter, that they might laugh now, but the toga would be washed clean with their blood.

Alliance between King Pyrrhus and Tarentum.—War was declared, and a Roman army laid waste the Tarentine territory; the fickle people was beginning to repent of its folly, and the aristocratic party, which urged submission to Rome, had come into power, when suddenly help appeared from abroad. The democratic party, in accordance with an old treaty for mutual assistance, had applied to Pyrrhus, the warlike king of Epirus; and at the very crisis of the negotiations with Rome, his favourite minister, the orator Cineas, came with promises of help. The proffered aid was readily accepted, for the Tarentines were only too glad to have some one to fight their battles, and a garrison of 3,000 Epirots was received into the citadel.

Character of Pyrrhus.—The Tarentines might well be confident in the strength of their new ally; Pyrrhus had been trained in the great wars which followed the death of Alexander, and was recognized as the first general of his time. He was moreover a great organizer, and had turned his native kingdom of Epirus from a mere loose confederacy

of mountain tribes into a strong and united state. One thing, however, was certain, that if Pyrrhus had succeeded in Italy he would have formed a western empire, under which the Tarentines would have been the first to lose their liberty. Hence it is not surprising that he soon became estranged from those he had come to assist; they complained of his severity, and he in return of their idleness and cowardice.

Pyrrhus' confidence of success.—Of his success Pyrrhus seems to have had no doubt; his cousin, Alexander the Great, had crushed, in four campaigns, the power of the "Great King"; his father-in-law, Agathocles, despot of Syracuse, had made himself master of Sicily, and had shaken the power of Carthage. He felt as confident of success as one of Wellington's officers, trained in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, would have been when fighting in India. It was his failure which revealed to the world that, unknown to all, a new military nation had arisen.

Contrast of Greek and Roman tactics.—Pyrrhus landed in Italy in the spring of 280, with 20,000 heavy infantry, and about 5,000 cavalry and light-armed troops; he had also twenty elephants, with which beasts the Romans were still unfamiliar.[1]

The campaigns that follow are most interesting in the history of warfare; the soldiers of Pyrrhus were professionals, those of Rome were a mere militia, and the old rule was once more illustrated that the bravest militia have, in regular fighting, no chance—at least at first—against a trained army. Even more important was the variety of tactics. Pyrrhus' men fought in the formation which the genius of Epaminondas had introduced, and which that of Alexander had perfected, the famous *phalanx*, or heavy column, which trusted for success to its weight and its unbroken firmness, and whose weapon was the long pike (*sarissa*), which kept off all attack.

The Romans, on the other hand, fought in open order, each soldier having a free space to move in, and acting for himself. They trusted to their heavy javelins (*pilum*) to break the enemies' ranks, and so to open the way for

[1] They called them "Lucae boves."

fighting at close quarters with their short double-edged swords (*gladius*).[1] Here, too, the usual result followed; the Roman maniples soon learned to break the phalanx, just as the Spanish infantry in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were more than a match for Swiss and German pikemen.

Pyrrhus' victory at Heraclea (280).—For the moment discipline and the old methods were successful; in Lucania, Pyrrhus met the Roman army under P. Valerius Laevinus, and engaged it on the banks of the Siris, near Heraclea; when he saw the Roman entrenched camp, his practised eye at once recognized that they were no mere barbarians that he had to fight. He gained a great victory, largely through the terror inspired by his elephants; the Romans lost nearly half their army, but their firm courage cost the victor dear, as 4,000 of his men fell. Pyrrhus was to find, as Hannibal found after him, that, however great the victories he might gain, it was useless to invade a country where the whole population was either hostile or indifferent.

Failure of Pyrrhus' negotiations.—It was true that some of the Samnites and Lucanians joined him, but there was no general rising against Rome such as he had hoped. He therefore resolved to treat, and, while advancing into Campania himself, sent Cineas to Rome; but the trained Greek eloquence was less effective than straightforward Roman patriotism, and the Senate, following the lead of the blind and aged Appius Claudius (whose speech has been in part preserved for us by Cicero),[2] told Cineas to leave Rome at once, and that they would never treat with Pyrrhus while he remained on Italian soil. Force proved equally unavailing; he advanced into Latium, but found the Roman legions harassing him in front, flank, and rear, while they refused to fight a pitched battle; he had, therefore, to fall fall back baffled into Campania.

Pyrrhus' Second Campaign.—During the winter, negotiations for the release of prisoners went on; and Pyrrhus found, in the person of the Roman ambassador Fabricius, that it was as impossible to corrupt the Romans with gold as it was difficult to conquer them in battle. The second campaign

[1] Polybius says that it was called "Spanish," but this probably refers to the material, and not to the shape of the sword. [2] *de Sen.* vi.

that followed was like the first. Pyrrhus gained another great victory at Ausculum, in Apulia (279), but again it cost him dear, and he was no nearer to reducing Rome. She too had suffered severely; in the five years between 280 and 275, her population fell 17,000 in number: accordingly an armistice was concluded, and Pyrrhus was set free to attack the Carthaginians in Sicily.

Pyrrhus in Sicily. His Final Defeat.—Here, too, fortune smiled on him at first; he deprived the Carthaginians of all their strongholds, except Lilybaeum in the extreme West, and was proposing to carry the war into Africa; but Lilybaeum proved impregnable, the Sicilian Greeks became discontented, and in 276 Pyrrhus returned to Italy a disappointed man. The end soon came; in the campaign of 275, he attempted to surprise the Romans in their entrenchments near Beneventum, but the attempt failed completely, and his army was shattered. Pyrrhus gave up the struggle, and left Italy, though a strong garrison still held Tarentum. The old M'. Curius Dentatus celebrated a splendid triumph over the "Red King." The rest of Pyrrhus' life does not concern us, but he was killed three years later (272) in a battle in the streets of Argos; he died as he had lived, a military adventurer.

Final Conquest and Settlement of Italy.—It was only after the death of Pyrrhus that Milo surrendered the citadel of Tarentum; the Carthaginians had tried to occupy it, but the Romans were beforehand with them. It was evident to all that Pyrrhus' prophecy would soon be fulfilled, when he said, "How fair a battle-field I am leaving in Sicily for the Romans and the Carthaginians." But before this great struggle began, Rome had still a little to do in securing herself in Italy. In 281, a legion of Campanian allies had mutinied in Rhegium, and for ten years they had made that town a centre of free-booters; they were now reduced and severely punished. A final campaign (269) crushed the Samnites. There was some unimportant fighting too on the east coast of Italy, and Picenum in the north and the Sallentines and Brundisium in the south were reduced.

In the year 268, the Sabines to the north-east of Rome, and the Picentes to the east of them, received the full franchise,

and new Latin colonies were planted at Paestum in Lucania (273), on the site of the old Greek city of Paestum, at Beneventum (268), in the heart of Samnium, and at Ariminum (268) on the coast of the Adriatic, in the extreme north-east corner of "Italy" proper.

Thus, as usual, the civil arrangements of Rome secured what her sword had won; she had now established her hold over all "Italy," and was ready for her fight for supremacy in the Western Mediterranean: but it is necessary, before describing this, to sketch briefly her internal development during the period of her great wars, and to compare generally the organization and the resources of the two great cities, Rome and Carthage, which were now to engage.

The Beginnings of Roman Literature.—The capture of Tarentum is important in the literary history of Rome. Before this there had been only formal official lists, *e.g.* of the magistrates, laws and ritual formulae; specimens survive in the *XII. Tabulae* and in the Song of the Arval Brethren. A few speeches, too, had been committed to writing (*e.g.* that of Appius Claudius; cf. p. 66). Roman literature now begins with Livius Andronicus, who was brought as a slave to Rome, where he took the name of his patron, Livius (272 B.C.), and taught as a schoolmaster. He translated the Odyssey into Saturnian verse,[1] and his translation was still used as a school book in the days of Horace.[2] He also translated Greek plays; his first drama was acted in 240 B.C. His work seems to have had no merits except that of priority.

[1] The Saturnian metre was probably based on accent, not on quantity, others explain it as half iambic and half trochaic. Macaulay quotes as corresponding to it the nursery rhyme—

"The Queen was in her parlour, eating bread and honey."

[2] *Ep.* ii. 1, 69.

CHAPTER XI.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION DURING THE PERIOD OF THE GREAT WARS

The Close of the Struggle between Patricians and Plebeians.—The last important disabilities of the plebeians were removed by the passing of the Lex Ogulnia in 300, which opened to them the Roman priestly offices. This completed the work which had been done by Cn. Flavius as aedile four years before (304). He was the son of a freedman, and had been a public clerk (*scriba*). When in office he published the rules for pleading (*formulae*), and the Calendar of *Dies Fasti* and *Nefasti*, so that henceforth all might know the proper methods of judicial procedure, and the days on which it might take place; hitherto this knowledge had been hidden in the breasts of the magistrates. Finally, the Lex Hortensia completed the process of equalizing the two orders; it was brought about in the following way:

The Lex Hortensia.—The long wars with the Samnites had naturally caused considerable distress in Rome, and three years after peace had been concluded (287), this broke out into open discontent; the plebs seceded to the Janiculum for the last time, a dictator, Hortensius, was appointed, and carried a law, establishing once for all the legislative power of the plebeian concilium, which voted by tribes. The principle of this legislation had been affirmed long before by the Valerio-Horatian laws of 449, and had been re-established by the Lex Publilia of 339. (Cf. cap. iv. p. 32.) It was now not only confirmed once more, but probably also extended; laws passed by the Comitia Centuriata still needed the *patrum auctoritas*, but the Lex Hortensia seems to have exempted the *plebiscita* absolutely and expressly from any claim which might be made to apply the same rule to them also.

The Survivals of the Distinction between the Orders.—No doubt social prejudices between patrician and plebeian still went on; only nine years before (296) the matrons had quarrelled as to the rites of the goddess Castitas, and the patrician wife of a plebeian consul had found herself excluded from these by her fellow patricians, and had therefore dedicated a new chapel to Chastity for plebeian matrons. Such rivalries, however, had little political significance. Livy, it is true, speaks of "patrician" and "plebeian" candidates during the Second Punic War, but the distinction was comparatively unimportant, and not the real point at issue. The old division by birth only survived in the qualifications for certain offices. None but a patrician could be *interrex*, an officer appointed to hold the consular elections, when for any reason neither of the consuls could be in Rome for that duty; and the same qualification was needed for the *rex sacrorum*, an unimportant religious official, in whom Roman conservatism preserved the old title of authority. On the other hand, what was much more important, only those who were plebeians by birth or adoption could be tribunes of the plebs. It might have been expected that these officers, who represented the claims of the plebeians as a separate order, would have disappeared when the union of the orders was complete; their power of veto, which had developed into the power of stopping all public business, seems absolutely inconsistent with the idea of a united government. But no doubt the plebeians thought the tribunes necessary long after they had really ceased to be so; and Roman conservatism never willingly parted with any established office. How the tribunes were used in the new order of things will be seen later. (p. 76.)

New Constitutional Questions; the Position of the Freedmen.—Meantime entirely new questions were coming up, prominent among which was the position of a new unprivileged class at Rome, the freedmen (*libertini*).[1] As the city increased in wealth and power, the number of slaves also increased; from

[1] It is generally said that a slave who had been set free was called the *libertus* of his master, while he was *libertinus* in relation to the state generally. Others explain *libertini* as being the descendants of those who had been themselves freed (*liberti*).

time to time some of these would be set free by humane or indulgent masters, with the result that Rome had within it a number of men personally free, but only allowed to vote in the four city tribes. In 312, the censor Appius Claudius put them on an equality with the other citizens by enrolling them in the country tribes as well. It was a most important departure from traditional procedure; and all the more important because in Rome, where every citizen had to vote personally, the freedmen, who were mainly engaged in business within the walls, were on the spot, and could always vote, while the majority of the citizens were farmers, often at a very considerable distance from Rome; hence the new class would exercise an undue influence in the comitia, and would outvote the landowners.

The attempt of Appius Claudius at Constitutional Revolution.—This was probably the intention of Appius; like the great Athenian statesman, Cleisthenes,[1] he combined the strongest aristocratic prejudices with a disposition to side with the mass of the people against his own order. He needed the popular support for his innovations; for, in spite of prevailing custom, which limited the actual power of the censors to eighteen months, and of the resignation of his own colleague, he remained in office during his whole lustrum (five years), and even then had to be compelled to resign. He had further sought to extend his influence by innovations in filling up the Senate, to which he raised men of low birth, especially the sons of freedmen, and by his great public works; the Via Appia has been already mentioned (p. 56), and he also constructed the first of the aqueducts (the Aqua Appia) which supplied Rome with water. On the whole, we can hardly avoid seeing in him a constitutional revolutionary, who tried, by his powers as magistrate and by appeal to the

[1] The parallel between the Claudii and the Alcmaeonidae is curious; both families

(*a*) Belonged to the bluest blooded aristocracy, and originally furnished some of the most obstinate champions of that class.

(*b*) Yet had something unusual in their origin, and were looked upon, by some at least, as aliens by descent.

(*c*) Left the mass of their order, and went over to the popular side.

(*d*) Displayed throughout a disregard of recognised religious obligations.

people, to secure for himself a position against the mass of his order, which, as represented by the Senate, really controlled the State. In fact, he anticipates, in very many respects, the work of C. Gracchus, two centuries later. But his attempt was premature; the consuls from the first declined to recognise his Senate, and used, for summoning that body, the list drawn up by the preceding censors, and the censors of 304 upset his arrangement as to the freedmen; that class were allowed to retain their votes, but to use them only in the four city tribes; hence the danger was avoided of a preponderating influence being given to the least worthy of the citizens.

The changed position of the Senate.—The career of Appius is most important, at once in itself, and because it shows clearly how political questions had changed at Rome. It was no longer a question whether patricians or plebeians should have certain rights; it was rather a question whether tradition or innovation should prevail, whether the Roman State should still be governed by the classes already governing, and in the old way, or whether any powerful individual, who might gain the ear of the people, should be allowed to rule. The key to this question is found in the changed position of the Senate; this had been, in the early days of the Republic, the centre of the patrician opposition, but as early as the end of the fifth century, plebeians had been admitted into it, and during the fourth century such admissions had become constant. The reason of the change lay in the method of the Senate's appointment; in theory it was the council of elders, nominated by the magistrate, whether king, consul, or censor, at his pleasure; but in practice, under the Republic, it was becoming a body of ex-magistrates. The *plebiscitum Ovinium* (318–312 B.C.), about this very time, expressed in a formal law the change that was going on; it transferred from the consuls to the censors the duty of filling up vacancies in the Senate, and directed that they should be filled by the "best men" from every rank (*ex omni ordine*), *i.e.* ex-curule magistrates.

The distinction between Nobiles and Novi Homines.—In this way the Senate was indirectly representative of the people, who had chosen the magistrates; but even as early as this

time, it could hardly be said that the people had free choice; office was beginning to be restricted to those whose ancestors had already held it (*nobiles*), while new men (*novi homines*), who belonged to a non-official family, were at a disadvantage; the mark of the "noble" was the right to have the busts (*imagines*) of his ancestors in his hall, and to display them in funeral processions. This distinction of ranks began in the fourth century B.C., and had become firmly established by the end of the third; at that period an attempt was made by Flaminius and others to break it down, as will be seen later (pp. 100, 111); but this failed, and the natural result was that Roman oligarchy in the second century became more exclusive than ever; even the officers in the army were appointed, not so much from merit as from birth and influence. In 362 the right of electing six military tribunes was given to the Comitia Tributa, and this was gradually extended till, by the third century B.C., all the twenty-four tribunes of the four first legions were so elected. The result was that the military tribunate became merely the first step in a young noble's career. The reasons for this growing exclusiveness at Rome seem to have been as follows:—

1. Conservatism was a greater force than it has ever been in any other State; the custom of the elders (*mos majorum*) had almost the force of law.

2. Family influence was strongly organized, and tended to perpetuate office in the same hands.

3. Above all, wealth was a great and a growing influence in Roman elections (though it is not till the second century that we find laws passed against actual bribery), and the main source of wealth in Rome was office, with its chances of obtaining booty. For all these reasons, office tended to continue in the same hands, *i.e.* in the hands of men of senatorial family.

The change in the conception of Office.—The whole conception of it gradually changed; hence, when Rome's great victories had been won, office became less a duty to be fulfilled than a privilege to be enjoyed; hence, too, a definite tradition grew up as to the time at which a man might first stand for a given office, which was finally embodied in the Lex Villia

Annalis of 180.[1] And with the growing exclusiveness of the nobles and the decay of public spirit, direct bribery began to be employed by candidates for office; the first law against this was the Lex Cornelia Baebia of 181, and from this time onwards to the end of the Republic, the offence and the laws against it become increasingly common. It was useless to attempt to stop by legislation what was the natural outcome of Roman constitutional arrangements; the sovereign people had a valuable privilege to give — that of governing the Western world—and usage prevented them from enjoying it themselves; hence, as a matter of course, on all ordinary occasions, they sold it to the highest bidder. A precisely similar state of things prevailed in England in the last century, when an exclusive aristocracy had to buy the right of governing from an ignorant and limited electorate.[2] This absolute exclusiveness and this bribery belong to the second and first centuries, though they were the natural outcome of the constitutional arrangements of the third century.

The Senate becomes Supreme in the State. — The Senate, thus formed of ex-officials, became, during the long wars of Rome, indisputably the chief power in the State. Its only possible competitors for this position were the magistrates and the Comitia, but there were good reasons why both these should give way before it.

1. The magistrates were many in number, and hence they interfered with each other, while the Senate was united.

2. They were in office for a year only, and then were responsible for their conduct; the Senate was permanent and irresponsible.

[1] By this law (*a*) there was to be an interval of two years between the holding of each curule office.

(*b*) The magistracies were to be held in a fixed order.

(*c*) A man must be twenty-eight years old to be quaestor, forty to be praetor, and forty-three to be consul.

[2] The Roman method of group-voting too was a direct encouragement to bribery; a well-directed expenditure could turn the votes of a few evenly-divided centuries or tribes, and so secure an election. Hence the Romans developed a system of electoral corruption (with definite agents, *divisores*), which can only be paralleled in the elections of the United States.

3. The higher magistrates, as a rule, belonged to the Senate, both before and after their term of office; hence they were in complete sympathy with it.

On the other hand, the Comitia was unfitted to be supreme; for (1) it was already, at the beginning of the third century, an unwieldy body of nearly 300,000 citizens, living scattered over a wide district, and very difficult to get together.

(2) It could only meet when a magistrate summoned it, and vote on what he pleased to put before it. There was no liberty of free initiation or discussion, such as made the Athenian assembly the absolute master of Athens.

(3) In any case it was obviously impossible that any assembly, even had it been well organized, could discuss and settle the intricate questions of foreign policy which had to be decided by Rome from the fourth century onwards.

The Merits of Senatorial Government.—And not only was the Senate head of Rome because of the absence of possible rivals; it also thoroughly deserved its position. Cineas had described it as an "assembly of kings," and it consisted largely of men who had experience of every department of State service, civil and military. Above all, it had that characteristic which makes oligarchy so strong a form of government in troubled times—a spirit of cautious but stubborn adherence to tradition. Hence, there was no danger that the Roman State would shipwreck itself in reckless enterprises, as the Athenian democracy had done in Sicily. Nor, on the other hand, could any number of defeats break the spirit of the body which controlled the destinies of Rome. It was the Senate which saved Rome in the struggle with Hannibal, and Rome's victory in the Second Punic War secured supremacy to the Senate for more than half a century longer.

The Senate's Power of Controlling Public Business.—It became customary for all business settled in the Assembly, whether legislative or administrative, to be discussed first in the Senate. There was no definite law to require this, after 287 B.C. (p. 69), for proposals in the *Concilium Plebis;* but when Flaminius, in 232 (see p. 100), carried an agrarian law without previous authorization by the Senate, it was looked upon as

an unconstitutional act, both by politicians at the time, and by clear-sighted and impartial observers like the Greek historian Polybius a century later. As a rule, the Senate could prevent such unusual acts by means of the tribune's veto. Among the ten tribunes it could always secure a representative, and his veto could check a troublesome colleague, and either prevent the legislation, or give the senators time to consider it, and if necessary propose it in their own way on a later occasion.

Growth of Senatorial Power Unconscious.—But this growth of Senatorial authority was unconscious, neither directly aimed at by the Senate nor conceded by the people. Nominally, the Roman State in the third and second centuries was governed as it had been in the latter half of the fourth; really a constitution that, after the Licinian laws, was an undeveloped democracy, had (almost) become a close oligarchy.

The change in Roman Religion.—Just as in civil affairs the Roman people began to leave the control in the hands of the men of experience and position, so Roman religion during the period following the abolition of the kingship, became more and more a matter of State administration. The authorities, the pontiffs and the augurs, did not interfere much with the religion of the family; *pietas*, the discharge of duties from man to man, was still the distinctively Roman virtue. But the relations of the community as a whole to the gods became in official hands a matter of forms and ceremonies. Hence, while the old state religion remained, it was "in stunted form and with paralysed vitality; Rome was the scene of an arrested religious development."[1] Religion was divorced from life by the very elaboration of its organization. Hence in the trying times of the Second Punic War the state religion was found wanting (*cf.* p. 126).

[1] Fowler, *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, p. 207.

CHAPTER XII.

THE ROMAN STATE DURING THE PERIOD OF THE GREAT WARS

Polybius' Description of the Roman Constitution.—At the end of this period of Senatorial rule, when, in the latter half of the second century B.C., the power of the Senate was about to be attacked, the great Greek historian, Polybius, describes the Roman Constitution as "mixed": *i.e.* one in which all three elements—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—were present. They were represented by the magistrates, the Senate, and the people respectively.

Position of the Magistrates in General.—It is important to remember that the magistrates represented the old royal power. In theory each "created" his own successor, although, as a matter of course, it was always the elect of the people who was so created; and during his term of office each magistrate was irremovable and irresponsible. But though the powers of the magistrates were apparently so great, yet in reality they came to very little, owing to the checks noticed in the last chapter (p. 74). Their names and their chief duties must now be briefly described.

The Consuls.—The consuls were the nominal heads of the Roman State. The year was called by their name, and they had the power of summoning the Senate and the Assemblies, and of presiding in them. But it was in war-time that the consuls were specially important. They then could levy an army, and compel the citizens to serve; and in the field their authority was practically unlimited.

The Praetors.—The praetor was the head of the judicial business of Rome. As this increased, a second praetor was appointed (243), who had charge of all suits between foreigners and citizens, and was therefore called praetor *peregrinus*,

in opposition to the original praetor *urbanus*. But a new use was found for praetors as the Roman Empire grew, and foreign dependencies needed special governors. Two more were added in 227 for the provinces of Sicily and Sardinia (*cf.* p. 97), and a fifth and sixth (in 197) for the two new provinces in Spain (*cf.* also pp. 226, 283). See note on p. 83.

The Aediles.—The aediles, curule and plebeian, were charged at once with the duties of police magistrates and with the maintenance of public works in Rome; in the latter capacity they had committed to them the charge of some at least of the games, the number of which was from time to time increased. The magistrates were expected to defray the cost of these festivals largely out of their own pockets, and so indirectly bought popularity from the sovereign people. But this is a feature of the second century, when Rome's hard struggle was over, and when she was becoming corrupted by the rewards of victory.

The Quaestors.—The quaestorship was the beginning of a Roman's official career (*cursus honorum*), though it was not itself a curule magistracy. It seems to have been an old office, dating from the royal period, to which the duty of superintending the treasury (*aerarium*) was transferred under the Republic; from 447 onwards the quaestors were elected by the Comitia Tributa. After a time two new quaestors were added (421), one of whom was assigned to each of the consuls when in the field; their number was again doubled, *i.e.* raised to eight, in 267. As has been said (p. 28), the quaestorship was specially important as being usually (though not at this period of right) a qualification for the Senate, and as being the preliminary step by which a man entered on the regular *cursus honorum*.

The Censors.—Beside the magistrates who have been mentioned, the censors and the tribunes held an unusual position; two censors were elected every five years (though they were actually in office for eighteen months only), generally from among the ex-consuls Their powers might be made very important, including as they did the superintendence of the Roman assessment (*census*) lists, which determined at once the amount of tributum which a man should pay, and his position in the state. Out of this duty

grew the censors' power of inquiring into the lives and characters of the citizens, and if they pleased, of inflicting, on their own authority, a mark of disgrace (*nota*). The power of filling up the Senate, described in the last chapter (p. 72), carried with it as a matter of course the power of expelling men from the Senate. Finally the censors had the control of the "public land," and the right of undertaking new public works, and contracting for their execution; it was as censors that Appius Claudius (p. 71), and C. Flaminius (p. 102), constructed their great roads.

The Tribunes.—The tribunes were no longer needed in Rome when the struggle of the orders was over; but they continued to exist, and even increased their powers, for at some period before the Second Punic War, they obtained the right of a seat in the Senate. They too, like the magistrates, became part of the Senate's machinery of government; their veto was useful to check unruly magistrates; and when the Senate wished a law, or a measure of administration, ratified by the people, it was most easy to obtain this by a tribune's proposing it (*rogatio*).

The Senate the Real Government of Rome.—The Senate had now become the virtual head of the Roman state. Its actual powers may be classified as follows, though as to most of these it must be remembered that they were due to custom rather than to definite enactments.

Its Powers. (1) Legislative.—Laws could only be passed by the sovereign people; but the Senate could and did issue decrees (*senatus consultum*) which dealt with immediate cases, and which had temporarily very much the force of laws. These they especially issued in all matters belonging to the state religion.

(2) Judicial.—The Senate properly had no judicial powers; but in great emergencies it ordered the consuls to propose to the people the establishment of a special court of enquiry (*quaestio extraordinaria*), the members of which were drawn from among the senators; such a court was set up in 186, for inquiring into and suppressing the immoral rites of Bacchus (p. 177). By such tribunals it exercised great influence; in the latter half of the second century, these became permanent and even more important than before.

(3) Administrative.—But it was in the department of administration that the powers of the Senate were most important; under this head fall:

(*a*) Its control of finance. Every Roman magistrate received from the Senate his equipment (*ornatio*), out of which the expenses of his office were to be defrayed; he himself was expected to serve without salary. He had to give an account of the expenditure, at the end of his period of office.

(*b*) The Senate settled all questions with regard to Rome's subjects. When provinces began to be formed, it decided what magistrate was to be assigned to each, and for how long he should hold his province.

(*c*) All Rome's foreign relations came before the Senate; it received foreign embassies, and discussed and settled conditions of peace and alliance. Of course a vote of the people was formally necessary for peace or war.

The Assemblies of the People.—The sovereignty of the people is seen in this last point, in its right of electing magistrates, and in its sole control of legislation.

There were three assemblies in Rome. Of these, the Comitia Curiata, the old assembly of the patricians, had become a purely formal body. It still met for certain acts, *e.g.* to sanction one form of will, *i.e. testamenta comitiis calatis facta*, and to confer the supreme authority on a magistrate, by a *lex curiata de imperio*, after his election in the Comitia Centuriata.

The Comitia Centuriata, or assembly of the whole people in their centuries, was still in theory the main assembly of the Roman people. About the end of the First Punic War,[1] it

[1] Livy (I. 43) and Dionysius distinctly tell us that the organization of the Comitia Centuriata in their day was not the same as it had been originally, but they do not tell us what the change was, and when it was effected; hence there are various conjectures on these subjects. The view most generally adopted is that

(1) The organization of the centuries was adapted to that of the tribes.

(2) The number of centuries in each tribe was made equal, *i.e.* there were two from each class, one of *seniores* and one of *juniores*, or ten altogether; thus we get 350 centuries in the tribes, to which must be added eighteen centuries of knights, the century of *capite censi*, and perhaps the four of *fabri* and *cornicines*, *i.e.* 373 in all.

(3) In this way the old distinctions of wealth were largely swept away. The date at which the change is made is very uncertain: it is usually

seems to have been re-organized in such a way as to make it more democratic. It always retained the right of electing curule magistrates, and had also the power of legislation.

To the comitia centuriata were brought all appeals that concerned the life or civil existence (*caput*) of a citizen, but appeals as to fines could come before the comitia tributa.

Owing to the clumsiness of the machinery of the comitia centuriata, laws were usually passed in the comitia tributa. In this comitia the whole people voted by tribes instead of by centuries: the consuls and the praetors had the right of summoning it, and besides legislation, it had the right of electing the quaestors. On the other hand the old exclusively plebeian assembly (*concilium plebis tributum*) still went on; it elected the plebeian magistrates, and had also the right of legislating for the whole people by its plebiscita. It was convoked by the plebeian officers.[2]

Extent of the Roman Territory.—Such was the organization of the Roman State proper, which extended, at the beginning of the Punic Wars, over about one-third of "Italy"; *i.e.* of the region south of the Macra and the Rubicon. It included, on the west coast, the greater part of South Etruria, Latium, and Campania, with the territories of the Aequi, the Hernici, and the Sabines in the centre, and of the Picentines on the east coast. Within this region there were nearly 300,000 citizens, according to the census of 265. Many of them had, at present, only the private rights of

placed between 292 and 218, the period which was covered by Livy's second decade, which is lost; of the dates during that period 241 is the most probable, as in that year the number of the tribes—35—was made complete. Ihne, however, conjectures, with great probability, that the change was introduced gradually by successive censors.

Mommsen, in the last edition of his history, thinks—(1) That the original number of 193 centuries was in some way maintained. (2) That the change was the work of Flaminius as censor in 220. But if this had been so, we should surely have heard of it among the many attacks on that much-abused statesman.

[2] Some scholars, *e.g.* Ihne, deny this distinction between the two bodies voting by tribes, *i.e.* between the comitia tributa of the *whole* people and the exclusively plebeian concilium plebis; it seems, however, certain. The actual difference between the bodies must have been very small indeed, as the plebeians came to be almost the whole people.

citizens, but this was but a temporary stage, as the Romans were continually granting the full citizenship to communities which had previously enjoyed only the partial rights.

Position of the Municipia.—In the Roman territory a large amount of self-government was allowed to the *municipia*, whether of full citizens or of partial citizens. They controlled their local affairs, and elected their own magistrates, as before. But their foreign relations were now merged in those of Rome, while justice, too, was administered by Roman officials. *Praefecti*, representing the praetor, were sent for this purpose to the colonies (*i.e. coloniae civium Romanorum*) and the municipia,[1] and also, with powers of administration as well as of jurisdiction, to those districts which were not organized as urban communities. In this way local vigour was reconciled with unity of action.

Rome's Allies. The Latins.—Outside the Roman territory proper the rest of Italy was held by Rome's allies. These were of two kinds, the *Nomen Latinum* and the *Socii* proper. The *Nomen Latinum* was a class of allies with peculiar privileges. They had the rights of trade and of intermarriage with Rome, and down to 268[2] their citizens could migrate freely to Rome, and so become full citizens. This right seems to have been lost by all communities enrolled in the *Nomen Latinum* after this date.

Under the "Latin Name" were included all the members of the old Latin League which had not been fully merged in

[1] The terms *colonia* (*i.e. civium Romanorum*), *municipium*, and *praefectura* are difficult, mainly because it is forgotten that they are not mutually exclusive. "*Colonia*" refers to the origin of the community. As a matter of fact, every colony was, strictly speaking, a municipium. It was not so called because "colonia" was a more honourable name, but the two only differed in the titles of their magistrates. The term "*municipium*" refers to the separate organization of the community as distinct from Rome itself. Municipia were of two kinds, of full citizens and of partial citizens. Finally, colonies and municipia were prefectures, as prefects were sent from Rome to administer justice in them. (This, at least, is Mommsen's view, but others hold that prefects were only sent to *municipia sine suffragio*.) There were prefectures which were not organized communities at all, and therefore not municipia; *e.g.* Capua, after its surrender in the second Punic War, ceased to be a municipium, but it remained a prefecture in a somewhat altered sense.

[2] Ariminum was founded in this year, the first Latin colony with restricted rights.

Rome *e.g.* Tibur and Praeneste, and, what was much more important, the inhabitants of the Latin colonies which Rome had planted in all the strategic points of Italy. Many of these colonists were Romans who had surrendered part of their rights as citizens in return for allotments of land. In all cases their interests were closely bound up with Rome's empire, for they were planted by the Romans on hostile soil, and the first result of Roman defeat would have been the recovery by the original inhabitants of the lands assigned, and the destruction of the colony. It was this which saved Rome in the Hannibalic War. The whole open country in South Italy revolted, but the towns, as a rule, remained faithful because their interests and Rome's were one.

The rest of the Allies.—Outside the *Nomen Latinum* lay the rest of the allies. The details of their condition were regulated by the terms of their treaty with Rome, but their general position was the same; *i.e.* they, like the *Nomen Latinum*, were independent in their home affairs, but had their foreign relations determined by Rome, and sent their contingents according to stipulation (*ex formula*) to serve in Rome's armies. They were called *civitates federatae.*

As a whole, they seem to have been fairly content, and many of them had submitted to Rome without a struggle. All respected her already as their champion against the Gaul, and soon were to respect her as their champion against the African.

NOTE.—The praetors, like all Roman magistrates, could issue an *edictum* in the discharge of the duties of their office. This edict became one of the most important sources of Roman law, much in the same way as the decisions of English judges are part of the law of England. It was usual for a praetor to adopt the edict of his predecessors (*edict tralaticium*), adding to it what clauses seemed necessary. The edict which thus was gradually produced was finally codified and arranged in the reign of Hadrian, and was called the *edictum perpetuum.*

In this way the narrow rules of the old *Jus Civile* were expanded, and the idea of equity was introduced. (*Cf.* Maine's *Ancient Law*, cap. iii., for the whole subject of the *edictum.*)

CHAPTER XIII.

CARTHAGE

Struggle between Rome and Carthage for Sicily. — The struggle between Rome and Carthage was inevitable, for the advance of Rome's power had brought her to the limits of Italy, and Carthage held most of the islands which naturally belonged to Italy, and were necessary for its security; she was mistress of Corsica and Sardinia, of the Lipari Islands, and of the western part of Sicily, and she seemed likely to get a footing in the eastern part. It was this which precipitated the conflict; Rome took up the contest which the Greeks had been waging for 200 years against Carthage, and settled that Sicily was to belong to Europe, and not to Africa; just as, more than a thousand years later, the Normans once more had a hard struggle to drive the Saracens out of Sicily, and back to Africa.

The Power of Carthage.—Carthage was a most formidable foe. Her 700,000 inhabitants dwelt in a city almost impregnable against attack, and admirably adapted for trade. Her rule extended all along the north coast of Africa, from the Atlantic to beyond the modern Tunis; the other Phoenician colonies were subject to her, and of the native Libyans, some paid her tribute and others were her allies. As has been said, her possessions also extended over the Western Mediterranean; her wealth and her trade were enormous, and, above all, she had the command of the sea. On this element the Greeks had once disputed her sway, but they had long ago given up the struggle.

The Carthaginian Constitution.—And the affairs of this powerful realm were directed by a government which had won the admiration of the greatest writer of antiquity on

political science, the philosopher Aristotle. In brief outline it was as follows:

At the head of the state were two *suffetes*,[1] who corresponded to the Roman consuls; their power, however, was now merely nominal. The real power lay in the hands of the Senate, but not so much with the whole body as with two committees of it, consisting of 100 (or perhaps of 104) and of 30 members respectively; the latter controlled the finance of the state, the former its judicature. This body of 100 was the real ruler of the state, and at the time of the Punic Wars used its powers unscrupulously for the advantage of its own members. The lives and fortunes of all citizens, and especially of generals engaged on active service, were at its mercy, and all cases were decided, not on their merits, but according to the interests of the close oligarchy of judges. The "100" were indirectly elected by the people, but in reality they contrived, by their wealth, to retain office almost permanently in the hands of the same families.

The assembly of the people had, in theory, much the same powers as the Roman assembly, but in character it seems to have resembled the degraded Roman assembly of later times, and, as a rule, to have been open to corruption, except when it was stirred by national disasters, or moved by enthusiasm for great leaders, like those of the house of Barca.

Character of the Carthaginian Government.—In fact, the government of Carthage much resembled that of Venice in the later days of that republic; the Suffetes were merely nominal heads, like the Doge, and all powers, civil and military alike, were controlled by a close oligarchy, which maintained itself by an unscrupulous use of the judicature. Probably the material prosperity of the state led the citizens to acquiesce in its rule; trade was good at home and abroad, and the mass of the people was contented. It was the disasters of the Second Punic War which enabled Hannibal to rouse popular feeling; but it was then too late to reform the constitution and to save Carthage.

[1] Their Phoenician name, Shophetim, corresponds to the Hebrew word for "judges."

Points of Weakness in Carthage.—For under the outward appearance of prosperity there were great weaknesses. A superficial observer would have said that Carthage, with her wide empire, her wealth, and her command of the sea, could easily crush Rome; the more far-sighted of Carthaginian statesmen, however, may well have feared the issue, when they remembered how weak their state had proved against far less dangerous foes, such as Agathocles and Pyrrhus.

1. **Discontent of her Subjects.**—Carthage was inferior to Rome in the following points. In the first place, the majority of her subjects in her wide empire were discontented, and ready to rise if they saw an opportunity. This was not only so in Sicily, where the Greek population for centuries had been struggling against the Carthaginians; in Africa also the subject Numidians hated the masters to whom they paid tribute, while the numerous Carthaginian slaves were ready to revolt at any moment. Whenever, therefore, Carthage had been attacked in Africa, she had been found weak, except so far as her power lay within her impregnable city walls.

2. **Decay of her Navy.**—Again, Carthage was no longer so strong in her maritime forces as she had been. Two hundred years of undisputed supremacy by sea had allowed the Carthaginian navy to become stereotyped, and so to lose efficiency. It is only on this supposition that we can understand how the mistress of the Western Mediterranean was almost uniformly unsuccessful by sea against the Romans, who never took kindly to naval affairs, and whose ignorance of seamanship was only compensated for by their bravery and persistence.

3. **Use of Mercenaries.**—Again, the land forces of Carthage were far inferior. The Carthaginian citizens could fight when necessary, but as a rule they preferred to pay others to fight for them. Hence the armies that met Rome were composed of soldiers of fortune, levied from all the coasts of the Mediterranean, men skilled in the use of arms, but lacking, under defeat, the courage of patriotism, and liable at any moment, if pay ran short, to become dangerous to their own masters.

4. **Lack of Union at Home.**—Above all, the defects which had developed in the Carthaginian constitution at home

affected most fatally the military operations abroad. The generals knew that ill-success would mean death, and so, when hard pressed, they often surrendered to the Romans, to escape their own countrymen. And when finally Carthage found a family of conspicuous military ability in Hamilcar Barca and his sons, the government supported them but poorly; they knew well that success abroad, if complete, would mean reform at home. If Hannibal had been finally victorious over the Roman Senate, he would have made short work of the oligarchy at Carthage.

Strong Points of Carthage.—In spite of all these weaknesses, the struggle against Carthage was the most serious which Rome ever had, for the following reasons:

(1) The Carthaginians, though weak to attack, could defend themselves with all the desperate persistency of the Semitic races; the horrors of the last siege of Carthage remind us continually of the defence of Jerusalem against Titus. And in Carthage itself, in Lilybaeum, and elsewhere, Rome found that she had to reduce fortresses of the first rank.

(2) By what seems a kind of historical miracle, there arose, among the corrupt oligarchy of Carthage, a family of unparalleled military genius. Only in this way can we explain the strange fact, that the very same troops who, under other leaders, were almost uniformly unsuccessful against Rome, were, under Hamilcar and Hannibal, almost uniformly successful.

(3) Rome herself had dangerous enemies; and it was because the genius of Hannibal knew how to enlist Gauls and Samnites against her, that he was able, unsupported by his own government, to maintain the war so long.

The Punic War the Result of the Conquest of Italy.—The outbreak of hostilities between Rome and Carthage is a striking illustration of the uselessness of treaties when national interests come into collision. Rome had been an ally of Carthage 250 years before;[1] and their alliance had been recently renewed against Pyrrhus, although under conditions

[1] I have accepted the early date (509) for the treaty between Rome and Carthage, copied from an inscription by Polybius; Mommsen, however, places it in 348.

which showed that the Romans were already apprehensive of their allies getting a foothold in Italy. Hitherto the states had had no reason to quarrel, and every reason to be friendly, for the Romans were not commercial rivals, while, in subduing the Greek cities of Italy, they were subduing those who had long been Carthage's enemies. But when Rome was acknowledged as mistress and champion of the Greek states, she naturally took over their enmity against Carthage, and within ten years of their last alliance, the Romans and the Carthaginians had almost come into armed collision at Tarentum (272). This was now to happen in reality; in Sicily, as in Italy, Rome appeared as the ally of Greek independence against Carthaginian aggression.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

The Mamertines at Messana.—About twenty years before the beginning of the First Punic War (289), a band of mercenaries, who had been in the service of the Sicilian tyrant, Agathocles, seized the city of Messana, and made it a centre of piracy. They were not seriously threatened so long as the leading Greek city, Syracuse, was weakened by faction; but when, about 270, Hiero made himself king of Syracuse, he set himself seriously to reduce these "Mamertines" (or children of Mars, as they called themselves), who were a trouble to all their neighbours. He soon began to press them hard, and they were compelled to look outside for help; some of them wished to appeal to Carthage, and others to Rome; the Carthaginians were the nearer, and occupied Messana with a garrison, while the negotiations with Rome were still pending. The Senate had greatly hesitated to receive the offer of the Mamertines to admit a Roman garrison; Rome was in alliance with Carthage, and the bad character of the Mamertines was notorious; but the people had no such scruples as to promising help, and one of the consuls of 264 was sent to give it.

The Romans knew they were entering on war with Carthage; but the political instincts of the people were right, for a Carthaginian garrison on the Sicilian Straits would have been a dangerous menace to the peace of Italy.

Periods in the First Punic War.—The long war which follows divides itself naturally into four periods:

264–261. The Romans reduce Sicily, except the Carthaginian strongholds in the West.

260–253. The Romans build a fleet, and carry the war into Africa with varying success.

252–249. The Romans prosecute the war in Sicily, but fail to take Lilybaeum.

248–241. Both sides are exhausted, and for six years nothing decisive is attempted. Then, by a final effort, the Romans build another fleet and end the war.

The First Period (264-261). Capture of Messana.—The consul, Appius Claudius, in spite of some misfortunes at first, dislodged Hanno and his Carthaginian garrison from Messana; the unlucky commander was put to death at Carthage for his ill success. The Romans succeeded in defeating both the Carthaginians and their ally, Hiero, in battle—an omen of the ultimate result of the war—but beyond the capture of Messana, little was actually effected.

The Greek Cities join Rome.—In the next year, however, the war took a decisive turn. Hiero, having been once defeated, entered into alliance with the Romans, an alliance which was loyally observed by him for nearly fifty years; most of the Greek cities, too, rallied to the side of the Romans. Carthage put forth its strength for a decisive effort, and a great army was raised and concentrated, under a general named Hannibal, at Agrigentum; this city, not far from the south coast of Sicily, had once been the second in the island, and was still important. The Roman consuls boldly invested it; with their Sicilian auxiliaries, their forces numbered 100,000 men; and in spite of the desperate efforts of the besieged, and the advance of another Carthaginian army to relieve the city, they maintained their lines. The Romans were suffering from both plague and famine, and are said to have lost 30,000 men; but the Carthaginians suffered still more, and, after seven months, were compelled to give up the struggle, cut their way out, and abandon Agrigentum. This decisive victory, dearly bought though it was, practically decided the war in Sicily. Carthage henceforth only held out desperately in a few strongholds in the West of the island.

The Roman government, however, soon saw that to reduce these, and to protect the Greeks who had joined them, it was necessary to obtain the command of the sea;

and so, with marvellous energy, they set to work to build a fleet.

The Second Period (260–253). The Romans build a Fleet.—With this event the Second Period of the war begins. The Romans had had a navy for some time, but it contained no vessels of a size equal to the huge Carthaginian quinqueremes. One of these had been driven on shore, and was now used as a model; and within two months the Romans had ready for sea a fleet of 100 quinqueremes and thirty triremes. They drew their crews largely from their allies,[1] and are said to have trained their inexperienced oarsmen by making them row on platforms on the shore. But they knew well how inferior their fleet must be in all sea manœuvres; and they prepared, by an ingenious device, to make the fighting at sea as much like fighting on land as possible. On the prow of each Roman vessel was erected a wooden gangway, thirty-six feet long, and broad enough for two men to cross abreast; this was hung from the mast by a pulley, and provided with a sharp spike below; it was called "*corvus*," and was so arranged that it could be rapidly lowered on the deck of any hostile ship that approached, and, grappling it by the spike, hold the two vessels together; the Roman soldiers could then board.

Naval Victory at Mylae.—This device fully answered the expectations of its inventors. When the consuls of the year 260 put to sea, the first division of seventeen ships fell in with a superior force of the Carthaginians and were all captured; but the second consul, Gaius Duilius, advanced at once with the main body, and attacked the Punic fleet, which was plundering the coast near Mylae. The Carthaginians were so confident of success, that they neglected all precautions, and the Roman corvi took them completely by surprise. Duilius gained a decisive victory, and captured or destroyed fifty of the enemies' vessels. The Romans were overjoyed, and not only granted Duilius a triumph, but conferred unusual honours on him; the Columna Rostrata,

[1] Cf. the special name, "*socii navales*," given to the crews of Roman fleets. Probably the whole story of the stranded Carthaginian vessel is a fiction, and the ships as well as the crews were furnished by Rome's Greek allies.

so called because adorned with the beaks of the captured ships, was erected at Rome to commemorate the battle.

The Roman Victory of Ecnomus.—The result of the change in the command of the sea became at once apparent. In the next year (259) the Romans attacked Corsica and Sardinia, and gained some successes, though these were not of much importance; and in 258 they actually ventured to make descents on the coast of Africa. The success of these, and still more the suggestions of their Greek allies, who knew that Carthage was most vulnerable at home, encouraged them to make a decisive effort to change the seat of war. They built a huge fleet of 330 large vessels, with crews of 300 each, and put on board two consular armies of nearly 40,000 men. The Carthaginians had made counter preparations on an equal scale, and the two fleets met off Ecnomus (256), on the southern shore of Sicily. The battle which followed was probably the greatest naval engagement of antiquity. The Romans, as usual, were out-manœuvred; they advanced in four divisions, of which the three first were drawn up in a wedge-like formation, and the fourth was a reserve; but by their superior skill the Carthaginian sailors succeeded in separating the Roman divisions, and a threefold battle ensued. The bravery of the Romans, and the irresistible corvi, however, more than compensated for Carthaginian seamanship. The Romans gained a complete victory, sank thirty vessels, and captured sixty-four. What was even more important, the way to Africa was open.

It is impossible to explain the Roman success except by supposing the Carthaginian navy had outlived its reputation; probably corruption among its officers and the peculation of officials had impaired its efficiency. The Punic fleet at Ecnomus was superior in numbers, and fought in a position chosen by its leaders; yet, in spite of all, it was badly beaten. The corvi would not have been dangerous to a really efficient enemy when once the surprise at their novelty had passed. We must remember, however, that the Carthaginian fleet was largely manned by slaves.

Roman successes in Africa.—The Romans, on arriving in Africa, found the open country at their mercy. They spread their ravages far and wide over this fertile and highly culti-

vated district, and took, it is said, as many as 20,000 captives, who were sold as slaves. Their booty was carried to the fortress of Clupea on the coast, where they established their base of operations.

But the Romans now in their turn began to suffer from over-confidence. One of the consuls and two of the legions were withdrawn, and Regulus was left, with the wholly insufficient force of two legions, to carry on the war. At first he continued to be successful; he defeated the unskilful leaders sent against him, and occupied Tunes, which was within ten miles of Carthage. The subjects, too, of the Carthaginians, especially the Numidians, were breaking into revolt, and Carthage itself was beginning to suffer from hunger. The government attempted to negotiate, but Regulus, feeling sure of success, proposed terms so exorbitant that it was impossible to accept them.

Defeat of Regulus. — In their despair the Carthaginians made a fresh effort, and entrusted their armies to Xanthippus, a Spartan, who had been trained in the school of Alexander's successors, and had recently arrived as a soldier of fortune. He forced Regulus to fight on the plain, where the Carthaginian cavalry and elephants could manœuvre freely, and, by a skilful use of these great beasts, he completely defeated the Romans. Their army was shattered; only 2,000 escaped to Clupea, and Regulus himself was taken prisoner. So great was the moral effect of this defeat that the Romans did not again, during this war, ever become really dangerous in Africa; they contented themselves next year with bringing off from Clupea the survivors of their defeated army (255). In order to do even this, they had to win another hard-fought naval victory off Cape Hermaeum. The Romans, however, had now to learn by experience that a fleet has other dangers to fear more deadly than actual enemies; they allowed themselves to be caught in a tremendous storm off the harbourless south coast of Sicily, and three-fourths of their vessels were completely destroyed.

Capture of Panormus.—Rome at once rose to meet the emergency. In three months she built 220 new ships, and resumed the offensive. The Carthaginians, who thought her power broken, and who were occupied in punishing their

revolted subjects in Africa, were taken by surprise, and the Romans gained a decisive success by capturing Panormus (Palermo), one of the three great Punic fortresses in West Sicily. Encouraged by this, in the next year (253) the Romans attacked Africa once more; but they failed to obtain a foothold, and on their return home were caught by another storm, and lost more than 150 vessels. For the rest of the war the Romans left Africa unmolested.

Third Period (253–249). Carthaginian Defeat at Panormus.—The Third Period of the war began with a time of inaction, for both sides were exhausted. But in 251 the Carthaginians made a great effort, and sent a strong army, with 130 elephants, to recover Panormus. They no longer, however, had a Xanthippus for commander, and were completely defeated in a great battle under the walls of the city. The Roman general, Caecilius Metellus, celebrated such a splendid triumph as Rome had never seen, in which 104 captive elephants were a prominent feature.[1]

Fruitless Siege of Lilybaeum.—Encouraged by the victory of Panormus, the Romans built another fleet (250), their third during the war, and proceeded to attack Lilybaeum. This town, strong at once by nature and by art, was garrisoned by 10,000 soldiers under a bold and skilful general, Himilco. Every device of the besieger's art was employed in vain; mines were met by countermines; as fast as the battering rams made a breach in the walls, the besieged raised fresh walls behind; and, in spite of desperate fighting, the Romans gained no ground. Carthaginian vessels, aided by their superior seamanship, ran the blockade which the Romans were attempting to maintain, and the besiegers suffered as much as the besieged from lack of provisions. Finally, at the close of the year, Himilco took advantage of a strong west wind to make a sally in force, and set the

[1] It is at this point that Roman historians introduce the story of the heroic behaviour of the prisoner Regulus. He was sent, with a Carthaginian embassy, to persuade his countrymen to make peace, or, at least, to exchange prisoners; but he dissuaded the Romans from all negotiations, and returned to Carthage to meet the death of torture which he knew was in store for him. The tale has been immortalized by Horace (*Odes* iii. 5); but Polybius says nothing of it, and the authorities for it are all late. Regulus seems to have died a natural death while a prisoner.

Roman siege works on fire; their war machines and war towers were destroyed, and they were compelled to turn the siege into a blockade. This, of course, was useless, so long as the Carthaginians could introduce provisions by sea.

Roman Naval Disasters.—The consul of the next year (249), Publius Claudius, saw this clearly, and attempted to surprise the enemies' fleet in the harbour of Drepana. It was too bold an enterprise in the face of a skilful enemy, and Roman caution attempted to check the consul by the report that the auspices of the sacred chickens were unfavourable; but Claudius, with the proverbial pride and impiety of his family, disregarded all warnings. The result was a fearful disaster; for, instead of surprising the Carthaginians, the Roman fleet was caught between the enemy and the shore, and only thirty vessels escaped out of 210; ninety-three vessels and 20,000 prisoners were taken. So great was the alarm at Rome that Claudius was compelled to nominate a dictator; he contemptuously named his own freedman, but the Senate rejected this nomination, and took on itself to appoint his successor. Claudius, on the expiration of his consulship, was prosecuted and heavily fined, and, according to some accounts, committed suicide. But the disasters of the year were not yet over; the other consul, Junius Pullus, attempted with 120 ships of war to convey a fleet of 800 transports along the south coast, to the army before Lilybaeum. He was met by a Carthaginian force and suffered much loss; what was much more serious, he was so delayed that he was caught by a storm and the whole of his fleet, except two vessels, was wrecked; most of the crews, however, escaped.

The Romans had thus lost their third fleet, and for a time gave up the struggle by sea; but they refused to make peace, and Junius gained a considerable success by surprising the temple of Venus on Mount Eryx, near Drepana; from this strong position the Romans could partly blockade the Carthaginian stronghold, and prevent the enemies' forays upon the open country.

How terrible were the Roman losses at this period may be judged from the fact that the number of citizens fell off more than 50,000 (some 15 per cent) during this

lustrum (252–247); hence it is not surprising that the Fourth Period of the war at first is marked by comparative inactivity on both sides, for Carthage too was exhausted.

Fourth Period (248–241). Rise of Hamilcar Barca.—War operations for a time were confined to ravaging raids in Sicily, and to privateering against the coasts of Italy and of Africa; the Carthaginians held their strongholds of Lilybaeum and Drepana, while the Romans were masters of the rest of Sicily, and refused to give up the blockade of the enemies' fortresses, although they had no hope of reducing these, unless they could once more make themselves masters of the sea. But the struggles of these desultory years are redeemed from obscurity by the appearance of a great man on the Carthaginian side. Hamilcar Barca, the father of Hannibal, was equally distinguished as a general and a statesman; by his personal influence over the Carthaginian mercenaries he, to some extent, made up for their lack of patriotism; and, by the boldness of his plans, he perplexed and baffled the Roman generals. He seized Mount Hercte, near Panormus, and from that position, impregnable so long as it could be provisioned from the sea, he ravaged Sicily and directed descents on the coast of Italy. The Romans endeavoured to protect themselves by fresh maritime colonies; the position of two of these, Alsium and Fregenae, in the immediate neighbourhood of Rome, showed how bold the Carthaginians privateers had become. In 244 Hamilcar suddenly shifted his position, and occupied the town of Eryx; as the Romans held both the foot and the summit of the mountain, the new position was a dangerous one, but it had direct access from the sea, and by it Hamilcar paralyzed the Roman operations against Drepana.

Decisive Victory off the Aegatian Islands.—The Senate saw that a decisive effort must be made; the treasury was exhausted and the currency was debased; but individual patriotism came to the relief of the state, and in 242 a fresh fleet of 200 vessels was fitted out from funds furnished by wealthy citizens; this was the fourth fleet built by the Romans during this war. The consul, C. Lutatius Catulus,

sailed with them for Drepana, and carefully trained his crews for a decisive struggle: this soon came, for the Carthaginians were compelled to attempt the relief of their strongholds, unless they were prepared to see them fall. Early in the following year a heavily laden fleet set sail from Carthage; they intended to land their stores and to take Hamilcar on board before they met the enemy, but Catulus was too quick for them; he attacked them, encumbered as they were, and gained a decisive victory off the Aegatian Islands.

Terms of the Peace.—The war was over, for Carthage had not the energy of Rome, and could not raise another fleet. It only remained for Hamilcar to make the best terms possible: the Carthaginians agreed to evacuate Sicily, to restore all Roman deserters, and to pay 2,200 talents within twenty years. The Senate and people, in ratifying these terms, increased the war indemnity to 3,200 talents, and shortened the period of payment to ten years.

The result of the war then was, that Carthage lost Sicily; but her hold on this had always been precarious, and her real power was not seriously impaired. The Romans, on their side, had gained their first province beyond the seas; King Hiero was left in possession of his dominions, but the rest of Sicily became an "estate" of the Roman people. It was governed by a praetor (or possibly, at first, a quaestor) sent annually from Rome; its local government was unaltered, except that a new ruler had taken the place of the Carthaginians, and received as tribute a tithe of the yearly produce, and customs duties of five per cent. on all imports and exports.

Italy had suffered terribly during the war, but we hear nothing of discontent among Rome's allies. Rome herself had shown that bull-dog perseverance which was to carry her through the still more terrible struggle of the next generation, when it was finally to be settled that she, and not Carthage, was to be mistress in the Western Mediterranean.

CHAPTER XV.

THE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PUNIC WARS (241–219)

Rome's Wars between 241 and 219.—Immediately after the Punic War was over, the town of Falerii revolted; as might have been expected, the revolt failed completely, and was crushed in six days. The Romans, however, enjoyed very little peace during the interval before their next great struggle with Carthage. It is true that, in the year 235, they closed the temple of Janus for the second time, as if they thought their wars were over, but within three years, at least, they were again fighting. The wars of this period divide themselves into three groups:

(1) In Sardinia and Corsica.
(2) Against the Gauls and Ligurians.
(3) In the Adriatic.

These overlap each other in date, but it is better to treat them separately.

The "Merciless War" in Africa.—The wars in Sardinia and Corsica grew indirectly out of the first Punic War. The peace which had concluded this had been only the beginning of misfortunes to Carthage. Her mercenaries during the Punic War had been frequently treacherous, and even the great Hamilcar had been obliged to repress mutiny among them by the most terrible punishments. Now that the government was discredited by defeat, and the exhausted treasury could not meet its obligations, the troops which had returned from Sicily, and were waiting for their pay, broke into revolt. The war which followed lasted three years, and was so distinguished by every circumstance of

horror that Polybius calls it "the merciless war" (ἄσπονδος πόλεμος). The mercenaries were joined by the subjects of Carthage, who had their own wrongs to revenge. The Government, after the defeat of Regulus, had inflicted the most terrible punishment on those who had joined the Romans, and had crucified three thousand of them. Now the whole of the Libyan towns, and almost the whole of the Phœnician ones, rose in revolt. One man alone saved Carthage. Hamilcar Barca, by his military skill, by his clemency at first, and by unsparing cruelty afterwards, restored confidence among his countrymen, and finally crushed the rebellion.

The Romans seize Sardinia and Corsica.—This war exhausted Carthage, and it also brought her once more into collision with Rome. The mercenaries in Sardinia had revolted soon after the mutiny in Africa had begun, and had appealed to Rome for assistance against the natives of the island. Rome refused to treat with them, but proceeded (in 238) to conquer the island on her own account. Carthage had now her hands free, and was preparing to recover her lost possession, but she was met by a threat of war, and also by a complaint that she had interfered with Roman commerce. The ground for this was that the Roman blockade-runners had supplied the insurgents in Africa with provisions and stores, and, when caught by the ships of the Carthaginian Government, had been treated with the utmost severity. Rome had little moral right on her side, but she was the stronger, and Carthage was compelled to cede her rights in Sardinia and Corsica, and to pay 1,200 talents in addition to the former indemnity.

This conduct on the part of the Roman Government is said to have been the cause of the undying hatred of the house of Barca to Rome. Hamilcar swore to be avenged, and bequeathed his hatred to his son Hannibal. But it may fairly be questioned whether Rome's conduct was not politically justifiable. She had some legal right on her side, she knew that the struggle must be renewed, and she was strengthening herself in every way for it. Carthage certainly would never, under any circumstances, have forgiven her

defeat in the first Punic War and her loss of Sicily, and the Romans knew this. Sardinia and Corsica seemed to them as necessary for their own safety as Alsace and Lorraine did to the Germans in 1871.

Sardinia and Corsica formed into a Province.—It was long, however, before the Romans really reduced these islands. The mountains in the centre rendered military operations difficult, and the Carthaginians no doubt secretly supported the natives in their resistance. The Romans claimed that the work of conquest was completed in 235, but we find consular armies repeatedly employed in Sardinia afterwards, and campaigning there was one of the great sources from which the Roman slave-market drew its supplies. Finally, in 231, the Romans united Sardinia and Corsica into a second province, and four years later (227) two new praetors were appointed to govern Sicily and Sardinia.

Agrarian Law of Flaminius.—Much more serious were the Gallic wars, which also grew indirectly out of the Punic War. The Carthaginian armies were largely recruited with Gallic mercenaries, and the cessation of hostilities left these free to return home and to threaten Italy once more. Already, in 236, the Boii had begun to move, but internal dissensions among them averted the threatening danger from Italy. Roman statesmen, however, saw that the frontier needed strengthening, and in 232 the popular leader, Gaius Flaminius, came forward with a proposal to plant Roman settlers in the land of the Senones, which had been left uninhabited, and used for pasture, since its devastation in 283. The plan of Flaminius seems to have been wise and statesmanlike, but it was bitterly attacked; the Roman governing classes found this large stretch of grass land most profitable, and objected to give it up. Hence Flaminius found it impossible to get the consent of the Senate to his proposal, and, according to the constitutional custom of Rome, could proceed no further; but he was not a man to stick at forms, and ignoring all precedents, he brought his proposal before the Comitia Tributa at once, and carried it through. The result was a great increase of popularity for Flaminius, and, at the same time, a deadly hostility between him and the governing classes.

Renewed Wars with the Gauls. — For the moment the result of Flaminius' measure was an unexpected one; the Gauls construed what was only a measure of protection on the part of Rome into a threat of aggression, and began to prepare for a general attack on Italy. The Boii on the south-east of the Po, and the Insubres on its upper course, were joined by the Gaesatae, a kind of "free company" of warriors from beyond the Alps. The Romans, however, as usual, had allies among the races with whom they were at war; the Cenomani, on the modern Mincio and Adige, were hostile to the rest of their countrymen, and the Veneti supported the Romans against their old enemies, the Gauls.

The Military Strength of Italy.—The storm did not burst for some years; but, in 225, the Gauls began to pour South, and the alarm was great in Rome; human sacrifices were ordered by the Sibylline Books, and, in spite of their un-Roman character, were actually carried out. Four armies were raised, so that over 200,000 men were under arms, and at the same time a survey was made of the whole available fighting force of Rome; it was found that, among the Romans and their allies, there were altogether more than 700,000 footmen, and about 70,000 horsemen;[1] and in a crisis like this, Roman and Italian fought side by side to defend their homes.

The Gauls defeated at Telamon.—The Gauls succeeded in evading the Roman armies by entering Etruria along the west coast, and reached Clusium, only three days' march from Rome; they defeated the first army that overtook them, but, finding the Romans closing in on every side, they retreated by the road along which they had come, hoping to reach Gaul with their booty. Their path, however, was barred by another consular army, which had just returned from Sardinia: driven to bay, the Gauls drew up their forces, to face both enemies at once, and a terrible battle was fought near Telamon; one of the consuls fell, but the Romans gained a complete victory, which was very largely due to the superiority of their weapons and to their discipline. 40,000 of the Gauls are said to have fallen, and

[1] *Polybius* ii. 24.

the spirit of the rest was so broken that they retired, without further fighting, to their homes in the valley of the Po.

The Romans subdue the Valley of the Po. — Hither, next year (224), the Romans followed them, and crossed the Po; the Boii submitted. Flaminius, the democratic leader, was consul in 223; he attacked the Insubres, and in spite of reverses at first, succeeded in winning a decisive victory. It was fortunate for him that he did so, as his enemies at home had sought to prevent him from gaining distinction by raising religious difficulties as to his election; and, on the very day of the action, he received a letter from the Senate forbidding him to fight, which (acting on Nelson's principle at Copenhagen) he did not read until the battle had been fought and won.

The war ended next year, when the Roman armies took Mediolanum (Milan), the capital of the Insubres, and penetrated to the foot of the Alps. In this campaign the consul, M. Claudius Marcellus, slew the Gallic king Virdumarus, and gained the *spolia opima* for the third time in Roman history at Clastidium (222 B.C.).

Roman Colonies among the Gauls.—All the land as far as the Alps was now nominally subject to, or in dependent alliance with, the Romans; they proceeded at once to secure it in their usual way. Latin colonies were planted at Placentia and Cremona in 218, and Flaminius, as censor (220), completed his victory as consul by carrying his great road (the Via Flaminia) north-east from Rome to Ariminum. The complete reduction of the valley of the Po was delayed by the second Punic War, but the importance of the victories now won cannot be over-estimated. When Hannibal invaded Italy, he found the Gallic tribes broken in strength and cowed in spirit; even as they were, they afforded him great assistance, but they would have been still more terrible but for the lesson of Telamon.

The First Illyrian War (229).—Rome had one more enemy to subdue during this interval between the Punic wars. The advance of her power in north-east Italy had brought on her the responsibility of maintaining order in the northern Adriatic. The peace of this sea was continually threatened by the Illyrian pirates, who, at that period. as so often in

later times, took advantage of the strong positions on their dangerous coast to harrass the commerce of their neighbours; they had recently become so bold as to ravage the coasts of the Peloponnese. Two wars were fought against them. The first of these was provoked by Illyrian attacks on Roman commerce, and by the murder of the Roman ambassadors, sent to demand reparation; it was soon finished, for the Illyrian queen, Teuta, was betrayed by her own general, Demetrius of Pharos, and was easily reduced. The traitor received as his reward the guardianship of Teuta's young step-son, who was appointed to succeed her in most of her dominions; and the Greek cities of Corcyra and Epidamnus, which were delivered from their Illyrian foes, became the "allies and friends" of Rome. Governors (*praefecti*) seem to have been sent to these places, which were under the general superintendence of the Italian magistrates.

Second Illyrian War.—Demetrius proved as false to the Romans as he had done to his own queen; but it was nearly ten years before the Romans punished him in the Second Illyrian War (219). In the meantime he had formed a close alliance with the king of Macedonia, and in defiance of the treaty of 228, which confined Illyrian ships to the N. of the Adriatic, he carried his plundering raids right round into the Aegean. The Romans in 221 subdued his allies, the Istrians, who lived in the promontory at the head of the Adriatic, and in 219 the consul, L. Aemilius Paullus, took Pharos. Demetrius fled to the court of Philip V. of Macedon, where he stirred up that monarch to hostility against Rome.

Rome's First Conquests outside Italy and the Islands.—These Illyrian wars are in themselves quite unimportant, but they are the beginning of three important departures in Roman history:

(1) Rome's victories in Italy were involving her in responsibility for the peace of the sea; of all her national duties, this was the one which she least efficiently fulfilled.

(2) The campaign of 229, and still more that of 219, gained for Rome her first foothold on the continent of Europe outside Italy; it was many years before this

developed into the province of Illyricum; but the fact showed that Rome was destined to be a European, and not merely an Italian power.

(3) Rome's defeat of the pirates brought her into active relations with the Greeks; she seemed their natural protecto. against their Macedonian foes. Hence the Athenians made the Romans honorary citizens, and admitted them to the Eleusinian mysteries, and Corinth threw open to them the Isthmian games.

The Greeks were soon to find that their new deliverer was only another mistress; but for the present all was friendly, and Rome had nearly twenty years of life-and-death struggle to go through before she could reap, in Hellas and elsewhere the fruits of her recent victories.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE (216)

The Second Punic is the War of the Barcine family against Rome.—The Romans had expected that the struggle with Carthage would be renewed; they had not expected that Carthage herself would be the aggressor; they knew well the strength and the weakness of their rival under her ordinary leaders, but they failed to realize the influence which one family of heroes could exert. The Roman state did not encourage genius; within the circle of the aristocracy all were equal, and pre-eminent ability in individual citizens was checked by the limitation of the periods of command, and by the all-pervading influence of the Senate. In the Second Punic War, the Romans found, by bitter experience, how inefficient were their amateur generals and their citizen soldiers, when matched against a general of genius and a trained soldiery; and the war dragged on, until Rome in her turn found a man of genius in Scipio.

Policy of Hamilcar in Spain.—Hamilcar Barca had sworn to be revenged on his country's conqueror, but he knew that in Carthage he could not find the material and the men for another struggle; he therefore set to work to found in Spain a new empire, which would give him what he needed; he tried to "call in a new world to redress the balance of the old." He and his family were not popular with the governing oligarchy at Carthage, but his enemies let him go to Spain, probably only too glad to be rid of him. This compromise was fatal to both parties; on the one hand, the attack of the Barcine family on Rome lost what chance of success it had (and perhaps this was great

at one time), because it was not loyally supported by the Carthaginian government. On the other hand, that government found itself involved in a war, in which either victory or defeat was equally certain to be fatal.

Carthaginian Progress in Spain.—Hamilcar went to Spain in 236, taking with him his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, and his son, the great Hannibal, now eleven years old; according to the story told by himself forty years later, he was made by his father solemnly to swear hostility to the Romans. Hamilcar rapidly turned the Carthaginian trading settlements in Spain into the beginnings of a great military power, and, during his eight years of command, he carried the Carthaginian arms over the valley of the Baetis, and some distance along the south-east coast. On his death in 228, Hasdrubal succeeded him and continued his work, although, in his case, it was the skill of the diplomat, rather than the sword of the general, that was employed. He founded the town of Nova Carthago (Cartagena), on the south-east coast, and transferred to it from Gades the centre of Punic power in Spain: it was a significant foundation; Gades was identified with the old mercantile oligarchy, whose days were past; New Carthage was the symbol of the fighting power, almost a despotism, which had taken its place.

Roman Treaty with Hasdrubal.—The Roman Senate was busy elsewhere, but it could not fail to hear of the advance of Rome's old enemy in a new quarter. Accordingly a treaty was concluded with Hasdrubal, by which the Ebro was fixed as the boundary of the Carthaginian and the Roman spheres of influence. Such delimitations, then as now, were not likely to be observed as soon as one or the other power felt itself strong enough to transgress them; the treaty was never even ratified by the Carthaginian Senate; and the Romans, on their part, proceeded to violate its spirit by forming an alliance with Saguntum, a city nominally of Greek origin, which lay in the Carthaginian sphere of influence, to the south of the Ebro.

The Capture of Saguntum the cause of the Second Punic War.—The collision was precipitated by the assassination of Hasdrubal in 221; the army at once elected Hannibal to succeed him, and the Carthaginian government had to

acquiesce. The influence of the family of Barca, and the profits of Spanish trade and Spanish booty, had formed a party in Carthage too strong to be restrained; but the government, which was led by Hanno "the Great," the old rival of Hamilcar, knew that the change of command meant war with Rome. Hannibal at once set to work to insure this; pushing the Carthaginian influence northward, he came into collision with the Saguntines, forced a quarrel on them, and proceeded to attack them. The town was defended with the desperation which has always, in both ancient and modern times, marked Spanish resistance, but after eight months, it was reduced and sacked. The unhappy inhabitants had in vain appealed to Rome for assistance; she did nothing but send an embassy to protest; the result of this weakness was a terrible blow to Roman prestige in Spain, and the transference of the war to Rome's own territory.

The Question of Right in the Second Punic War. — When Saguntum had fallen, Rome sent a second embassy to demand reparation; but the warlike enthusiasm of Carthage was kindled, the Roman demand was refused, and the Roman envoy was told he might give them "Peace or War," as he pleased. "We give you War" was his laconic reply, and thus dramatically opened the greatest struggle of antiquity.

With regard to the rights and wrongs of the struggle, it is difficult to speak positively; Hannibal was certainly the aggressor, as he attacked a city which Rome had admitted to her alliance. The Romans were always loud in their reproaches against "Punic faith"; but the attack on Saguntum is far more justifiable than the seizure of Sardinia: when two powers are fighting for very existence, it is opportunity, and not the letter of treaty obligations, which determines the aggressor.

Hannibal's Attack on Italy a Surprise to the Romans.—The Romans had entirely miscalculated the danger; they proposed that one of the consuls, P. Cornelius Scipio, should go to meet Hannibal in Spain, while the other, Ti. Sempronius Longus, was to carry the war into Africa; no doubt they expected for him the success of a Regulus and a speedy end of the war. They were terribly mistaken; Scipio sailed to

Massilia, but on landing in Gaul, found, to his surprise, that Hannibal had already crossed the Pyrenees, and was preparing to force the passage of the Rhone. In spite of the opposition of the Volcae, he succeeded in doing this, before Scipio had begun to move northward with the main body of his army. The Roman consul, finding that the enemy had three days' start of him, and that they were moving north-east towards the Alps, declined to follow them further; he sent his brother with his army into Spain, while he himself returned to Italy, to raise a new army, and to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. Scipio seems to have been a commander of some genius; his sending his army into Spain was a piece of brilliant strategy, and more than anything else saved Rome; for, by thus striking at Hannibal's base of operations, he cut off those reinforcements which the Carthaginian had expected from his brother Hasdrubal in Spain, and the want of which spoiled the effect of his great victories in Italy.

Hannibal's Crossing of the Alps (218).—For the moment, however, Hannibal was left unmolested, and he pushed forward to encounter a difficulty, more formidable than any human foe, the passage of the Alps. He followed the course of the Rhone beyond its junction with the Isère, and then turned eastwards and began the ascent. Twice during its course he was in serious danger from the attacks of the mountaineers, but in spite of all difficulties, he gained, on the ninth day, the summit of the Little St. Bernard[1]; it was now about the end of September. The descent was unimpeded by the enemy, but presented even greater natural difficulties, for in one place the track had been swept away by an avalanche or a landslip; however, after seven days of hardship, Hannibal's army reached the foot of the Alps. It had suffered terribly in the crossing: he had started from Nova Carthago with 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry; but only 50,000 of the former, and 9,000 of the latter, were left after the crossing of the Pyrenees. Now only half of these

[1] I have followed Mommsen in supposing that Polybius is describing this as the pass by which Hannibal crossed; by it he descended into the Val d'Aosta. Livy makes him take a more southern route, and come down among the Taurini, *i.e.* on Turin.

remained, and Hannibal, with 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, found himself about to attack the greatest military power of antiquity. Everything about the Carthaginian general is wonderful; the boldness of his conception of invading Italy, was equalled by the skill with which he overcame all obstacles in reaching that country. We cannot but wonder, however, that Hannibal adopted a plan, which involved so terrible a loss; perhaps the resistance at the Rhone and among the Alpine tribes, was unexpected by him, and, delaying as it did his march till the season was far advanced, increased the difficulties of his crossing. At any rate, Hasdrubal, eleven years later, does not seem to have found, in crossing the Alps, the difficulties which had so weakened his brother.

The Battle of Ticinus.—Hannibal, after giving his troops a few days' rest, proceeded at once to attack the Taurini, and stormed their capital; this success immediately brought him allies, and he moved East to meet Scipio, who, landing at Genoa, had taken command of the Roman forces in the valley of the Po. These were decidedly inferior to Hannibal's, and their task was rendered the more difficult by the open or concealed hostility of the Gallic tribes; but Scipio advanced to meet Hannibal, probably hoping to crush him before his troops had recovered from the passage of the Alps. He was grievously mistaken; as he was reconnoitring with his cavalry, he fell in with Hannibal, engaged in a similar errand, on the river Ticinus, a tributary running into the Po from the Lacus Verbanus (Lake Maggiore). The forces at once engaged, and the Romans, inferior in numbers and efficiency, were badly beaten, and their leader wounded. This combat might have taught the Romans two lessons, that they had to deal with an enemy very different from the one they had conquered in the first Punic War, and that in cavalry and light-armed troops, they were completely over-matched. Scipio did learn these lessons, but he was almost disabled by his wounds, and his term of office was nearly up; two years of far more terrible defeats were needed, before the Romans as a nation were taught prudence.

Scipio's Retreat on Placentia.—The consul, in spite of his wounds, showed great skill in extricating his army from the

perilous position into which he had brought it; he fell back rapidly on the Po, and succeeded in crossing it, though with some loss, and in breaking down the bridge behind him. He then retreated on Placentia, where, at the junction of the Po with the Trebia, a river flowing north from the Apennines, the Romans had just planted a colony of 6000 men. Thus, for the first, but by no means the last, time in the war, the Roman fortresses gave their beaten armies a firm base of operations. Why Scipio left this base we do not know, but he soon moved his army across to the left bank of the Trebia, and here, in a strong natural position, awaited the approach of reinforcements.

Sempronius' Defeat at the Trebia.—These soon came; his colleague, Sempronius, had gained some successes over a Carthaginian fleet, which had ventured to attack Sicily, and was preparing to cross into Africa, when he was summoned by the Senate to take part in the defence of Italy. He sent his army round to Ariminum by sea, and marching across Cisalpine Gaul, effected a junction with Scipio. But, though he brought reinforcements, he brought also a division of command, which meant defeat; it was in vain that Scipio pointed out that, in their strong position, with their front covered by the Trebia, it was hopeless for Hannibal to attack them; while, unless he could gain a decisive victory, the invader, even if undefeated, must perish for lack of supplies, and from the desertion of the Gauls. Sempronius, confident from his recent successes, and eager to have the credit of crushing Hannibal himself, before his year of office expired, was resolved on fighting; Hannibal was equally eager to give him the opportunity which he sought, and the result was a defeat far more decisive than that of the Ticinus. The Romans, on a bleak December morning, were hurried, unbreakfasted, through the ice-cold stream, to attack an enemy who was supposed to be fleeing; instead of this, they found him waiting to receive them, with his troops rested, and well fed. But though they were weary before the fight began, and though their cavalry was beaten at once, the Roman infantry fought stubbornly on; it was only by an ambush in their rear that Hannibal at last broke their courage. Even then 10,000 of them cut their way through


CLASTIDIUM
PLACENTIA
RIVER PO
RIVER TREBIA
A Roman Camp
B Hannibal's Camp
C Roman Legions
D Roman Cavalry
E Roman Light Armed
F Hannibal's Infantry
G Hannibal's Cavalry & Elephants
H Hannibal's Light Armed
I Ambush
Roman Army
Hannibal's Army

the enemy, and reached Placentia in good order, whither they were soon followed by the consuls with the rest of their beaten army.[1]

Results of the First Campaign.—Hannibal was now able to draw abundant supplies and reinforcements from the Gauls round him. He might well feel satisfied with the campaign that was over; he was safe in Italy, and had shown that the Romans were not invincible; even he himself must have felt his confidence in his genius increased, as he remembered the blunders of his opponents. He believed that he had only to wait for the return of spring to cross the Apennines, and raise Central and Southern Italy against Rome, as he had already raised Cisalpine Gaul.

Flaminius assumes the Command.—The Roman consuls for the year 217 were Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius; of these, the former was in command in Umbria, the latter in Etruria, in order that they might bar Hannibal's path, whether he chose to advance by the East or the West side of Italy. Unfortunately for the Romans, there was again division in their camp; Flaminius was a popular leader, but he was the sworn foe of the Senate (p. 100); hence that body had tried, by raising religious and legal difficulties, to prevent him entering on the command to which he had been elected, and he had only evaded these by leaving Rome secretly, in a way most unusual for a consul. He seems to have been a man of capacity and bravery, but he had gained his military experience in a bad school; in fighting against barbarians, it may have been good policy always to attack at once, to "get the enemy on the run, and keep him on the run;" but against an experienced general this impetuous policy was exposed to fearful risks; and Hannibal knew his man, and was certain to take advantage of his rashness.

Hannibal invades Etruria.—The Carthaginian army had tried to cross the Apennines before the winter was over; they failed in their first attempt, but, succeeding in their

[1] I have accepted the account of Livy (xxi. 54–56) that the battle was fought on the right bank; Polybius confirms this. Mommsen, however, puts the battle on the left bank, and Scipio's camp on the right: his reasons are, (1) Sempronius coming from E. joined Scipio unopposed; (2) Hannibal took Clastidium, the Roman magazine, more than 20 miles to W. of Placentia.

second, they were in Etruria before the Romans expected them. Hannibal was resolved on forcing on a battle before the two Roman armies could unite; he therefore marched past Flaminius, and proceeded to lay waste the plains of Etruria. The Roman consul had been appointed to finish off the war at a blow, and believed that he could do it. Irritated by the sight of the enemy's ravages, he started in pursuit, thinking that he had only to come up with the Carthaginians, and victory would be certain. Hence he neglected the most ordinary precautions, and advanced right into the trap which Hannibal had laid for him.

Battle of Lake Trasimene.—This trap was near Lake Trasimene, to the north-west shore of which the mountains approach very close for a time, and then recede, leaving a small plain. In this plain the main Carthaginian army was drawn up on some rising ground, across the line of the Roman advance, while, with his light-armed troops, Hannibal occupied the mountain sides overhanging the road, and his cavalry was sent back to bar the entrance of the pass, as soon as Flaminius had entered on it. The snare was made more complete by the mist which covered the shores of the lake. Flaminius was unaware that the enemy were near till he suddenly saw them before him; he was preparing to attack them, when he found himself attacked in front, flank, and rear. The Roman army, surrounded by enemies on three sides, and with the lake on the fourth, was completely surprised. Flaminius did all that a brave man could, and fell fighting, while his whole army was killed, or compelled to surrender. 6,000 of the irresistible infantry cut their way through; but there was no Placentia on which they could retreat, and next day they too had to surrender to Hannibal's cavalry. The Roman army was annihilated, and to complete the disaster, the cavalry of Servilius, advancing hastily to support Flaminius, was surprised, and the whole force defeated or slain.

Hannibal moves into Apulia.—Rome seemed to lie open to the conqueror, and expected an immediate attack. A dictator, Q. Fabius Maximus, was appointed, and all was prepared for a desperate defence. But Hannibal knew that he was far too weak to carry the capital by assault; now, as

always, his object was to crush Rome by breaking up her confederacy. With this purpose, he again, as after the battle of the Trebia, made a marked distinction between his Roman and his Italian prisoners; the former were harshly treated, the latter dismissed with kind messages to their several states. With the same purpose, he crossed the Apennines, and moved down the east coast into Apulia; it was in the South that Roman dominion was most recent, and it was from the hardy Samnites and Lucanians that Hannibal expected to draw reinforcements.

Fabius' Policy of Cunctatio.—For the present, however, he was disappointed; the allies of the Romans did not revolt, and the dictator, appearing with a new army, followed closely all Hannibal's movements, but rigidly refused to be drawn into a general engagement. His policy was one of caution, for which the geographical features of Italy offered every opportunity; from the slopes of the Apennines Hannibal could be watched in the plains below, and his communications harassed, while it was impossible for him to attack a foe whom he found always entrenched on higher ground and in safe positions. Fabius thus gave the Romans time to recover their confidence; if he did not show them how to beat Hannibal, he at least showed them how to avoid great defeats; and the invader, unless he gained overwhelming successes, was bound soon to exhaust himself. Hence it was not without reason that the Roman contemporary poet, Ennius, praised Fabius as "Cunctator"—"*Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem.*" It was in vain that Hannibal moved across Italy, hoping to have Capua betrayed to him; he was disappointed, and could only ravage the Campanian plain. On trying to regain his base of operations in Apulia, he found himself nearly cut off among the mountains by the watchful Fabius, and only extricated himself by a dexterous stratagem.

The Romans Persist in their Rash Policy.—But the Romans had not yet learned the lesson of prudence. The dictator and the Senate were accused of prolonging the war from selfish motives, and the master of the horse, M. Minucius, was entrusted by the people with an independent command. His rashness nearly led to a great defeat, which Fabius succeeded in averting; but though Minucius at once

resigned the independent position which had been given him, the policy which he had represented still commanded the belief of the Roman Comitia, and the end of the year saw the election, as consul, of the democrat, M. Terentius Varro, a man of neither birth nor military experience, whose only claim to office lay in his hostility to the Senate at home, and to the policy of "cunctatio" in the field. His colleague, Aemilius Paullus, was a man of experience, but unpopular. The battle of the Trebia had shown how fatal was the Roman system of divided command. Hence, though the end of the year 217 saw Hannibal's success checked for the moment, he might well be confident of the next campaign. He was firmly established in South Italy; he had strengthened his army where it was weakest by arming and training his infantry in the Roman fashion, and he had reason to believe that one at least of the consuls was eager to give him the opportunity for a decisive battle. Another victory, he felt sure, must break up the Roman confederacy.

The Romans Advance to Cannae.—The Roman people made preparations for the campaign of 216 on an unusual scale. The army which was to crush Hannibal consisted of eight legions (the numbers of which had been increased by one-fifth; *i.e.* to 5,000 men), 40,000 men in all; there were also an equal number of allies and 6,000 cavalry. In addition to this, a legion was sent north to threaten Hannibal's base of operations in Cisalpine Gaul. The Carthaginian was waiting for the Romans in Apulia, the wide plains of which district were all in favour of his cavalry. Of these he had a superior force (10,000 men), though his infantry was but half as numerous as the Roman. After some manœuvring, the two armies at length found themselves opposite each other in the valley of the Aufidus, near the little town of Cannae. Though the position was most unfavourable to the Romans, owing to their inferiority in cavalry, Varro was resolved to fight at once, and, as he had the command on alternate days, Aemilius was unable to prevent him. Each of the armies had a camp on both sides of the Aufidus, but the battle seems to have taken place on the right bank; it was fought on August 2nd,


CANNAE
and surrounding Country
from Italian Ordnance Survey 1859
Note
The Contour lines and figures represent the height above Sea level in Metres
Romans
Carthaginians
Scale
3 Miles
Adriatic
Sea
R. Ofanto
Old Bridges
Roman Greater Camp
Hannibal's 2nd Camp
Lesser Camp of the Romans
Appian Road
Hannibal's 1st. Camp
Monte di Canne
Fontana di Canne
A Roman cavalry (2000)
a Allied cavalry (4000)
B Roman light armed
C Carthaginian light armed
D Carthaginian heavy cavalry (4000)
d Numidian cavalry (6000

according to the Roman calendar, probably in June according to the season of the year.

Battle of Cannae.—In both armies the cavalry was drawn up on the wings, the infantry in the centre, with the light-armed in front. For a time the Roman infantry, by sheer weight of numbers, drove all before it. The Carthaginian centre, composed of Gauls and Spaniards, gave way; but Hannibal had prepared for this, and his best troops, the Numidians, were in reserve. Hence, when the Roman infantry thought they had broken the enemy's centre, and that the battle was almost won, they found themselves confronted by a new division of fresh troops, while the Gauls and Spaniards re-formed, and returned to attack the flanks of the great Roman column. It was now that the faulty arrangements of the Roman leaders became manifest. In spite of their superior numbers, their forces were nearly surrounded, and, owing to the close formation adopted, the mass of the Romans were unable even to reach the enemy. It was the same mistake which the French marshals made against Wellington. The column is irresistible, if it bear all before it; but if a line is not broken at the first onset, then the column, in turn, suffers from its own unwieldiness. Still the Roman infantry fought gallantly on; but meantime their cavalry had been decisively defeated on both wings, and leaving the light Numidian horse to pursue the Roman fugitives, Hannibal brought his victorious squadrons on the Roman rear. The battle now became a slaughter; the mass of Roman infantry, unable to fight or to flee, was cut down where it stood. Never was victory so complete; at least 50,000[1] of the defeated army fell on the field, while 10,000 more were taken prisoners, mainly those who had been left to guard the camp. Among those who fell were the consul Aemilius Paullus, both the consuls of

[1] The number of killed and prisoners is uncertain; Polybius puts the former at 70,000; Livy makes the number of prisoners and fugitives larger. With regard to the site of the battle, Polybius put it on the right bank of the Aufidus, on which river the left flank of Hannibal and the right of the Romans rested. The plain here is suited for cavalry, though not so low or so level as that on the left of the river, to which many modern authorities transfer the battle.

the preceding year, and at least eighty men of senatorial rank. Not more than 10,000 men, among them the consul Varro, escaped to Canusium and to Venusia.

Hannibal's Delay after Cannae.—It has been a favourite subject for discussion with historians whether Hannibal ought to have advanced at once to Rome. Livy says that his lieutenant, Maharbal, offered to make him master of Rome within five days, and, when Hannibal refused, exclaimed, "*Vincere scis, Hannibal: victoria uti nescis.*" But no doubt the great Carthaginian knew his own trade of war far better than armchair historians. Apart from the fact that he had lost 6,000 men in the battle, Rome was two hundred miles away, and the road across the Apennines was not easy. A surprise was impossible, and, failing this, an advance on Rome could only mean repulse, and possible disaster. All the moral effect of Cannae would thus have been lost. As will be seen in the next chapter, Hannibal was not deceived as to the effect which his crowning victory would have on the Roman allies; one element alone he had miscalculated, the stubborn spirit of the Romans themselves. The momentary despair among the fugitives was checked by the courage of young Scipio (afterwards "Africanus"), and Varro took all the measures of a prudent and brave general to remedy the consequences of his own recklessness. There are few scenes in history more striking than his subsequent return to Rome. The Senate, forgetting their old quarrel with him and all his mistakes, met him, and solemnly thanked him for "not having despaired of the Republic." The result, then, of Hannibal's victory was that the Romans were united once more. They were beaten, but, as they would not own it, they were not beaten. To quote the words which Horace (*Odes* iv. 4, 57 *seq.*) puts in the mouth of Hannibal:

> "Duris ut ilex tonsa bipennibus
> Nigrae feraci frondis in Algido,
> Per damna, per caedes, ab ipso
> Ducit opes animumque ferro"

CHAPTER XVII.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR (SECOND PERIOD)

(FROM THE BATTLE OF CANNAE, 216, TO THE FALL OF CAPUA, 211)

Causes of Hannibal's Victories.—So far Hannibal had had an unbroken series of successes; it may be well to briefly recapitulate the causes.

(1) The personal element of his own genius can only be mentioned; ancient and modern critics alike have ranked him among the greatest of generals.

(2) But he was aided by the mistakes of his opponents; divided command had been largely responsible for the disasters of the Trebia and of Cannae; lack of military training led to the crushing defeat of Flaminius. It is no disparagement of Hannibal to say that his opponents, except Scipio, were incapable; the same is true of the Austrian generals in Napoleon's masterpiece, the Italian campaign of 1796; greatness in a general consists in making as few mistakes as possible, and in profiting by those of others.

(3) Hannibal's cavalry and light-armed troops were much superior to any the Romans could bring against them.

(4) Perhaps the most important cause of all was that Hannibal had hitherto had but one object—to assume the aggressive; he had nothing to defend.

From this time onwards all these causes, except the first, disappear; the Roman armies are commanded by men who, if not soldiers of genius, were, at least, trained and experienced: the Romans improved their auxiliary forces; the light-armed troops (*velites*) were first organised at the siege of Capua in 211; above all, Hannibal now had allies, and his

presence was required in several quarters at once, to protect them. Wherever he was present, there success still was almost invariably faithful to Carthage; in his absence the Romans were almost as invariably successful.

Revolts to Hannibal.—After Cannae, South Italy at once revolted to Hannibal; the Bruttians, the Lucanians, all the Samnites, except the Pentri, joined him; and it only needed his presence in Campania for him to receive the alliance of Capua, the second city in Italy. Most of the Greek towns of the South also joined him (though not all at once), *e.g.* Croton and Locri; but Rhegium, the key to Sicily and the Straits, always remained faithful to Rome.

Hannibal, however, was not deceived by his success; the Latin colonies everywhere, which occupied the positions of strategic importance in Italy, remained faithful to Rome, for their interests and hers were one; hence his movements were hampered at every turn, and he now had to defend his allies against the Romans. It was, moreover, all-important for him to secure easy communication with his friends outside Italy; hence for the next four years the objects of his continual marches and counter-marches are,

(1) To secure a first-rate harbour, if possible, Tarentum.

(2) To protect his allies, and especially Capua, from the Roman attack.

Roman Success at Nola.—Immediately after Cannae, Hannibal had offered to treat for peace, but the Senate refused to listen to his envoys, or even to ransom the prisoners in his possession. Instead they made the most desperate preparations for war; in the lack of free men, even slaves were manumitted and enrolled in the legions. They had their reward; the tide of Hannibal's success was at once checked, and before the end of the year, M. Claudius Marcellus, "the Sword of Rome," had the honour of repulsing Hannibal himself by a sally from Nola, an important town in the South of Campania. He well deserved this honour, for it was only his promptitude which had prevented the democratic party in that place from following the example of Capua and joining Hannibal. The year 216 thus ended with brighter prospects for Rome than had at one time seemed possible. How hard was the task

before Hannibal was shown by the desperate defence of Casilinum, a fortress important as commanding the passage of the Vulturnus and the junction of the Latin and the Appian Roads. There a small force of allies held out for months against the whole power of Hannibal's army, and only hunger compelled them at last to surrender (early in 215).

Another disaster (this time in the North of Italy) befell the Romans in this year of misfortune; the consul elect for 215, L. Postumius, who had been sent against the Gauls, fell into an ambush in the wood of Litana, and he and the greater part of his army perished.

Hannibal Winters at Capua.—Hannibal spent the winter with his troops at Capua, and it was a favourite commonplace with the ancient historians, that the luxury of the allied town did more harm to his army than his Roman enemies had been able to do; his army is described as having been demoralized. This seems to be a purely fancy picture; afterwards, as before, Hannibal himself is irresistible; he only ceased to gain the great victories of his early campaigns because the Romans were now too wise to fight pitched battles with their whole force.

Fresh Enemies in Rome, Sicily, and Macedonia.—The great Carthaginian knew that diplomacy must be used to complete the work which his sword had begun; he had asked for reinforcements from Carthage, and some were sent, but the home government was too jealous of him to be of much use; and the successes of the Scipios in Spain, which will be described at the end of the chapter, deprived him of the support which he had expected from his brother Hasdrubal. Hence he tried to raise up enemies for Rome, and allies for himself, in other quarters: Sardinia had risen in revolt; what was much more important, Hiero, the old king of Syracuse and the faithful ally of the Romans, had died towards the end of 216, after a reign of fifty-four years, and had been succeeded by his grandson, Hieronymus. This foolish young king believed that he could make himself ruler of the whole of Sicily while Rome and Carthage was fighting; he received Hannibal's envoys, and concluded a treaty with Carthage. Although he was assassinated at the end of 215, his anti-Roman policy was

followed by the rulers of the republic which was established in Syracuse. Most important of all, Philip V., king of Macedon, who was sheltering at his court Rome's enemy, Demetrius, sent ambassadors (early in 215) to Hannibal to conclude an alliance against Rome. The fortunate accident of their capture only postponed the alliance; it was finally concluded before the end of the year (215). The terms were, that Hannibal and Philip should unite against the Romans; Hannibal was to have Italy and all the booty, and then go to assist Philip in Greece. The lion's share of the spoil was thus to belong to the Carthaginian, and perhaps Philip saw this; at any rate he did nothing to assist his ally in Italy, though the danger of an attack from him compelled the Romans to keep a fleet cruising in the Adriatic, and an army on the watch in Apulia.

The Romans gain ground in 215.—Apart from diplomacy, the year 215 was unimportant. Hannibal was again repulsed in an attempt on Nola, and his Samnite allies were harried by the Romans. The people of Cumae too, were defeated with great slaughter by the consul Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, a general of the school of Marcellus, and a Carthaginian army in the South was beaten at Grumentum.

The rising in Sardinia too was suppressed by T. Manlius Torquatus; it had rather injured than helped Hannibal, for to Sardinia were diverted reinforcements from Carthage, which would have been invaluable to him had they reached him in Italy as was originally intended. But the Carthaginian government, in their hatred of their great general, wasted in Sardinia forces which might have decided the war at its main seat; they were too blind to see that even success in these outlying provinces would have been useless, so long as Rome herself remained unconquered.

The Interest of the War centred in Sicily.—The two next years were comparatively unimportant in Italy (214 and 213). On the whole the Romans gained ground. They recaptured (early in 214) Casilinum, and pressed hardly on Hannibal's allies everywhere. He himself spent the latter part of 214 and most of 213 in trying to reduce the important town of Tarentum, but for the present his attempts were unsuccessful. Meanwhile the chief interest of the war was

transferred to Sicily, whither Marcellus was sent in 214, and where he maintained a hard struggle for more than two years. It seems strange that Hannibal stood idle while Rome's best general was away in Sicily; but he had no harbour, and his enemies had command of the sea; hence he was unable to co-operate with his allies and his countrymen in Sicily.

Marcellus captures Syracuse.—The Romans recognized to the full the importance of Syracuse, by sending their best general to attack it; had Sicily been lost, the bridge between Africa and Italy would have been restored. And for a time it seemed as if it would be lost; though there was a Roman party in Syracuse, especially among the leading men, yet the mob was strongly on the other side; and the mercenary forces, among whom were many Roman runaway slaves and deserters, were desperate against any peace, the first condition of which they knew would be their own surrender; and they were confirmed in their resolution by the severity of Marcellus, who executed 2,000 deserters, captured at Leontini. Hence, during the first two years (214 and 213), the Romans made little progress. Syracuse defended itself desperately under Epicydes, an envoy of Hannibal, while the attacks of the besiegers were baffled by the engineering skill of Archimedes, the great mathematician. Finally, Marcellus was compelled to turn the siege into a blockade, but, owing to the great extent of the Syracusan walls, this could only be partial; the Romans, however, held on with dogged pertinacity, fighting the Carthaginians in various parts of Sicily, and maintaining the blockade of the capital. At last, in 212, a fortunate accident revealed to them a weak place in the Syracusan wall. A night attack upon it was successful, and put the Romans in possession of Epipolae, the high ground above Syracuse, across which, just 200 years before, the Athenians had endeavoured to carry their blockading wall. The older part of the city, Achradina and Ortygia, still held out; but the mob and the mercenaries, who now held it, were very different from those Syracusans who had humbled the power of Athens. After their Carthaginian friends outside had failed in two attempts at relief, by land and by sea, the defenders capitulated. Marcellus gave his soldiers leave to

plunder the city, but ordered them to spare the citizens; the famous Archimedes, however, was killed, in spite of Marcellus' express command. The capture of Syracuse introduced an evil precedent into Roman conquest; the city was full of the masterpieces of Greek art, and Marcellus carried off many of these to adorn his triumph.

Final Reduction of Sicily. — This well-deserved honour, however, was denied him; for, though he gained some further successes, he left the Carthaginians still in possession of the important town of Agrigentum. His excessive severity had made the resistance of the Sicilians the more desperate, and so Marcellus had to content himself with the minor honours of an ovation (211). The reduction of Sicily was completed next year (210) by M. Valerius Laevinus. It is noteworthy that the Roman successes, after the fall of Syracuse, were made much easier by the rivalry between Hannibal's lieutenant, Muttines, and the generals of the Carthaginian government; in fact, Muttines finally went over to the Romans, and betrayed Agrigentum to them.

Hannibal's Victories in 212.—While the war in Sicily was going on, Hannibal had at last obtained his object in Italy; in 212 the town of Tarentum was betrayed to him. But his success was only partial, for the citadel held out under the Roman general Livius; and as this commanded the entrance to the harbour, Hannibal was unable to reap the full benefit of his conquest. And it was dearly bought, for the Romans meanwhile were establishing their blockading lines round Capua. The revolt of that city, the second in Italy, had been the high-watermark of Hannibal's success, and its reduction was now to show that his success had been in vain. Roman armies were strongly encamped at Casilinum, to the north, and above Suessula, to the south of Capua; they prevented the land from being cultivated, and already, in 212, hunger was making itself felt in the city. Hannibal had prepared a relief convoy under Hanno at Beneventum, but the consuls surprised and captured it. This victory was, in its results, more than sufficient to compensate for Hannibal's brilliant successes in the same year. Gracchus fell into an ambush and was killed, Centenius was defeated in Lucania, and the praetor, Cn. Fulvius, at Herdonea, in

Apulia; but, in spite of all, the consuls were drawing their bands of iron ever closer round Capua.

The Romans reduce Capua.—With the year 211 the siege began in earnest. Three Roman armies were encamped round the doomed city, and communications with the outside were cut off. Hannibal advanced to its relief, and attacked the Roman lines; but though the besieged co-operated with a sally, and the besiegers suffered severely, yet the blockade remained unbroken. Hannibal therefore tried to accomplish by stratagem what he had failed to gain by force; he suddenly marched northward along the Via Latina, ravaging as he went, and hoped, by thus threatening Rome itself, that he would compel the withdrawal of the forces from before Capua. He actually reached within three miles of Rome, and encamped on the bank of the Anio, to the north-east of the city; but he found a Roman army waiting for him in a strong position. Without raising the siege of Capua, the proconsul Fulvius had hurried north by the Appian Way with a considerable body of troops, and, joining these to the new levies, he was fully able to hold Hannibal in check. The undaunted confidence of the Romans was shown by the fact, that the very ground on which Hannibal was encamped was sold by auction for its full price. Hannibal could neither frighten the Romans nor make them attack him, and he fell back, leaving Capua to its fate. This soon came, for hunger compelled the Campanians to surrender at discretion. The punishment exacted was terrible; fifty-three of the leading men were scourged and beheaded, many of the citizens were sold into slavery, and the estates of the wealthy were confiscated. Capua also ceased to exist as a corporate town; "from the second city it was reduced into the first village in Italy." Its territory became the property of the Roman state, and a *praefectus* was sent to govern it. (Cp. p. 82, note.)

The Importance of the Fall of Capua.—It can hardly be said that the treatment of Capua was unduly severe; the laws of war, in ancient times, left the conquered at the absolute mercy of the conqueror, and the Capuans had given the Romans special provocation; they had revolted in spite of the favourable treatment which they had always

received, and they had begun their revolt by putting all Roman citizens in Capua to death. It is almost surprising that the stern proconsul, Fulvius Flaccus, did not make of them a still more terrible example. But the example was sufficient; all Italy saw that Rome was unconquered and apparently unconquerable. It was clear that Hannibal, if he still hoped for success, must draw large reinforcements from outside Italy; these the home government at Carthage was hardly likely to send him, and hence they could only come from Spain. We must turn to the operations in Spain which, during the last seven years, had prevented his receiving from his brother Hasdrubal, that help which he had hoped for.

Comparative Strength of Rome and Carthage in Spain.—Cn. Cornelius Scipio, on his arrival in Spain in 218, had a hard task before him, for Rome had allowed her ally, Saguntum, to perish unassisted, and her prestige in Spain had received a severe blow. On the other hand, Rome had two points in her favour, which proved of great importance: (1) the Carthaginians were known and disliked in Spain, and so the Romans could represent themselves as deliverers; (2) the Spanish allies of Carthage saw that she was seeking success in Spain, only as opening the way for a march on Italy, and such a removal from home was most distasteful to them.

The Romans too were most fortunate in their leaders; both the brothers, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, were men of ability; what was even more important, they loyally co-operated, while the Carthaginian forces suffered from divided command.

It is impossible to sketch the operations in detail; the exaggerations of Livy represent the Roman successes as overwhelming, and yet we find the Carthaginians repeatedly assuming the offensive. No doubt in a country like Spain, where (at any rate in the interior) there were no towns which could be securely held, and where the native tribes continually changed sides, definite success was hard to gain.

The Romans more than hold their own (218–216).—The following stages in the struggle may be noticed. In the year 218, the Romans secured the line of the Ebro, so far at least as it was needed to guard the passes of the Eastern

Pyrenees; Tarraco was occupied, and made a kind of "new Rome," in opposition to Nova Carthago. In the next year, 217, the Carthaginian fleet was surprised at the mouth of the Ebro and almost annihilated; the Romans used the command of the sea thus gained to carry the war into the enemies' territory. In 216, however, Hasdrubal was able to attempt a march north, with the object of bringing reinforcements to his brother; but he was decisively defeated by the Roman generals in the valley of the Ebro, about the time of the battle of Cannae. This victory had a double result; it kept Hasdrubal in Spain, and diverted to his support forces which were being prepared at Carthage to reinforce Hannibal.

Rapid Successes of the Scipios, followed by their Defeat and Death.—The Romans now assumed the offensive more decisively, and, for the next four years (215–212), operations were mainly carried on south of the Ebro, and largely in the valley of the Baetis (*i.e.* in the modern province of Andalusia). In 214, the Romans re-occupied and restored Saguntum, thus doing their best to blot out the disgrace of their arms. Their progress was the more easy, because Hasdrubal had been recalled to Africa, to put down a revolt of the Libyan King, Syphax; in this war, the Carthaginians received the most valuable help from Masinissa, prince of Eastern Numidia, who was soon to prove one of their most deadly enemies. After reducing Syphax, Hasdrubal returned to Spain, and it was at once seen how illusory were the Roman successes. The Scipios, relying on their Spanish auxiliaries, waited his attack; but these deserted, and the Roman generals were overwhelmed by superior force and killed (212). An Englishman will at once be reminded of Wellington's experience at Talavera, and of Sir John Moore at Corunna. The remnants of the Roman force were withdrawn behind the Ebro, and under C. Marcius, a subordinate officer, raised to the chief command, succeeded in holding the Carthaginians at bay, till reinforcements could arrive from Italy; these were rendered possible by the fall of Capua, and Claudius Nero, one of the praetors of 211, who commanded them, here first successfully crossed swords with Hasdrubal, whom he was to defeat so decisively four years later at the Metaurus.

Appointment of young Scipio to the Spanish Command.—But though the Romans resumed the offensive, Nero's harshness made him unpopular in Spain; it was therefore resolved by the Roman government to send a special officer with pro-consular power. What follows in Livy reads like a romance; none of the accredited Roman generals, he tells us, ventured to come forward for a post of such difficulty, but at last the young Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of the consul of 218, offered himself as a candidate, and was unanimously elected. It seems incredible that so important an office should have been given in a way so haphazard; yet it is even more incredible that it should have been deliberately given by the Senate to a young man of twenty-four. It seems best therefore to accept the story as true; Scipio is too manifestly a favourite of Fortune for ordinary rules of credibility to apply to his acts. He believed in himself as different from other men, and so was able to make others believe in him. In him, at last, Rome had found her man of genius; he made mistakes, which nearly cost Rome dear, and which caused horror in generals of the prudent school of Fabius; but he had that vigour and enterprise by which alone the genius of Hannibal could be crushed.

Religious developments during the Second Punic War.—The disasters of the War had a marked effect on Roman religion. The narrative of Livy is full of the records of "prodigies," which reveal the excitement of men's minds. To allay this excitement the old forms of the state religion were powerless; men sought to appease the gods by new and strange ritual. "*Tanta religio, et ea magna ex parte externa, civitatem incessit ut aut homines aut dii repente alii viderentur facti,*" says Livy (xxv. 1) of the year 213. Such new developments were the "Ver Sacrum" of the year 217, dedicating to the gods all things born in the year, the numerous and elaborate "lectisternia," and above all the introduction of the orgiastic worship of the Magna Mater from Asia in 205 B.C. (*cf.* p. 180)

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR (THIRD PERIOD)

(211–201)

Hannibal retires into South Italy. — Hannibal's hopes of outside support were failing him everywhere; Sicily and Sardinia had been reconquered by the Romans, Philip of Macedon was held in check by a Greek confederacy, as will be described later (p. 146), and Spain was the scene of more defeats than successes for the Carthaginians. In Italy too he was himself compelled to concentrate his forces more and more in the South of the peninsula; the towns which had joined him could not be held without garrisons, and his Numidian troops were too valuable to risk in positions where treachery was so probable; *e.g.* in 210, 500 of his men were betrayed to Marcellus, in the Apulian town of Salapia.

Divisions of the Last Period of the War. — This concentration enabled him to gain some successes, yet, after the fall of Capua, it was evident that there was no hope of raising Italy against Rome with his present force. Once only did his prospects revive — when the long-delayed reinforcements from Spain at last reached Italy—and the victory of the Metaurus crushed them completely. Hence it is natural to divide the last period of the war at this battle; before 207 Hannibal still hoped for victory, after it he only hoped to alleviate defeat, while the Romans assumed the offensive with ever-increasing boldness.

The Romans recapture Tarentum.—In spite of the capture of Capua in 211 — or perhaps, we may say, because its capture had set him free—Hannibal, in the next year, was

brilliantly successful; he gained at Herdonea, over the proconsul, Cn. Fulvius, a victory which cost the Romans 7000 men; he also fought against Marcellus at Numistro, and probably with success, though Livy claims the victory for the Romans. But these victories, and his capture of a Roman army at the Bruttian town of Caulonia in the next year (209), were like his victories in 212; they led to nothing permanent, and were more than counterbalanced by a great Roman success. While Hannibal was away in Bruttium, the veteran Fabius, consul for the fifth time, marched on Tarentum, and though repulsed at first, succeeded in obtaining an entry by treachery, and gave the city up to the horrors of a sack: thirty thousand Tarentines were sold as slaves, and three thousand talents were paid over to the Roman treasury. Fabius was allowed a triumph, the first given to a Roman general in this war.

Exhaustion of the Latin Towns. — It was time that the Romans gained some decisive success, for, in this very year, there appeared signs that the spirit even of the Latin race was not indomitable. Twelve of the thirty Latin colonies, mostly the older ones lying near Rome, refused, on the ground of exhaustion, to furnish any more troops or money; but the other eighteen, headed by Fregellae, did not follow this example, and Rome was saved. The refusal was passed over in silence, for Rome was too wise to threaten where she could not punish.

Death of Marcellus. — The year 208 was, on the whole, unfavourable to the Romans; they suffered no great defeat, but they were compelled to raise the siege of Locri, after a disaster of a kind unparalleled in Roman annals; the old Marcellus (consul for the fifth time) and his colleague Crispinus fell into an ambush, while reconnoitring near Venusia, and were killed. Marcellus was the Blucher of Rome; he was not a great general, but he was a vigorous and skilful soldier, and like the Prussian marshal in the Napoleonic wars, his patriotic persistency enabled him to uphold his country's cause against the superior genius of its conqueror.

Exhaustion of Rome.—But now he too was gone; Fabius, the one Roman general left, who had commanded without

disaster against Hannibal, was over eighty years of age, and Hannibal was still unconquered. The Republic seemed sinking from sheer exhaustion, yet the demands on its strength were undiminished; by 210 the number of legions needed had risen to twenty-one, and two more were to be added for the decisive struggle of 207; more than one-fourth of the manhood of Italy was under arms by land or sea. The lack of money was almost as serious as the drain of men; already, after Cannae, a commission of three (*triumviri mensarii*) had been appointed to superintend the finances of the State, and the land tax had been doubled. The currency too had been debased, and the stringent Oppian Laws, passed in 215, had limited extravagance of dress in the Roman ladies. The State was compelled to obtain its supplies on credit, and the pay of the soldiers was in arrear, even though a considerable number of the better classes served for nothing.

Finally, in 209, the government was compelled to lay hands on the 4,000 lbs. of gold, which formed the most sacred reserve of the treasury;[1] it was no wonder there were financial straits, when the fields were going out of cultivation, and when corn had risen to three times its average price; in fact, the Roman people was only kept alive by supplies from Egypt and Sicily. The distress of Rome too was seen by her subjects, and ominous rumours of revolt in Etruria were heard in 208. Varro was sent to Arretium to restore order, and a legion had to follow to support his measures.

News of the Approach of Hasdrubal from Spain.—At this dark crisis, when all sacrifices seemed to have been in vain, there suddenly came the terrible news that Hannibal's brother, Hasdrubal, having evaded Scipio in Spain, was wintering in Gaul with his army, and might be expected in Italy for the next campaign. How he had managed to evade Scipio must be told later (p. 132). The alarm in Rome was terrible. A new invading army was coming to reinforce the one which had so long proved invincible in the field, and Italy was exhausted by the disasters of the last eleven years. It was difficult to find consuls for such

[1] It was the *aurum vicesimum*—the produce of a tax of 5 p.c. on the value of manumitted slaves, imposed in 357.

a crisis, but finally C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius Salinator were elected. The former had served with success against Hasdrubal, as propraetor in Spain; the latter had, twelve years before, been successful in the Illyrian War. He had then been condemned for unjust distribution of booty, and had since lived in moody retirement. But all wrongs were now forgotten, alike by Livius and by the people, and the two consuls, who had been personal enemies, were publicly reconciled.

The Campaign of 207. Hasdrubal Defeated at the Metaurus.—It was arranged that Livius should command in the north against Hasdrubal, while his colleague was to hold Hannibal in check in the south. Nero was the first engaged, for he in vain tried to stop Hannibal moving from Bruttium into Apulia. However, though failing in this, he kept close to his great antagonist, ready to act as circumstances might demand. Meanwhile Hasdrubal had crossed the Alps, apparently without difficulty, and was raising the Gauls and Ligurians as he advanced. He wasted some time in a vain attack on Placentia, and then marched on to Ariminum. He hoped to meet his brother in Umbria, and, with the united armies, to march on Rome; but the messengers, sent with despatches to Hannibal, fell into the hands of Nero, who at once decided on a bold plan. Hannibal, he knew, would wait, before moving north, for instructions from his brother. So, leaving the bulk of his troops to watch the enemy opposed to him, he set out secretly, with 8,000 picked men, to join Livius. A week's forced marches—it is said of 40 miles a day—brought him to Sena, where Livius was posted, and the consuls at once set themselves to compel Hasdrubal to fight. In spite of their precautions, he saw that Livius had been reinforced, and endeavoured to retreat; but his guides played him false, he was unable to find a ford over the river Metaurus, and was overtaken by the Roman consuls. Compelled to fight with a river in his rear, he did all that was possible for a brave and skilful commander. He posted his weaker troops, the Gauls, on the left, in an impregnable position, and himself took post with his Spaniards on the right. The battle was long and fierce, but was decided by the brilliant tactics of Nero. He saw

that, while he could not get at the Gauls, they were equally unable to help their comrades, and, rapidly marching behind his colleague's forces, he fell on the flank and rear of Hasdrubal's own division. The Spaniards fought with the courage of despair, and Hasdrubal met a soldier's death among his men; the Carthaginian army was annihilated. Nero returned from the field of battle as rapidly as he had come, and the first news that Hannibal received of his recent movements was the ghastly token of the head of Hasdrubal, which was thrown into his camp.

Results of the Battle of the Metaurus.—He immediately recognized that all was lost, and retired to Bruttium, where he held out for the next four years. Even then it was the circumstances of Carthage, and not any direct attack of the Romans, which compelled him to withdraw: he was invincible in Italy to the last. It may seem strange that Hannibal remained so long, almost inactive, in Italy, especially when his own country was threatened; we can only conjecture that here, as so often, he was thwarted and hampered by party feeling at home. Perhaps too he hoped to join Mago, who had left Spain and invaded Liguria in 206, and once more resume the offensive in Italy. Meanwhile, in Rome the joy was as great as had been the suspense;[1] men felt as if the war were over, and a splendid triumph was accorded to the two consuls. The Romans now relaxed their efforts, and disbanded some of their troops; but they also soon took the opportunity (204) of compelling the rebellious Latin communities to make good their arrears of men and money. It was natural that Rome should rejoice now that the strain was removed, but the war had still to be ended, and we must turn to the man for whom this honour was destined by Fortune.

Scipio Captures Nova Carthago (210).—Scipio had gone out to Spain in 211, and at once[2] proceeded to show that he was no ordinary general. The Carthaginian leaders were

[1] Livy's powers of narrative are never better shown than in his description of this crisis.

[2] Others place Scipio's starting in 210, and the capture of Nova Carthago in 209. All we know for certain is that his success was early in the year.

in three different parts of Spain, and never dreamed that the Romans would assume the aggressive. Scipio, taking advantage of their over-confidence, advanced to attack New Carthage, which he knew was but weakly garrisoned. Only his friend, Laelius, shared the secret of the expedition, but Scipio knew how to inspire confidence in his troops, and on this occasion he told his men that Neptune would fight for them. And his promise was fulfilled, for, though the land attack on the town failed, as Scipio expected, an attack on the sea-wall, which the ebb tide had rendered accessible, found the enemy off their guard on the side which they believed impregnable. Hence, on the very first day of attack, the stronghold fell, and treasury, granary, arsenal, and capital were at once lost to the Carthaginians. What was, perhaps, most important was the number of Spanish hostages, whom Scipio sent to their homes. Not the least remarkable of the gifts of this most un-Roman of Roman generals was the power of sympathizing with barbarian populations, and so winning their enthusiastic affection. Among the most important of the Spaniards who were won over was Mandonius, a chief of the Ilergetes.

Scipio Drives the Carthaginians from Spain.—Scipio was not slow to follow up his success, and invaded Baetica; but, in his ambitious projects of aggression, he neglected his plain duty of keeping Hasdrubal in Spain. He attacked him at Baecula (208) with some success, but allowed him to retreat northward, perhaps trusting to intercept him at the eastern passes of the Pyrenees. As, however, Hasdrubal made his way into Gaul by the western passes, Scipio failed in his first duty, a duty which his predecessors had performed successfully for ten years with far inferior forces. Fortunately for Rome, the success of Nero at the Metaurus made up for Scipio's carelessness in Spain, and victories, which would have been dearly purchased had Hasdrubal joined Hannibal, were easily gained in Spain when the son of Barca had been crushed in Italy. The details of the campaigns of 207 and 206 are hard to follow, but Scipio seems to have won a decisive victory at Baecula in 207, and to have gradually pushed the Carthaginians further and further south and west till, before the end of 206, Mago

evacuated Gades, and sailed to Liguria to endeavour once more to raise enemies against Rome at home.

Scipio's Position in Spain.—The Romans were thus left the only foreign power in Spain; already, however, the Spaniards had found that they had gained nothing by changing their Carthaginian for Roman masters, and a rebellion had to be crushed, in which Mandonius was a ringleader. What is more important than the details of the Spanish campaigns is the position of Scipio, and his designs on Africa; after the battle of Baecula, the Spaniards had wished to proclaim him king, and though he disclaimed the title, yet, as Polybius points out, both now and still more afterwards, he "had opportunities for gaining for himself royal power." Scipio is the first man in whose career we see the foreshadowing of the proconsular power, which, more than a century and a half later, was to overthrow the Republic altogether.

Scipio plans an Attack on Africa.—More immediately important were Scipio's designs on Africa; he knew that it was there that Carthage was especially vulnerable, and in the course of the year 206, he entered into negotiations with both Masinissa and Syphax, the rival Numidian princes. Hitherto the former had been the deadly enemy of Rome, but he saw on which side fortune was inclining. Syphax, who was the more powerful, and who had once been Rome's ally, was actually visited[1] by Scipio in Africa, and gained over for the time.

The Senate's Suspicions of Scipio.—But the attack on Africa was not to be delivered from Spain; Scipio returned in the course of 206 to Italy, and was elected consul. At once there arose a question of the greatest constitutional importance between him and the Senate; by the majority of that body, led by the aged Fabius Maximus, he was viewed with suspicion, at once for his Greek culture and his arrogant self-confidence, and for his expressed determination to carry on the war at home with the same reckless vigour that he had shown in Spain. He made no secret of his intention to appeal to the people for permission to carry the war into Africa, if the Senate should refuse to give him that province;

[1] Of course the story of this visit is denied by the sceptical Germans, but it is most characteristic of the romantic and adventurous Scipio.

in other words, he proposed to do, in administration, what Flaminius had done, twenty-five years before, in carrying his agrarian law, and what Marius did a century later, with the object of gaining this same province of Africa. But the Senate still had the wisdom which is necessary for all successful rule, that of knowing when to yield; they agreed to give Scipio leave to cross into Africa, if he saw it was "in the interests of the state." But in order to limit his ambition, they assigned him only thirty ships and the two legions in Sicily, which were composed of the fugitives of Cannae and of Herdonea.

Scipio accused of Misconduct in Sicily.—Scipio, however, was not to be baulked in this way; he appealed for volunteers, and seven thousand flocked to his standard; here too, in the introduction of the personal tie between general and army, he anticipates the great commanders of the last century of the Republic. Scipio made his preparations carefully, but another serious collision nearly broke out between him and the Senate. He had succeeded in taking Locri, and Pleminius, who was put by him in command of that city, behaved with the utmost cruelty; complaints were made to Rome, and it seemed as if Scipio were implicated in the oppression, while he was further accused of neglecting his preparations; a commission of ten was sent to report, and with it two tribunes, whose sacred persons were to overawe the general, if it were necessary to arrest him among his soldiers. Fortunately the commissioners found themselves able to acquit Scipio of oppression, and that his army was in good order: the collision between Senate and general was thus averted.

Scipio Invades Africa.—Scipio now was ready to carry the war into Africa, and in 205 he sent his friend, Laelius, to reconnoitre; he found Masinissa eager to join the Romans, but Syphax had transferred himself to the other side, either from love for his Carthaginian bride, Sophonisba, or because his rival was now against Carthage. Finally, in the spring of 204, Scipio himself started, and landed without opposition near Utica; his force was comparatively small, but he expected to find allies in Africa itself. At first, however, he met with but little success; he failed to take Utica, and

Syphax joined the Carthaginians with a great force, while Masinissa was for the moment a fugitive from his dominions. Scipio was driven to negotiate, though we can hardly believe seriously; Syphax seems to have aspired to play the part of a mediator between Rome and Carthage. But when the enemy were thus thrown off their guard, the Romans suddenly attacked them (203), fired their camps, and defeated them with terrible slaughter. A similar result followed in the next battle, in the "Great Plains," and Syphax, fleeing to his own dominions, was pursued and captured by Masinissa. This meant that the African natives once more rose against their Carthaginian masters, and, in spite of the prolonged resistance of Utica, the Carthaginians felt compelled to enter into fresh negotiations with Scipio. The terms which he proposed were moderate; the Carthaginian armies were to be withdrawn from Italy, all claims on Spain were to be given up, and a war indemnity of five thousand talents was to be paid. The Roman Senate told Scipio that they would accept these terms, and a Carthaginian embassy was despatched to Rome; meanwhile Hannibal[1] and Mago were recalled to Africa.

But the negotiations broke down, either because the Romans thought they could impose more severe terms, or because the Carthaginian war party believed that, with Hannibal in Africa, they could crush Scipio. Probably both causes were at work; at any rate it was the Carthaginians who violated the armistice, by plundering a Roman convoy which was driven ashore in the bay of Carthage. Scipio therefore, at the close of the year 203, resumed the war, which was now one of life or death.

The Campaign of Zama (202).—The final campaign was prolonged far into the year 202, for Hannibal still wished to negotiate. But Scipio felt the time for this had passed, and he succeeded in forcing on a decisive battle; it took place near Zama, on October 19, a date which is fixed by the eclipse which occurred during the battle. Each side was drawn up in three lines, but the Roman maniples were not arranged chequer-wise (*i.e.* in alternate rows), according to

[1] Hannibal is said to have massacred, at the sanctuary of Juno Lacinia, 4000 Italians who refused to embark; the story is very doubtful.

the usual plan, but were drawn up behind each other; this arrangement was adopted to neutralize the attack of the elephants of the Carthaginians, which rushed down the lanes between the maniples, without doing any harm. The presence of Masinissa on the Roman side gave them the superiority in cavalry, and of Hannibal's infantry only part were his invincible veterans; in fact, when his first line had been driven in, we are told that his mercenaries and the native Carthaginian troops actually fell on each other. With an army thus divided, no genius could avail; the veterans died fighting, and the Carthaginian army was annihilated; Hannibal himself had the courage to survive, in order to undertake the far harder task of guiding his unfortunate city through her defeats.

Terms of the Peace.—Even now Carthage was formidable, for her walls were impregnable; and Scipio was eager to conclude the war, at once to avoid being superseded, and we may well believe, from a feeling of magnanimity. The terms finally settled (early in 201) were much more severe than those offered in 203:

(1) Spain was to be surrendered.

(2) Carthage was to give up all her ships of war but ten.

(3) She was to pay two hundred talents a year for fifty years, *i.e.* she became tributary.

(4) She was not to wage war without the permission of the Roman people.

In this way Carthage was made defenceless and dependent on Rome, and to secure her in this state, Masinissa was recognized as the "ally and friend" of the Roman people, and placed in possession of his own dominions and part of those of Syphax. Thus the hatred against Carthage, so long felt in Africa, was concentrated in a strong power, which, of necessity, was friendly to Rome. Scipio's triumph was magnificent, and deservedly so; his genius and his good luck had ended Rome's most terrible war.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR IN ITALY AND IN AFRICA

Rome becomes a Mediterranean Power.—The Second Punic War is the turning point in Roman history, both at home and abroad. It led inevitably to the extension of her provincial system, and to her entanglement in the affairs of the East; these results will be described in later chapters. Here it will be sufficient to note briefly that Rome now, for good and for evil, became a Mediterranean, and not merely an Italian power.

Authority of the Senate Confirmed.—But the changes which the war had wrought in Italy itself were important and far reaching. In Rome, its effects had been to prolong the authority of the Senate for another century. At the end of the third century, that authority was seriously attacked; not only had Flaminius ventured to legislate without the consent of the Senate (p. 100), and defied its authority in the field (p. 111), but his party had carried the Claudian law, definitely limiting the commercial rights of senators (218). This law had important ulterior consequences, for it was the beginning of the separation between the capitalist and the official section of the Roman upper classes, which a century later was made so important by C. Gracchus. But the disasters of Flaminius and Varro, the popular consuls, and the unwavering firmness shown by the Senate in the most terrible crises, had postponed the attack on the privileges of the *nobiles*, and the authority of the Senate.

It is significant how from this period onwards the same names occur again and again in the consular *fasti*. Already merit outside the charmed circle of the nobility found it

difficult to obtain recognition; thus the knight, C. Marcius, who, after the fall of the two Scipios (212) (p. 125), had upheld the Roman arms in Spain with brilliant success, never rose to high office because he was not of noble descent. The reform thus postponed was rendered all the more revolutionary, when at last it was attempted by the Gracchi.

Change in the Economic Condition of Italy.—Even more serious was the change in the economic state of Rome, which was the result of the Second Punic War. The destroyed homesteads could be replaced; but it was much harder to revive the old spirit of country life, which had been destroyed by nearly twenty years of continuous warfare. Roman citizens had unlearned in the field the habits of peace; many had served ten or more campaigns in succession, during which discipline had been terribly relaxed. The agricultural distress of Italy during Hannibal's campaigns, had revealed to keen-sighted men that it was easier to import corn from Sicily and from Egypt than to grow it in Italy. Finally, the enormous number of slaves poured into the market tended to discourage honest labour, and to develop the worst evils of Roman capitalism. The *Ager Publicus* was greatly increased by the confiscations of the lands of communities or individuals; but much of this was turned into pasture, on which half-savage slave herdsmen tended the flocks of the wealthy occupiers.

Loss of Population in the War.—The number of Roman citizens had fallen, between 220 and 204, by nearly one-fourth (from 270,000 to 214,000), and the loss of the Italian allies had been almost as great. The State was still healthy enough to make this loss good, but we may assume with confidence that the Hannibalic war had cost Italy 1,000,000 lives.

Loss of Privileges by the Allies.—In another respect too the results of the war were most prejudicial. Rome had triumphed, thanks to the support of the Latin race, but a large number of her Italian allies had turned against her. Hence the defeat of Hannibal was, in some ways, equivalent to a second conquest of Italy; only the Bruttians were actually reduced to the position of bondsmen, but other states lost territory or privileges, and saw the line drawn more sharply between them and their masters. A number

of new colonies were planted (194), *e.g.* Salernum among the Picentines, and Puteoli, and old ones were strengthened, *e.g.* Venusia and Narnia.

Growing Exclusiveness of Rome.—And, though Rome had triumphed by the aid of the Latins, they too found their privileges lessened as the imperial city grew stronger. It was significant that, in 194, eight Roman colonies were planted, and only two Latin; and in 187 the Latins, for the first time, found their right of obtaining the citizenship by migration to Rome rudely limited by the expulsion of 12,000 of their number; a similar expulsion took place in 177. In 188, the inhabitants of various towns, among them Arpinum, received the Roman *civitas;* but this is the last instance of such extensions of the franchise. To this growing exclusiveness two causes contributed; on the one hand, the Romans were deservedly proud of their triumph, and contemptuous of those who had had little or no share in winning it; on the other hand, the Romans grew more reluctant to extend their citizenship as its material advantages increased; *e.g.*, in 203 the aediles distributed among the citizens a large amount of Spanish corn at less than cost price.

Reduction of the Gauls in the North of Italy.—It was some time, however, before the results described in the last two pages—closer oligarchy, depopulation of the country districts, and alienation of Italy—began to show themselves. More immediate results of the Hannibalic War were the extension of Italian civilization to the Po, and the organization of the Celtic communities beyond that river as a bulwark against future invasion. The ease with which the house of Barca had found allies in the valley of the Po revealed to the Roman Senate the need for advancing its outposts. Already, before the war was over, Mago and his Gallic allies had received a severe check, and, in the very year of peace with Carthage (201), hostilities were begun against the Boii. The fighting was severe, and the Romans met with some defeats, but the disunion among the Gallic tribes aided them. The Cenomani, who had been allies of Rome in the previous war, now again deserted the Insubres, and the tribes north of the Po were reduced after several campaigns (196). The Boii maintained the

struggle for some years longer, but in 191 were compelled to submit to the consul, Scipio Nasica, who harried the whole country, and boasted that he had left only old men and boys alive.

Organization of Cisalpine Gaul.—The two sides of the Po were differently treated. On the northern bank, the Insubres and the Cenomani were left in enjoyment of their national organization, and no attempt was made to supersede the Gallic canton (*Pagus*) by the Italian town; but on the south or right bank the Boii were compelled to cede half their territory, while the remnants of the tribe amalgamated with their conquerors, and soon disappear from history.

New Roman Colonies and Roads.—These new regions were secured by a fresh plantation of colonies. Placentia, which had been destroyed by the Gauls in 200, was restored; and Pisaurum among the Senones, and Bononia, Parma, and Mutina among the Boii, were planted between 190 and 180, to be at once Roman fortresses and centres of Roman influence.

With the Roman colonies went as usual the extension of the military roads; the great Via Flaminia was extended across the basin of the Po, from Ariminum to Placentia, under the name of the Via Aemilia (187). At the same time, another road was carried from Arretium in Etruria across the Apennines to Bononia. Along the lines of these roads Roman influence extended; to this day it is "along the Via Aemilia that all places of importance in the district are found." How rapidly the Gauls assimilated Italian culture may be seen from the fact that Caecilius, one of the most distinguished dramatists of the day, who died in 168, was a manumitted Insubrian.

Reduction of Liguria.—Even harder was the struggle which the Romans had in North-West Italy, against the Ligurian tribes; it was necessary to reduce these, not only because they had joined Hannibal and Mago, but also because, through their territory, lay the land road into Transalpine Gaul, along which the Roman armies were now constantly passing, on their way to the new Spanish provinces. The territory of the Ligurians was difficult of access, since there the Apennines send their spurs right down into the sea;

its inhabitants too were warlike, and had long been used to plunder the plains of northern Etruria. Here too the fighting was of a very chequered character; victory after victory was gained, but it was hard to reduce the enemy in their mountain fastnesses, and the Roman armies suffered severely; but at last, in 180, the proconsul, M. Baebius, transferred 40,000 of the Apuani, the most important of the Ligurian tribes, from their strongholds to the plains of Samnium, where they settled down quietly. This device for dealing with especially troublesome enemies was often employed by the Romans in later times, when they were establishing their empire in Western Europe. The new district was secured by the colony of Luna (Spezzia) in 177, which is important as being the last citizen colony in Italy for a long period. It marked the end of the period of conquest; it may also be said to mark the renewal of agrarian troubles at home, which revived as soon as the area available for the use of Roman citizens ceased to expand. But this result was as yet unforeseen; and the Romans might well pride themselves on the fact that their hard-bought victories, though not profitable in booty or in immediate glory, had yet secured a new and important region for the Pax Romana.

Formation of Modern Italy.—Italy was thus assuming the form which it has borne ever since, although a century and a half was to pass before the full Roman citizenship was extended to these regions; for the present, the valley of the Po was governed as a province. The Senate had laid down the principle that no more northern hordes should cross the Alps; migrating bands, which had wished to settle peacefully (186–179), were compelled to return to their homes beyond the mountains; and the town of Aquileia, the last Latin colony in Italy, and the most northerly outpost of Roman rule, was planted at the head of the Adriatic in 184, to secure from invaders the Eastern gate of the Alps.

Constant Numidian Encroachments on Carthage.—The result then of Hannibal's attack on Rome had been to consolidate and extend her dominion in Italy. In Africa, on the other hand, his failure had resulted in reducing his beloved city to a state of abject dependence on her bitterest enemies. The treaty which ended the war seems to have been devised

by the Romans, with Machiavellian acuteness, to bring about the utmost humiliation of the conquered, and to prepare the way for future quarrels; by it Carthage was to retain her territory undiminished, and yet Masinissa was to have all districts which he or his predecessor had possessed within Carthaginian territory. Stipulations so contradictory were interpreted by a bitterly partial judge; for the Carthaginians were forbidden to take up arms, even in self-defence, without Roman consent, and Masinissa seems to have been encouraged to constant encroachments. He was now in possession of most of the dominions of Syphax, as well as of his own, surrounding Carthaginian territory on every side, and as early as 193 he robbed his old masters of part of the richest portion of their territory, the province of the lesser Syrtis. He was a typical Numidian, unscrupulous and vigorous, willing to go any lengths at once in flattering the stronger and in trampling on the weaker. During his long rule of more than fifty years he raised Numidia into a strong and semi-civilized power, and he seems to have hoped ultimately to make Carthage its capital. Fortunately for the Romans the old bitterness, born of centuries of oppression, rendered reconciliation between him and Carthage impossible: otherwise the Libyan party at Carthage might have become formidable. As it was, Carthage suffered fifty years of persecution before she was goaded into the third Punic War. It was in vain that they asked the Romans either to allow them to defend themselves, or to settle the frontier definitely; Rome preferred to keep her policy of crushing Carthage gradually by Numidian means.

Hannibal expelled from Carthage.—But there was one Carthaginian who was too much dreaded to be dealt with in this way. Hannibal, having forced his countrymen to conclude peace, set himself to work to reorganize Carthage, and to remove the abuses which had weakened it. The oligarchy had ruined his chances of success in the second Punic War, and now prosecuted him for embezzlement; but he boldly assumed the aggressive, and by making the authority of *Suffete* once more a reality, broke the power of the corrupt ring which had long misruled Carthage. He reorganized the finances, and introduced new life into

the state; had he been left alone, this wonderful man might even have succeeded in re-creating Carthage, as he had created armies in Spain and in Italy. But the Romans were far too watchful to permit this, while his enemies at home were constantly on the alert, to accuse him to their nation's foes. The Romans, therefore, sent an embassy to demand his surrender (195), and Hannibal, by a timely flight, spared his country the alternative of immediate destruction or of disgraceful compliance. In later chapters he will be found stirring up enemies for Rome in the East. In view of his persistent hostility, the Senate can hardly be blamed for demanding his surrender, though it is pleasant to read that his conqueror, Scipio, was chivalrous enough to protest against the demand.

Disunion at Carthage.—Hannibal was given to Carthage too late to save her, for even he could not make a corrupt oligarchy patriotic and self-denying; and where he failed it was not likely that others would succeed. The same causes continued which had brought failure before; the patriotic party intrigued with Rome's enemies in Macedonia and in Syria, while the members of the old government sought, by cringing submission, to secure Rome's favour. This disunion rendered a real growth of strength impossible, but it did not prevent commercial prosperity; as early as 187 Carthage was able to offer to pay off all the remaining instalments of her war indemnity. This prosperity the Romans could not forgive; it alarmed the fears of statesmen and excited the jealousy of the commercial class; but it was fifty years before the final catastrophe took place.

CHAPTER XX.

THE FIRST AND SECOND MACEDONIAN WARS

(215–205 AND 200–194)

Philip V. of Macedon. — Even before the Second Punic War, it was obvious that Rome's interference beyond the Adriatic would bring her into collision with Macedonia; her enemy Demetrius of Pharos had been the ally of the kings of that country. The character of Philip V. of Macedon precipitated the collision; his restless and aggressive temper and his reckless disregard of the rights of his neighbours stirred up enemies against him in Greece. It would have been wise for him to put himself at the head of a Pan-Hellenic movement for excluding all Roman interference, but such a policy was impossible to a monarch whose garrisons were everywhere, and who boasted that he possessed "the fetters of Greece" in Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth.

State of the Greek World in the Third Century B.C. — The ease of Roman conquests in the Greek world cannot be understood, without a brief reference to the confusion which had prevailed ever since the death of Alexander the Great. His wide domains had been divided among three powers; Macedonia had secured most of the European districts, except so far as the Greek states had resumed their independence; the Seleucidae from their capital at Antioch nominally ruled over the old Persian Empire, from the Hellespont to the Punjaub; while Egypt, under the Ptolemies, had become a maritime power, which held Cyrene, Cyprus, and some of the Cyclades, and which was strong in the command of the sea and in a well filled treasury.

But in addition to these three great powers, there were numberless smaller states, especially in Greece and on the coast of Asia Minor, which were nominally or really independent. Of these, the two great Federal Leagues, the Aetolian and the Achaean, were the most powerful in Greece, while in the Aegean, the commercial kingdom of Pergamum and the free city of Rhodes usually acted together, and were the champions of commerce and city life against despotism.

Roman Relations with the Greek World.—Of the great states, Egypt had long been friendly to Rome, and had renewed the alliance as recently as 210; she feared the great land powers of Syria and Macedon, and was more than once saved by Roman diplomacy from invasion and conquest. Still more important for Rome was her friendship with Rhodes and Pergamum; no doubt this was partly selfish on both sides, for their enemies were Rome's, but it was also due to the feeling, which had a very real basis, that Rome would be the protector of Hellenism in the east, as she had protected Neapolis and Syracuse against Samnites and Carthaginians in the west. It is impossible to understand Rome's conquests, if we put them down simply to greed for territory and for booty; this element was present, but her statesmen were also moved by a chivalrous desire to champion her Hellenic kindred. Above all, Roman diplomacy was moved by fear; the Senate had trembled at Hannibal and his allies, and they could not rest secure till Macedon had been rendered harmless.

The First Macedonian War (215-205).—The Romans in the first Macedonian War had their usual good luck; the vigorous and wise Antigonus Doson had died in 220, and Philip V. came to the throne at the age of 18; he was but 23 when he concluded his alliance with Hannibal. His youth may be the reason for what is otherwise inexplicable, his lack of energy in beginning the war, and the cowardice which he at first showed. At any rate nothing could be more contemptible than his operations against Apollonia (216), and he allowed the Romans to assume the offensive and recapture Oricum (214). Nor was he even then left in peace: Rome knew that to assume the offensive was the

surest means of defence, and she organized against him a confederacy of the anti-Macedonian states in Greece (212), in which the Aetolian League and Attalus of Pergamum were the most important members; Rome's own share consisted of a few ships. The result was seven years of aimless warfare, marked by remorseless cruelty on both sides, in which Greece, divided as it was between the opposing parties, suffered severely; at last the Aetolians and Philip concluded peace, and Rome made a treaty with him in the following year, practically on the base of the *status quo*.

The Roman People unwillingly enter on the Second Macedonian War (200).—Unfortunately for Philip, a Macedonian corps fought on the side of Carthage at Zama; it could not be proved that it was sent by him, but the Roman Senate were not likely to be too particular as to his exact responsibility, for they were eager to interfere in the affairs of the East.

Philip's violence had already raised up for him a host of enemies; he had joined the King of Syria in a league against Egypt, but instead of attacking that country, he occupied, on his own behalf, Egypt's possessions in the Aegean (201). In so doing, he displayed the utmost cruelty; his treatment of the people of Cios and of Abydos shocked the whole Greek world, and Attalus and the Rhodians once more organized a confederacy against him. At the same time one of his generals attacked Rome's ally, Athens (200); Philip would gladly have avoided a quarrel if he could, but he soon saw the Senate was resolved on war. It was not easy, however, at first to induce the Roman people to consent; some of the tribunes complained that hostilities were simply sought by the nobles for their own selfish interests, and the people almost unanimously refused to vote for a declaration of war.

They were, however, in the end induced to do so, by the promises that all citizens among the troops already on service should be sent back to their homes, while the allies were retained in the field, and that all enrolled for the new war should be volunteers. This unfair distribution of the burdens of service, and this unwillingness to serve, are new and ominous features in Roman politics.

Philip's Successes in the First Campaign.—Even when the consul, Sulpicius Galba, took the field (late in 200), he had with him only two legions; but, fortunately for the Romans, Philip's policy had prevented him from getting any important allies in Greece, while the Syrian king, Antiochus, was occupied in Egypt, and was not disposed to assist an ally whose actions under their late treaty had been purely selfish. Hence Philip had only his own subjects to rely upon. The population of Macedonia consisted of brave and loyal soldiers devoted to the royal house, but it had never been very dense, and it had been drained by the repeated wars; Philip therefore was only able to bring into the field some 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. The Romans invaded Macedonia from the north-west, but the campaign was indecisive; although they gained some successes, yet they suffered severely from lack of provisions, and the whole force might have perished had not Macedonia been attacked on the north by Rome's barbarian allies, the Dardanians, while a Roman fleet appeared in the Aegean. The Aetolians too, after long wavering, decided to join the Romans, and invaded Thessaly. Philip succeeded in beating off all these attacks, but meanwhile the Roman force escaped from its critical position (199). The result of this first campaign had been creditable to Philip, but it also showed his weakness in face of enemies so numerous.

Flamininus assumes the Command (198).—In the next year Philip advanced southward to meet the attack which the Romans were directing against him from this new quarter. The consul of 199, P. Villius, was at first in command, but he was soon superseded by the consul of the year (198), Titus Quinctius Flamininus, the hero of this war. He was only thirty, but he was a good soldier, and an accomplished diplomat. Above all, he was an enthusiastic believer in the Greeks and in Greek freedom, and so was well fitted to unite all the anti-Macedonian party against Philip.

His first operation was skilfully to turn Philip's position. The king was encamped in the gorge of the Aous, and his position in front was impregnable; but the usual weakness of such mountain positions was soon seen, for the Romans succeeded in reaching, by mountain paths, the heights which

commanded the king's camp, and he had to flee in confusion. Thessaly was lost to the Macedonians, except some of its fortresses.

Decisive Campaign of 197.—Flamininus occupied the winter in diplomacy. He succeeded in persuading the diet of the Achaean League to renounce its neutrality, though Argos still remained faithful to Philip. Hence, with the exception of the fortresses, Flamininus had won nearly all Greece. The winter was spent in negotiation, but Philip's concessions were insufficient. The Senate demanded, as a preliminary, the surrender of the three great fortresses—Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth—and this, of course, was refused. Hostilities were therefore resumed, and the two armies met in the south-east of Thessaly, not far from Larissa. The actual battle took place on the ridge of Cynoscephalae, on ground which was too rough to be suitable for the Macedonian phalanx. On the right wing, however, it carried all before it; but Philip's left was caught by the Romans while still in disorder, and routed. Then the superior flexibility of the Roman formation told at once, for twenty companies were at once transferred to the other wing, to attack the rear of Philip's victorious right. The result was that his whole army was broken up, and 13,000 Macedonians are said to have been killed or captured. In the skirmishes before the battle the Aetolians had greatly distinguished themselves with their cavalry, and they claimed that the victory belonged to them.

Terms of the Peace. — The bitterness between them and the Romans was aggravated by the negotiations which were at once entered upon; they wished to depose Philip, and to destroy the power of Macedonia, but Flamininus was most unwilling to remove a kingdom which was necessary for the protection of the northern frontiers of Greece against the barbarians of the Danube valley. Hence he refused to deprive the king of his ancestral dominions; but Philip was compelled to surrender all his foreign possessions, to reduce his army to 5,000 men, to pay a war indemnity of 1,000 talents, and to promise that he would conclude no alliances without the knowledge of Rome. Thus Macedonia, like Carthage, was made dependent on Rome, and the centre

of Greek diplomacy was shifted from Philip's capital, Pella, to the Senate. It remained to be seen how the Romans would use the power thus won.

Greece declared Free (196). — The Senate laid down the general principle that all Greece should be free, and ten commissioners were sent with whom Flamininus was to act. The Aetolians complained that Greece had only changed masters, but the Greeks in general were well satisfied, and there was a scene of indescribable enthusiasm when, in the summer of 196, at the Isthmian games, Flamininus proclaimed that all Greek cities which had been taken from Macedonia should be free. The commissioners then proceeded to regulate the distribution of these communities among the various leagues. As far as possible neighbouring states were grouped together; the Achaean League received the largest additions, for the Peloponnese was a well-marked geographical unit, and the Achaeans were the strongest power in it. On the other hand the Aetolians gained but little, and were not allowed to resume their authority in Thessaly.

Difficulties of the Roman phil-Hellenic policy.—Force was necessary to establish the new order of things; Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, had organized a robber power, which plundered by land and by sea. The strength of his position enabled him to negotiate, and he was allowed by Flamininus to keep Sparta on surrendering all his foreign possessions. This settlement pleased no one, and was a fair warning to the Romans how little their phil-Hellenic policy could hope for success. It was useless to give home rule to a country where, in every district and even in every town, two bitterly-opposed factions had long-standing grievances to settle. However, for the moment, the Romans secured peace; they refused to receive for themselves any advantage from the war, and, though they everywhere tried to strengthen the aristocratic party which favoured them, they no doubt honestly believed that this policy was for the good of Greece. Greek democracy had been tried over and over again, and always found wanting, alike in foreign and in home affairs. In 194, Flamininus bade farewell to the Greeks at Corinth; he urged them to use wisely the freedom he had given them,

and announced that the Roman garrisons were withdrawn from the "fetters of Greece." He only asked, as a favour for himself, that the Greek communities would ransom any Roman captives who might be among them. His request was granted, and 1200 liberated Romans walked in his triumph, a triumph glorious not for addition of territory, but for championship of a principle; Flamininus is remembered in history as "the liberator of the Hellenes." The Romans, however, were to find that liberty is not a privilege that can be given; some nations cannot be free, and Greece had sunk to being such a nation.

Greek influence on Roman Literature.—Whilst Rome was "liberating" Greece, Greek literature was capturing Rome:

> "Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes
> Intulit agresti Latio."[1]

But there was a national party at Rome, which did not yield without a struggle. Cn. Naevius (died about 200 B.C.) had been a soldier in the first Punic War, and wrote a poem on it in Saturnian metre. He was a strong democrat, unlike most of the later Roman poets, and was imprisoned for his attacks on the nobles.[2] In his self-written epitaph, he confesses the triumph of Greek influences:

> "Obliti sunt Romae loquier Latina lingua."

Naevius in literature corresponds to the party of Flaminius and Varro in politics; as their attempts to establish popular rule in Rome failed (cf. p. 137), so did his attempt to found a really national literature. The champion of Greek culture was the Campanian Ennius (239–169), the friend of Scipio Africanus. His poem on Roman history—the *Annales*, in eighteen books—was written in hexameters; it is frequently imitated by Virgil.[3] But he was also a dramatist and a satirist. His proud confidence in his fame is seen in his epitaph:

> "Nemo me lacrimis decoret, nec funera fletu
> Faxit. Cur? Volito vivu' per ora virum."

[1] Hor. *Ep.* ii. 1, 156. [2] *Cf.* his gibe, "Fato Metelli fiunt consules."
[3] *Cf.* p. 117 and *Aen.* vi. 846; *cf.* p. 180 for his religious views.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF SYRIA (192–189)

Antiochus the Great, King of Syria.—Greek disunion would alone have been enough to prevent a lasting peace; but the great house of the Seleucidae also still remained to be dealt with. Antiochus III. had come to the throne in 223; he had carried his victorious arms into Bactria and, following the steps of Alexander, had reached India, and so had earned the title of "Great." Since the death of Ptolemy Philopator, he had been attacking Rome's ally, Egypt; the Senate had proclaimed itself "guardian" of the young Egyptian king, but had Antiochus confined himself to occupying Syria, it is hardly likely the Romans would have interfered. It was a different matter, however, when Antiochus seized the Egyptian possessions on the north of the Aegean. Flamininus sent envoys to the Syrian king to assert the freedom of all Hellenes, and to tell him to evacuate the Asiatic cities which had belonged to Macedon or Egypt, and Antiochus had replied that he was only reclaiming his ancestral inheritance. He had, even before this, become engaged in hostilities with Rome's allies, Eumenes of Pergamum, and the Rhodians; when, in 195, Hannibal, who had been driven from Carthage (cf. p. 143), took refuge at his court, it was evident that war was inevitable.

Hannibal's Plans for a Coalition against Rome.—The combination which Hannibal formed against Rome was of the widest kind. Antiochus made overtures to Pergamum and to the Greek city-states; it was hoped that Philip of Macedon would assist to expel the Romans from Greece; and ambassadors were sent to Carthage to endeavour to

raise a third Punic War; Rome also was busy in Spain, suppressing a serious revolt. In this way Hannibal hoped to unite East and West against his hated enemies.

The Aetolians precipitate a Conflict.—But it was ever the fate of the great Carthaginian to see his plans spoiled by the inefficiency of his tools; Antiochus, the Oriental despot, was not the man to unite Greece, nor could Philip forget how Antiochus had failed to support him against Rome. The execution of the design was delayed, and it was the reckless conduct of the Aetolians, which precipitated a conflict in Greece, by attacking Sparta and killing Nabis; at the same time they seized the fortress of Demetrias, and invited Antiochus to come and liberate the Hellenes. Hannibal was in favour of an attack on Italy, but this design was too bold for the pusillanimous Oriental despot; he landed, however, in Greece in the autumn of 192. Both sides were disappointed; instead of finding Greece enthusiastic to receive him, Antiochus met with no support; and the Aetolians, in their turn, complained that a king, who had promised the hosts of Asia, came with only 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry.

Roman victory at Thermopylae (191).—The Romans had meanwhile landed at Apollonia, and in 191 the war was begun in earnest; the Roman commander was Acilius Glabrio, a man of energy and ability, while on his staff, serving as mere military tribunes, were two consulars, M. Porcius Cato and his friend L. Valerius Flaccus. Antiochus attempted to prevent the Romans penetrating from Thessaly into central Greece by occupying the famous pass of Thermopylae; the Aetolians were bidden to guard the heights, so as to prevent the Romans turning the position as Xerxes had done. But they allowed Cato to force their position, and the Asiatic army, attacked in front and in flank, broke up in confusion. The king escaped with only five hundred men, and promptly returned to Ephesus.

Antiochus' defeat at Magnesia (190).—It was necessary for the Romans, if they wished to crush him, to carry the war into Asia, and for this task Lucius Cornelius Scipio, the brother of the great Africanus, was chosen, on condition that the conqueror of Hannibal served as his lieutenant.

Popular enthusiasm rose high, and many veterans enlisted. The real difficulty of the war, however, had been overcome before the two Scipios took the field. The Romans had yet to learn the weakness of a host of Asiatics; but by sea the Syrian king was really formidable, and the Roman admiral, though assisted by the ships of Rhodes and Pergamum, had a hard struggle to secure the Aegean, and the Hellespont; finally, in August 190, a victory at Myonnesus, an island off the coast of Ionia, gave the Romans the command of the sea. So alarmed was Antiochus, that he even evacuated the stronghold of Lysimachia, in Thrace, by which he might well have delayed for some time the advance of the Roman army. The victories of their fleet, and the loyal aid of Philip of Macedon, who provided abundant stores, brought the Romans safe into Asia after a long and toilsome march. The rest of the campaign was easy; Antiochus, instead of falling back and exhausting the enemy by desultory warfare, brought his huge and disorderly masses into collision with the legions at Magnesia (late in the autumn of 190). The result was what might have been expected; what had happened at Arbela to Darius, and was to happen to Surajah Dowlah at Plassy, now befell the Syrian king. The very size of his host ensured its discomfiture; for the worthless troops threw into confusion those who could and would have fought; and, without the legions having been engaged, Antiochus was defeated by the Roman allies. He is said to have lost 50,000 men, while his conquerors lost about 300. L. Scipio had won the name of Asiaticus, and the Romans a new continent; it is significant that, of all Rome's great enemies, Syria alone never required a second defeat.

Terms of the Peace.—Antiochus submitted at once, and peace was concluded next year. The king surrendered all his possessions in Europe, and in Asia Minor west of the river Halys and of Mount Taurus. He paid the enormous war indemnity of fifteen thousand talents, and agreed not to interfere in any way with the affairs of the West. Even in the dominions nominally left to him, Cappadocia and the two Armenias became independent.

Settlement of Asia Minor.—The territory thus gained was at once distributed by the Romans. A large number of Greek cities were set free, and Rhodes was rewarded with a considerable slice of territory on the mainland, comprising Lycia and part of Caria. But the bulk of Antiochus' ceded dominions went to Eumenes, King of Pergamum; his rule now extended from the Hellespont to the south coast of Asia Minor, and inland over Lydia, Great Phrygia, and Lycaonia; in Europe also he received the Chersonese. It was evident that he was to play the part in Asia which Masinissa and his Numidians were playing in Africa.

Manlius Volso's Campaign against the Galatians.—The settlement of Asia was carried out by a commission, presided over by Cn. Manlius Volso, one of the consuls of 189; but he did more than reap the fruits of other men's labours. The Gallic tribes, who had been settled in Asia Minor for a century, and who had given their name to Galatia, were a terror to all their neighbours; they conducted systematic plundering raids on all who refused to purchase security by paying blackmail. Now that the power of Syria was broken, it was necessary for Rome to do something to secure the peace of Asia Minor; Volso therefore attacked and crushed the Galatians. The attack was unprovoked, but probably necessary; at all events, the conqueror secured enormous booty. In two respects this expedition deserves to be remembered:

(1) Volso undertook it upon his own responsibility, thus setting an evil precedent, and showing how great the power of the proconsuls was becoming.

(2) From the booty acquired in this campaign the Romans dated the decay of discipline in their armies. No doubt this was a long-standing evil, but it is significant to note the exact date assigned to it.

Rearrangement of European Greece.—Meanwhile, European Greece had been once more settled. The Aetolians, after other respites, were at last thoroughly reduced by the consul of 189, M. Fulvius Nobilior, who took Ambracia. They had to cede their conquests, and became dependent on Rome in their foreign relations. The Achaeans and Philip of Macedon both received an increase of territory,

but neither was content; the Achaeans were disappointed because they were not allowed to extend their league beyond the Peloponnese, their natural limit, and Philip considered that he ought to have had part at least of the share of Eumenes, *i.e.* the Thracian Chersonese. The Romans, however, had tried to do their best for the Greeks, and were now heartily sick of the whole peninsula, its constant quarrels, and its foolish assertions of its own dignity. Greece was prepared to do anything but fight; the Romans knew it would not do this, and that it could not if it would.

Death of Hannibal.—In this way the kingdoms which had been built up out of Alexander's empire fell easily before the Italian republic; within twelve years of the defeat of Carthage, Rome was supreme in the East, and had no longer any country to fear. But she condescended to fear one man. Hannibal had been for forty years her implacable foe; even under Antiochus, he had shown himself as bold to plan and as skilful to execute as ever, and Rome could not be easy while he was alive. Antiochus had bound himself in the treaty to give him up, and Hannibal had fled to Crete; thence he returned secretly to the court of Prusias, King of Bithynia. The Romans, however, detected his hiding-place, and demanded his surrender; to escape this he took the poison, which he had long carried about with him in a ring, and died at the age of sixty-four (183).

The Romans have been accused of brutality in hunting the great man to death, but they felt him too dangerous to be let alone. They feared him as the English feared the great Napoleon, and the Romans had no St. Helena in which to keep a great captive safe.

Death of Philopoemen.—In the same year with Hannibal died Philopoemen, the general of the Achaean League. He may be called the last great man of free Greece, for he was an honourable politician, and a good soldier. Henceforward, Greece has only intriguers and mob orators to guide her affairs. At once in the field and in home affairs, all was going down before the constantly encroaching power of Rome.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR (171-167) *AND THE GREEK WORLD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF CORINTH* (146)

Philip of Macedon prepares for another War. — Philip of Macedon had good reason for discontent with his share of the plunder of Antiochus, and the treatment which he received afterwards was such as to provoke him still further. The Greek states knew that Macedonia was humbled, and hastened, by constant complaints against their old masters, to court their new ones, the Romans. The Senate, perhaps, tried to do justice, but all their actions were dictated by cold policy; they meant to keep Greece divided and dependent, and acted accordingly. Philip's policy, on the other hand, was one of impulse. He had loyally supported the Romans against Antiochus, and he expected gratitude; as he was disappointed, his anger against Rome became more bitter than ever, and he set himself to prepare for another struggle. His kingdom, during the period of peace, was recovering from the drain on its population, and Philip strengthened himself by alliance with the Thracians on his eastern frontier, and by organizing his northern frontier against the Dardani (who lived in what is now Servia); he even tried to gain over the barbarians beyond the Danube, the Bastarnae, to crush his more immediate enemies, but the plan failed when, after his death, an attempt was made to carry it into execution.

He is succeeded by his son Perseus. — The Romans were well aware of the danger, and war seemed inevitable; but Philip sent his son Demetrius to Rome, and his explanations were accepted. Unfortunately, out of this embassy grew a terrible tragedy; the Romans showed marked favour to Demetrius, who, when a hostage, had been educated in

Italy, and so excited the suspicions of his father against him; these were encouraged by the eldest son, Perseus, who was jealous of his brother's popularity, and who even accused Demetrius of treasonable correspondence with the Romans, and produced a forged letter to confirm the charge. Philip was deceived, and ordered the execution of Demetrius (181), but he discovered the deceit, and died broken hearted two years later. He was succeeded by his son, Perseus, who managed to get the Romans to recognise his succession, but set himself to continue his father's plans. Unlike his father, who was passionate and intemperate, he was correct in life, businesslike, and careful, but he lacked decision and vigour; he could plan wide schemes, but his heart always failed him when the time came for their execution, and again and again he missed opportunities which might have made him successful.

The Third Macedonian War (172). — Perseus tried to strengthen himself by matrimonial alliances with the kings of Syria and of Bithynia, and he set himself to court the Greeks. Everywhere the patriotic party was in his favour, and he appealed also to the great class of the poor and the discontented, who swarmed everywhere in Greece, and who were eager to risk a revolution in which they had everything to gain and nothing to lose. His diplomacy was only partly successful. It is true that even Rome's old allies, the Rhodians, wavered, and paid marked respect to Perseus; but the Greek states knew that alliance with Macedonia meant war with Rome, and when the actual outbreak of hostilities occurred he found no support in Greece. The final cause of the war was the complaints of Eumenes of Pergamum, who came to Rome with a long list of charges against Perseus. To make matters worse, the Pergamenian king was, when returning, almost murdered at Delphi, and Perseus was strongly suspected of complicity. War was declared late in 172, but the Romans still negotiated to gain time; hence actual hostilities did not break out till 171. Perseus was far stronger than his father had ever been, for he had a large army and a well-filled treasury; and, had he acted boldly and assumed the offensive, he would certainly have secured allies, and might,

perhaps, have prevented the Romans from landing in Greece. He had, however, made up his mind to a defensive war, and not even a brilliant success near Larissa in 171 could induce him to do more than ask for peace on the old terms. The Romans of course refused, and Perseus evacuated Thessaly more from faintheartedness than from necessity. In spite of his folly the Epirots came over to his side.

Misconduct of the Roman Armies (170).—The next year of the war was even more discreditable to the Romans. They suffered several reverses, and the lack of discipline in their army was so great that allied States suffered from it even more than the enemy. It was a new and evil precedent when works of art from a friendly city like Chalcis were seized and shipped to Rome. The Senate had to interfere to protect its Greek friends from its own officials; but Perseus still remained on the defensive. He feared equally to move his own forces or to spend the vast treasures which his father and he had accumulated; this misplaced economy cost him the valuable aid of 20,000 Celtic mercenaries.

Intervention of the Rhodians.—In 169 the Romans blundered into some successes. The consul, Q. Marcius Philippus, crossed the mountains, lying to the west of Tempe, into Macedonia, but might easily have been overwhelmed, as he had neither provisions nor supports. Perseus, however, fled to Pydna, and the impregnable Tempe surrendered. At this moment the tragedy of the fall of Macedonia was lightened by a grotesquely comic incident. The Rhodians sent an embassy to Rome to announce that they would no longer tolerate a war which was ruining their trade, but would themselves attack whichever side should refuse to make peace. The Rhodian assembly had lost its head from long-continued prosperity, but the Senate retorted to this piece of democratic folly by declaring Rhodes' possessions on the mainland to be free.

Aemilius Paullus Ends the War by his Victory at Pydna (168.—The Roman people saw, however, that it was necessary to put an end to this blundering, and elected as consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, an officer of tried reputation and unblemished character. He was a man of 60, he was poor, and he had been consul before; hence from every point of

view his election was unusual, but it was fully justified. Within fifteen days after his arrival in Macedonia he had brought on a decisive battle at Pydna. The old question of phalanx against maniple was settled once and for all, so far as ancient history is concerned. At first the tremendous weight of the Macedonian spearmen carried all before it, but the hurry of pursuit and the uneven ground broke up their close order, the Roman cohorts poured in wherever there was a gap, and once more

> "The short broadsword
> Through the thick array
> Of levelled spears and serried shields
> Hewed close its gory way."[1]

Twenty thousand Macedonians are said to have fallen, and Perseus, after an attempt at flight, surrendered to the Romans with his children and his treasures. He ended his life a state prisoner in Italy, and with him the monarchy of Alexander passes out of history. Genthius, the King of Illyria, was reduced about the same time, and his dominions were annexed by Rome, although Illyricum does not appear as a separate province for another century.

Rome Imposes Tribute on Macedonia.—The Romans saw that their policy of non-intervention had been a failure; weak States were a constant source of intrigue, and powerful States of danger. They could not even yet make up their mind to form new provinces, but they rearranged the East once more, and a tribute was definitely imposed on Macedonia and on Illyria. From the battle of Pydna Polybius dates the full establishment of the Roman Empire (168), and in the next year direct taxation (the *tributum*) was abolished at Rome. It was clear that Rome meant to govern the world, but it was not till 146 that she really set herself to the task. Meantime, Macedonia was divided up into four districts, which were nominally republics. They were to pay to Rome only half the tribute which they had paid to their kings; but how much the Macedonians disliked this "freedom" was seen in the fact that the Romans had to banish to Italy a large number of Macedonian loyalists. Roman jealousy set limits on Macedonian foreign trade,

[1] MACAULAY, *Prophecy of Capys.*

and also forbade commerce and intermarriage between district and district.

Rome's Ingratitude to Pergamum and to Rhodes.—The Roman tools in the East were now to find what gratitude is worth in politics. The Pergamenian kingdom had been almost created by the Senate, and had done Rome good service for half a century; but now Eumenes was accused of intrigues with Perseus, and was forbidden to come to Rome, and the Galatians and Pamphylians were encouraged to resist him in Asia. A similar treatment befell the Rhodians; though they deserved to be punished for their folly, yet, as Cato pleaded in the Senate, a wise policy would have overlooked this in remembrance of their past services. But gratitude was not a Roman virtue; Rhodes had to surrender her possessions on the mainland, and found her trade injured by the creation of a free port at Delos.

Punishment of Greece Proper.—In Greece proper, a terrible vengeance was wreaked on the Epirots, who were annihilated as a nation; 150,000 are said to have been sold into slavery. Among the Greek cities, however, the Romans did their best to check the vengeance of their own partisans; with this purpose they deported to Italy a large number of citizens who had been prominent on the "patriotic" side; from the Achaean League alone there were taken more than 1000, among whom was the historian Polybius; these were kept in honourable confinement (165). In other respects the Greek cities were left for the present to "stew in their own juice," until twenty years more of this process had made Rome's final interference necessary.

Rome's Interference with Syria.—With regard also to the Greek world in Asia, Rome now asserted herself. Antiochus Epiphanes of Syria took advantage of the Romans being busy, to invade Egypt; it was the year of the battle of Pydna, and only diplomatic interference was possible, but it was enough. The Roman Commissioner, C. Popillius, bluntly told the great king that he must leave Egypt, and when delay was asked for, drew a circle in the sand round him, and bade him decide there and then. The king came out of the circle, and promptly evacuated Egypt. It was not necessary to take much trouble with such a king as this,

but the Romans gave him something to do at home, by encouraging the Jewish rebels under the Maccabees.

Macedonia made a Province.—The settlement of 168, like all half measures, proved only a temporary arrangement; the Macedonians regretted their royal house, they missed their national unity, and they resented the interference with their trade and commerce. The Romans tried to appease this by re-opening the mines (158); but in 152, there appeared a certain Andriscus, who pretended to be an illegitimate son of Perseus; his rising, neglected at first, soon became formidable, but he was finally defeated by Q. Caecilius Metellus in 148.[1] Other pretenders appeared soon after, appealing especially to the disorderly elements in the population; the Romans therefore resolved to turn Macedonia into a regular province, swept away the fourfold division, and put the whole country under a governor (146).

Folly of the Achaean Patriots.—This change was not due merely to local necessity; it marks a new departure in Roman policy, for, in the same year, another new province was formed in Africa (p. 185). This year saw also the end of Greek freedom. The surviving Achaean exiles had been allowed to return in 151, and most of them had not been as wise as Polybius, who saw the necessity of submission; one of them, Diaeus, at once proceeded to embroil his country with Rome. The cause of quarrel was the old enmity between Sparta and the Achaean League; both sides appealed to Rome, and when the Roman commissioners gave a decision in favour of Sparta, the mob of Corinth insulted them. Even then the Romans endeavoured to spare the infatuated Greeks, but the only result was that the Achaeans believed the Romans were afraid of them, and elected Critolaus, the head of the anti-Roman party, to succeed Diaeus. The few respectable citizens, who saw the necessity of submission to Rome, were accused as traitors, and the League was hurried forward to its ruin.

[1] He is often called the "Pseudo-Philp," as, according to some accounts, he pretended to be the son of Perseus, who died in Italy after his father.

Fall of Corinth (146).—Metellus, the victor of Macedonia, first advanced against Critolaus, whose behaviour in the field was as incapable as his policy at home; the Romans met no serious resistance until they reached Corinth, but this town held out long enough for Metellus to be superseded by the consul for 146, L. Mummius. Corinth soon fell, and enormous booty passed into the Roman hands, for the city was rich in works of Greek art. Mummius sent a large number of these to Rome, to adorn his triumph, stipulating with the carriers that, if these priceless masterpieces were injured, others as good were to be put in their place. Such a clause was usual in contracts, and we can hardly say whether its introduction here was due to boorish ignorance, or to a deficient sense of humour on the part of the Roman consul.

Greece loses its Freedom, and disappears from History.—Corinth was destroyed as a city—a punishment deserved by the folly of its mob; but probably the Romans were urged to this unusual severity by a motive much less worthy than a desire for justice. It was commercial jealousy of the great mercantile city which induced the Roman Government to destroy Corinth, just as, in this very same year, they destroyed Carthage from similar motives. Had the Romans punished as severely every Greek town in which the mob was foolish and disorderly, Greece would have been depopulated at once, instead of slowly wasting away from her own public folly and private vice. The Achaean League was broken up, as were the other federations in Greece; the Romans carried out thoroughly their policy of division.

The communities retained their local freedom, but paid a tribute to Rome, and parts of Northern Greece were assigned to the province of Macedonia. Only a few communities, *e.g.* Athens, were allowed to retain their old treaties, and were exempt from taxation (*civitates foederatae et immunes*); the rest of Greece lost its freedom, though the province of Achaia was not created for a long period. It is sad to note the disappearance from the world's stage of a people who had been so great; but Greece had outlived all its strength, except in some departments of intellectual life. Politically,

it was incapable; morally, it was hopeless; economically, it was bankrupt. The Greeks scattered themselves over the world as teachers of civilization in its higher, and still more in its lower, forms; but at home Greece rapidly became the depopulated district which Byron[1] describes:

> "The crushed relics of their vanished might.
> The Roman saw these tombs in his own age,
> These sepulchres of cities, which excite
> Sad wonder."

The influence of Greece on the Roman Drama.—As Ennius (p. 150) marks the triumph of Greek influences in Roman epic poetry, so do Plautus (254–184) and Terence (185–159) in the Roman drama. All their plays are *palliatae*, *i.e.* Greek in character; they are translated or adapted from the "New" comedy of Menander. But there is a great difference between the two poets; Plautus is the typical Roman comedian; all his twenty plays (of which perhaps the *Menaechmi*—imitated by Shakespeare in the Comedy of Errors—is the most famous), are marked by broad humour and admirable dialogue. Terence, on the other hand, is the poet of an aristocratic clique; he was the friend of the younger Africanus, whom scandal accused of writing his plays for him. Hence, both in his plots and in his dialogue, he is more careful than Plautus, but he lacks variety and freshness.[2] Caesar well expresses his merits and defects in the lines:

> "Tu quoque, tu in summis, o dimidiate Menander,
> Poneris et merito, puri sermonis amator."

Tragedies based on Roman history (*praetextae*) were written by Naevius (*cf.* p. 150) (*e.g.* his "Clastidium" based on the victory of Marcellus, *cf.* p. 102), but the example was little followed till the time of the Empire; none has survived but the very late play *Octavia*. Comedies of Italian life (*togatae*) were much more successful, especially those of Afranius (born *circ.* 150 B.C.), whose plays were still acted in the time of Cicero.

[1] *Childe Harold*, iii. 45.

[2] Terence left six plays, several of which, *e.g.* the *Andria*, are "contaminated," *i.e.* made up of two Greek originals.

CHAPTER XXIII.

ROMAN POWER IN SPAIN DURING THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

Roman Dominion in Spain, and English Dominion in India.—The Romans had gone to Spain to protect themselves from the Carthaginians—in fact, purely as a measure of defence. Spain was to them what India has been to the English, who, in the same way, established themselves as ruling powers in the East, to exclude the Dutch and the French. And in another respect Roman dominion in Spain is like that of England in India: it illustrates the great principle that when once a foreign nation gets a firm hold on the sea-board of a country inhabited by weaker or less civilised tribes, its dominions must extend till they reach natural boundaries. It is not a question of deliberate aggression: it is rather due to the fact that conflicting ideas of right lead, of necessity, to actual conflicts, and in these, in the long run, the weaker goes down.

In one respect, however, Spain offers a great contrast to India. The history of Roman rule there is one of constant assimilation of conqueror and conquered—a process which is barred in India by obstacles of every kind.

Priority of Spain among the Provinces.—Spain is really Rome's first province beyond the sea; for though Sicily and Sardinia were earlier reduced, yet these islands have always formed part of Italy geographically, as they still do politically. It was in the Iberian peninsula that Rome first undertook the task of governing a country remote from Italy; it is here she begins her great work of stamping Western Europe with her own likeness. And this priority among the provinces Spain will be found to retain throughout. In spite of the hard struggles which the Romans had to wage, Spain is

always the first to receive new privileges, till at last the process reaches its highest point in the first century A.D., when this new Roman world gave the empire the first provincial emperor in Trajan, and the first group of provincial Latin writers in the two Senecas, Lucan, Quintilian, and Martial—the glories of the Silver Age. It is necessary to bear in mind these broad results in tracing the history of Roman conquest; only in this way can the real interest be seen of what appears, at first sight, to be a long series of chequered campaigns, marked by constant treachery and oppression on the part of the conquerors.

Early Extension of Roman Civilization.—The Romans had been welcomed in Spain as deliverers from Carthage; but, as has already been seen (p. 133), the Spaniards found their mistake before Scipio had left Spain; yet, even thus early, the assimilation of the two nations had begun. Scipio left in Italica a settlement, half Latin and half Spanish, formed of his legionaries who had married Spanish wives; it was not a Roman town (*municipium*), for two generations were to pass before a statesman could conceive of planting an organized community outside Italy, but it was a step in that direction. So, too, from the very first, we find, in the so-called "silver of Osca," a coinage imitated from the Roman denarii.

Cato's Settlement of Spain.—But the Roman hold on Spain was of the slightest. In 197 two provinces were organized, "Hither and Further" (*Hispania citerior et ulterior*) corresponding roughly to the basins of the Ebro and the Guadalquivir (*Iberus* and *Baetis*), and the number of praetors was raised from four to six in order to provide governors for the new dependencies. But the same year saw the breaking out of a general insurrection, and the position was so serious that in 195 the consul, M. Porcius Cato, was sent to Spain. He found the whole of Hither Spain in revolt; outside of Emporiae the Romans had only one or two strongholds. His vigour and decision, however, restored order; he defeated the Spaniards in a pitched battle, and issued simultaneous orders to all the towns, from the Pyrenees to the Baetis, that they should pull down their walls. There was no time to concert resistance, and so the order was obeyed.

Cato was wise enough to confirm by just treatment the impression which he had made by force. He also organized the working of the mines, which made Spain the Eldorado of the Old World, and which were, no doubt, one of the great reasons why the Romans kept hold of a country so remote and so difficult of conquest. From the very first Spain was differently treated, in the matter of tribute, from the older province of Sicily. There was no system of tithes (*decumæ*) to be farmed by the Roman publicani; a definite payment (*stipendium*) was imposed on each community, and collected by the natives themselves. Hence, much extortion and oppression was avoided.

Roman Standing Army First in Spain.—Cato was awarded a well-deserved triumph at Rome, but Spain was very far from settled; year after year the Celtiberians, in the centre of the peninsula (in the modern Castile) and the Lusitanians, in the west and south-west, gave trouble to the governors of the Hither and Further Provinces. In fact it was in Spain that the Romans first maintained a standing army. Originally the burgesses had been called out for each campaign, and the long continued service of the second Punic War had been only an exception, due to the life-and-death character of the struggle; but it was obviously impossible to change an army every year in a district so remote as Spain. Hence the custom grew up that a Roman might be called upon to serve continuously for sixteen years in the infantry or for ten in the cavalry.

The Spanish service was very unpopular; the risk was great and the booty was usually small; hence the evil custom of putting unfair burdens on the allied troops (p. 146) was developed, and an undue proportion of them was sent to distant campaigns. The Romans too had to introduce conscription to fill up their own Spanish levies; this was first done in 151, owing to the lack of volunteers, and the unwillingness of the people to be recruited by the military tribunes. This change in the character of the service was of far reaching results; it goes on through the whole of the second century B.C., and ends in the creation of those legions of professional soldiers, which were the foundation of the Empire.

Meantime Spain was a school for Roman generals, who wished really to learn the art of war, *e.g.* it was there that Aemilius Paullus, the victor of Pydna, had first distinguished himself (190–189).

The Gracchan Settlement of Spain (179).—The border warfare and the risings of the Celtiberians and the Lusitanians culminated in 179, when Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus was praetor in Spain; with his colleague Albinus he gained brilliant victories, but he saw that force by itself was useless, unless the causes of revolt were removed: accordingly he treated the Spaniards fairly, and settled the land question on an equitable basis. The result was that he won their enthusiastic devotion; his measures secured peace for nearly a generation, and 40 years after, his very name was sufficient to make his son and namesake, the famous demagogue and reformer, an acceptable mediator with the Celtiberians of Numantia. The effect of combined justice and strength in dealing with less civilized peoples is a feature as familiar in Roman as it is in Indian history; the work of Gracchus in Spain may be compared with the settlement of the Punjaub by the Lawrences. The period of the Gracchan peace is marked by the settlement of a Latin colony at Carteia, the first outside Italy (171).

Galba's Treacherous Massacre of the Lusitanians.—Unfortunately the Roman generals were not as a rule men like Gracchus, and about 155 war again began against the Lusitanians. After some successes and still more defeats on the part of the Romans, it was terminated by a shameful act of treachery (150); the praetor, Servius Sulpicius Galba, invited the Lusitanians to submit, promising them honourable terms and settlements under Roman protection. Trusting in Roman honour, they laid down their arms, and were massacred almost to a man; among the few who escaped was Viriathus, who was soon to teach the Romans that treachery often costs dear. Galba was impeached on his return to Italy, and the old Cato made his last public appearance as the champion of good faith and Roman honour; but Galba used all the resources of his eloquence and his wealth, and worked on the feelings of his judges by displaying his sorrowing family in court; he was acquitted,

and was actually elected consul in 144. A people who had so forgotten the first principles of justice, had to learn by bitter experience.

The Lusitanians Reduced.—Viriathus, in 148, raised the Spaniards once more in revolt; from shepherd and bandit, he became first a guerilla leader, and then head of a regular army; he defeated several Roman praetors, and three consuls successively were sent against him, one of whom, a Fabius, actually made a treaty with him (141). But his brother and successor, Q. Servilius Caepio, repudiated the treaty and resumed the war; he found gold a more useful weapon than steel; taking the opportunity of renewed negotiations, he bribed some of the Lusitanian envoys to murder their leader, and then the submission of the people soon followed, and they were deported to the plains. War in this quarter was terminated by the consul, D. Junius Brutus, who gained the name of "Gallaicus"[1] from his conquests, and who was the first Roman to reach the north-west coast of the peninsula; he deported the Lusitanians to the plains.

The War with Numantia.—Meanwhile a war of very similar character, but, if possible, marked by even greater incapacity and treachery, was being waged against the Celtiberians (153); it was provoked by the fact that the Romans refused to recognize any longer the Gracchan settlement. The first Roman operations were unsuccessful; Marcellus, in 152, made an honourable treaty with the Spaniards, but it was repudiated by his successor, L. Licinius Lucullus. After some years of unimportant hostilities, the war centred at Numantia. This little town, situated in the mountains, near the head waters of the Durius (Douro), defied the Roman arms for 11 years (143–133); twice did Roman generals conclude peace with it (140 and 137), and twice was the peace repudiated, the second time under peculiarly disgraceful circumstances. The consul, C. Hostilius Mancinus, had fallen into an ambush with all his army, but, thanks to the mediation of Tiberius Gracchus, his quaestor, was allowed to purchase his safety by granting honourable terms to Numantia. The Roman government at home rejected these, and the old

[1] The name of the people survives in that of the modern province of Galicia; Brutus was in Spain five years, 138–133 B.C.

farce of the Caudine Forks (p. 55) was played over again by the surrender of Mancinus and his officers to the Numantines, who, of course, refused to receive them.

Scipio Aemilianus in Spain.—The war therefore was resumed, till the Roman people at last were compelled to elect as consul for 134 their only general, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (known sometimes as "Africanus Minor"), who had shown himself at once brave and skilful in his conquest of Carthage (p. 184). His election was itself unusual, for he had already been consul in 147; and probably re-election had by this time been declared actually illegal.[1] His proceedings were certainly of a very unusual nature; he raised his army largely by his own personal influence, and, on his arrival in Spain, surrounded himself by a body-guard of 500 friends. This step was rendered necessary for his personal safety by the absolute lack of discipline in the Spanish army, but it was a direct precedent for the "praetorian" guards of the great proconsuls of the next century, and of the emperors. Scipio's own operations in Spain were successful, but not really brilliant. He first restored order among his own troops, and then proceeded, with an overwhelming force, to blockade the unhappy Numantines. Starvation did what the Roman arms had failed to do, and the town surrendered, after suffering the most frightful extremities of want. It was razed to the ground, and Scipio added "Numantinus" to his other titles; but history remembers rather the heroic defenders than their conqueror, and the Romans themselves ranked Numantia with Carthage, as among their most formidable foes.[2] Nothing could better show the collapse of the Roman military system than the long resistance of this petty town. It is a remarkable fact that there were serving, in the camp at Numantia, the three men who were directly or indirectly to bring about the new order of things Jugurtha was there at the head of the Numidian contingent, and C. Marius and P. Rutilius Rufus were serving as subor-

[1] The epitome of Livy, at all events, says he was twice "legibus solutus." As the ordinary interval of ten years had elapsed since his first consulship, we can only suppose that all re-election was at this time illegal.

[2] Cf. HORACE. *Odes* ii. 12, 1.

dinate Roman officers. The Numidian prince learned at Numantia the weakness and venality of Rome, and it was to crush him that Marius and Rutilius organized the new Roman army.

It is a relief to find that, after the campaigns of D. Brutus and of Scipio, Spain sinks out of notice for fifty years; during this period, the work of spreading Roman civilization went quietly on, till a new stage begins with the command of Sertorius (p. 227).

General Character of the Spanish Wars.—The description given by Velleius of the war with Viriathus, *triste et contu meliosum bellum*, well applies to most of the Roman campaigns in Spain under the Republic. War there was most difficult, as the country presents a series of natural fortresses, and is especially adapted to "guerilla" fighting; the very word is Spanish.[1] Hence Spain is, as Napoleon said, a "country where large armies starve and small ones are beaten." Rome adopted her usual methods; she deported the more stubborn tribes to the plains (*cf.* pp. 168, 319), and introduced her road system. It was the arts of peace rather than those of war that finally secured the country.

[1] *Cf.* Macaulay, *Essays*, p. 257 (Student's Edition), for a brilliant description of the difficulties of conquering Spain.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE INTERNAL HISTORY OF ROME BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THIRD PUNIC WARS

Scipio Africanus and Cato.—Rome's history between the Licinian laws and the revolution of the Gracchi is mainly external. The direct constitutional changes are few, and the gradual development or degeneration in politics and in literature, in religion and in morality, is hard to trace. The constitutional changes have been already described in chapter xi., and the next chapter will attempt to give some sketch of the internal development of Rome. Two men, however, stand out so markedly in the period after the second Punic War that they must be described separately. Scipio Africanus and his family represent (though on their better side) the forces which were changing Rome; while the famous M. Porcius Cato, the organizer of Spain (p. 166), the successful leader at Thermopylæ (p. 152), and the censor of 184, is the champion of all that was best in old Rome, which was passing away, but which had laid strong and deep the foundation of world-wide empire.

The later years of Scipio Africanus.—Scipio's unconstitutional behaviour as consul has been already described (p. 134). After his victorious return to Rome, he became an ordinary senator, so far as he could ever be ordinary; the only exceptional position he received was that he was enrolled at the head of the Senate as *Princeps Senatus*. But he was the chief of that party among the Roman nobles, which patronized the new Hellenic culture, and he was also the head of a family which looked on itself as having a special claim to honour and position in the state. His influence had secured the appointment of his brother Lucius to the important command against Antiochus; and when Lucius was

called upon to produce his accounts for the campaign (187), the great Africanus publicly tore his books to pieces, exclaiming that it was unworthy to demand particulars as to petty sums from a man who had paid 200,000 sestertia (nearly £2,000,000) into the treasury. When Lucius was afterwards prosecuted and condemned, his brother rescued him by force, and being impeached for this, he refused to say a word in his own defence; but reminding the people that it was the anniversary of Zama, he summoned them to the Capitol to give thanks for his services to the State, and to pray that Rome might have more citizens like himself. He then quitted Rome, which he considered ungrateful, and went into retirement at his country estate of Liternum. Lucius was attacked again, but proceedings were stopped by the veto of the tribune, Tiberius Gracchus, who, though belonging to the opposite party, afterwards married Cornelia, the daughter of Africanus, famous in history as the "mother of the Gracchi."[1] Scipio died soon after (183), in the same year as Hannibal. He was too unlike his countrymen to submit to their routine government, and too patriotic to conspire against it; but it is obvious that, great as his services had been, it was impossible for the Romans to allow him, without protest, to make his own rule of conduct for himself.

The early years of Cato.—Foremost among his opponents was M. Porcius Cato. He was by birth a poor farmer of Tusculum, but he attracted the notice of a wealthy and noble neighbour, Valerius Flaccus, who brought him to the front in politics. His own good services in the field, and his vigorous eloquence in the assembly and in the law courts, secured his further advancement. He was present at the capture of Tarentum, under the veteran Q. Fabius Maximus, whose friendship he won, and inherited the old commander's jealousy of Scipio, under whom he was quaestor in Sicily (205). The usual friendship between consul and quaestor was impossible in this case; for the subordinate was the exact opposite of his superior. Shrewd common-sense, a

[1] The exact order of the later events in the life of Scipio is uncertain; the accounts of Livy and of Aulus Gellius are hopelessly irreconcilable: I have in the main followed Mr. Shuckburgh's arrangement, which is as probable as any.

rigid observance of forms, an honest contempt for all claims but those of merit, and an almost boorish simplicity of life and manners, made him the necessary enemy of the high-born, mystical, and cultivated man of genius.

The Repeal of the Leges Oppiae. — Cato's consulship was marked by an almost humorous defeat. In the very crisis of the Punic Wars had been passed the Leges Oppiae (215), which forbade the Roman ladies to wear more than half an ounce of gold. Now that victory had come, it was proposed to relax this regulation, and, in spite of all Cato's eloquence, which was supported by his colleague Flaccus, the Roman ladies triumphed (195).

The Censorship of Cato (184).—But the most famous year in Cato's life was that of his censorship, in which again he had Flaccus as colleague. As a candidate for this office he gave out that he was standing definitely as the reformer of morals and the assailant of the nobility, in fact, as one who intended to punish without fear or favour; and, in spite of a storm of opposition, he was triumphantly carried by the votes of the yeomen farmers, who admired his rough wit and his stubborn independence. He did not disappoint them; he removed the brother of the great Africanus from the list of equites, and struck off from the roll of the Senate the name of Flamininus (the brother of the conqueror of Greece), who had disgraced the authority of a Roman magistrate by the brutal murder of a Gallic refugee; but his severity was rendered ridiculous when he degraded a senator for kissing his wife in the presence of his daughter.

The short-sightedness of Cato as a Reformer.—The ideal of Cato was the career of the old farmer statesman, M'. Curius Dentatus; but he failed to distinguish between evils that were deep-rooted and those that were merely on the surface; in fact, with true Roman short-sightedness, he often struck at the symptom while he encouraged the cause. He did his best, by example and by precept, to encourage the old Roman devotion to agriculture; his policy is seen in the extension of burgess colonies during the first twenty years of this century. (*Cf.* p. 139–140.) He says, "Farmers furnish the best men and the ablest soldiers; no calling is so honourable, safe, and inoffensive as theirs." Yet the system

which he recommends is that of working estates with a bailiff and slaves; it meant that land, which once would have supported one hundred families of small holders, now maintained one free family and some fifty (mostly unmarried) slaves. And in his advice as to the treatment of these, Cato adopts from the plantation system all its undisguised brutality; a "slave must either work or sleep," he says, and old and sickly slaves were, in his judgment, to be sold. In fact, he supported the very system which was eating the life out of Roman labour, and raising the most terrible dangers for Rome in the next century. It is impossible, however, not to respect Cato for his honesty and shrewdness; he did his best to maintain a high standard of public conduct; he prosecuted offenders in high places, regardless of the enemies he raised for himself;[1] and he protested against the short-sighted demagogism of corn distributions in Rome, which ruined Italian farmers, and attracted a pampered and worthless mob to the capital.

Cato's Opposition to Greek Philosophy.—Above all, he set himself to check the introduction of Greek ideas and education into Rome. Children were to be reared by their parents, not by slaves, and taught Latin, not Greek. He urged that those who wished to write should write in Latin, and should devote themselves to the history of their country; and he himself set the example by composing a work on the *Origines* of Rome. He himself studied Greek literature in his later years, and borrowed largely in his speeches from Demosthenes; but the contemporary Greek philosophy drew out all his scorn and hatred. He did his best to check its spread by government action; in 173, two Epicurean philosophers were expelled from Rome; in 161, the Senate forbade rhetors and philosophers to reside in the city; and when, in 155, the Athenians sent the most famous philosophers of the day, headed by Carneades, the chief of the Platonic Academy, to plead their cause as ambassadors in Rome, Cato proposed that they should receive their answer and be dismissed at once, in order that the young Romans might not be corrupted by their teaching. His hostility was

[1] He is said to have been defendant in nearly fifty cases, and to have been always acquitted.

partly patriotic and partly moral; the historians of Rome hitherto had written in Greek, *e.g.* Fabius Pictor; Cato, as has been said, wished to see his native tongue developed; he felt as a patriotic German felt in the days of Frederic the Great, when French influence everywhere dominated German courts and learned bodies. And morally he had good reason to despise the philosophers, who questioned everything and settled nothing; he saw clearly that their high-sounding phrases were but the veil of practical worthlessness; and he hoped that he could keep his countrymen in ignorant enjoyment of traditional beliefs, which had made them narrow, but upright and trustworthy.

The Failure of Cato's Ideal.—Of course his effort was vain; it would have been impossible to exclude the new ideas, even had the Roman upper classes been united against them; and when a large number of the Senators believed in and welcomed the new culture, Cato's efforts were but the stopping, at one inlet, of what was pouring into Rome on every side. Even Cato in his old age saw the hopelessness of his attempt, and devoted himself more to Greek writers.

Hence his policy and his career must be looked upon as a failure. Rome changed in spite of him. But he left behind a high ideal of duty done, and it is with reason that Cicero makes him the chief speaker in his treatise on *Old Age*, where Cato sets forth, with all the stateliness of the Latin tongue, the charms of virtue, of work, and of simplicity, and borrows from the highest Greek philosophy its forecast of the happy immortality which may be the crowning reward of a man who has done his duty.[1]

[1] The *Origines* of Cato is unfortunately lost, but a large part of his work *De Re Rustica* survives; his style is rugged and abrupt; the motto "*Rem tene, verba sequentur*" illustrates alike his precept and his practice.

CHAPTER XXV.

ROMAN CHARACTER AND RELIGION DURING THE PERIOD OF THE PUNIC WARS

Roman Character the Secret of Roman Success.—It was not by accident that Rome conquered her rivals; as Polybius points out, she was victorious because she deserved victory. Her success was partly due to the wisdom and firmness of her government, and partly to the blunders and follies of her enemies; it was due also in part to the courage of her soldiers, though this in itself had proved of little use against the genius of Hannibal; but it was due especially to Roman morality and character. The Romans conquered the Mediterranean world because they deserved to do so, because they could trust each other and therefore act together, and because with all their cruelties and breaches of faith, they yet had a high ideal of national honour. History unfortunately notices especially a nation's sins and blunders; but behind these lay an ideal of justice and law, which down to the middle of the second century B.C., was largely realized, and which even in the troubled century of the break up of the Republic, was never left without witnesses and champions. The Roman ideal was summed up in the words, "religio" and "pietas," words which were applied quite as much to human as to divine relations. In their attitude to the gods the Romans had none of the beautiful imagination of the Greek; they may be almost said to have no mythology of their own, and hence they adopted the Greek mythology. Still less had they the enthusiasm for spiritual religion which marked the Semitic races; the idea of "communion with God" would have been absolutely meaningless to a matter-of-fact person like Cato. But they firmly believed that they had obligations

to the gods which they strove honestly to fulfil, whether they were the mere performance of ritual ceremonies or the observance of rules of conduct, and by these rules they regulated their relations to each other and to the state. Polybius well describes the contrast between them and his own countrymen: "The Roman magistrate would on his simple word of honour administer enormous sums, while in the case of the paltriest sum in Greece, ten letters were sealed and twenty witnesses were required, and yet everybody cheated." And the truth of this judgment from an unprejudiced witness is well seen in the fact, which so often seems surprising, especially in the history of the Spanish wars, that, in spite of repeated breaches of faith, the pledged word of a Roman commander, or of the Roman Senate, is so highly valued by their enemies.

Decay of Roman Morality.—But however true this ideal may be of the past period, it certainly was ceasing to be so all through the time of the great wars. Old-fashioned ideas of religion and morality were passing away, and new manners and new beliefs were coming in. It was noticed as an evil precedent that in 231 Sp. Carvilius divorced his wife without any sufficient ground; this was striking at the root of family life, on the sanctity of which Roman greatness was based. So in 216, the year of Cannae, Roman reverence received a terrible shock by the detection of unchastity in a vestal virgin. These guardians of the sacred fire were the symbols and the representatives of purity. The downward course, once begun, was rapid. In 186 all Italy was horrified by the discovery of a vast association for the propagation of the rites of Bacchus; men and women of the highest families were said to be implicated, and the practices were at once obscene and treasonable. The association had spread into all parts of Italy, and seven thousand persons were involved. A special senatorial commission was appointed to investigate the scandal, and the ringleaders either committed suicide or were executed.[1]

[1] Our information as to this conspiracy is partly derived from Livy's narrative, and partly from a copy of the Senatus Consultum on the subject, which is one of the most important early Latin inscriptions that has survived.

The causes of this decay of Roman character were various. No doubt the prolonged wars had much to do with it; for a campaign is a bad school of morals, and a terrible solvent of domestic life. But leaving this on one side, and also the economic evils which will be dealt with in chapter xxvii., the following influences may be noticed—the great increase of wealth, the corresponding increase in the number of slaves, and the foreign influences—from Greece and from the East—which came in the train of the great wars.

Increase of Wealth.—The war with Tarentum had first brought Rome into connection with a rich and highly civilized state; and the war indemnities of Carthage, and still more those of Macedonia and of Asia, had poured the precious metals into Rome. The tribute of the provinces and the working of the mines in Spain and in Macedonia continued this process. Some of this wealth went to the state, but comparatively little: in 157 the reserve fund of gold and silver in the treasury was less than £1,000,000, even though the expenditure on public buildings had been slight, *e.g.* between 272 and 144, no new aqueduct was constructed at Rome. It was rather the private fortunes of individuals that increased. Scipio Africanus gave each of his daughters a dowry of fifty talents. This increase was fatal to the old simplicity. It was useless to pass sumptuary laws like the Lex Orchia of 181 as to the number of guests at dinner, or the Lex Fannia of 161 limiting the cost of entertainments. The whole Roman system aimed at concentrating the right of governing the world, and so the means of making money, in the hands of a narrow circle; and with the accumulation of wealth went of course a higher standard of private expenditure.

Increase in Number of Slaves.—But it was especially by the increase of slaves that this increased prosperity worked its most deadly results: each war brought an addition to the number of these unhappy beings; after the capture of Agrigentum in 262, 25,000 are said to have been sold at once, and in 177 Tiberius Gracchus boasted he had captured or slain 80,000 Sardinians, and had brought so many slaves to Rome that "cheap Sardinians" (*Sardi venales*) became a proverb. In fact, one of the main reasons for many of

the Roman petty wars in Liguria, in Spain, and elsewhere was that greedy generals wanted to make money out of their captives. Slavery is always a terrible evil, for it degrades the idea of labour, and renders impossible a high standard of purity of life; but the Romans made it especially dangerous, for they robbed it of all human elements; the lash and the cross were the means by which slaves were kept in order; "so many slaves, so many foes," said the Roman proverb. It was impossible that a nation trained, from its childhood upwards, to inflict torture and death on dependents, could escape being brutalized; and the Romans rendered this all the more certain by introducing gladiatorial shows, in which slaves were

"Butchered to make a Roman holiday."

The first instance of such an exhibition was in 264, but the taste for blood rapidly grew, and, for the next six centuries, slaughters of this kind were the surest passport to popularity with the mob of Rome. Even a good man like Cicero disliked these shows not for their cruelty, but because they were vulgar and tiresome.

Political use of Roman Religion.—The influences of wealth and of slavery would alone have been sufficient to destroy Roman morals; but they were also directly attacked. The cold and hard morality of the Roman state religion was bound to grow colder and harder, and to cease to suffice all who had any emotional nature; and this was the case the more, because the Government definitely made religion into a political weapon.

The auspices had been originally a method by which men believed they could learn the will of heaven; they had become, by the time of the Punic wars, a means of embarrassing or delaying a magistrate whom the aristocracy disliked; and, in 156, this use of them was embodied in the Lex Aelia et Fufia,[1] according to which any of the higher magistrates could prevent his colleague from bringing any

[1] This law specially applied to the Comitia Tributa, and seems to have placed it under the same religious restrictions, to which the Comitia Centuriata had always been subject.

measure before the Comitia, by announcing that he was going to watch for unfavourable omens (*obnuntiatio*).

Foreign Influences in Rome. — Roman religion then was made—so far as the ruling classes could effect it—a piece of party machinery, and its place was taken by new worships and by Greek philosophy. Oriental cults were introduced by the State (205), *e.g.* the worship of the Great Mother, Cybele, from Asia Minor; and where the State led the way, others would follow, even though illegally, *e.g.* in 137 the votaries of the mystic rites of the Eastern deity, Sabazios, and the Chaldean soothsayers had to be expelled from Rome. These orgiastic worships appealed especially to the uneducated; with the higher classes, Greek philosophy in the same way supplanted the old faiths. It was rather the questioning and the destructive side of it, than its moral teaching, which was popular at Rome. The doctrine of Epicurus, that the gods had no care for mortal affairs, was eagerly accepted; and too many of his Roman disciples were eager to give to the doctrine, that pleasure was the chief end of life, a gross and material interpretation which the Greek philosopher himself had never taught. And the Romans readily accepted the shallow theories of Euhemerus, who had explained away the gods of the Greek Pantheon by professing to find in them mere mortals; *e.g.* the story that Kronos devoured his children was explained by the supposed existence of cannibalism which had been abolished by a king named Zeus. Euhemerus' *Sacred Memoirs* were translated by Ennius, and furnished a plausible reason for neglecting the obligations of the old religion, to Roman nobles who found it convenient to be free from its restrictions. So widely did scepticism spread among the Roman upper classes, that by the end of the second century B.C. the creed of Polybius was generally held; he looks upon all beliefs as to divine government and a future life as mere stories devised to frighten the ignorant multitude, by "mysterious fears and all that kind of stage machinery." The great lawyer Scaevola summed up the attitude of the Roman upper classes when he said that a man had three creeds: one of outward ritual, which was part of the business of the state; one which contained the accepted doctrines

as to the gods and a future life, which was held only for the sake of imposing on the multitude; and his own real creed, which ignored the gods altogether, and contained only the teachings of philosophy. When this was the result of Greek literature and Greek teachers, we cannot be surprised at the protests of Cato against their introduction into Rome.

Rise of Roman Satire.—But in one department of intellectual life Rome was original; as Quintilian says, "*Satira quidem tota nostra* (*i.e. Romana*) *est.*" Roman satire[1] is more general than the personal attacks of the "Old Comedy" or the Greek epigrammatists, more personal than didactic poems, like those of Hesiod: of all forms of poetry it is most akin to oratory and to practical life, and so it appealed to the Romans. Its great inventor was C. Lucilius (148–103), a Campanian by birth, who became a member of the Scipionic circle, and of the Senatorial reform party (p. 192); he himself had only the "*jus Latinum.*" His satires (of which fragments survive) are mainly in hexameter verse; they are rough in style, but show wide culture, wit, and good sense. Horace continually refers to him and his wide-reaching attacks on high and low alike.[2]

[1] Various derivations of the word are given, *e.g.* (1) from *lanx satura*, because the poem was a "medley" of various subjects; (2) Mommsen derives it from "*saturi*," *i.e.* it is the "masque of the full men." At any rate it was probably dramatic in form at first, and connected with popular festivities.

[2] *Cf.* Sat. II. 1. 62 *seq.*

Est Lucilius ausus
Primus in hunc operis componere carmina morem
Detrahere et pellem, nitidus qua quisque per ora
Cederet, introrsum turpis—
Primores populi arripuit, populumque tributim.

Cf. also Sat. I. 4. 6 *seq.* and I. 10.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE THIRD PUNIC WAR, AND THE CONDITION OF ROME AFTER THE FALL OF CARTHAGE

Roman Fear of Carthage.—During the fifty years that had passed since the Second Punic War, Rome had been gathering in the fruits of her great victory; the crowning result was now to be achieved in the destruction of Carthage. The encroachments of Masinissa had continued, and in 154 the quarrel became acute; the patriotic party at Carthage at last were goaded to despair, and entered on war with the Numidian King, in which they were defeated. This defeat made them eager once more to submit to Rome, and they sent ambassadors to ask for terms; but the majority of the Senate had resolved that Carthage must be destroyed. At the head of this party was the aged Cato, who, in a recent visit to Africa, as commissioner, had been struck with fear and envy at the sight of the prosperity of Rome's ancient rival; he was so impressed with the danger to Rome that he used every opportunity to urge his countrymen to decisive measures; availing himself of the privilege of a Roman Senator to speak on any subject which he thought important, without regard to the question before the House, he made it a rule to conclude every speech he made with the brief motion—"*Carthago delenda est.*" He was opposed by Scipio Nasica, on the strange ground that the existence of Carthage was a benefit to Rome; he argued that, if the danger from it were removed, the Roman people would have no enemy to fear and would quarrel among themselves. Cato, however, had on his side the old hatred of his countrymen against the African city, and especially the jealousy of the mercantile party at Rome, who coveted the commerce of Carthage. His advice prevailed, though he died in the

year in which war was declared. It is usual to call the destruction of Carthage a great and an unnecessary crime; and certainly nothing could be more treacherous than the way in which the Romans carried out their design. But the existence of Carthage was a real danger to Rome, according to the ideas of the ancient world; with the death of Masinissa in 149 disappeared the great obstacle to reconciliation between Carthage and the Numidians, and in the third Punic War one of Masinissa's kinsmen was actually on the side of Carthage. And we may well be suspicious of the peaceful intentions of a city, which had 200,000 stand of arms within its walls.

Roman Treachery towards Carthage.—Still, whatever was the ultimate danger to Rome, the Carthaginians for the moment were most unwilling to fight; they sent the hostages which Rome demanded, they surrendered all their arms, and were prepared to give up their territory; but the Roman ultimatum was only sent when they believed Carthage was at their mercy. They required that Carthage should be abandoned, and that its inhabitants should remove to a spot ten miles from the sea.

This demand not only wounded Carthaginian honour and sentiment; it was really a sentence of destruction, for, away from the sea, the great commercial city could not exist. Hence the announcement was received with a burst of fury and despair. The people recalled their exiles of the war party, and prepared to resist to the last (149). The Roman consuls were so confident of success that they did not at once advance on the defenceless town; when they did advance, they found the city prepared to receive them, and were only saved from disaster by the wisdom and vigour of a young military tribune, P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, who was to have the honour of concluding the war. Scipio was the son of Aemilius Paullus, the victor of Pydna, but he had been adopted by the son of the great Africanus, and hence the name of Scipio was associated with the final destruction of Carthage, as it had been with its humiliation.

The consuls of 148 were as unsuccessful as those of 149, and it seemed as if the Romans were to find complete disaster where they had expected an easy prey. So alarmed

were the people that they took a most unusual step; Scipio was standing for the aedileship, but the Comitia insisted on electing him consul, though he was under the proper age, and had never been praetor. Africa was assigned him as his province without the formality of drawing lots. He justified the confidence of his countrymen; he restored discipline in the Roman army, and at once began to press on Carthage by occupying the suburb of Magalia (147). In order to make his blockade complete, he closed the Carthaginian outer harbour with a mole, a task which the besieged had deemed impossible. They held out, however, till the next year, in spite of terrible sufferings from famine. When the final assault was delivered, the street fighting lasted six days, and the horrors of the struggle can only be paralleled in the capture of Jerusalem by Titus. At last the Byrsa, or citadel, surrendered, and 50,000 captives fell into Scipio's hands; it is said that the population of the city had been more than ten times as great at the commencement of the siege.

Carthage was burned with fire, the plough was passed over its site, and a solemn curse was invoked on any who might attempt to rebuild it. The territory of Carthage was formed into the province of Africa, for, now that her rival was gone, Rome had no need and no wish to encourage the Numidian princes; these were to find, like the Rhodians and the kings of Pergamum, that gratitude is but a weak force in politics.

The Fall of Carthage is the Beginning of a New Period.— With the fall of Carthage, Roman History enters on a new period; Rome is no longer struggling for supremacy in the Mediterranean; she has attained it. It may seem at first sight as if this supremacy had been won at Zama, but Carthage, though, perhaps, no longer formidable, at any rate was thought by the Romans to be so; Macedonia and Syria may never have been really dangerous to Rome, but Rome had feared them all the same; the Greek states were bound to be dependent on some power, but Rome had tried to treat them as free communities. Now Carthage and Macedonia had disappeared, the power of Syria was a mere shadow, and the Greek states were henceforth dependent on

the governor of the new province of Macedonia, though some of them retained a nominal freedom.

The Extension of Roman Provincial Dominion. Macedonia. Africa.—Rome's changed position had showed itself in extensions of her dominion. The new provinces which were formed at this time, Africa and Macedonia, were not, like Sicily and Sardinia, naturally parts of Italy, nor, like the Spains, seized for defensive purposes; they were frank recognitions of the fact that Roman conquests meant henceforth extension of direct Roman empire, and that this empire was to be administered for the benefit of the ruling population at home; already in 167, after Pydna, the spoils of Macedonian royalty had allowed the abolition of the tributum—the one direct tax paid by Roman citizens.

Asia.—This principle of provincial extension is further shown in the acquisition of the province of Asia in 133; though this was formed thirteen years later than Africa and Macedonia, and came (nominally at least) by bequest and not by conquest, its acquisition was equally the result of the half century of war in the East which succeeded Zama; and as the richest of all the "estates of the Roman people" (*praedia populi Romani*), Asia is the most striking example of the character of Roman provincial government.

New Problems of Roman Government.—The changed condition of things, then, had brought a number of entirely new problems to the front: some of these were recognized by statesmen at once, others soon pressed for solution. The history of the last hundred years of the Republic is the history of the vain attempts to solve these, or rather of the revolution which grew inevitably out of the attempt to solve them.

I. Abroad. (1) Misgovernment in the Provinces.—These problems divide themselves naturally into two classes, those of foreign policy, and those of home government. Of the former, the one which was especially pressing for solution was the question how to prevent misgovernment in the provinces: a case like that of Sulpicius Galba (p. 167), who was accused of treachery and oppression in Further Spain, and acquitted in spite of the clearest evidence and of all the

efforts of the old Cato, showed clearly that some further means were necessary to secure justice for the provincials.

Hitherto cases of provincial misconduct had been tried by a commission of Senators, specially appointed by the Comitia for the purpose; now a law was carried, by the tribune Calpurnius Piso, that every year a special court (*quaestio perpetua*) should be established to try cases of extortion (*de repetundis*); the jurymen from among whom the court was to be constituted were all senators. This court is the first permanent judicial body in Rome, and is very important in the development of Roman law, as it was soon imitated for the punishment of other offences; but it had little effect in checking the evil immediately concerned. The senators who composed it from year to year were always ready to acquit members of their own order (*cf.* p. 226).

But although the Romans were not at first successful in governing the world justly, it is well to notice that their ideal of government is higher than that of any previous imperial power. They at least tried to do justice to their subjects.

(2) **The increased power of the Proconsuls.** — Another problem of foreign government was soon to present itself, *i.e.* how was the obedience of the provincial governors to be secured by the Senate? It was one thing to issue orders to an official serving in Italy at the head of an army of citizens; it was quite another thing to obtain the submission of a leader hundreds of miles away, and at the head of an army, the soldiers in which might have been for years absent from their homes.

(3) **The Difficulty of obtaining Soldiers.** — But for the moment the tradition of military obedience prevailed; what perplexed the statesmen of the Republic was not how to make soldiers submissive to the central government, but how to get soldiers at all. In this matter, foreign and home questions meet.

It has already been stated (cf. p. 166) that the dangers and difficulties of service in Spain had made it necessary to introduce a form of conscription; the qualification for service in the legions had been reduced, before the time

of Polybius, from 11,000 to 4,000 asses, and for the fleet citizens of even lower census and freedmen were employed. The Roman Government also found that the supply of free citizens, from whom the army was enrolled, was beginning to diminish. From the year 159 to 131 the number in the quinquennial census returns grew steadily less.

II. At Home. (1) **Decay of Population.**—The causes of this decay of population will be stated in the next chapter; but it must be remarked that unlike modern states, where over-population is continually being complained of, the old world tended to grow weak from diminishing population; *e.g.* Greece had steadily decreased in strength since the fourth century, and many of its regions were now almost deserted. This decay of free men at once diminished the fighting strength of a country, and revealed only too clearly economic and moral unsoundness.

(2) **Decay of Yeoman Class.**—And it was not only that population was diminishing; its distribution was being changed in the most disastrous way. Before the Hannibalic war, the bulk of the Roman citizens had been yeoman farmers, living on and cultivating their own small farms; in Rome, as everywhere, the real fighting strength of the armies was found among those who lived a healthy and natural life in the country. Now every generation saw fewer citizens in the country, while the mob of the city continually increased—a mob which was troublesome to the government at home, and useless for the armies abroad.

(3) **Discontent of Roman Allies.**—This problem of diminishing fighting strength was patent to all. There was another which lay less on the surface, but which was to assert itself definitely in the very next generation: Rome's allies in Italy were becoming discontented with their inferiority of position; they wanted closer union with Rome. Keen-sighted statesmen saw that some means must be found of reconciling the satisfaction of the allies' wishes, as yet unexpressed, with the pride and exclusiveness of the Roman people.

These difficulties were enough, and more than enough, for the ablest statesmen. Increasing misgovernment abroad, and increasing responsibilities of empire, were coupled with

diminishing population at home, and unsound economic conditions which sapped the very strength of the country. In addition, the discontent of Italy had to be satisfied. Well might a far-sighted statesman like Scipio Aemilianus,[2] as censor in 142, change the usual prayer for the increase of the Roman State into a prayer for its preservation.

(4) **The uncertainty as to the Sovereign Authority in the State.**—But it is quite possible that the prudence of the Roman Senate might have found some palliation, if not some cure, for all these evils, had its position been secure; the permanence of an oligarchical government is one of the most marked features of history; *e.g.* the Lacedaemonians, in spite of disasters, never ceased to be a great state while free Greece existed, while the importance of democratic Athens is confined to two centuries; Venice,[1] too, displays the same stability. At Rome, however, this principle was not to be exemplified; the constitutional powers of the Senate were not equal to the actual authority which it had exercised during the period of the great wars. Hence the difficulties of the Roman State were made the battle-ground of the rival parties contending for the headship; in their struggles all free government became impossible, and personal rule a necessity; the Republic perished, and the Empire was established.

[1] The Venetian oligarchy was one of the closest and the most corrupt the world has ever seen; but for centuries it

"Held the gorgeous East in fee
And was the bulwark of the West."

The subjects of Venice in Italy, in the Adriatic and in the Eastern Mediterranean were, on the whole, contented, and were unwilling to change her rule for that of any other state.

[2] Scipio Aemilianus was the centre of the famous "Scipionic circle" (*cf.* p. 181), well known in literature as being the setting in which Cicero places his dialogues, *De Republica* (p. 256) and *De Amicitia* (p. 293). Its chief member was C. Laelius (p. 192), whose attitude to Scipio was the model which Cicero set before himself in relation to Pompey (*cf.* p. 246). For its principles, *cf.* p. 192, for its part in literature, pp. 163, 180.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF ROME AND THE TRIBUNATE OF TIBERIUS GRACCHUS (133)

Causes of Decay of Roman Agriculture.—It has been already said that the population of the Roman State was decreasing, and its distribution changing in a disastrous way. The causes of this must now be described.

(1) The Hannibalic War.—There is no doubt that the long strain of the Hannibalic War had been very trying for Roman agriculture. For more than ten years Hannibal was master of the country districts of Italy; as Horace writes:

> "Dirus per urbes Afer ut Italas
> Ceu flamma per tædas vel Eurus
> Per Siculas equitavit undas."

Military reasons had compelled the farmers to take refuge within the walls of the towns; and the free population of Italy had perished by hundreds of thousands; but had there been no further evil, population would have recovered of itself, as it did in France after the still more terrible strain of the Napoleonic wars.

In Italy, however, the period of comparative peace which followed Zama had perpetuated the evils which war had begun. Roman agriculture was suffering from two great drawbacks—the competition of slave labour at home, and the competition of the provinces which had been the prize of war. These must be dealt with separately.

(2) Competition of Slave Labour.—The Roman capitalists were shrewd business men, and they recognized that slave cultivation was cheaper than the employment of free men. Slaves were plentiful as the result of the great wars, and their labour was not liable to the interruption of military service, for which freemen were required every year.

Hence, as has been said (p. 173), even so patriotic a Roman as old Cato advocated the employment of slaves; but Roman capitalism was not satisfied with his methods. The plantation system was introduced from Carthage, and became firmly established in many regions, especially in Etruria, while in South Italy pastoral husbandry, carried on by half savage slave-herdsmen, prevailed. As early as 196 Roman troops had to take the field in Etruria against a band of slaves. These were purchased wholesale, and worked in the fields in chained gangs. Roman masters had none of the merciful feelings which have often (as in many of the Southern States of America) made slavery comparatively endurable, and, at the same time, economically unprofitable. Cato laid down, with the brutal frankness of a Legree, that it was cheaper to use slaves up and buy new ones, than to endeavour to keep the old ones alive by care and kind treatment. Hence the "ergastula" — the slave barracks — where these unhappy chattels were herded together, often in chains, became an established feature in Roman agriculture.

(3) **Competition of the Provinces.**—Such methods of cultivation tended, in the end, to exhaust the land of Italy, and, no doubt, are the partial cause of the desolation of the Campagna and the Maremma; but, for the moment, they enabled the large owners to undersell the yeoman farmers. But even slave labour had ceased to be profitable when applied to corn growing. Sicily was the granary of Italy, and, by the regulations of the Roman Government, a considerable part of its produce had to be paid as tribute to the Roman State, which owned it.

Hence the price of corn was artificially depressed, and corn-growing was being superseded in Italy by pasture farming; in fact, the same process was going on which caused such distress in England under the Tudors.

(4) **Unfair "occupation" of the Ager Publicus.** — These economic difficulties were aggravated by the fact that the Roman Ager Publicus was almost entirely in the hands of large owners. The limitations on its "occupation" by the rich, imposed by the Licinian law, were neglected from the first, and they had become quite a dead letter; for, during the period of the conquest of Italy, fresh acquisitions of

territory had provided continually new land for distribution, and the citizens had been too busy and too prosperous to trouble about merely economic questions. Now that all Italy was reduced, no more colonies were sent out to secure fresh regions (the last was to Luna in 177), and the old difficulties of the fifth and fourth centuries, B.C., between the land-owning and the landless citizens, revived. Men began to ask whether it was for the interest of the State that the public domains should be farmed by a few, while the number of citizens who had no land was continually increasing; they felt with Goldsmith—

> "Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
> Where wealth accumulates and men decay."

The condition of the mass of Roman people was described by Tiberius Gracchus in a speech which told how "the wild beasts in Italy had each his hole and his lair, but those who had fought and died for Italy had a share in air and light, but in nothing else, and wandered about with their wives and children, without home or settlement."

Causes which still favoured Roman Agriculture.—We must not exaggerate, however, the evils of the Roman world. It was true the number of yeoman farmers was decreasing, but, at this time, and for long after, many districts of Italy were occupied by small proprietors, *e.g.* the valley of the Po and the secluded mountain-valleys of the Marsians.

Etruria, the evil state of which had inspired Gracchus' eloquence, was the exception rather than the rule. It was true that it was impossible for a yeoman farmer to grow anything which he could sell at a profit, but the vast majority of them did not need to sell anything at all. They lived on the produce of their own farms, and, having no rates or taxes to pay, they were in no need of money, and independent of markets; but, then as now, the attractions of the city with its amusements and chances of rapid success, tended to draw men from the country. Thus the parallel of modern agricultural depression breaks down.

Land Policy of the Reform Party. C. Laelius.—But though the state of Italy was not so bad as eloquent demagogues asserted, and as modern historians have described it, the fact remained that it was bad, and was growing worse. And

the aims, at once of statesmen who wished to increase the strength of the state, and of the poor citizens who simply knew that they were poor while others were rich, were alike concentrated on the Ager Publicus; if this could be reclaimed from its occupiers, and parcelled out in small lots, the number of poor citizens would be diminished, and population would receive a healthy stimulus. Hence, as early as 145, Laelius, the friend of Scipio, had proposed that the State should resume possession of its property. The proposal was justified by the letter of the law, but it was surrounded by so many difficulties that it may well be doubted if it would have been possible to carry it out; much of the Ager Publicus had been in private possession for upwards of two hundred years; it had come to be looked on as really private property, and it had in many cases been bought and sold as if it were actually such. Hence to reclaim it implied either an arbitrary act of something very like confiscation, or an endless series of law suits, to settle the conflicting claims of the state as owner, and of the occupiers; it is not surprising that Laelius dropped his proposal, and so earned for himself the title of "Sapiens."

He and most other Roman reformers seem to have felt that violent change, whether economic or constitutional, was likely to cause more mischief than it remedied; hence they left schemes of far-reaching change alone, and tried to improve the working of the constitution by ballot laws,[1] and to check its evils by the prosecution of prominent offenders. Very likely they were selfish in their prudence, but it is hard to blame them in view of the terrible results of the revolution which they feared, but which another was to set in motion.

Tiberius Gracchus. — That other was Tiberius Gracchus with whom the series of genuine popular leaders begins again; he took up the policy and the methods of Flaminius, although his motives and his upbringing were very different.

Tiberius Gracchus and his brother are in some ways the exact reproductions of the aristocratic demagogues of Greece;

[1] The most important ballot laws (*leges tabellariae*) were the Gabinian Law (139) introducing it for elections, the Cassian Law (137) which applied it to certain forms of trial, and the Papirian Law (131) which introduced it for legislation.

like Pericles and Alcibiades they left their own order and identified themselves with the popular cause, but the parallel is clearer with Gaius Gracchus than it is with his brother. They were the sons of one of the most distinguished Romans of the second century, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, whose justice had won the hearts of the Spaniards; after his early death, they were trained by their mother Cornelia, the daughter of the great Africanus; Tiberius was married to the daughter of Appius Claudius; hence both by birth and by marriage he was connected with the noblest families in Rome. Family traditions were as strong with the Romans as with the great Whig families in England in the last two centuries, and it is well to notice that the Scipios and the Claudii had often taken a line in politics independent of the traditions of their order.

The education which Gracchus had received tended to strengthen his reforming tendency: he was taught by a Greek philosopher, Blossius of Cumae, all the political science of his time; hence his views had an ideal colouring alien to the practical traditions of the majority of the Romans.

His Revolutionary Spirit.—He approached the constitutional difficulties of his time in a spirit very different from that of Laelius. He believed he was born to save the Roman nation; this ideal he set himself to carry out, and in attaining it, any means seemed justifiable. The very unselfishness of his aims made him the more unscrupulous as to his methods; and he had no practical experience to show him that revolutionary measures were bound to have results far more wide-reaching than he dreamed or intended.

Elected as Tribune for 133.—When he was elected tribune at the end of 134, he was only entering on political life in the way usual at Rome; but he at once showed that his tribunate would be unusual, by promulgating, on his own responsibility, a bill reviving the Licinian Laws. It enacted—

His Agrarian Law.—1. That every occupier should have as his absolute property as much of the Ager Publicus as he was permitted to hold by the Licinian Laws, *i.e.* 500 jugera. Gracchus proposed, as a further concession, that he might have 250 more for each of his grown-up sons up to 1000 in all.

2. That all Ager Publicus "possessed" beyond these

limits should revert to the State, and should be alloted to the poorer citizens by a Board of three Commissioners specially appointed by the people.

3. These allotments were to consist of 30 jugera each, and were to be inalienable, but subject to the payment of a small rent to the State.

4. The dispossessed occupiers were to receive compensation for improvements in the land of which they were deprived.

In theory this law revived laws already existing, the only new point was that it provided machinery for carrying them out; it even relaxed the legal rights of the State by granting absolute ownership of the land not resumed, and by its promise of compensation. But in practice it meant an economic revolution, and men saw this.

Opposition of the Capitalists and the Senate.—The bill was bitterly opposed by all the capitalist class, and also by the Senate, whose position was assailed by the action of Tiberius Gracchus; for though he, like Flaminius, was strictly within his legal rights in bringing forward this law, yet in practice it had been the invariable custom of the past century, that only those measures should be laid before the people which had the previous sanction of the Senate. Whether Gracchus could ever have obtained this is very uncertain; he did not try to obtain it till it was too late; hence, at the very outset of his political career, he set against him the constitutional party.

But he had a strong party in his favour; the country voters of Italy, who commanded a majority in thirty-one out of the thirty-five tribes,[1] were enthusiastic for his scheme of reform, which had also influential supporters in Gracchus' own order. Of these, the most prominent were his father-in-law, Appius Claudius, and the wealthy and eloquent Licinius Crassus, who was afterwards consul in 131; one of the consuls of 133, Mucius Scaevola, was also sympathetic.

When Gracchus found that his proposals were not accepted, he re-introduced them in a more severe form, withdrawing the clauses that granted compensation; it seemed certain the bill would be carried if put to the vote, and so the Senate

[1] A country voter, on removing to Rome, still continued to vote in his old tribe; but at this period at any rate the majority in the *tribus rusticae* was composed of genuine yeoman-farmers.

had resource to the usual weapon, and induced one of his colleagues, Octavius, to veto it.

Tribunician Veto on Gracchus' Proposals. — This brought everything to a standstill. Gracchus at first retaliated by vetoing, in his turn, all the business of the State; he then sought the mediation of the Senate. Failing to obtain this, he proceeded to a measure which was the mistake of his life, and which made a resort to force almost inevitable. He appealed to the people to depose his colleague Octavius; and as Octavius persisted in his veto, he was forcibly removed from the tribunate.

Gracchus Deposes the Opposing Tribune. — Gracchus justified his action by the plea that the tribune represented the people, and that it was monstrous for the people's own officer to thwart its will; but to depose an official was a breach of the fundamental principle of the Roman State, that a man, during his year of office, could not be called to account or compelled to resign against his will. Gracchus, too, was attacking the basis of his own power by violating the sanctity of a tribune.

Gracchus carries his Agrarian Law, and attacks the authority of the Senate. — But for the moment the step succeeded. With Octavius out of the way, the proposals of Gracchus were at once passed, and he himself, his father-in-law, and his brother were appointed commissioners, with full powers to decide what was Ager Publicus, and to divide it among the people. He had at first only wished to change the economic conditions of the State, but he now felt himself committed to a policy of opposition to the Senate, and proceeded to attack their control of foreign affairs by proposing a bill before the people dealing with the treasures of Attalus, the late King of Pergamum, which, along with his dominions (*cf.* p. 185), he had just bequeathed to Rome. These were to be distributed among the recipients of the new allotments, to enable them to stock their land.

Gracchus illegally seeks Re-election. — But Gracchus' year of office was now drawing to a close. He knew that as soon as he was a private person, without the safeguard of office he would be prosecuted for his unconstitutional action in deposing Octavius; hence he seems to have promised

further democratic measures, anticipating in part the work of his brother. To carry these he sought re-election, though this was forbidden by law, except after an interval of ten years, and perhaps was altogether illegal at this period.

He is Murdered by the Senators. — The Senatorial party proceeded to spread the rumour that Gracchus was aiming at a tyranny, in order to discredit him with the people. It was the old weapon which had proved fatally effective against Maelius and Manlius, but by this time it seemed to have lost its force. He would probably have been re-elected had the election been suffered to proceed;[1] but it was broken up amid a scene of confusion, and next day he was attacked and murdered by a mob of senators, headed by Scipio Nasica, who was Princeps Senatus, and, perhaps, Pontifex Maximus. It was an act as illegal as it was brutal. The consul had refused to take any measures against Gracchus, who, however unconstitutional his conduct, had in no way resorted to violence. His death was a murder, carried out by the noblest and wealthiest men in the State from private hatred and fear. With it begins a century of bloody violence in Roman history, which culminates in the Proscriptions. The Roman nobles drew the sword, and they were to "perish with the sword."

Tiberius Gracchus' career is a sad one. His ideal for Rome may not have been possible. He, like so many of his countrymen, tried only to remove the evils which were the results of a bad system, and left the bad system itself alone. In fact, it would not have been possible for the wisest and most powerful reformer to deal with the mischiefs arising from slavery, and from the unjust privileges of Roman citizens, and so to remove the real causes of the social evils of the time.

But his ideal was at least unselfish, and, perhaps with prudence, he might have succeeded in carrying it out in part, and doing something for Roman agriculture. Unluckily his impatience and his lack of constitutional foresight ruined everything. He hurried through a remedy which did a little good for two or three years, and in doing so he began a revolution which, in the end, deluged Rome with blood, and made free government impossible.

[1] I have followed Appian's account of the election.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND SCIPIO AEMILIANUS

Results of the Tribunate of Gracchus. — The death of Tiberius Gracchus was followed by the prosecution of his supporters. The Senate set up a court of inquiry (*quaestio*), with the consul Popillius at its head, which executed and banished many of the popular party; but it was unable to shield Scipio Nasica from the indignation of the people, and he was compelled to go into exile. The Agrarian Commission, too, continued to work, and Tiberius Gracchus' place in it was taken by Crassus. It is impossible to say what permanent results it produced, but inscriptions are still found in various parts of Italy, which testify to its activity, and the number of small farms which it created was probably considerable.[1]

The Italian Allies begin to show Discontent.—Gracchus, in seeking to remedy one evil, had brought another to the front. Some of the Ager Publicus was held by the Italian allies, and they were with good reason alarmed and angry to see themselves dispossessed of their rights for the benefit of the Roman populace. Hence their already existing discontent began to show itself, and it found a champion in Scipio Aemilianus, who returned from his victory over Numantia soon after his brother-in-law's murder.

Scipio Aemilianus opposes the Democratic Party.—He had sympathized with his ideal of economic reform, but he disapproved of his unconstitutional measures, and when he found that the action of the Land Commission was throwing Italy into confusion, and embittering the relations of Rome

[1] The census increases from 318,823 in 131 B.C. to 394,726 in 125 (Liv., *Ep.*, 59, 60; but the figures may be corrupt). The *proletarii* would be more eager to be enrolled if there was a chance of land. Mommsen, however, thinks only landowners were counted.

and her allies, he stepped in and induced the people to withdraw from the commissioners the power of deciding what was Ager Publicus and what was not, and to transfer this to the consuls. Hence the action of the commission was made dependent on others; their work came to a standstill, and the threatened peace of Italy was restored.

Scipio also interfered with success to prevent another change in the constitution, which was aimed at by the democratic party. Papirius Carbo, who had succeeded to the place of Appius Claudius in the Land Commission, proposed as tribune, in 131, a law permitting the re-election of tribunes. By this the obstacle which had ruined Tiberius Gracchus would have been removed, and a tribune who could retain his popularity with the people, could remain perpetual master of the State. This measure was thrown out[1] mainly by the influence of Scipio.

His Sympathy with the Allies.—But this statesman was not merely an opponent of changes proposed by others; he was a champion of good government, who was not afraid to prosecute leading members of his own party (*e.g.* the consular Cotta, between 133 and 129) for misgovernment. And he seems to have been the only Roman before Gaius Gracchus, whose views of politics extended beyond the narrow limits of Roman citizenship. He knew that Rome's allies were now her best soldiers; he knew that a large proportion of the population of Rome itself was worthless for service, and that many of them were slave-born, though freed by their masters; he was not afraid to tell a mob that hooted him that "Italy was but a stepmother to them." Hence he had a real sympathy with the demands of the allies; what these were must be described in more detail later on in the chapter. Scipio perhaps hoped to carry some partial measure for extending the Roman franchise to them.

In fact his policy seems to have been to maintain senatorial ascendancy by the support of the country voters throughout Italy, and to counterbalance the proletariate

[1] It seems, however, to have been passed in a modified form after his death. Appian's statement to this effect is confirmed by the fact that no objection of illegality seems to have been urged against the re-election of Gaius Gracchus in 123.

at Rome by the enfranchisement of the Italian farmers. In such a policy lay the only chance for the Roman Senate. The Italians, if they had been made citizens would have been content with the mere title, and would have left the actual direction of power to the Roman nobles. But this course, though the only safe one, was too bold for a selfish oligarchy.

Scipio's Political Isolation and Death.—Scipio in his own day met with little support outside his own circle of friends, and no senatorial leader continued his policy after him. In the midst of his political activity he suddenly died, and though the circumstances of his death pointed to murder, there was no judicial inquiry.

The Senate was thankful for the respite which Scipio had gained them, and did nothing for the three years of quiet which followed his death. It was left for the democratic party to take up the cause of the Italians, and to endeavour to recall the Roman people to those wise principles of government which had made Rome great, although they had been forgotten for fifty years.

The Democratic Leaders Propose the Grant of the Franchise to the Allies.—Rome, as has been said (*cf.* pp. 49, 82), had won the dominion of Italy because she understood how to respect the feelings of her subjects, and because she was always ready to extend the bounds of her citizenship when her allies were ready to receive it. Her policy, unlike that of all the Greek states, had been one of extension and comprehension. But her success in the Second Punic War, and her rapid conquests in the East, had changed the whole condition of affairs. She no longer felt that she needed her allies, and her citizens were jealous of any proposal to admit outsiders to share the advantages of Roman citizenship; while, on the other hand, the allies were now eager to be more closely connected with a city that was becoming the mistress of the world. We have seen in the measures of 187 and 177 (*cf.* p. 139), removing from Rome the Italians who had settled there, the clear signs of the growing alienation of feeling; but it was the proposal of Tiberius Gracchus which now made the allies give open expression to their grievances.

The Grievances of the Allies.—These may be divided under the following heads:—

At Home.—(1) The Italian cities complained of interference on the part of the Roman Government by legislation and by judicial action; *e.g.* the Senatus Consultum de Bacchanalibus was passed at Rome, but applied to all Italy. (*Cf.* p. 177.)

(2) The fact that Italian cities often had the *jus commercii* only with Rome, and not with each other, was a serious drawback to their material prosperity. Moreover, "all roads" literally "led to Rome," to the great profit of the trade of the capital.

(3) Roman magistrates considered themselves justified in levying presents from Italian cities, and they often behaved most insolently in defiance of the rights of the allies; *e.g.* a magistrate at Teanum was scourged because the town baths were not cleared sufficiently fast to satisfy the wife of a Roman consul, who wished to use them on her journey through the town.

In the field.—(1) The Italians complained that the burdens of service were unequally distributed. Nominally, Rome and her allies furnished equal contingents; really, the Italians were compelled to raise far more than their share, especially for arduous and unprofitable wars, like those in Spain.

(2) The Italians felt keenly the disgrace that they could never rise to a higher post than the command of their own contingents. Italian veterans continually saw Romans of no military experience promoted over them.

But though the grievances of the allies were many and serious, it must never be forgotten that they had the two great privileges which marked free men in the old world.

(1) They paid no tribute.

(2) They served in the ranks with the Romans.

The latter point is a pretty sure proof that the stories of Roman oppression in Italy are exaggerated;[1] it was too

[1] The outrage at Teanum, referred to above, comes to us in a fragment of a speech of C. Gracchus. The experience of our own day might well convince historians that political speeches are uncertain materials for history.

dangerous to oppress continuously communities with arms in their hands.

The Folly of the Senate in Refusing all Redress of these Grievances. — Hence Italian discontent smouldered long before it broke into a flame, and the slightest concession on the part of the government might have made them loyal and attached once more. The democratic leaders saw this, especially as their own interests made them anxious to secure the support of the allies; they wished to get rid of any opposition to their agrarian measures. But the mass of the Roman populace was always hostile to an extension of the franchise; and the Senate, with much less excuse, was equally short-sighted. In 126, it induced the tribune, Junius Pennus, to bring in an "alien act," removing all Italians from Rome; and when, in 125, the consul Fulvius Flaccus proposed a law extending the franchise, he was at once sent to Gaul on foreign service.

The result was an outbreak; Fregellae rose in revolt; but the attempt was premature, and the city was taken and razed to the ground by the praetor Opimius. It was thought, with some reason, that the democratic leaders in Rome were privy to the revolt, and this charge was actually brought against Caius Gracchus. This great leader played a prominent part in the question of Italian privileges, as in every other question of Roman politics.

Tiberius Gracchus and the Allies.—Tiberius Gracchus had taken no direct part in raising the franchise question, but his action brought it inevitably to the front. When a revolution had once altered the balance of political privileges, it was certain that the allies, who had been excluded from all privileges, would begin to agitate for their share. They felt that unless their condition was improved, it would grow worse; so long as they had no votes, they were liable to be sacrificed to the Roman proletariate, which had votes and so was worth conciliating (*cf.* p. 197). It must, however, be always remembered that the question of the extension of the franchise to the allies is a natural part of Rome's development; their demand for political privileges is only a stage in that process of expansion which had begun with the struggle of the Orders, and which reached its completeness in the Romanization of the provinces.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE TRIBUNATES OF CAIUS GRACCHUS (123 AND 122)

The Aims of C. Gracchus.—C. Gracchus, at the time of the death of his brother, was a member of the Land Commission; but he was nine years younger than Tiberius, and seems to have taken very little part in public life for some years; his actions as tribune later show that he was resolved on revenge for his brother's death, but he was waiting his opportunity. On his return from service as quaestor in Sardinia, at the end of 124, he stood for the tribunate, and was elected, in spite of tremendous opposition; he intended, and the Senate guessed that he intended, to punish his brother's murderers, and to break the power of the order to which they belonged. He was no mere economic reformer like Tiberius; he wished to change the whole constitution of the State, and from the very first his measures were aimed at substituting direct government by the people for rule by the Senate; as the people could only govern by deputy, his policy really was to exalt himself as the representative of the people.

It was asserted in his own day, and has been maintained by Mommsen, that he aimed at monarchical power for himself; this is most unlikely; but he certainly seems to have intended to play the part which Pericles had played at Athens, to humble the Senate, as the great Greek demagogue had humbled the Areopagus, and to direct the popular will by his eloquence.

The Supporters of Gracchus' Policy.—He saw clearly, however, that something else than mere eloquence was necessary for a permanent hold on the Roman people, and so he deliberately set himself to secure, by material gains, the

support of those whom he needed to establish his power. This power once gained was to be used for the noblest ends—for the relief of distress in Italy, and for extension of Roman privileges, not only to the allies, but to the provinces. We can hardly arrange his measures chronologically, or even decide which were passed in his first, and which in his second tribunate; to this he was elected, without opposition, at the end of 123. It is, however, fairly certain that the measure giving cheap corn to the citizens was one of his earliest, and that the extension of the franchise to the allies was the crowning point of his policy, introduced by him in his second tribunate, when he believed himself to be well established, and intended once for all to secure his power by swamping the old comitia with a crowd of new Italian voters, devoted to the statesman to whom they owed their privileges.

The Measures of C. Gracchus.—His measures may be arranged under the following heads:

(1) Measures of revenge for his brother.

(2) Measures designed to secure himself a party in the State, and to break the power of the Senate.

(3) Measures for the relief of distress.

(4) Measures for the benefit of Italians and provincials.

I. Measures of Revenge.—He seems to have begun his career with measures directed against his brother's opponents.

(1) He procured the exile of Popillius, the consul who had proceeded against his brother's followers, and who had executed many of them; this he did by a law banishing all who had condemned Roman citizens without consulting the people (*injussu populi*); this law was only a reassertion, with additional penalties, of the ancient claim of Roman democrats that only the people could decide cases which affected the life or rights (*caput*) of a citizen.

(2) He also proposed a law that all who had been deprived of any office by the people should in future be ineligible for any other office: this was obviously aimed against his brother's opponent, Octavius. At the request of his mother, he did not press his proposal; but merely to bring it forward was a warning to all future opponents that the people could not be resisted without danger.

II. Measures directed against the Senate. — These two laws struck not only at individuals, but also at the power of the Senate.

(1) This object was attained more directly by his Lex de Provinciis, which enacted that henceforth the provinces for the incoming consuls were to be fixed *before* their election took place; hitherto they had been fixed *after* the election. In this way the Senate was prevented from making provincial arrangements to suit individuals; it had been in the habit of granting the best provinces to its own supporters when elected.

(2) Still more important was the law which took away from the members of the Senate the right of composing the *quaestiones*, or special judicial tribunals; of these the most important was, as has been said, that for cases of extortion in the provinces (*de repetundis*). Gracchus also established a new permanent tribunal (*perpetua quaestio*) dealing with murder cases. The control of the law courts in Rome, as in Greece, was a source of direct political influence; cases were decided not on their merits, but from party feeling. Hence this law took away from the Senate the power of protecting its own members when accused of oppression, and transferred it to a new order in the State, the Equites; these were the wealthiest class of citizens outside the Senate. They had supported that body in its struggle with Tiberius Gracchus; his brother now made of them, as he hoped, firm supporters of his anti-senatorial policy.

(3) With the same end in view, he rearranged the whole taxation of the new province of Asia. He introduced a system of tithes, like that established in Sicily; and henceforth the revenues of Asia were farmed entirely by Roman *publicani*, who paid down a lump sum for the right of collecting the taxes, and then made their profit by extorting the greatest possible amount from the provincials.

(4) Gracchus also, as has been said, won over the Roman mob by his corn law: this enacted that any citizen might every month buy of the State, at about half the cost price, sufficient corn for his own livelihood. The heavy loss to the treasury was met by the increased revenue from the province of Asia. Gracchus in this way tried to secure his

power by attaching to himself the capitalists and the mob of Rome.

III. Measures for the Relief of Economic Distress.—He used his power for the relief of economic distress.

(*a*) He revived his brother's old agrarian law.

(*b*) He endeavoured to give assistance to the poor farmers of Italy by an elaborate system of roads throughout the country.

(*c*) He proposed new colonies both in Italy and in the province of Africa, where a Roman town, Junonia, was to be planted on the site of Carthage.

IV. Measures for the Benefit of Italians.—This last proposal belongs also to that side of Gracchus' policy which we must especially admire. It was an entirely new thing in Roman history that an organized community of Roman citizens should exist outside Italy. And, in this colony, Italians, who were not already citizens, were to share equally with the existing citizens.

The principle thus introduced was carried out fully in Gracchus' last and greatest proposal, viz. that the franchise should be given to all Latin communities, and that the rest of Italy should receive Latin rights.

Decay of Gracchus' Popularity.—This last proposal alienated Gracchus' own supporters. The Roman citizens were not at all eager to share their privileges with others, however deserving; as the consul Fannius (a partisan of Gracchus, who had been elected for the year 122 through his influence (*commendatio*), but who deserted him) pointed out, there was already far too great a crowd of citizens in the Forum. Hence Gracchus' popularity began to wane. This was all the more the case when the influence of his eloquence was removed through his absence at his new colony in Africa.

The Senate saw its opportunity, and induced one of his colleagues, Livius Drusus, to come forward with popular proposals and undermine the influence of Gracchus. Drusus promised twelve colonies in Italy to Roman citizens; the promise could not possibly be fulfilled, and was not intended to be fulfilled, but the Roman mob was caught by it and deserted its old leader. Hence, when Drusus vetoed

Gracchus' franchise law, the popular champion was compelled to give way.

Gracchus' failure to secure re-election. His Murder.—His only chance now, not only of keeping his power, but even of saving his life, lay in securing once more his re-election as tribune. In this he failed, while Opimius, his strongest opponent in the Senate, was elected consul.

Encouraged by this, the party opposed to Gracchus at once assumed the offensive against him. His colony of Junonia was attacked, and, in the confusion which followed, Gracchus and his friend and late colleague in the tribunate, Flaccus (the consul of 125, see p. 201), withdrew for safety to the Aventine. Gracchus was very unwilling to defend himself, or to resort to force, but the Senate was resolved on his death. Led by the consul, they voted that the constitution was in danger, and passed the *Senatus consultum Ultimum*,[1] giving the consuls dictatorial power, and so suspending the right of appeal to the people. They then attacked their opponents; little resistance was offered, but a terrible slaughter was made of the democratic party; 3,000 fell, among them their two chiefs, Flaccus and Gracchus.

Results of Work of C. Gracchus.—The second great reforming tribune thus met the fate of the first, but his work in part survived him. His judicial and provincial arrangements went on, and the Roman State still continued to pauperize its citizens by selling corn below cost price.

Gracchus' work ended in failure. He had tried to relieve distress in Italy, and the only permanent result was a measure which attracted more and more of the country population to Rome. He had tried to extend the privileges of the provinces, and he had set up a court of capitalist judges, more corrupt and more selfish than the old senatorial judges, while he had extended a system of taxation which made the burdens of Asia far heavier, and which rendered the name of *publicanus* a synonym for oppression and unfairness. But

[1] This decree takes the place of the old dictatorship (*cf.* Camillus in 367, p. 31); by it the Senate declared the State to be in danger, and suspended the right of appeal. The people, however, never admitted the legality of this decree. (*Cf.* the condemnation of Cicero in 58, p. 252.)

he had succeeded in dividing the upper classes of Rome; henceforth, for fifty years, the capitalists and the Senate were in deadly strife, and he had given a blow to the power of the Senate from which it never recovered. And though his ideals of extension of privilege to Italy and to the provinces were not carried out, to him belongs the great honour of being the first Roman whose policy extended beyond Italy, and who dreamed of the time when the world was to enjoy Roman privileges, as well as to submit to Roman rule. With him first appears the idea that the whole "orbis terrarum" was to be the "urbs Romana."[1]

C. Gracchus as an Orator.—The two Gracchi were innovators in style as they were in politics; Cicero tells us that they spoke "much more easily and freely" than their predecessors. This was especially true of C. Gracchus, who was the first of Roman orators to employ violent action when speaking; in this respect he was compared to the Athenian Cleon. But Cicero praises in the highest terms his style, as "*grandis verbis, sapiens sententiis, genere toto gravis.*"[2] Unfortunately but few fragments of his speeches have come down to us. (Cf. p. 200.)

[1] This idea, the real secret of Rome's greatness, is well expressed by Rutilius in the oft-quoted lines:

> "Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam,
> Profuit injustis, te dominante, capi;
> Dumque offers victis proprii consortia juris,
> Urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat."

[2] Cicero, apart from their literary merits, condemns the Gracchi. When he praises them, it is only to heighten by contrast the iniquity of the popular leaders of his own day; *e.g.* Rullus (p. 243) and Clodius. But as a rule they are on his roll of bad citizens, with Sp. Maelius (p. 28) and M. Manlius (p. 29) and Saturninus, who culminate in Catiline and Antony, while he ranks himself with Scipio Nasica and Opimius as a defender of the state. He definitely says of Tib. Gracchus, "*Regnum occupare conatus est vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses*" (*De Amic.*, 41).

CHAPTER XXX.

THE RESTORED RULE OF THE SENATE (122–90)

Reactionary Policy of the Senate.—The consul Opimius dedicated a temple to Concord, and civil strife in Rome seemed to have been quenched in blood; but such "harmony" could not be lasting. The objects which Gaius Gracchus had sought were still the objects of the popular leaders, and the methods which he had employed for forwarding them were faithfully copied by his successors, Saturninus and Livius Drusus the younger, though with widely different aims. But for the moment the Senate was triumphant, and they proceeded to undo what little good the Gracchi had done; the law forbidding the sale of the allotments, which had been made by the Agrarian Commissioners, was at once repealed, and in 118 a second law was passed forbidding any further distributions of the Ager Publicus, and abolishing the Sempronian Commission. The *possessores* still paid a rent to the state for the land they held, but even this was abolished soon afterwards (probably by the Lex Thoria[1] in 111 B.C.; this law survives in the famous Naples Inscription, C. I. L. I. 200). The old Ager Publicus thus became private property, and further proposals, like those of the Gracchi, were rendered impossible.

Revival of Democratic Policy.—But it was useless to crush opponents by force, when the evils which they had sought to remedy went on worse than ever. The complete mismanagement of the foreign policy of Rome, and especially the inability to defend the provinces against barbarians, which was shown especially in the Jugurthine war, which will be described in the next chapter, roused the people once more to a determined attack on the Senate.

Marius, elected Consul, receives his Province from the People.—The election of Marius to the consulship for 107 was itself a

[1] Mommsen, however, gives this name to the second law, that of 118.

most significant protest against the senatorial oligarchy, for he was a "*novus homo*," and sprung from a middle-class family in the country town of Arpinum. Still more important was the resolution of the people which sent the new consul to Africa, in place of the proconsul Metellus, whose command in that province had been already prolonged by the Senate. Even Gracchus had, except in one or two instances, interfered with senatorial government only in Italy; now it was the command of the armies which was wrested from that order. Marius' successes in Africa, his reorganization of the army, and his successes against the northern barbarians —the Cimbri and the Teutones—placed him in a position such as no Roman had ever occupied before: five times in succession (for the years 104 to 100) he was re-elected to the consulship; and in his sixth term of office, when all foreign danger was over, he set himself, supported by his victorious army, to revolutionize the home government.

His Coalition with Saturninus.—He himself was no statesman; the most brilliant general of his time in the field, he was helpless in civil affairs; but the Senate had provoked him by their exclusiveness and their haughtiness, and the rude soldier, who would probably have been quite willing to enter the ranks of the optimates if they had treated him civilly, set himself to revenge the slights and sneers which he had suffered, by allying himself with two thorough-going democrats, L. Appuleius Saturninus, and C. Servilius Glaucia. These demagogues were men of bad character, who for personal ends copied the policy of C. Gracchus; the former had been tribune already in 103, and was now again tribune in 100, and the latter was praetor. The objects which they sought were partly praiseworthy; the Gracchan policy of colonies in the provinces was revived, and Marius' veterans were to receive lands in Gaul. The Italians too were indirectly encouraged in their claims to the franchise, by being admitted, along with existing citizens, to share in the colonies. All these measures were passed by violence, without any previous consultation of the Senate; the members of that body were even compelled to swear obedience to the Agrarian law, under pain of exile, a penalty which only Marius' especial rival, Metellus, the conqueror of Jugurtha, was bold enough

to incur. The policy of corn distributions to the people was carried even further than it had been by C. Gracchus. In this way the direct rule of the popular leaders was once more established; they controlled the streets of Rome by mob violence, and did not scruple to rid themselves by open murder of dangerous opponents. The eloquent C. Memmius, a moderate democrat, was murdered when he ventured, at the end of 100, to stand against Glaucia for the consulship.

Overthrow of the Democratic Coalition.—This unscrupulous violence caused their ruin; all respectable classes united against them; Marius was compelled to desert his own allies, and Saturninus and Glaucia, after being declared public enemies, were murdered in a faction fight. With them fell the influence of Marius, and the rule of the Senate was once more restored, while its champion and hero, Metellus, returned from exile; but the union of the tribune Saturninus and of the army leader Marius was an ominous combination. It had failed this time through the incapacity of the latter and the reckless audacity of the former; but it was only too probable that, when some really capable general attempted to play the part in which Marius had failed, the power of the Senate might fall, not only temporarily, but never to rise again.

The Senatorial Party Refuse all Reform.—However, the optimates were far too blind to see their danger. They persecuted the members of the democratic party, and went on misusing their power as of old. Even the wisest members of their party failed to see that some concession was necessary, at least to the allies. The consuls of the year 95, L. Licinius Crassus, the great orator, and Q. Mucius Scaevola, were among the most respectable statesmen of the time, but their only idea as to the Italian question was to pass a law which not only barred all irregular access to the franchise in future, but established a commission to inquire into all cases where it had been illegally assumed in the past. It was no doubt unsatisfactory that the allies should obtain, in an underhand way, what their Roman masters were unwilling to concede; but a wise politician would have seen the unwisdom of depriving the Italians of their one resource. These good lawyers shut

down the safety valve of the state-machine, and rendered an explosion inevitable.

Drusus' Attempt at Reform.—One man, however, tried to avert this by timely concessions. M. Livius Drusus, the son of the old opponent of Gaius Gracchus, came forward as a champion of the allies. He had, however, another object as well. He wished to restore to the Senate the control of the jury courts which Gracchus had taken from them. The equestrian judices had behaved with scandalous partiality, and used their power in the courts to shelter their own extortions. Their unfairness had recently been shown in a striking case: P. Rutilius, one of the most respected men of Rome, had done his best as legate of Scaevola, the pro-consul of Asia, to protect the provincials from the rapacity of the publicani. He was impeached on his return home for the very offence which he had striven to prevent, and was condemned in defiance of all justice. Drusus therefore combined the best of the objects of C. Gracchus with a championship of the Senate, and he had the wisest of the Senators on his side. He sought to win over the people by increased distributions of corn, and by promising colonies and grants of land, while the question of the judicia was to be settled by a compromise; they were to be given back to the Senate, but to a Senate recruited by 300 of the Equites. The compromise was not popular, but Drusus succeeded in carrying his laws by uniting them all in one measure (*per saturam*). Hence the people voted the whole of them, for the sake of the promised advantages.

Drusus' Failure and Murder.—This "tacking" was illegal, and Drusus' laws were declared void by the Senate, in which his party was now the weaker. There was obviously little chance of his being able to carry his law giving the franchise to the Italians, and he seems to have seen this and to have prepared to supplement constitutional methods by force. He was accused of being privy to a widespread Italian conspiracy, and certainly he was on friendly terms with some of the most anti-Roman of the Italian leaders; but before he could do anything, legal or otherwise, he died suddenly, probably by violence. The Italians saw that the redress of their grievances was hopeless unless extorted by

the sword, and prepared to revolt. Meanwhile Drusus' triumphant enemies set up a special commission, on the proposal of the tribune, Q. Varius, and proceeded to prosecute all his partisans. In the midst, however, of their abuse of justice, the news suddenly came that Italy was in revolt. Rome's shortsightedness had involved her in a civil war with those who had been hitherto her strongest supporters. But before we speak of this, we must describe the foreign affairs[1] of Rome, during the period of the revolution which has occupied the last four chapters.

[1] For part of these our main authority is the Bellum Jugurthinum of C. Sallustius Crispus (87–34 B.C.). (Cf. p. 272 note.) He was a partisan of Caesar, and governed Africa for him (46 B.C.). Mommsen says that his two histories are party pamphlets; the "Jugurtha" is intended to exalt Marius, the uncle of Caesar, and the "Catiline" to explain away the discreditable part played by Caesar in supporting the great conspirator. The first of these charges certainly breaks down, for Sallust does full justice to Metellus, the rival of Marius, and also to the part of Sulla in ending the war. But the reputation of Sallust as a historian has suffered much of recent years; he is most careless as to his facts, and gives hardly any dates. (There is only one in the whole of the "Catiline.") His style is careful and epigrammatic, and has been compared to that of Thucydides; but in this respect, too, he is now much less admired than formerly.

CHAPTER XXXI.

ROMAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION

Weakness of Roman Government Abroad. — "A house divided against itself cannot stand"; and Rome was no exception to this rule. While tribunes and Senate had been contending for power at home, her strength abroad was paralysed; and even when the Senate was in undisputed control over foreign affairs, its Government was far too corrupt to be effective. The high offices of State were no longer conferred for merit, but distributed among a close ring of noble families; their holders cared nothing for the State interests, but only to make a fortune for themselves, and to win some pretext for a triumph. It was a "period of many triumphs, but few victories."

Asia.—The acquisition of Asia (see p. 185) was, as has been said, only the last result of the diplomacy of the two preceding generations; but the weakness of the Roman arms was revealed by their difficulty in reducing Aristonicus, a pretender, who claimed to belong to the house of the Attalids, and who kept the Romans at bay for two years. His resistance was rather of the nature of a slave rising than really national,[1] and was crushed by M. Perpenna (130).

Sicily.—Similar weakness was shown in Sicily, where the cruelty of the masters drove the slaves to revolt under a Syrian named Eunus, and where, for at least four years, they held the whole open country, though the Romans kept the fortified towns (135–132).

Advance only in Gaul.—In fact, the only advance made at this period was in Gaul, with which the Romans had been compelled to establish relations, owing to their provinces in Spain. Massilia, the old Phocaean colony, had long been

[1] We may compare the difficulty which the English had in suppressing the dacoits in Burmah after organised resistance had ceased.

their ally; in Gaul, as in Sicily, Greek cities looked on Rome as their natural friend against the Carthaginian enemy. In 125, the Massiliots found themselves hard pressed by the Gallic tribes, and the Consul Flaccus was sent to their aid; he gained some successes, and the Romans formed an alliance with the Aedui, who were in the next period to take the place of Massilia as the Roman "cat's paw" in Gaul. After some years of fighting, the Romans finally in 121 completely defeated the Allobroges and their allies the Arverni, and founded the province of Gallia Narbonensis, the name of which survives in the modern "Provence." They set to work to secure it in characteristic fashion; the Via Domitia was carried by one of the conquerors, along the southern coast of Gaul, the military post (*castellum*) of Aquae Sextiae was founded (122), and finally in 118, the project of C. Gracchus was realised by the establishment of a colony of Roman citizens at Narbo Martius.

First Transmarine Colony.—This step was completely adverse to the interests of Massilia, but that city was no longer necessary to the Romans; and, in any case, it was the friend of the Senate, and not of the people, which was beginning to interfere with the management of foreign affairs, and which saw its own interest in the foundation of Roman colonies outside of Italy.

Roman Wars in Macedonia.—Rome's weakness abroad was becoming more and more apparent; in 114 the Consul Cato was defeated, and the barbarians overran his province, Macedonia; this, however, was avenged two years later, when Livius Drusus penetrated to the Danube. But far more serious were the wars with Jugurtha and with the Cimbri and Teutones; these must be described separately.

Against Jugurtha.—In 118, Micipsa, King of Numidia, died, and dissensions at once broke out in his family; his illegitimate nephew, Jugurtha, succeeded in murdering his cousins, Hiempsal and Adherbal, and made himself master of the whole kingdom. He knew Rome well, having served in her armies, and by unscrupulous bribery had succeeded in getting his crimes condoned more than once; but he went too far, and murdered not only his cousin, but a number of Italians, who had defended Cirta, Adherbal's capital, against

him (112). This roused the Roman people, while Roman diplomatists saw the danger of a strong and united Numidia; and the popular leaders too hoped to injure the Senate by exposing the venality of its members. After two campaigns, in which Jugurtha's gold paralysed the Roman armies (111–110), the Romans, smarting under their disgrace, finally undertook the war in earnest, and sent out Metellus, a capable general, and, what was still more important, an incorruptible one. He completely defeated Jugurtha at a battle on the River Muthul, and one by one reduced most of the fortified towns in Eastern Numidia; but he quarrelled with Marius, his lieutenant, and finally found himself superseded, just when success seemed in his grasp, by the popular vote which gave the command in Africa to Marius (107).

The latter was a good soldier, and well aware of the difficulties of the campaign; he carefully recruited his army, and succeeded in reducing the rest of Numidia; but the end of the war was as far off as ever, for it depended on the person of Jugurtha, and though the Romans could always defeat him in battle, they now found it impossible to bring him to a decisive engagement. In fact they had exactly the same difficulty which the French met with in conquering the famous Abd-el-Kadir in Algeria, the modern representative of Numidia.

Jugurtha had by this time taken refuge with Bocchus, the king of Mauretania (the modern Morocco); this monarch feared the Romans, and was disposed to negotiate, but Marius, a bad diplomatist, though a good soldier, violated his territory and forced him into hostilities. A defeat, however, brought him to his senses, and Marius' quaestor, Sulla, persuaded the treacherous African to make terms; venturing his own life, he visited the barbarian prince, and by sheer force of will, induced him to betray Jugurtha, with whose capture the war ended. The Romans took no additional territory for themselves, but set up another of Masinissa's descendants on the throne of Numidia, while they handed over part of that country to Bocchus, as a reward for his treachery.

Invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones (113).—It was time this war was over, for a far more serious danger was threatening Rome. In the year before war with Jugurtha

broke out, news had come of the defeat of the consul Carbo and his army in Noricum by a horde of barbarian warriors, known as the Cimbri and the Teutones What their nationality was is uncertain, but they were probably Germans, and formed a kind of advance guard of the wandering nations which, more than 400 years later, were to burst the iron band of the Roman frontier, and overwhelm the civilization of the old world. Fortunately the barbarians did not realize their strength, and passed into Gaul before invading Italy; here in 109 and 107 they, or their allies, defeated two consular armies, while in the autumn of 105 the Romans suffered the most severe defeat which the Republic had sustained since Cannae, at Arausio (Orange), on the Rhone, in which 80,000 men are said to have perished. Even then the northern hordes turned aside to plunder Spain, and Rome had three years in which to prepare for the life-and-death struggle. She, and the cause of civilization with her, were saved by the military genius of one man, C. Marius; he returned from Africa at the end of 105, to find himself, in his absence, elected consul for the second time, and for three more years (103–101) the Roman people gladly committed their fortunes to him. Such a series of commands was unprecedented, but Marius justified the confidence placed in him; for two years he prepared his army, and then in 102 met and annihilated the Teutones at Aquae Sextiae (Aix), in the S. of Gaul. The Cimbri, meanwhile, had moved round to attack Italy from the north-east, and drove Marius' aristocratic colleague, Catulus, into a retreat too precipitate for his credit. But next year (101), on the Raudian plain, near Vercellae, they met the conqueror of the Teutones, and were annihilated in their turn.

Marius' Army Reform.—Rome had been saved by her low-born consul, and the army which he had made; but that very army which had saved the state was soon to ruin the republic. Marius as consul in 107 had revolutionized Roman military arrangements; the repeated defeats of the armies had shown him that a new system was necessary, and he changed both the method of enlistment and the armament and organization of the legions. No doubt his innovations had been in part anticipated during

the preceding century, but to him belongs the credit of thoroughly carrying out the new system.

The most important changes were:

(1) Hitherto there had been a property qualification for serving in the legions, though it had been reduced to 4000 asses; henceforth all free-born citizens might serve.

(2) Hitherto enrolment had been more or less compulsory; a certain number of men were taken from each tribe, if necessary by lot; now the ranks were filled by voluntary enlistment.

(3) The number of the legion was raised to 6000, and each received for itself the standard of the "eagle."

(4) The cohort of 600 men was made the fighting unit, instead of the smaller body, the maniple.

(5) In the legion all the old distinctions of rank and age[1] were swept away, and one uniform system of armament was introduced, by the *pilum* being given to all.

The result of these changes was that:

(1) The army became a profession, and a profession mainly for those who had no stake in the country.

(2) In it all distinctions but military distinctions were abolished.

(3) Hence the army became almost absolutely dependent on the general.

Marius, by making these changes, improved the efficiency of the Roman army, and saved Rome; but he laid the foundation of the Empire.

Second Sicilian Slave War.—The only other war of importance during this period was a second slave revolt in Sicily, which lasted from 103 to 99, and which was marked by frightful cruelties on both sides. The Romans, however, were extending their power in the East. In 103 the first governor was sent to Cilicia; in 96 the last king of Cyrene left his kingdom to the Romans, who declared his cities free; and in 92 Sulla, by vigorous diplomacy, forced Mithradates, the king of Pontus, to fall back from Cappadocia. But these were only the beginnings of relations which were to have important results later. We must now return to Italy and the revolt of the allies.

[1] In the second century the divisions had been *hastati* and *principes*, armed with *pilum*, and the *triarii* (the veterans) with the *hasta*.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE SOCIAL (90–89) *AND THE CIVIL WARS* (88–81)

Organization of the Italian Confederacy. — Although the Italians had long been plotting a resort to arms, yet the revolt at last broke out unexpectedly. The insolence of a Roman official at Asculum, in Picenum, caused his murder; but when once the flame was kindled, it spread far and wide. All Italy to the south and east of Rome (with the exception of the Latin towns) formed an organized confederacy; its capital was placed at Corfinium, in Picenum (the name of which was changed to Italica), and the Roman arrangements of consuls and senate were slavishly followed. In fact, all Italy was to be organized in Roman fashion, with Rome left out.

Absence of Idea of Representation.—The Roman constitution, which required all citizens to come to the city and vote directly, had long been unworkable, but at least it was the natural growth of centuries. It seems to a modern view very strange that Italians, scattered all over Italy, should have adopted the same clumsy form of government, instead of arranging for the election of delegates, who could easily meet and decide on matters concerning the general interests; but this idea of "representation" was unknown to the old world, which had seen no free form of government except that of the city-state, where all citizens took a direct share in the management of affairs.

Comparison of Strength of Rome and the Italians.—The war was especially formidable, for the tribes in revolt had furnished the best soldiers to the Roman armies—*e.g.* the Marsi—and their generals were trained in the Roman school. In actual fighting strength the allies were, no doubt, far

superior, as the events of the first year of the war clearly showed. But Rome had great advantages on her side:

(*a*) The Latin colonies throughout Italy, forty in number, remained faithful, and thus the government held command of the fortified posts.

(*b*) Rome could (and did) draw on the resources of her provinces for auxiliaries, *e.g.* on Numidia for light horsemen. Rome, too, had command of the sea.

(*c*) Rome had her government in working order; the allies had to organize theirs, and quite failed to do so.

(*d*) Rome, from her position in the centre of Italy, could move her forces on the inner lines; the allies were ignorant of each other's position and movements.[1]

(*e*) Above all, the allies were not united in aim; the majority of them only wanted to be made Roman citizens, while a few, like the Samnites, hated the very name of Rome. Hence by timely concessions dissension could be spread in the allied ranks.

First Year of the War (90). Roman Disasters compel Concessions.—It was this last point which saved Rome, but it needed a year of disasters to teach her haughty spirit the lesson of submission; for, during the first year of the war, the Italians gained great successes. One of the consuls, Caesar, was defeated with great loss, and the Samnites overran Campania. The other, Rutilius Lupus, lost both his life and a large part of his army, though his lieutenant, the aged Marius, gained some successes, and captured the enemies' camp. The Romans therefore at last yielded to force what they had so long refused to reason. The surviving consul, L. Caesar, passed the Lex Julia, by which the *civitas* was conferred on all the allies who had taken no part in the revolt. This measure was supplemented in the next year (89) by that of two tribunes, Papirius Carbo and Plautius Silvanus; by this Lex Plautia Papiria, all Italians who submitted within sixty days could obtain the franchise. The consul Pompeius also carried a law, giving the Latin

[1] A good instance of the importance of this is the disastrous march of 15,000 picked Marsians, in the winter of 90-89, to induce Etruria to revolt, although that district had already declared for Rome. Practically the whole force perished.

franchise to the Transpadanes, who had remained faithful to Rome in the struggle.

Second Year. Disunion of Allies and Roman Successes.— These concessions were at once effective; no more allies revolted, and disunion was spread among those already in arms; for now that the Romans had once conceded the principle of enfranchisement, it was obvious that all not too deeply committed, could hope to attain the position they coveted. Hence (89 B.C.) the fortune of war decidedly favoured Rome. Pompeius Strabo,[1] father of the "great" Pompey, as consul, reduced the rebels in the north-east and finally captured Asculum (in this campaign Cicero saw his first and only service), while, in the south, Sulla carried the war into the enemy's country, and overran Samnium. By these and other like successes, the revolt was practically crushed; hence Rome had triumphed, but only by conceding the very point against which she had fought. Her obstinacy had cost the lives of 300,000 of the best fighting men in Italy.

Insufficiency of Roman Concessions. — Even now the Romans, by the grudging nature of their concessions, did their best to make the new privileges nugatory. The Italians were to be enrolled in eight of the old tribes, which were to vote last; hence they would often not be called on to vote, but would find themselves still controlled by their Roman masters.[2] Roman obstinacy brought its own punishment. Out of the discontent of the Italians sprang the Civil War, which followed immediately on the Social; in fact the Samnites never laid down their arms. Rome itself too was full of disorder; the old rivalry between the Knights and the Senate still existed, and the pressure of war had produced wide financial distress. To alleviate this, the praetor urbanus, Sempronius Asellio, announced that he should

[1] After his victory an inscription (published 1908) records that *e lege Julia* he gave citizenship to thirty Spanish horsemen—the first instance of provincials being enfranchised by a commander.

[2] This treatment put the new citizens in practically the same inferior position as the freedmen, who were confined to the four city tribes. According to another account (that of Appian), ten (or fifteen) new tribes were to be created for the Italians, which were always to vote last; this would have secured the same result by different means.

revive an old law forbidding all payment of interest. This so enraged the capitalist party, that they murdered him while he was actually engaged in his official duties; and though the authors of the crime were notorious, it went unpunished.

Coalition of Marius and Sulpicius. — Everything therefore was ready for a further struggle; it was the ambition of Marius which precipitated the renewed outbreak of hostilities. He had long been jealous of Sulla, who, as the captor of Jugurtha, disputed his laurels in Numidia; and now he saw his rival made consul for the year 88, and promised the command against Mithradates in the East. To upset these arrangements, he resolved to appeal to the people. He bribed the eloquent tribune, P. Sulpicius Rufus, by the payment of his debts, to undertake his cause. Sulpicius, in order to ensure a majority in the comitia, carried a law through, to enable the Italians and the freedmen to vote in any tribe they pleased; then, having secured his majority, he, by a popular resolution, transferred the command in Asia from Sulla to Marius.

Sulla's Appeal to his Legions. — These measures were carried through by violence, and Sulla fled to his army. He was not the man to submit to such indignities, but resolved to meet force by force. The use of force in the Comitia was no new thing, but Sulla resolved to crush it by the force of the legions. He appealed to his soldiers to support this revolutionary step, and they unhesitatingly rallied round him. Their officers, however, who belonged to the wealthy class, held aloof; this contrast is significant of the political effect of the changes in the army made by Marius.

Sulla's Reactionary Measures.—Sulla's army advanced from Nola on Rome, and seized the city in spite of some opposition; Sulpicius and others were executed; Marius had to flee for his life, and after many hair-breadth escapes reached Africa. Sulla meanwhile restored the old constitution, and relegated the Italians into their position of inferiority; he also modified the arrangements of the Comitia Centuriata (p. 81), restoring the old method of voting so as to give the wealthy citizens more complete control, and he checked the legislative powers of the tribunes. But his presence was needed in

the East, and though he was fully conscious of the dangerous position of affairs in Rome, where a democrat named L. Cornelius Cinna had been chosen one of the consuls for 87, he yet set sail to maintain the honour of Rome abroad.

The Bellum Octavianum and the Marian Massacres.—The next six years in Italy are a Saturnalia of blood and disorder. Hardly had Sulla sailed, when Cinna proposed to recall Marius, and to give full rights to the Italians; driven from Rome by his colleague Octavius, he returned with an army and was joined by Marius, who had landed in Etruria and raised a force of desperadoes. The proconsul Pompeius Strabo, commanding the only other army in Italy, who wavered between the Senate and the Marians, died so suddenly that he was thought to have been murdered. Rome was starved into surrender, and Marius and Cinna were elected consuls for 86, the former for the seventh time. The triumph of the democratic leaders was marked by monstrous cruelty; all who had offended Marius, even his former colleague Catulus, were murdered by his attendants; the old man seemed to be seized with blood-madness. Things became so bad that the respectable Marians were compelled to interfere, and Sertorius, of whom we shall hear more presently, checked the massacres by summarily cutting down the assassins. Marius died soon after, having lived too long for his reputation; it is charitable to think he was really mad at the last.

Democratic Rule in Italy (86-83).—Cinna meantime was endeavouring to restore order; acting under his direction, the censors of the years 86–85 extended equal rights to all the Italians, who were thus finally placed on an equality with the Romans. Relying on his soldiers, Cinna made himself consul for both 85 and 84, apparently without going through the form of an election. But the news of Sulla's successes in the East, where, as will be described in chapter 34, he had successfully vindicated Rome's honour against Mithradates, warned the party, now masters of Italy, that a day of reckoning would come; and Cinna was preparing to sail to meet Sulla, when he was murdered by his mutinous soldiers at Ancona (84). With him died the last hope of the democratic party; Sertorius, the only other statesman in it,

left Italy for the West, refusing to serve under the worthless leaders remaining, among whom young Marius was marked by ferocity equal to his father's, without the same excuse. The nominal leader, C. Carbo, was a weak man.

Sulla's Return (83) and Vengeance.—When Sulla landed in Italy, early in the year 83, he seemed to have a nation against him and only an army of 40,000 men (though these were tried veterans) with him; but by promising to recognize the Italians as citizens, he had robbed his opponents of the only ground of principle on which they could have fought. Henceforth it was a struggle for order against disorder, for Roman traditions against mere personal ambition and the race hatred of the Samnites; Sulla therefore was at once joined by the best men in Italy, and under him fought as lieutenants all the great commanders of the next generation, including Pompey, Crassus, Lucullus. His career in Italy was one of uninterrupted success; army after army that came against him, was defeated or deserted to him, and by the end of 82, he saw himself victorious almost everywhere except over the Samnites. Their army suddenly evaded him, and advanced on Rome, which they vowed they would raze to the ground; but the city held out long enough for Sulla to come up, and outside the Colline Gate was fought a battle in which the very existence of Rome was at stake. Sulla finally triumphed and the Civil War was at an end; how Sulla waged it may be seen from the fact that he butchered eight thousand Samnite prisoners in cold blood, and laid waste their country. In this way he stamped out the last anti-Roman feelings in Italy, which was henceforth Roman as far as the northern limits of Etruria and Umbria.

Unification of Italy.—The unity was dearly purchased by the bloodshed of ten years' war, and the country never wholly recovered from this terrible period: it was the Social and Civil Wars, and not the ravages of Hannibal, that dealt the death blow to the prosperity of South Italy. [1]

[1] Cicero, whose sympathies were keen with the country towns of Italy, always condemns Sulla. He speaks again and again of his "*regalis potestas*," and says he was "*trium pestiferorum vitiorum luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis magister.*" (*De Fin*, III., 75.)

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE CONSTITUTION OF SULLA

Sulla made Dictator.—Sulla had succeeded in the two first parts of his work; he had saved Roman power in the East, and he had crushed disorder in Italy; his proverbial good luck (he assumed the name of "Felix") had never failed him; but now he had a harder task still—that of reorganizing the Roman constitution, which had been destroyed by forty years of revolution, followed by ten years of civil war. For performing this task he not only had the power of his legions, but was invested with absolute authority in Rome, by being appointed dictator; this old office, unknown for more than one hundred years, was revived for a new purpose, and in a new form; Sulla was made dictator for an unlimited period (not for six months only), and was given absolute power of life and death over the citizens.

Sulla's aim the re-establishment of Senatorial Rule.—He was a statesman of "blood and iron"; he saw with true Roman clearness the end which he intended to attain, and no consideration of mercy or justice hindered him in the choice of the means by which he proposed to attain it. He saw that Rome had been prosperous during the two preceding centuries, when it had been ruled by the Senate; therefore the rule of the Senate was to be restored, with new constitutional safeguards. He saw too that there were whole classes in the State which were rivals to the Senate; these were to be as far as possible crushed; as he had ended Samnite opposition to Rome by massacring the Samnites, so he intended to end equestrian rivalry by wiping out the old equestrian order.

Sulla's Proscriptions.—It was the work of destruction which he took in hand first. He introduced a new feature in

Roman government by his "proscriptions"; the names of all who had been hostile to him, or who were likely to be dangerous, were "posted up" in public, and these men might be killed with impunity, and their property was confiscated to the State. Altogether, nearly 5,000 perished in this way, including 2,600 of the equestrian order.

Sulla's Constitutional Measures.—Sulla having in this way cleared the ground, proceeded to set up his constitution. The power of the Senate was secured by:

(*a*) His enactment, already passed (88), that no law should be brought in without the consent of the Senate.

(*b*) Its great opponents, the tribunes, were henceforth to be drawn from the ranks of the senators; they were robbed of their old power of *intercessio* in all that concerned the general business of the State, and only retained it in its original form, that of giving help to individuals (*auxilium ferendum*). The tribunate, too, was degraded by making its holders incapable of afterwards holding any other office.

(*c*) The power of the magistrates was limited by re-enactment of the law forbidding re-election within ten years; the old rules as to the age of magistrates, and as to the sequence of offices[1] (*cursus honorum*), were also re-enacted.

(*d*) The control of the censors over the Senate was done away with. Henceforth all quaestors were to become senators not merely as a matter of course, but by actual law.

The Senate therefore was henceforth to be a body controlling all departments in the State; it nominally would owe its election to the people, but wealth and the power of custom would practically secure that members of the same families would always be appointed. Sulla saw, too, the dangers of the system of corn distributions; these were forbidden for the future. Thus a burden on the treasury was removed, and also a great means of popular agitation.

Sulla's Administrative Machinery.—Sulla, having done his best to secure a strong government, also recast the whole machinery of administration. His most important arrangements in this respect were:

(*a*) He made a general rule of that which had long been

[1] *i.e. quaestura, aedilitas, praetura, consulatus.*

a custom, that consuls and praetors should stay in Rome during their year of office, and only take a province when their imperium had been prolonged (*prorogatum*) as pro-magistrates. The increase of the Roman Empire and of its business required this division of powers.

(*b*) He increased the number of the praetors to eight, and of the quaestors to twenty.

(*c*) He developed the system of quaestiones, or standing courts, for the trial of certain offences. So far, they had only existed for extortion (*res repetundae*), for crimes of violence (*de sicariis et veneficiis*), and for treason (*majestas*)[1]; now they were set up for all kinds of criminal acts. In this way Sulla founded Roman criminal law. These quaestiones were to be made up of senators, and the law of C. Gracchus on the subject was repealed.

(*d*) Sulla saw the weakness of the control which the central government could exercise over its officers in the provinces; he had himself, in reliance on his army, more than once defied authority. He now made it a rule that the outgoing governor should leave his province within thirty days of his successor's arrival; and it was made treasonable for a man to wage war on his own responsibility.

Sulla's Resignation of the Dictatorship.—Sulla also provided for his veterans by grants of land in various parts of Italy. Twenty-three legions were so settled. In this way he hoped to restore the ravages of war, and to secure his government. In addition, he enfranchised 10,000 slaves who had belonged to those who had perished in the proscriptions; these "Cornelii" would secure his control of the Comitia. Having completed his task, he laid down his dictatorship. He could truly sum up his work for the Senate in the words of a modern statesman—"I have lifted it into the saddle; let us see if it can ride."

Results of Work of Sulla.—But this latter power he could not give. The same selfishness and short-sightedness which had made the Senate unpopular while its rule was undisputed, now rendered it impossible for it to retain its restored

[1] Set up by Saturninus, probably in his second tribunate, with the especial object of punishing violent opposition to a magistrate when performing his duties.

authority. Sulla could lay down his power safely, and ended his days in peace; but before he had been dead ten years, all his constitutional work was undone, and the Senate had lost the power which he gave it.

On the other hand, the administrative machinery which he had constructed, at once for judicature and for executive, lasted long after the Republic; in fact, in some respects as long as Rome itself lasted.

Sulla was a thorough Roman, with a marvellous talent for practical work, and a strange lack of insight as to the principles which must inspire all such work; he was a Roman, too, in his reckless disregard of life and right when they stood in his way. It was this cruelty on his part which was his most fatal influence on Roman history. He had taught his countrymen the use of the legionary sword and of the legalized assassin. Other parties were not slow to imitate his example, and the natural result of the methods of Sulla was, on the one hand, the conspiracy of Catiline, and, on the other, the despotism of Caesar.

The Remains of the Democratic Party.—But the immediate danger to Sulla's work was not from the survivors of the democratic party. Pompey had driven Perpenna from Sicily, had captured and executed at Lilybaeum the ex-leader, Carbo, and had crushed the Marians in Africa, in spite of the support of the Numidian pretender, Hiarbas.

Sertorius in Spain, 80–72.—It was only in Spain that Sertorius maintained the democratic cause. In him the best principles of that party were embodied. He was the champion at once of liberty and of order; and the extension of privileges which his party had secured for Italy, he was prepared to give to the provincials. In 80 B.C. he was invited by the revolted Lusitanians to be their leader, and he was joined by a few Roman exiles. These last were put in all positions of chief authority; but he treated the natives courteously as equals, and did his best to prepare them for Roman privileges by giving them Roman education. Strong in their support, and in his own military genius, he maintained the war for eight years, defeating all the Senatorial generals, among them even the "great" Pompey, and when hard pressed by

superior force, falling back on that guerilla warfare for which the Spaniards have always been famous. But Sertorius was never dangerous to the Roman government outside Spain, and in 72 treachery brought his career to an end; he was murdered by his lieutenant, Perpenna.

Parties opposed to the Sullan Settlement. I. The Moderate Men, *e.g.* Cicero.—But, though armed resistance had not been formidable, there were elements in Rome full of danger to the constitution of Sulla. He had, by his cruelty and arbitrary conduct, alienated all moderate men, and the democratic party had still leaders, in spite of the proscriptions. M. Tullius Cicero and C. Julius Caesar, who now appear on the political scene, represent these two sections; the former, who was in his twenty-fifth year (81), and was just beginning his career as an orator, belonged, by birth and education, to the party of the optimates; but he was only an eques in rank, belonging as he did to a wealthy municipal family at Arpinum, and was not likely to acquiesce in the establishment of an oligarchy, which barred all opening to the talent of "novi homines." Cicero now, as always, was an aristocrat in sympathy, but it was an aristocracy of the best Romans of all classes that he supported. Accordingly, in the year 80, he made his first appearance in a criminal case (*causa publica*), by defending Sextus Roscius, of Ameria, on a charge of parricide. He boldly attacked Chrysogonus, a freedman of Sulla, who, like many other of the dictator's followers had used the proscriptions to gratify his private greed, and triumphantly secured the acquittal of Chrysogonus' intended victim. In this, as in other cases, the law courts showed they were not disposed to support Sulla's arbitrary acts.

II. The Democrats and Caesar.—Among the surviving democrats, Caesar was already coming to the front, though he was only a young man of 22.[1] The nephew, by marriage, of Marius, and the son-in-law of Cinna, he had boldly refused to obey Sulla's command to divorce Cornelia, the daughter of the democratic leader, and had hardly escaped with his life. He abstained, however, from supporting the first open attack on Sulla's constitution, which was made by Lepidus, one of

[1] Mommsen dates his birth, 102; the usual date is 100.

the consuls for 78; Caesar was too clear-sighted to follow such a leader. Lepidus failed completely; he is only important as anticipating Catiline in his revolutionary attempt. Declared a public enemy, he died in Sardinia (77 B.C.), and his followers, led by Perpenna, joined Sertorius.

III. **Sulla's own partisans,** *e.g.* **Pompey.**—But there was another element even more formidable than the democrats to the continued rule of the oligarchy. Cn. Pompeius, the son of the consul of 89, had, as a young man of 23, raised an army, in Picenum, to support Sulla (83), and had greatly distinguished himself in the Civil War. For his defeats of the Marians in Sicily and in Africa, he had, in 81, insisted on having a triumph, though he was only an eques and had no office qualifying him to command. Sulla contemptuously acquiesced in this defiance of his arrangements. He had done what he could for the Senate, and probably saw it was useless to go to war again; he could have crushed Pompey, but others would have risen to make the same claims.

When Sulla was dead, Pompey became still further estranged from the Senate. Though he had supported Lepidus for the consulship, he aided in crushing him; but he insisted, in the same year, on being given an extraordinary command against Sertorius in Spain, thereby in part superseding the Senatorial general, Metellus Pius. Such commands too were, of course, a defiance of all the principles of Sulla's constitution. Pompey in fact, with his usual self-centred policy, was only prepared to support the oligarchy, provided that exceptional honours and powers were allowed to himself; he did not want to be autocrat of Rome, but he did want to behave as if he were autocrat.

Misgovernment of the Restored Oligarchy.—His command in Spain removed him from Italy for six years; but meantime the attacks on the Sullan constitution went on. The Senate had "learned nothing and forgotten nothing" in their humiliation; and extortion in the provinces, and weakness at home and abroad, were as outrageous as ever.

Slave Revolt under Spartacus.—The Pirates openly defied the Roman power, while Spartacus, an escaped gladiator, with his force of revolted slaves, held for two years (73–71) the whole open country in the South of Italy, and defeated

a praetor and two consuls who were sent against him. Rome herself now felt the horrors of a slave rising, such as had already twice devastated the province of Sicily. Finally, in 71, the praetor, M. Licinius Crassus, another lieutenant of Sulla, and the wealthiest man in Rome, succeeded in defeating and killing Spartacus. With his victorious army, he drew towards Rome, to which Pompey had also returned with his Spanish legions.

Consulship of Pompey and Crassus, 70.—The two lieutenants of Sulla had long been jealous of each other, but they agreed to sink their differences, and assist each other's candidature for the consulship. They were supported by the whole strength of the democratic party, and, being elected without difficulty, they entered on their office pledged to undo the constitutional work of Sulla. [1]

Cicero's Prosecution of Verres.—The most famous prosecution in Roman judicial annals took place this year, and showed clearly the necessity for some change. Verres, the propraetor of Sicily, had for three years misgoverned his province with every form of avarice and cruelty; yet he was defended by the Senatorial leader, Hortensius, and would have been acquitted but for the eloquence and energy of Cicero, who told the jurymen that they were on their trial as much as the criminal himself. Verres gave up his case, and went into exile, and the system of provincial government which he represented was doomed.

Pompey and Crassus restored the tribunes to the position of which Sulla had deprived them (this had already been partly accomplished in 75), and broke down the Senatorial monopoly in the law courts. By the Lex Aurelia of the praetor Cotta, the judicia were henceforth to be composed of three orders—the senators, the equites, and the tribuni ærarii [2]—from each of which an equal number of judices was to be taken.

[1] Previous laws with the same object had been that of C. Aurelius Cotta in 75, removing the tribunes' disability for higher office (*cf.* p. 225), and the Lex Terentia Cassia of 73, restoring the sale of cheap corn.

[2] *Tribuni aerarii* were probably the class next in fortune below the equites; the compromise was unfavourable to the Senate.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE WARS WITH MITHRADATES AND WITH THE PIRATES

Mithradates VI., King of Pontus (120–63).—While Rome had been distracted by civil war, she was also involved in a most serious struggle abroad. Since the destruction of Carthage, she had never had a foreign foe whom she had cause to fear, except the Cimbri and Teutones. Now she suddenly found herself face to face with a monarch, who not only disputed her power in Asia, but wrested from her for a time two provinces in Europe, who waged three wars against her with varying success, and who taxed all the skill of three of her greatest generals.

Mithradates VI. (Eupator), King of Pontus, belonged to a family whose rule dated back before the conquests of Alexander, but he was at the same time full of Hellenic sympathies. In this combination lies his chief importance; he represents at once the last serious resistance on the part of the Greeks, and the first collision of Rome with the genuine East. Since Marathon and Salamis the European nations had despised the Orientals. Mithradates begins that reaction of the East against the West, the dangers of which the Romans first learned in Crassus' defeat at Carrhae, and which culminates in Chosroes and Mahomet.

Mithradates' Early Relations with Rome.—He had come to the throne in 120 at the age of twelve, and had early learned to fear and hate the Romans, who deprived him of Phrygia, which had been given to his father, Euergetes, for services in the war against Aristonicus. His first conquests were on the north of the Black Sea, where he saved the Greek cities in the Crimea from the Scythians. He then proceeded to extend his dominion in Asia Minor at the expense of the

neighbouring kingdoms — Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, and Galatia. Rome's policy now, as always, was to keep the states on her borders weak and divided; but Mithradates' gold was powerful to shut the eyes of the senatorial government, and it was long before any notice was taken of him. At length, however, even the corrupt oligarchy felt compelled to move, and in 92 Sulla was sent as propraetor to Cilicia, forced Mithradates to submit, and restored the deposed king of Cappadocia. On this occasion the Romans first came into relations with the Parthians.

First Mithradatic War (88–84.)—But the news soon followed that Rome's allies in Italy had revolted, and Mithradates resumed his ambitious projects. He had with him the sympathy of the Greeks, who were groaning under the oppression of the Roman publicani. He invaded the province of Asia, captured the Roman legate, M'. Aquillius, who was put to death with the utmost insult and cruelty, and ordered the massacre of all Italians. The pent-up fury of the Greeks burst out, and at least 80,000 perished. Rhodes alone, among the Asiatic cities, remained faithful to the Romans. The people of that important trading community had been badly treated by the great republic in the preceding century; but they knew and feared her power, while they needed her as the only possible mainstay of the order so essential to their commerce. They therefore gave shelter to many of the fugitive Romans. Mithradates in vain endeavoured to take Rhodes, which now, as long afterwards in the fifteenth century, A.D., was the bulwark of Europe against Oriental despotism. The King of Pontus knew that it was now war to the knife between him and Rome. He sent his lieutenant Archelaus to European Greece, the whole of which came over to him; in Athens especially he was welcomed, and set up over that city the so-called philosopher Aristion, who ruled it with a rod of iron.

Sulla's Victories in Greece (87–85).—But the day of reckoning had now come; order was restored—at least in name—in Italy, and Sulla, in the spring of 87, landed in Greece. The struggle at first centred at Athens, which resisted desperately, and was only taken after nearly a year's siege; the Peiraeus soon after surrendered; in all these operations.

Sulla was much hindered by the lack of ships. He next met and defeated Mithradates' generals in Boeotia (86–85), at Chaeronea and Orchomenos. These battles are important as showing clearly the superiority of the Romans, when well led, to the best Asiatic troops; Archelaus' host was four times as numerous as that of Sulla, it was trained and officered by Greeks, and had in it many Europeans, and even a considerable force of Italian deserters; but the motley throng went down before the genius of Sulla and the discipline of his men as easily as huge armies of Asiatics, with their French auxiliaries, were scattered by little bands of Englishmen at Plassy and at Assaye.[1] Out of 60,000 men, only 10,000 managed to escape, while Sulla claimed to have lost but twelve men; he, however, seems to have had the genius of the great Napoleon for minimizing his losses. The Asiatics were driven from Greece and from Macedonia, which they had also over-run.

Sulla in Asia. Peace with Mithradates.—Sulla had at last succeeded in raising a fleet, and carried the war across the Aegean; but he had now another enemy besides the Pontic king. The Marian leader, Flaccus, who came out with an army to supersede Sulla, was murdered by his soldiers at the instigation of his lieutenant, Fimbria; but the latter assumed the command, displayed great vigour, and nearly captured Mithradates. The Pontic king, by his cruelty and oppression, was losing the support of the Greeks, and after long negotiations made peace with Sulla early in 84; he surrendered all his conquests, but otherwise the terms were unusually favourable. Sulla in fact could not follow up his successes, as he was needed in Italy, and had a rival Roman leader in Asia; against him he now turned his arms, and Fimbria, deserted by his troops, killed himself.

The issue of the war was doubtful: Mithradates had lost his recent conquests, but he had retained his ancestral kingdom, and had not been punished for his massacres; the punishment for these fell on the province of Asia, which

[1] Mithradates' whole career suggests many parallels to that of Hyder Ali of Mysore, the great opponent of the English in India during the last half of the eighteenth century.

had to pay up its arrears of tribute, and a fine of 20,000 talents besides; it had Sulla's army also quartered on it for the winter. Asia did not recover for two generations from these exactions, and from the burden of debt which was contracted to meet them.

Second Mithradatic War (83-81).—The war was soon renewed, owing to the ambition of Licinius Murena, whom Sulla had left in command in Asia; in defiance of the treaty he invaded Cappadocia, but his perfidy met its due reward; he was completely defeated, and peace was once more restored on the old terms. This second Mithradatic War is chiefly memorable because in it the young Caesar first saw fighting, and greatly distinguished himself at the siege of Mytilene.

Third Mithradatic War (74-63).—Mithradates was only biding his time. Sulla, to whose genius he might well attribute his defeat, was dead, the Roman rule in Asia was more oppressive than ever, and he had in the Pirates a formidable ally on the sea, by whose means he opened negotiations with Sertorius in Spain. The cause for war was furnished by the death of Nicomedes, the king of Bithynia, who died in the year 74, leaving his kingdom to the Romans. Mithradates, who had reorganized his forces, invaded the country, and defeated the proconsul Cotta at Chalcedon; but, unfortunately for him, Rome had another great general at her disposal in L. Licinius Lucullus, the proconsul of Cilicia. He, though notorious for his wealth and luxury, was a trained soldier and a man of genius; what was almost as important, he was a man of character and justice, who, by his financial arrangements, did his best to lighten the burdens of the unhappy provincials;[1] by these means he conciliated the Greek cities, but made bitter enemies of the publicani and of the equestrian order at Rome.

Brilliant Successes of Lucullus.—Lucullus at first stood on the defensive, while Mithradates exhausted his army in

[1] He had first shown his fairness as quaestor in Asia in 80; during the winter of 71-70 he cut down the rate of usury to 12 per cent., and forbade the recovery of arrears which exceeded in amount the original debt.

the siege of the impregnable city of Cyzicus (73); then he drove the Pontic troops out of Bithynia, and in his third campaign over-ran Pontus itself. Mithradates was driven to appeal to his son-in-law, Tigranes, King of Armenia, who, after some hesitation, decided to support him; but Lucullus carried the war into the enemy's country, and scattered the vast Asiatic host at Tigranocerta in the autumn of 69. Even now he was not content; with a reckless energy, which can only be compared to that of Alexander the Great, he pushed on, and is said to have dreamed of conquering both Armenia and Parthia; but his soldiers were tired of their ceaseless advance (68–67), and mutinied in their winter quarters at Nisibis in Mesopotamia, at the instigation of Publius Clodius, who began his career by thus showing in the field the spirit of disorder for which he was afterwards notorious at Rome.

Lucullus superseded by Pompey.—Lucullus had to give way, especially as he was not supported by the government at home, where the equites were loud in their complaints, and where Pompey was intriguing to succeed him. He had, too, the mortification of seeing his subordinate, Triarius, lose all his conquests in Pontus. The work had to be done over again, and Lucullus was set aside for Pompey to reap his laurels. In order to understand this measure we must return to Rome and the work which Pompey had been doing elsewhere.

Power of the Pirates. Its Causes.—Pompey, on the expiration of his consulship (70 B.C.), retired into private life. He believed, however, that Rome would need his services again, nor was he disappointed; the weakness of the senatorial government was once more clearly shown by their inability to deal with the Pirates, who, encouraged by their long impunity, had raised themselves into a formidable power. The coasts and islands of the eastern Mediterranean had been from the earliest times a special home of such marauders; they were suppressed in the fifth century B.C. by the strong government of Athens, but they had once more become troublesome in the confusion that followed the break-up of Alexander's empire. Matters became even worse when Rome appeared in the

East, and when the kingdoms of Syria and of Egypt were passing into mere shadows. The period from 200 to 30 B.C. was a transition time; the Greek powers had lost all strength, and Rome was slow in taking up the responsibilities of those whom she had crushed. This was especially the case during the period of internal strife, when the Pirates were continually being reinforced by the fugitives who had escaped the Social and Civil wars and the proscription. The constant needs of the Roman slave market too were another cause of piracy; the captives who, with modern buccaneers, were simply made to "walk the plank," were the most valuable part of the booty of the old marauders. The plays of Plautus and Terence find continually the motives of their plots in the capture of their heroes and heroines.

The Pirates in Collision with Rome.—But the Pirates were now no longer confining themselves to the waters of the Levant and the Archipelago. Their strongholds were still Cilicia and Crete, but they fitted out whole fleets, ravaged the coasts of Italy, and began to cut off the corn supplies of the sovereign city herself. Even the Roman armies only ventured to cross the Adriatic in the winter, when the pirate fleets had left the sea. Something had been done in isolated districts; *e.g.* by Servilius in Cilicia and Isauria (78–76), and by Metellus in Crete (68–66). But combined action was needed, as otherwise the Pirates, when beaten in one district, simply changed their headquarters. The Senate had attempted this in 74, when an extraordinary commission was given to M. Antonius, the father of the famous triumvir "Mark Antony," to clear the seas of piracy. He received the *imperium infinitum aequum*, *i.e.* an authority in all the maritime provinces equal to that of the special governors of each. This grant of powers was, constitutionally, most important, for it was the first formal recognition of the need of *unity in administration*, which was the main cause of the Empire; but its immediate result was nil, owing to the incapacity and corruption of Antonius, who died in disgrace in Crete (71).

Pompey's "Extraordinary" Command against the Pirates (67).—Now that the Roman people began themselves to

feel the pinch of starvation, something had to be done. Gabinius, one of the tribunes for 67, was a dependant of Pompey, and was ready to serve him as Saturninus had served Marius, and as Vatinius and Curio were soon to serve Caesar. He proposed (but without mentioning any name) that a magistrate should be appointed, with extraordinary powers over all the coasts of the Mediterranean. He was to hold office for three years, to have under him twenty-five legates chosen by himself, and 6,000 talents at his disposal. In fact, he was to be absolute master in all the maritime affairs of Rome. Catulus and Hortensius, the leaders of the Senate, pointed out the unconstitutional nature of the proposals, and the danger that the new officer would become master of Rome; but necessity knows no law, and the people cared only for their daily bread. Caesar too supported the measure, to spite the Senate, and (perhaps) as a precedent for similar measures in his own interest later. It was carried; Pompey was elected, as all knew was intended, and the confidence of the Roman people was shown by the immediate fall in the price of corn. Pompey did not disappoint expectations. Within forty days he had cleared the Western Mediterranean of pirates, and, in a slightly longer period, the eastern part of that sea. His conduct was marked by equal ability and uprightness. While gathering an overwhelming force for united operations, he recognized that piracy had other causes than mere lawlessness. He avoided driving his enemies to desperation, and granted pardon to all who submitted; and he did his best to provide for these by grants of land and by foundations of cities; *e.g.* Soli, in Cilicia, was resettled under the name of Pompeiopolis.

Pompey's "Extraordinary" Command in the East (66-63).—His wisdom and uprightness met at once with their reward. In 66 the tribune Manilius proposed to invest Pompey, in addition to his existing powers, with the province of Bithynia, and with full authority to end the war against Mithradates, and to settle the affairs of the East. This was bitterly opposed by the same party which had opposed the Lex Gabinia, but it was triumphantly carried. The praetor Cicero supported it in one of his most brilliant

speeches, the *Pro Lege Manilia*, in which his eloquence finds a worthy subject in the great services of Pompey. That general was thus invested with practically autocratic powers at once over the Mediterranean and over the eastern half of the world.

His task was much easier than it appeared. Mithradates was outmanœuvred, and driven from Pontus (66). He took refuge in the Crimea, where he endeavoured to raise up fresh enemies for Rome in the tribes of the Caucasus. Pompey advanced as far as the Phasis, and defeated the mountain tribes, who treacherously attacked him (65). Further he did not care to go, but returned southwards to settle the affairs of the East. Tigranes of Armenia had been compelled to submit and to surrender his conquests in Syria, where he had, some years before, crushed the last relics of Greek power. His son Tigranes, who had been treacherous to all parties, was sent as captive to Rome to grace Pompey's triumph. The Parthians, who had been at first bought off by promises of territory on their bank of the Euphrates, were now deprived of Gordyene, which properly belonged to them as being east of that river. Pompey himself, in 64, advanced into Syria. Here he had to settle the question of the Jewish succession, for Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, the representatives of the Maccabean family, were quarrelling as to the High Priesthood.

Death of Mithradates (63).—As Pompey was moving southward to reduce Aristobulus, he heard at Jericho of the death of Mithradates. The old king had taken refuge at Panticapaeum in the Crimea, whence he appealed to the Scythians, and set to work to organise the barbarians against Rome. He is said to have intended to move into the valley of the Danube, and to threaten Rome and Italy from the north-east; but such wide projects alarmed his own followers, his family feared the terrible old man, and his son, Pharnaces, who had already conspired and been pardoned, raised the people and the troops against him. Mithradates anticipated murder by ordering one of his own soldiers to put him to death. Thus died the most formidable enemy whom the Romans had had since Hannibal; unfortunately for him he had to deal with a succession of soldiers of genius; but his

real weakness lay in his treachery and cruelty. Assassination and intrigue had been his own methods throughout life, and he perished by them.

Pompey's Settlement of the East.—Pompey knew that, with the death of Mithradates, his difficulties were over; he now pressed on to Jerusalem, which he took after a three months' siege. Though he treated the Jewish religion with respect, he insisted on entering the Holy of Holies in the Temple, and the Jews noted with bitter exultation that, from this time onward, all his campaigns failed, and his wisdom was turned into foolishness. But for the moment the East lay at his feet; he set up Hyrcanus as High Priest, and increased the power of his counsellor, Antipater, the father of Herod the Great; the Jews were left free, but made subject to tribute. The same kind of arrangements on a larger scale was carried out over the whole East; Bithynia and Syria were made provinces, and to the former was joined part of Pontus; Cilicia[1] had its bounds enlarged. In fact, the Roman dominions in Asia were increased fourfold.[2]

The amount of territory disposed of among subject princes was still larger. Pharnaces received for his treachery the kingdom of the Cimmerian Bosporus; Ariobarzanes was restored to Cappadocia, and entrusted with the protection of the Euphrates frontier, and Deiotarus, tetrarch of Galatia, had his dominions extended, and received the title of king. Pompey anticipates at once the power and the policy of the Emperors; like them he aimed at having dependent States as "buffers" between the Roman provinces and independent kingdoms. But Pompey had not the enterprise to make himself master of Rome; he was a splendid organizer, but neither in the field nor in politics was he a man of originality; he returned to Rome at the end of the year 62 with a devoted army, and with such a reputation as no Roman had ever enjoyed; but in order to understand his conduct on his arrival it is necessary to describe what had happened in his long absence.

[1] See p. 217.

[2] Crete was also made a province at this time, having been reduced by Metellus, who disputed Pompey's claim, based on the *imperium infinitum aequum*, to interfere with his arrangements.

CHAPTER XXXV.

EVENTS AT ROME DURING POMPEY'S ABSENCE (67–62)

Parties at Rome. The Senatorial Party.—The period of Pompey's absence in the East is one of the most perplexing in Roman history. Intrigue and counter intrigue were occupying the minds of the statesmen at home, while all who had any political position looked with apprehension for the return of the all-powerful soldier.

The chief parties in Rome were the Senatorial, the Equestrian, and the Democratic. The first had the nominal control of the government, and to it most of the magistrates belonged; but its leaders, Catulus and Hortensius, were men of little ability, while M. Porcius Cato, who was just coming to the front, ruined the effects of his practical wisdom and of his unblemished character by his obstinacy and his inability to make any of those concessions which are essential to political success. The optimates, as a body, had but one principle, *i.e.* to confine the privileges of government to the narrow circle of "noble" families, and to exclude all men of unusual ambition like Pompey, and all "novi homines" like the rising orator Cicero.

The Equestrian Party.—The Equestrian party represented the material interests of Rome; it included in its ranks two very different elements, the wealthy money-lenders and tax-farmers, and the "country party," *i.e.* those families which, though possessing considerable wealth and influence in their own districts, had never had any share in the magistracies of Rome. Crassus, who, though himself a senator, was estranged from his order, represented the former section, and Cicero the latter. It was the orator's special ambition to break down the exclusiveness of the Senate, and thereby

to reconcile to it the party of material interests; in fact, to establish the *concordia ordinum.*

The Democratic Party. — Finally, the Democratic party contained all the remnants of the Marian faction which had escaped proscription; it was strong in the mob of Rome, which wanted political power simply for the price it would fetch, and it was led by statesmen who were eager to extend still further the franchise, which had been won for the whole of Italy proper. It was the Transpadanes, the inhabitants of Gallia Cisalpina (the modern Lombardy and Venetia), who were now eager to exchange their partial rights as Latins for the full privileges of the Roman civitas. The leader of this party was the young Caesar, who had as aedile boldly restored the trophies of Marius (65); he was hopelessly in debt, but he had powerful friends behind him, especially Crassus, and he trusted, like most young Romans, to clear himself from his embarrassments by obtaining a province. What Caesar's further designs were it is impossible to say; it is hardly likely that he was already dreaming of being master of the Roman world; he probably only intended to carry out the policy of C. Gracchus, both in weakening the Senate and in extending Roman privileges to new classes; but in the wider Rome of which he dreamed, there was sure to be ample field for a man of political genius.

These parties were not organized like English political parties; there was far more of individual ambition, and far less of principles to be fought for; but, as a rule, their members acted together, and the term "party" may be loosely used of them.

The Roman Anarchists.—Still less organized was a fourth class of Roman citizens, the "Anarchist party," if it may be so called; but it was very numerous. The civil wars had ruined many; those who had enriched themselves by the victory of Sulla had, in most cases, long ago spent their ill-gotten gains, and were eager to refill their purses by fresh proscriptions. The soldiers of Sulla especially had sold their land allotments, and were ready to draw their swords once more for any leader who promised booty. Finally, the reckless extravagance of Roman life was continually adding men of all ranks to the class of bankrupts.

When we remember that religion had now lost all hold on Rome, that the ties of family life were relaxed among rich and poor alike, that there was a large slave population, many of whom were desperate from the cruelty of their masters, and that the government had practically no police force with which to maintain order, it will easily be seen that there was grave danger that an organized band of reckless men might seize the government, and introduce a new reign of bloodshed and bankruptcy (*novae tabulae*).

Catiline.—At the head of this desperate class was L. Sergius Catilina, a member of one of the oldest Roman families, which had sunk into decay; he was a man of enormous bodily strength, and of a vigour and decision of character which largely supplied his lack of political ability; but he was stained by every crime, and hopelessly in debt. He, in conjunction with other discontented and bankrupt nobles, formed one or more conspiracies for a general massacre at the beginning of 65; but the evidence as to these is contradictory and uncertain. Caesar and Crassus are said to have been implicated; this is doubtful, but they were certainly intriguing against the Senate. Caesar tried to induce the people to give him a special command, in order to establish Roman rights in Egypt, which was said to have been bequeathed to the Republic by Alexander II., who died in 81; the country was all important from its strong defensive position, and from its being one of the chief sources of Rome's corn supply; but Caesar failed to obtain the commission which he sought. Crassus meanwhile, as censor, had proposed to enrol the Transpadanes as citizens, but failed, through the opposition of his colleague, Catulus.

Cicero Elected Consul.—It was thus common hatred of the Senate which united Caesar and Crassus with Catiline, although Catiline had been a Sullan, and Caesar was the representative of the Marians. Catiline stood in 64 for the consulship, but the coalition was beaten in the Comitia; the Senate, finding the chances of their own candidates hopeless, rallied round the "novus homo" Cicero, who was elected along with Catiline's friend Antonius.

Caesar's Intrigues: the Agrarian Law of Rullus.—Caesar seems to have been resolved to secure resources for himself by any means, fair or foul. He supported Catiline again for the consulship, during the year 63, but meantime induced one of his friends, the tribune Servilius Rullus, to bring in a bill setting up a commission of ten to deal with the Ager Publicus; as there was little land left to be divided in Italy, the commissioners were to have the control of the finances of the state, and of the booty of all generals on foreign service, except Pompeius, so that they might buy land for allotment The proposal failed, owing especially to the opposition of Cicero; he represented it as being an attack on the popular hero Pompeius, who being "absent" was excluded from the commission. Caesar, however, secured one result by the proposal: Cicero was compelled to declare himself on the side of the Senate, his influence with the people was shaken, and a dangerous rival in popular favour removed.

The Prosecution of Rabirius.—Caesar also reasserted the old tradition of the democratic party, that no citizen could legally be put to death without appeal to the people, by prosecuting an old senator, Rabirius, for the murder of Saturninus. Cicero here also was compelled to adopt the anti-popular side. Rabirius escaped, but only by a legal formality, and with Caesar's connivance; unlike most of the Romans, the future dictator never shed blood without necessity, though, like his countrymen, he was prepared to stick at nothing when occasion required.

Catiline and Caesar.—The main interest of the year, however, centred in Catiline's candidature for the consulship. He was playing a double part; outwardly he was the democratic statesman, supported by one of the consuls, and by a large party, but he was also at the head of an inner ring of desperate men. How far each section knew of the other's existence and plans, was uncertain then, and must always remain doubtful; but it is on the face of it improbable that Crassus, the wealthiest man in Rome, was a member of a conspiracy of bankrupts, or that Caesar, who when a mere boy had held aloof from the premature attempt of Lepidus, now had joined himself with a far more reckless leader, when he was himself on the high road to success; for

during this year 63 he was not only elected praetor, but also was appointed by the people, Pontifex Maximus, against the aged and respectable Catulus.

Catiline's Conspiracy.—When the consular elections came on, probably in July, Catiline was once more beaten. He was now tired of his double character, and with the more reckless of his partisans, resolved to appeal to force. But the conspiracy was far too widely spread to remain a secret, and in Cicero the government had an unusually able and determined consul; his spies were everywhere, he knew the most secret counsels of the conspirators, and was able to take measures to secure his own life against assassination and the state from surprise. By the end of October all seemed ready for action, and Manlius, an old officer of Sulla, raised the standard of revolt at Faesulae, in the centre of the district where Sulla's veterans were most numerous. Under pretence of aiding the distressed, a general bankruptcy was aimed at. The Senate, by its "consultum ultimum," gave dictatorial power to the consuls; but Cicero, though he knew all the plans of the conspirators, was far too prudent to proceed against them openly till he had absolutely overwhelming evidence. His policy was to make Catiline show his hand; and on November 7th he attacked him before a full Senate, in the speech known as the First Catilinarian Oration. Catiline, finding all his plans known, left Rome the same night for the insurgent camp. He was declared a public enemy, and the consul Antonius was sent against him. Cicero had conciliated his colleague by leaving to him the wealthy province of Macedonia; he himself did not take a province.

Execution of the Conspirators.—Meanwhile Catiline's chief followers, Lentulus and Cethegus, continued the conspiracy in the city; they endeavoured to gain over some ambassadors of the Allobroges who were in Rome; they were reckless enough to give letters to these supposed allies, who were playing a double game, and were really in communication with the consul. By a pre-arranged plot, the ambassadors, with the letters in their possession, were arrested on the Mulvian Bridge, as they were leaving Rome, on the night of the 2nd of December. Cicero had now indisputable evidence

of the guilt of the conspirators, and that they had sought to enlist Rome's hereditary enemies, the Gauls, against her. He no longer hesitated, but at once arrested the conspirators and summoned the Senate. At its second sitting, on December 5th, decisive action was taken; Caesar, as praetor elect, urged that the letter of the constitution should be observed, and the conspirators merely imprisoned; but the bolder course prevailed, which was especially advocated by the consul and by Cato, and the conspirators were condemned to death. Cicero at once carried the sentence out; Lentulus and his comrades were led to the old Mamertine prison near the Forum, and strangled.

This act has been called a "judicial murder," and no doubt the right of the Senate to condemn to death, or to delegate to the consuls the power of life and death, had never been admitted by the people; but the maxim, "salus populi suprema lex," holds good here. The conspirators had been taken red-handed, and by their execution the forces of disorder were paralysed. Cicero's justification lies in the fact that Catiline received no more recruits, when it was seen the government was in earnest. Hemmed in by overwhelming forces, he fell fighting near Pistoria, with a bravery worthy of a better cause.

Cicero's Services to Rome.—Cicero's prudence and decision had saved the state from the danger of another period of disorder, such as had followed the Bellum Octavianum. Had Catiline succeeded, Pompey would have been the sole resource of Roman order; he would have had to play the part of Sulla, which he was not loth to do, and a military despotism would have been inevitable. As it was, Cicero had united the equites and the Senate in defence of order, and if his spirit of mutual concession had prevailed, the republic might have been saved. But it was easy to see how unlikely this was. At the very crisis of the Catilinarian conspiracy, Cicero had to oppose his own strongest supporter, Cato, who was prosecuting the consul elect, Licinius Muraena, for bribery. Cicero saw that minor offences must be condoned when the state was in danger, and saved Muraena by a speech full of humour and of the most consummate tact. But he was thoroughly conscious how great was the

risk he[1] had run in violating the letter of the law; when he laid down his office at the end of 63, he was attacked for this unconstitutional conduct by Metellus Nepos, one of the tribunes, and an adherent of Pompey.

Pompey and the Senatorial Party.—And the year 62 was largely spent in idle disputes between this tribune, supported by Caesar, the praetor, who had made himself Pompey's champion, and the Senate, which was adopting an attitude of hostility to the great general. His power was inconsistent with the strict rules of oligarchy, although his vanity could easily have been conciliated[2] if the Senate had been willing to sacrifice, as the price of his support, some of the appearance of its power. Pompey finally landed at the end of the year 62, and at once relieved the State from anxiety by disbanding his legions; but his full alienation from the Senate belongs to the period of the next two years.

[1] Cicero, in his speech for Muraena, did not attack his opponents openly, but sought to raise a laugh against the pedantries of the Roman lawyers, of whom the defeated candidate, Serv. Sulpicius, was one of the most distinguished, and against the impracticable morality of the Stoics, of which Cato was the champion. The device was a brilliant success; but it is curious to find Cicero pouring contempt on Roman Law and Roman Stoicism, which were to be the two greatest intellectual and moral forces of Rome under the Principate.

This is characteristic of the great orator; he was not a statesman in the higher sense, and had no insight into the deepest needs of his time; but he was a consummate political tactician, and if the Senate had been wise enough to follow his leadership, Pompey would have been secured for the *optima causa*, and Caesar would have missed his opportunity (p. 249). Cicero saw that Pompey only wanted exceptional privileges for himself, that he was ready to play, as it were, the part of Scipio Aemilianus (pp. 169, 184) on a larger scale, but that he would not be dangerous to "Liberty." His theory of what Pompey's position should be he embodied later in his *De Republica* (v. 8, *cf.* p. 256). The *moderator reipublicae* (Cicero seems even to have called him *princeps*) was *alendus gloria*, and was *populi utilitati magis consulere quam voluntati;* this is an euphemism for carrying out the policy of the Senate. Pompey was actually given this position by the Senate in 52 B.C., but it was then too late for the coalition to rush Caesar.

[2] Cicero's aim from 63 B.C. onwards was to win Pompey for the Senate. He saw that the State required power to be concentrated in one man's hands (pp. 236–7); but he saw also that Pompey wanted only an unusual position in the Republic, not to overthrow the Republic. Cicero hoped that Pompey would be a second Scipio Aemilianus; the unusual honours granted to Scipio (pp. 184, 169) were precedents for the unusual election of Pompey in 78 (p. 229). Cicero himself was to play Laelius (p. 192) to Pompey's Scipio (Ad. Fam. v. 7).

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE "FIRST TRIUMVIRATE" AND THE CONSULSHIP OF CAESAR (61–59)

Causes of Quarrel (1) between the Senate and Pompey.—Pompey delayed his triumph till September in the year 61. It was the most magnificent which Rome had seen, and he paid 20,000 talents into the treasury. But his importance was already passed, and without his legions the man who had ruled the East as "king of kings" could not carry the smallest measure in Rome. Pompey had many enemies who were jealous of him personally, *e.g.* his old rival, Crassus, Lucullus, whom he had superseded against Mithradates, and Metellus, who had resented his interference in Crete; and the strict constitutional party, headed by Catulus and Cato, had not forgotten that his extraordinary powers had been granted in spite of their opposition. Hence he found it impossible to persuade the Senate either to ratify his arrangements in the East, or to bring in a bill giving his veteran soldiers the lands which he had promised them.

(2) Between the Senate and the Equites.—And the Senate, not content with alienating Pompey, proceeded to quarrel also with the moneyed classes, whose loyal support had enabled Cicero to save both the Senate and Rome itself from the conspiracy of Catiline. The cause of quarrel was a discreditable one. The equites, in their eagerness to secure the farming of the taxes of Asia, had bought the privilege at such a price that they could never hope to recoup themselves, even by the most reckless extortion; hence they asked for a relaxation of the terms of their bargain. Cicero supported this on the grounds of policy, though he admitted it was unjust; but the Senate, led by Cato, refused. In a state so full of abuses as Rome, this

body could only hope to secure its power by admitting others to share the profits of power; hence Cicero's policy was that of a statesman, while Cato's was a piece of ill-timed scrupulosity, which was supported by the majority from purely selfish motives.

Trial of Clodius.—The unpopularity of the Senate was made still further manifest by the issue of the trial of Publius Clodius. This young noble belonged to one of the oldest houses in Rome, and he and his family were notorious, even in those days of laxity, for the most scandalous immorality. He was accused of having violated the rites of the Bona Dea when they were being celebrated at the house of Caesar as praetor. Though none but women were allowed to be present, Clodius had intruded, disguised as a woman. The Government took the matter up all the more readily because the offender belonged to the Opposition party, and Clodius was prosecuted for impiety (61). An attempt was made to "pack the jury" on the ground that it was only in this way that bribery could be prevented.[1] The attempt failed, and Clodius was acquitted in spite of the clearest evidence, an important part of which, unfortunately for himself, was contributed by Cicero. This failure was looked upon as a Senatorial defeat, and Cato made matters worse by still further provoking the equites. They had, by old prescription, if not by actual law,[2] an exemption from prosecution in cases of judicial bribery, and this most scandalous privilege Cato proposed to take away. His proposal was righteous, but certainly ill-timed.

Caesar's return from his Province.—Such was the state of things in Rome when, in the summer of 60, Caesar returned from his province in Further Spain. In order to understand his present position, it is necessary to describe briefly his proceedings since his year of office as praetor had ended. His financial liabilities (which amounted to nearly

[1] No doubt the Senate was justified in saying this; on the other hand, Clodius would have had no chance of justice with a jury nominated by his foes. Precisely the same difficulty occurs in cases of agrarian crime in Ireland, except that there intimidation takes the place of bribery.

[2] *Cf.* Cic. *pro Cluentio.* It seems to have been due to the accident that, when the law against judicial corruption was passed by C. Gracchus, only senators could be jurymen.

£1,000,000) had been so great that his creditors would have prevented him from leaving Rome, had not Crassus come to his assistance. It was Crassus' policy to lend money to men of ability, and he advanced about £200,000 to Caesar, to clear him from his most pressing liabilities.

Caesar, in Spain, was brilliantly successful. He carried the Roman arms far into the north-west of the peninsula, into the neighbourhood of Brigantium (the modern Corunna), and organized his province in such a way as to satisfy all parties, Roman money-lenders and provincials alike. He also cleared off his own debts; probably, with characteristic thoroughness, he took care to leave no one who could complain of the way in which he got his money, and a few thousand barbarians more or less, killed or sold, did not matter to a Roman politician. It is noticeable, too, that here, as in Gaul afterwards on a far greater scale, Caesar's means are important in themselves, though they are still more important as ends to something greater. Spain was to him mainly a step to financial solvency, and to power at Rome, yet he left his province with its frontiers enlarged and its organization improved.

Caesar's Coalition against the Senate.—His object now was to secure the consulship for the next year (59), but in order to be in time to stand for this, he had to forego a triumph. The Senate could not refuse him this honour, but had hoped by means of it to prevent him from being a candidate, for if he wished to have a triumph, he must stay outside the city, and so would be unable to stand for the consulship, unless the Senate gave him a dispensation from being present. When this dispensation was proposed in his behalf, Cato "talked it out." The only result was that Caesar gave up the formal honour, and stood for the consulship, more resolved than ever to humble the Senate. To attain this object, and to secure his election, he united in his support all the parties whom the Senate had provoked. He promised Pompey that, if he were consul, he would secure the ratification of his acts and the land which he wanted for his veterans, and to confirm their alliance, Pompey married Caesar's daughter, Julia, a lady who combined all her father's personal charm with a virtue which

was now rare among Roman matrons. Caesar also promised the equites, through Crassus, to secure a better bargain for them as to the Asiatic taxes; and he succeeded in reconciling Pompey and Crassus, in spite of their twenty years of rivalry. This coalition is called the "first triumvirate," though it was only an informal coalition. Cicero too was asked to join it, but in spite of his old friendship with Pompey, he could not bring himself to attack the Senate.

Caesar's Consulship.—Caesar, supported by his own party, and by the personal influence of Pompey and the whole weight of the capitalists, easily secured his election. All that the Senate could do was, by unscrupulous bribery, to give him as colleague M. Bibulus, a blue-blooded aristocrat whose obstinacy was only surpassed by his stupidity. Caesar at once proceeded to bring in measures to satisfy his supporters, but even now he tried to avoid an open quarrel with the Senate by laying before them his proposed Agrarian law in the ordinary way. As, however, they refused to accept it, Caesar dropped all attempts at conciliation, and, for the rest of his consulship, appealed directly to the people, as Gracchus and all the democratic leaders since his time had done. The Senate tried to hinder him in the usual way, by inducing tribunes to veto his proposals, and, by the use of the religious machinery of the State, rendering all legislation impossible; but Caesar had the tribunes removed by force, and when Bibulus shut himself up in his house, and declared that he intended to "observe the sky" for omens during the rest of the year, Caesar ignored his colleague and his omens altogether. He intended to be master of Rome, and did not shrink from violating the constitution, and from employing actual force to carry his laws.

Illegality of Caesar's Proceedings.—What these were will be stated immediately, but a word must be said as to the justification for his conduct. There is no doubt that, in his consulship and afterwards, Caesar treated the constitution with slight respect; there is no doubt too that afterwards, if not now, Caesar set to work to make himself master of Rome, and to abolish "liberty"; it was this which ranged against him Cicero, Cato, and all the best men in Rome. But his conduct can be abundantly justified; the constitution

which he disregarded had become unworkable; the difficulty in suppressing Catiline, and the extraordinary powers given to Pompeius, were only the most striking of the many proofs that the Roman Government could no longer perform even the primary duty of all governments, that of maintaining order at home and abroad. And the "liberty," which Caesar abolished, meant the enrichment of the privileged few, the corruption of the people of Rome, and the oppression of the provinces. Caesar proposed to substitute for this, centralized government, the maintenance of order, and the extension of privileges to the provincials. These great advantages involved despotic power and all its terrible consequences, but, though the remedy was bad, it was better than the disease of anarchy; the blame for Roman imperialism should fall not so much on Caesar, who established it, as on the long series of blunders which rendered it necessary, if Rome was still to exist.

Caesar's Measures.—Caesar's measures may be divided under the following heads:

I. Measures for the satisfaction of his allies.

II. Measures to secure his own position in future.

III. Measures for the improvement of Roman government.

I. **For the Satisfaction of his Allies.**—(1) An agrarian law was passed dividing up the Ager Campanus for the benefit of Pompey's veterans and of the poor of Rome; 20,000 settlers were planted out by the commission of twenty which Caesar nominated. This law involved the loss to the State of the Campanian revenues, for the lands had been mainly let in small portions and highly farmed; but this loss was made good by the revenue from the new provinces which Pompey had acquired in the East.

(2) The tax farmers were let off a third of the price which they had agreed to pay for the revenues of Asia.

II. **Measures to secure Caesar's Position.**—(1) The tribune Vatinius brought in a law giving Caesar the proconsulship of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum for five years. This direct appeal to the people, in the disposition of provinces, was an attack on the Senate's special prerogative, and was a repetition of the Lex Gabinia and the Lex Manilia. It

was the more important because, as Cato said, Cisalpine Gaul was the "citadel of Italy," and an army there was dangerous to the State. The Senate, however, had to acquiesce, and added Transalpine Gaul, probably because they saw that Caesar meant to take it.[1]

(2) In order to provide the triumvirs with a vigorous and unscrupulous agent, P. Clodius, who belonged to a patrician family, was adopted as a plebeian and elected tribune for next year.

III. Measures for the Improvement of Administration.—(1) The Senate was no longer to be an irresponsible body; its proceedings (*acta senatus*) were henceforth to be published.

(2) A more severe law was passed against provincial extortion (the Lex Julia de Repetundis).

(3) Especially a law was passed limiting the demands which governors in the provinces might make for their personal expenses.[2]

(4) Caesar saw that the real remedy for provincial grievances lay in extension of privilege rather than in direct legislation against oppression; accordingly he planted a colony (probably a Latin one with special privileges) at Novum Comum in Cisalpine Gaul; he had already in 69 tried to stir up the Gauls to claim the Roman franchise, and we find him after this treating them as if they were full citizens.

Caesar Master of Rome as Consul. — Caesar, in spite of some unpopularity which was shown in the mysterious conspiracy of Vettius,[3] remained master of Rome all the year; the wits said the consuls for 59 were not "Bibulus and Caesar," but "Julius and Caesar."

[1] It is not unlikely also that they hoped Caesar would fail completely. The Senate would have been quite willing to purchase, by disaster to the State, the overthrow of a dangerous opponent.

[2] We may compare for the abuse of this power the mediaeval abuse of Purveyance.

[3] The real nature of this conspiracy is a mystery now, as it was then. It may have been a genuine plot to assassinate Caesar and Pompey; it may have been a sham plot organized by them to revive their popularity; but in any case it will bear out the statement above.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

EVENTS AT ROME DURING CAESAR'S CAMPAIGNS IN GAUL (58–51)

Anarchy in Rome during Caesar's Absence.—Rome had had a taste of the hand of a master during Caesar's consulship. He left Italy at the beginning of 58, to prepare in his Gallic legions the instrument for finally establishing his power; and during his eight years' absence, things went from bad to worse in home and in foreign administration. The events of these years must be sketched before we return to the career of Caesar, in whom, henceforth till his death, the interest of Roman history centres.

The Tribunate of Clodius (58).—The year 58 is marked by the tribunate of Clodius. In him the anarchic spirit may be said to be embodied, for he was a perfect master of disorder. He was the tool of Caesar and Pompey, but he had also a genius for mob leadership. The Senate in 68 had abolished the old clubs (*collegia*), which were originally established for the worship of the *Lares compitales* at the cross-roads, but which had become centres of sedition. Clodius revived these, and organized in connection with them an army of disorder[1] and corruption, which might move the envy of a modern American "ward politician" or "political boss." Clodius set himself to conciliate popular support by the usual means. The corn distributions to the citizens, which had been established by Gracchus at half-price, and which had been cheapened by Saturninus, had been abolished by Sulla, but had been soon re-established (B.C. 73); even the Senate had recently voted such a distribution on the proposal of Cato, who sometimes condescended to play the

[1] *Cf.* Cic. *pro Sestio* (34).

demagogue. Clodius now carried a measure that the corn should be absolutely given away.

Besides his own supporters, he had on his side the two consuls for 58—Aulus Gabinius, Pompey's old adherent, and L. Calpurnius Piso, Caesar's father-in-law. To secure these further, he granted them, by vote of the people, Syria and Macedonia, the provinces which they especially desired.

He also limited the action of the Lex Aelia et Fufia (*cf.* p. 179), if he did not repeal it outright, in order to prevent in future even such an attempt to check popular legislation, as had been made by Bibulus.

Removal of Cato and Cicero. — But his most important measures were intended to get rid of those statesmen who might be dangerous to the "triumvirs" and their arrangements. Cato was sent abroad with a commission to annex Cyprus, which was declared forfeit to Rome for the misconduct of its king; this was nominally an honour, but really meant the banishment of a formidable leader of opposition. Cicero was more directly attacked; he had refused to unite his fortunes with the party of Caesar, or to accept the post of lieutenant which Caesar offered him, as an honourable excuse for quitting Rome. Caesar therefore, since he would not be a friend, treated him as an enemy, and let Clodius gratify the personal animosity which he felt against him. Cicero had trusted the promises of Pompey to deliver him, but he was to find by bitter experience that Pompey either could not, or would not, save his friends.

Clodius began by re-asserting the old principle, that a citizen could only be condemned to death by the people. Cicero had violated this in executing the Catilinarian conspirators, and the people had not forgotten it. Hence when Clodius carried a decree, banishing anyone "who had put to death a Roman citizen without trial," all knew that Cicero was referred to, and he retired from Rome to avoid a contest. Clodius then carried another decree, by which Cicero was banished by name[1] four hundred miles from Rome, and his house was to be destroyed. He retired to Thessalonica in Macedonia.

Cicero's Recall.—But Clodius went too far. Encouraged by his own success, he interfered with all departments of the

[1] See note at end of chapter.

State, and actually ventured to upset some of Pompey's arrangements in the East. This was more than Pompey could bear, and proposals for the recall of Cicero were made by eight of Clodius' fellow-tribunes before the close of the year (58). Nothing came of these; but one of the consuls for the next year, P. Lentulus Spinther, was the exile's warm supporter, and almost all the tribunes were on his side, including, as they did, his friends, T. Annius Milo and Publius Sestius. Still, the violence of Clodius, whose gangs of ruffians (*operae*) turned all attempts at legislation into pitched battles, and wounded both Q. Cicero and Sestius, prevented anything being done till the year was well on its way. Finally, on the summons of the Senate, the country voters came to Rome in force; Clodius was overwhelmed by numbers, and Cicero was recalled. He had already landed in Italy, in anticipation of his recall, and was received everywhere with the greatest enthusiasm.

Cicero's Policy on his Return.—Cicero's head was somewhat turned by this reception, but at first he proceeded with great caution, for Clodius was still dangerous, and he had not yet received back the site of his house, which Clodius had destroyed and dedicated to Liberty. He especially courted Pompey, to whom, on his proposal, was given a special commission to look after the corn supply of Rome. But with the year 56 he became bolder; in March, he defended his friend, P. Sestius, who was prosecuted for violence in his tribunate, and secured his acquittal. In his speech for the defence, and in his attack on Vatinius, which formed part of the same proceedings, he treated Caesar and Pompey with great respect, though he used the utmost violence of language against their tools. But he and others thought the "triumvirate" was now breaking up, for in Caesar's absence the old rivalry between Pompey and Crassus had revived; each of them desired to be appointed to the important duty of restoring the Egyptian king, who had been expelled by his subjects, and was seeking by bribes the help of Rome in recovering his throne.

Cicero's Defiance of the "Triumvirs," who Re-unite at Luca.—Cicero therefore thought that he might boldly attack Caesar's consulship, and gave notice in April that he would

move a motion of inquiry as to the agrarian law of 59. But to do this was to provoke Pompey as well as Caesar, nor had the latter any intention of allowing his plans to be upset. At Luca, on the borders of his province, he met both Pompey and Crassus, and induced them to be reconciled. This meeting was attended by 200 senators, but the real business was done by the three, who settled that

(*a*) Cicero should be brought to reason.

(*b*) Pompey and Crassus should be consuls together for the next year, 55.

(*c*) They were to procure for Caesar a prolongation of his Gallic command for five years, and to secure Spain and Syria for themselves as provinces for the same period.

Cicero's Humiliation.—Cicero was first dealt with; he was told through his brother Quintus that he must cease to be troublesome, or prepare for the consequences. He submitted and withdrew his proposed motion of inquiry. But he had also to speak in favour of the prolongation of Caesar's command, which he did in his *De Provinciis Consularibus;* much as he disliked the duty, yet his genius was fired by the greatness of Caesar's exploits, and this "disgraceful change of front," as he calls the speech, contains one of his finest bursts of oratory. He had also to defend his old enemies, Gabinius and Vatinius, to oblige Pompey and Caesar. But after the year 56, Cicero almost retires for some years from public life, and to this period belong his treatises, *De Oratore* and *De Republica*. Cicero loved Pompey as much as that cold and hard politician could be loved, and he respected Caesar and was grateful to him for repeated acts of kindness to his brother and to himself; but he could not bring himself readily to take orders for his political action from others in a state where he himself ten years before had been a leader.

Consulship of Pompey and Crassus.—Meanwhile the rest of the programme of Luca was carried out. Pompey and Crassus secured by open violence their election against Domitius Ahenobarbus, and so these two rivals once more shared the consulship. They then carried out their provincial programme, and themselves proposed the prolongation of Caesar's command, while the tribune, C. Trebonius,

carried similar decrees in their favour. Crassus left Rome before his year of office was up, and with his departure, and still more with his death, in the year 53 (*cf.* p. 259), the united action of the "triumvirate" ceases (54). The death of Julia, Pompey's wife, of whom he was very fond, also tended to loosen the political ties.

Effects of the first "Triumvirate."—The effects of this famous league were far reaching, but very different from what some of its members had expected. It broke the power of the Senate, and controlled the course of affairs at Rome; but the man who gained by this was not Pompey the Great, or Crassus the wealthy, but Caesar. What would have happened had Crassus lived, it is hard to say; the open rupture would have been delayed, for Caesar's interest was the union of the three, and neither Pompey nor Crassus would have precipitated a quarrel, by which he would have arrayed Caesar and his other colleague against himself.

Anarchy in Rome (54–52).—The breakdown of the ordinary government of Rome is clearly seen in the period that follows; the confusion in the city became so aggravated that the consuls for the year 53 were not elected till July of that year, *i.e.* about twelve months late, while bribery became more scandalous than ever. The same difficulties occurred in the elections for 52; Milo, who had taken the position of the senatorial mob-leader in opposition to Clodius, was standing for the consulship, and Clodius himself for the praetorship. Pitched battles took place in the streets, and finally, in January 52, Milo caught Clodius on the Appian Way, near Bovillae, and murdered him. This led to an outburst of popular fury in Rome; the body of Clodius was burned in the Forum, and in the confusion the Senate-house was destroyed.

Pompey Sole Consul.—In order to restore order, Pompey was named sole consul on the suggestion of Cato and Bibulus. Even the senatorial party recognised that a strong hand was necessary, and they had now consented to accept Pompey as leader, hoping in this way to be able to crush Caesar. Pompey's reconciliation with the Senate, and his alienation from Caesar, was marked by his marriage with

Cornelia, daughter of Metellus Scipio, whom, later on in the year (52), he associated in the consulship with himself.

Measures of Pompey's Consulship.—Pompey succeeded in restoring some degree of order in Rome. His measures may be arranged under the following heads:

I. The punishment of disorder.

II. Better regulations of government.

III. Covert attacks on Caesar.

I. To punish Disorder.—A number of prosecutions took place, the most important of which was that of Milo. His guilt was undoubted; but Pompey, to insure his conviction, set up a new form of trial, and surrounded the court with soldiers. Cicero, who had undertaken to defend Milo,[1] was greatly alarmed, and broke down in his speech, and Milo went into exile to Massilia.

II. For the better Regulation of Government.—(1) A number of laws were passed—(*a*) increasing the penalties against bribery; (*b*) regulating proceedings in the law-courts, especially by limiting the length of speeches of counsel; and (*c*) forbidding the interference of powerful friends (as *advocati*) for the assistance of accused persons.[2]

(2) An important law was passed as to the provincial magistracies. Hitherto a consul, or praetor had gone to his province immediately after his year of office was over (*cf.* p. 226); now an interval of five years was to elapse. This law had an important bearing on the position of Caesar (*cf.* note on p. 269), and also affected Cicero, for as there were not sufficient ex-magistrates to supply all the provinces under the new arrangement, consulars of older standing, who had never taken provinces, were now compelled to take them, and Cicero, to his great disgust, had to leave Rome for Cilicia.[3]

[1] Cicero's fine speech, the *pro Milone*, represents what he might have said, not what he did say. He actually had the audacity to send a copy of it to Milo. Roman ideas of honour seem to us very strange.

[2] Shuckburgh well compares these "laudationes" to the "maintenance" which was so common an abuse in English law-courts in the fifteenth century.

[3] Cicero's behaviour in his province belongs rather to his biography than to Roman history. He governed mercifully and well, and gained some military successes against the mountain tribes in the Taurus. His provincial government kept him from Rome during the greater part of the critical years 51 and 50.

III. Measures against Caesar.—One clause of the provincial law, which required all candidates for office to canvass in person, was especially aimed at Caesar. It was his intention to stand for the consulship in 49, without giving up his army, and to be elected *in absence*. This privilege had been promised him by Pompey, and actually given to him by a law which the ten tribunes of 52 carried, but now it was absolutely forbidden by the new law. It is true that when Pompey's attention was drawn to this, he added a special exception in Caesar's favour, but this had no legal validity. It was evident to all men that Pompey considered that he had done with Caesar, and that he would support the Senate against his old colleague. He showed, however, how little he regarded his own laws by at once setting aside his provincial law, and securing for himself a five years' extension of his command in Spain.[1]

Finally, two members of the Senatorial party, Servius Sulpicius and M. Claudius Marcellus, were elected consuls for next year (51). Everything was preparing for the great struggle between Caesar and the Senate.

Collapse of Roman Government abroad. Gabinius in Syria.—The weakness of Rome abroad, except where Caesar was at work, is well seen in the events which were occurring in the East during these years. The inability of the Senate to control its governors is shown by the behaviour of Gabinius in Syria; on his own responsibility, and without any authorization from the Senate, he restored Ptolemy Auletes to the throne of Egypt (55). For this service he received the enormous bribe of 10,000 talents.

Crassus' Defeat by the Parthians.—Far more serious than this disobedience was the discovery of a new and most formidable enemy in the Parthians. Hitherto the Romans had carried all before them in the East, and Crassus had taken his province of Syria as an easy means of gaining wealth and glory; hence, after plundering Syria during the winter of 54–53,[2] he crossed the Euphrates with a large

[1] *Cf.* Tac. *Ann.* iii. 28: (*Pompeius*) "*suarum legum auctor idem ac subversor*," an epigram which might well serve as a motto for Pompey's whole career.

[2] Among other places which he plundered was the temple at Jerusalem.

army. The campaign was a series of mistakes. He refused the offered alliance of the Armenian king, which would have provided him with light-armed troops; he allowed himself to leave his base of operations, the Euphrates, and to be drawn into the desert; again, trusting his Arabian guide, he allowed himself to be surprised by the enemy; when he was surrounded by the hordes of the enemy's light horse, he formed his troops in close order instead of deploying them, so that every shot told; and, finally, he accepted his treacherous foe's invitation to an interview, and was murdered (53).

His Defeat at Carrhae.—Almost all his host was killed or captured; the name of Carrhae ranked with that of Cannae among the greatest of Roman disasters; only one division escaped, thanks to the energetic leadership of the quaestor, C. Cassius, whose successful retreat showed how much the disaster was due to the blunders of Crassus. The only excuse for the triumvir, who had been a good soldier in his day, is that in his old age, when his energy was failing, he was suddenly confronted with one of the most difficult problems in warfare—one which the Romans never fully solved—viz., how, in a level country, to protect an infantry force from the attacks of cavalry and skirmishers. The Parthians in the next year overran Syria, but Cassius succeeded in repulsing them, weakened as they were by divisions among themselves. The campaigns of 53–51 settled one important point; the Roman frontier in this region becomes the line of the Euphrates and of the desert.

The De Rerum Natura of Lucretius.—The collapse of Rome is well reflected in the great poem of T. Lucretius Carus (98–55). His aim was to introduce the system of Epicurus to his country-men, and thereby to destroy superstition and all the terrors of a future life; his pessimism and his hostility to the State religion are most marked.

CICERO'S CONDEMNATION.—The friends of the orator said this was illegal, because he had been mentioned by name in the sentence, contrary to the law of the XII. Tables, which forbade "*privilegia.*" Clodius, however, argued that Cicero had condemned himself by going into exile, and that the *privilegium* was simply declaratory of this fact, and so legal.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

CAESAR'S CAMPAIGNS IN GAUL (58-51)

Caesar's Work in Gaul.—It is a relief to turn from disorder in Rome, and failure in the East, to Gaul, where Caesar was in command. He was building up his power for the struggle with his rival Pompey and with the Senate; but he was also adding a new and vast province to the Roman world, *i.e.* to the area of civilization. Caesar was now over 40 years of age and he had seen but little service; neither friends nor foes suspected that under the Roman man of fashion and the astute party leader, lay concealed one of the great generals of the world's history. But the versatility of Caesar is only the most surprising of the many surprises in his career; he found time during his nine years' absence from Rome to conquer a vast country and to repulse the formidable Northern barbarians, and at the same time to direct the course of political intrigue in Rome, and to compose one of the great histories of the world. Caesar himself modestly called his account of his campaigns *Commentarii*, *i.e.* it was to be merely material for a future historian; but all critics alike in his own day and in subsequent centuries have admired the extraordinary clearness and vigour of his close-packed narrative. It is characteristic of the insight of the man, that even his accounts of the Britons and of the Germans, barbarians with whom he only came in contact for a few weeks, show such insight and good sense, that they have remained the basis of all later accounts of those tribes.

Weakness of Rome in Gaul.—The task which Caesar had set himself might well have seemed hopeless; very probably the Senate gave him Transalpine Gaul as a province (*cf.* p. 252), hoping that his failure there would discredit him, even if it did not altogether rid them of a troublesome

opponent. The Roman hold beyond the Alps was confined to the south-eastern corner and to a thin strip along the Mediterranean; this was partly occupied by the province of Gallia Narbonensis, partly by the friendly town of Massilia. The rest of Gaul was inhabited by powerful and independent tribes. There was too a new and formidable danger; the Germans under Ariovistus had been called in by the Sequani, to aid them in their feud against the Aedui; and the invaders, to the number of 120,000, were already settled in Gaul.

Causes of Caesar's Success.—But there were causes at work which materially assisted Caesar. The very presence of the Germans was a strength to him, for he was able to set himself up at once as the champion of the Gauls against the invaders; and this was no mere pretence. The tide of German conquest, which was already beginning to roll into Gaul through the "gap of Alsace," was turned back for 400 years, and Gaul was delivered from a foe which it feared and hated even more than the Romans. And the feuds of the Gallic tribes among themselves were of great assistance to Caesar. Not only did they enable him to deal with them in detail, so that it was not till 52, when it was too late, that Gaul was united against him, but he even had valuable allies among them; *e.g.* the Aedui in the centre, and the Remi in the north. And in every tribe Caesar knew how to conciliate some of the nobles to himself. He was always ready too to gratify the warlike spirit of the nation by enlisting Gauls in his army. It is Caesar who begins this on a great scale, introducing a principle as important in the Roman empire as it has since been in that of England in India.

Caesar's First Campaign. The Helvetii.—The task which Caesar set himself in his first campaign was twofold. Before expelling the Germans, he had to deal with the Helvetii, who, to the number of nearly 400,000 (including about 100,000 warriors), had left their homes in the West of Switzerland, and wished to take up new ones on the other side of Gaul. He first barred their passage through the corner of the Roman province, and then pursued them northward along the Arar (Saône), and completely defeated them near Bibracte (Autun). The unhappy survivors, about 110,000 in number, were sent back to their original homes.

Ariovistus.—Caesar then turned against the Germans, and ordered Ariovistus to leave Gaul, which, of course, the Suevian king declined to do. Caesar's own army were dismayed at the idea of meeting the terrible warriors of the North; but he restored its confidence, and succeeded in occupying the impregnable fortress of Vesontio (Besançon). He then defeated the Germans in the South of Alsace, and drove the scanty remnant of them back across the Rhine. One or two tribes were allowed to settle (*e.g.* the Triboci in Alsace) to guard the Rhine against their own countrymen.

War against the Belgae (57).—The South-East and East of Gaul had accepted the Roman championship, and the legions wintered among the Sequani, outside the Roman "province." The next campaign was to be against the Belgae (*i.e.* the tribes in the North-East), who, with the exception of the Remi, had formed a confederacy to protect their independence. After a repulse on the river Axona (Aisne), the united army broke up, and Caesar proceeded to deal with the tribes severally. He succeeded everywhere, though the Nervii (in the valley of the Sambre) were only conquered after a tremendous struggle. They surprised his army in the act of entrenching its camp, and for a moment threw it into complete disorder; Caesar himself, to restore the courage of his men, fought in the ranks like a common soldier; but at last discipline triumphed, and the Nervii were almost annihilated.

War against the Veneti and Aquitania.—In the next campaign Caesar turned his arms against the West. The Veneti, in the modern Brittany, had seized two Roman officers, and, confident in their naval strength, defied Caesar. The fortresses which fringed the much-indented coast, could only be reduced by a fleet; but this was organized by Caesar's lieutenant, D. Brutus, and Roman skill proved more than a match for the barbarian familiarity with the waters. The Veneti, when they saw themselves beaten in their own element, surrendered, and were severely punished. Meanwhile, young P. Crassus, one of Caesar's lieutenants, reduced the Aquitani in the South-West. Caesar himself marched against the Menapii and the Morini on the coasts of the Channel, but gained little decisive

success. His legions wintered this year in the North of Gaul. The results of the campaign are the more remarkable, when we remember that in the spring of the year Caesar was at Luca (*cf.* p. 256), arranging for the conduct of affairs at Rome.

Fourth Campaign. Repulse of the Germans. First Invasion of Britain.—These three campaigns had displayed the Roman arms victoriously in every part of Gaul; but Caesar knew well that it was far from conquered, nor had he pretended to make it a province. To keep his soldiers employed, he turned his arms in the next year against foes outside Gaul. Two German tribes, the Usipetes and Tencteri, had crossed the Rhine, and Caesar marched to meet them; they wished to settle peaceably, and tried to negotiate, but Caesar treacherously seized their chiefs, and then attacked them and drove them back into Germany. He himself pursued them across the river, bridging the Rhine between Bonn and Coblenz, and spending eighteen days on the German bank, where he received the promise of hostages. Rome was overwhelmed by the rapid succession of Caesar's victories, though Cato was bold and honourable enough to propose that he should be given up to the Germans for his treachery.

Caesar now turned against another outside foe. The connection between Britain and Gaul was close, and no doubt the islanders had sent some help to their continental kinsmen; Caesar therefore resolved to cross the Channel, sailing probably from near Boulogne. He landed after a struggle, and gained some slight success, but the only direct result of the campaign was a few hostages. Caesar doubtless expected no permanent conquests from these dashes into Germany and Britain; he only wished to employ his soldiers till he had further need for them, to spread the terror of his name both in Gaul and outside, and to keep attention at Rome concentrated on his successes.

Fifth Campaign: Second Attack on Britain.—Accordingly in the next year he invaded Britain on a larger scale. Sailing from a new spot, Portus Itius (probably also near Boulogne), he landed, and advanced till he had crossed the Thames, defeating a chief whom he calls Cassivelaunus; the result of the campaign may be summed up in Cicero's words: "Britain has been settled and hostages received; there is

no booty, but tribute has been imposed." (Of course it was never paid.) In fact, Caesar's work is well described by Tacitus as having rather "revealed than bequeathed Britain to subsequent generations."

Caesar's Winter Quarters in 54.—So far Caesar had been uniformly successful, but he was conscious that the spirit of Gallic independence was still uncrushed, and that at any moment he might have to fight in order to keep what he had partly gained. He was, however, compelled by the scarcity of corn to disperse his legions during the next winter, sending them into quarters among various tribes instead of concentrating them, as in former years, in one great camp. He did his best to obviate any danger by posting them all (but one) within a space of 100 miles, so that, in case of need, they could support each other; the more advanced of them commanded the line of march from the territory of the Remi northward to the Rhine. Caesar waited till he heard that they were all safely in their quarters, and then started for North Italy, where his presence was required to watch affairs at Rome.

Before he could cross the Alps, however, he was recalled by the news of a general rising of the Belgic tribes. The leader was Ambiorix, chief of the Eburones, who first attacked the most advanced of the line of legions, which, under the legates, Sabinus and Cotta, was posted between the Meuse and the Rhine. The direct attack failed, but the Romans were induced, by the treachery of Ambiorix, to leave their camp, and perished almost to a man. The Gauls then pressed on to attack the camp of Q. Cicero, the brother of the great orator; the Romans, however, though hard pressed by superior numbers, and though the camp buildings were set on fire by the Gallic missiles, held out heroically; it was the defence of Rorke's Drift on a far larger scale. At last Cicero managed to get a messenger through the enemies' lines, and warned his commander of his peril; Caesar, in spite of risings elsewhere, hastened up by forced marches, and arrived just in time to relieve his lieutenant and to scatter the besiegers. Caesar, however, thought it necessary to spend the whole winter in Gaul.

The Campaign of 53.—He knew that the recent outbreak was but the prelude to one on a larger scale; Ambiorix was still at large, and the Treviri were trying to induce the Germans to cross the Rhine to their help. Caesar's rapidity, however, forced the rebellious Gauls to submit, and marching into the country of the Menapii (in South Holland, between the lower Scheldt and the Meuse), he compelled that tribe, the only one which had never submitted, to give hostages. He then crossed the Rhine once more, but the Suevi retired before him; returning to Gaul, he left his bridge partly standing, and defended by a strong garrison; it was to be a perpetual warning to the Germans that they should leave Gaul alone. The hunt for Ambiorix was continued, and Caesar harried the territories of the Eburones with characteristic thoroughness. He then crossed the Alps to spend the winter in Italy, leaving his legions in the North and North-East of Gaul.

The Great Rising of the year 52.—It is strange that Caesar should have ventured in this way to separate himself from his troops, and he nearly paid dearly for his rashness. This time it was the tribes of Southern Gaul, especially the Arverni (in Auvergne), that broke into revolt, and the rebellion found a really great chief in the Arvernian noble, Vercingetorix. He saw clearly that the Romans were irresistible in pitched battles and in sieges, and therefore urged his countrymen to avoid definite engagements, to burn their towns, and to harass the Romans by cutting off their provisions. He hoped too to keep Caesar from joining his army. But the Roman commander was too quick for him; crossing the Cevennes in the depth of winter, he descended into the territory of the Arverni, and joined his legions among the Lingones. Then turning southward into the Loire Valley, Caesar captured, after a hard struggle, Avaricum (Bourges), the capital of the Bituriges, which they had refused to burn. But this success only confirmed the authority of Vercingetorix, for it convinced the Gauls of the wisdom of his policy; Caesar too failed to carry the strong position of Gergovia among the Arverni, which he attacked with a wholly insufficient force. The Aedui, Rome's oldest allies, joined the revolt, and the whole

of Gaul seemed lost, for their defection was thought to show the Roman cause was hopeless.

The Struggle at Alesia.—Caesar felt that he must turn south to protect the "province," and Vercingetorix, seeing this retreat, abandoned his own plan, and attacked the Romans in the territory of the Lingones; he was beaten, and forced to take refuge with his army in the impregnable fortress of Alesia (not far from Dijon).

Caesar had now the chance he wanted; he surrounded the defeated Gauls with a line of works, and proceeded to starve them out. But an army of 240,000 foot and 8,000 horse advanced to the relief of Vercingetorix; in it were contingents from almost all Gaul.[1] Caesar's army was now besieged in its turn, but he had carefully prepared a second line of works, planned for defence as the former was for offence. The Gauls attacked furiously, and the besieged co-operated by a vigorous sally; but Caesar's genius and Roman discipline prevailed, the relieving army dispersed, and Vercingetorix surrendered himself to his conqueror, hoping thereby to save his followers. Caesar kept him a captive to adorn his triumph; he was only merciful to his own countrymen, and the Gallic noble had been too dangerous to be pardoned.

The Settlement of Gaul (51–50).—The very fact that the revolt of 52 had been so dangerous made its suppression the more decisive; the Gauls felt that they could not throw off the yoke of their conquerors and finally submitted. Caesar had enlisted some of them in his legions (the famous legion *Alauda*), and found their cavalry most useful in the civil war which he was about to wage. In this way he drew off into his own service the more fiery spirits among them. At the same time the last relics of resistance were stamped out among the Bellovaci in the extreme North; and the defenders of Uxellodunum in the South lost their right hands as a punishment for their prolonged resistance. Caesar especially took measures to secure the Belgic tribes, which, from their

[1] Some of the Aquitani in the South-West, the Remi, Rome's old friends, and the Treviri were absent. How strong was the national feeling may be seen from the fact that Caesar's personal friend, Commius, was one of the commanders of the rebels.

nearness to Germany, were most likely to revolt. He had not time to form Gaul into a province, but he seems to have imposed tribute on all the tribes, and to have taken hostages from them; he himself, at the close of the year 50, crossed the Alps into Cisalpine Gaul, where his presence was urgently needed in view of the crisis rapidly approaching at Rome.

Results of Caesar's Work in Gaul.—Plutarch tells us that Caesar's eight campaigns cost the lives of one million Gauls, to count only those slain in action, and that in them 800 towns were stormed. It was a fearful price to pay, but no mistake could be greater than to suppose that all this bloodshed took place merely to gratify one man's ambition. Caesar's work in Gaul secured for Rome its most splendid province, and its foundation opened a wide field for Roman civilization; the conquest had been carried out so thoroughly that the Romans had afterwards almost no trouble in this country. We may say then that these eight campaigns laid the foundation of modern France. And it was not only Gaul itself that was secured for Roman empire; the tide of barbarism was rolled back to the Rhine, which henceforth becomes the frontier of civilization for 400 years. The strong arm of the proconsul Caesar secured for the Old World breathing space and a long respite from the invasion of the Northern hordes.

The Commentaries of Caesar.—Caesar's campaigns in Gaul are an almost unique instance of an event of the first importance in the world's history being described by the chief actor in it. Caesar modestly called his work "*commentarii*" ("memoirs"), and in his treatment carefully avoids all ornaments or elaboration of style. His work is valuable not only for military matters, but also for the wonderful skill with which he selected the important points in every subject he touches, *e.g.* his few chapters on the Germans (in Books iv. and vi.) are still looked upon as the beginning of Teutonic history, and are quoted by the historians of the English constitution. Whether Caesar distorted facts to justify his own conduct is uncertain; but undoubtedly his "memoirs" were written with a political end, and he puts his acts in the best possible light.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE FIRST CIVIL WAR (49–45)

Events Leading to the Civil War.—The anarchy of the years 58 to 52 had proved, if further proof were necessary, that Rome must have a single ruler, who would maintain order with a strong hand. The proceedings of Pompey in 52 had shown pretty clearly that that statesman had no intention of sharing this duty with Caesar, but that his purpose was to keep himself in an exceptional position as the nominee and representative of the Senatorial government. Caesar, on the other hand, had no choice between destruction and making himself master of the state; so long as he was a magistrate he was safe, and could not be called to account, but his period of command expired in 49, and his enemies made no secret of their intention of prosecuting him for his proceedings in Gaul, so soon as he was out of office (*privatus*). Hence his plan to be elected consul for the year 48, and no doubt he hoped that Pompey would once more consent to share power with his old ally. But Pompey's recent enactment requiring that a candidate must be present in person (p. 259) was fatal to Caesar's plans, as he knew that he would be at once prosecuted and so debarred from success. Still more serious was the provision that five years should elapse between office and the holding of a province (p. 258) as owing to it, Caesar would have to give up his command in March 49, and his enemies had already fixed on L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, consul for 54, as his successor.[1]

[1] This point is very technical, but it must be understood if the question between Caesar and his enemies is to be rightly grasped. The provinces of the consuls were fixed before their election, and it was a rule that no province should be assigned to a consul which would not be actually

Proceedings in the Year 51.—One of the consuls for the year 51, M. Claudius Marcellus, was a violent aristocrat, and he at once proceeded to attack Caesar through his friends, the Transpadanes. He caused a prominent citizen of Novum Comum to be scourged, and by this act practically defied Caesar.[2] The question of the disposal of Caesar's provinces was also several times raised, but nothing was settled owing to the opposition of Caesar's partisans, and the uncertain attitude of Pompey, who would not commit himself further than by the safe generality that "everyone must obey the Senate."

The Tribunate of Curio in 50.—In the next year the struggle began in earnest. Among the tribunes was C. Scribonius Curio, a young aristocrat of great ability, but deeply in debt through his extravagance and debauchery. He had been a strong opponent of the triumvirs, but he was just the man whom Caesar wanted as his agent in Rome, and he accordingly purchased his support by paying his debts, which amounted to over £500,000. It was the case of Marius and Sulpicius (p. 221) over again, only now the purchaser had an army at his back to support the proceedings of his tribune.

Curio proceeded with the utmost skill. He posed as an independent politician, who disliked the excessive power both of Pompey and of Caesar, and met the proposal that Caesar should resign his provinces, by the counter-proposal that both the great commanders should resign; this he actually carried in the Senate in June 50, while as tribune

vacant at the end of his consulship ("*ut eam desponsam non decretam habere videatur*," says Cicero, *de Prov. Cons.* 15, 37).

Now Caesar held his province by law till March 49; hence it could not be assigned to one of the consuls of the year 50, as he would have had to wait 3 months for it. It would therefore by the ordinary rule have been assigned in the year 50 to one of the consuls for 49, who would not be ready to enter on it till December of that year. Hence Caesar had reckoned on his command being "de facto" prolonged for the last nine months of 49, and during this interval he could have secured his election for the year 48.

[2] The Gaul seems to have been an ex-magistrate, and so, as Novum Comum was a Latin town, was entitled to the privileges of Roman citizenship, and could not legally be scourged. Even if this was not the case, Caesar seems to have treated *all* the Transpadanes as Roman citizens, for he enrolled them in his legions.

he vetoed the motion against Caesar. As it was certain that Pompey would under no circumstances give up his command in Spain, Caesar was able to keep his province while representing himself as willing to submit to the Senate.

Finally, in December,[1] the consul Marcellus, cousin of the consul of the preceding year, brought forward the definite proposal that Caesar should be declared a public enemy (*hostis*). Curio vetoed this, and the consul, in a rage, appealed to Pompey, putting the sword into his hand and urging him to "save the state."

Caesar as the Defender of the Constitution.—This act was clearly unconstitutional, and was followed by another which was still more so. Curio, as soon as his year of office was over, joined his leader in Gaul, and returned on January 1st, 49, with a letter in which Caesar offered to resign, if Pompey would do the same. The consuls, however, refused to allow this to be discussed, and a motion was brought forward that Caesar should give up his command at once or be declared a public enemy. Caesar's friends among the tribunes for 49, the famous Mark Antony and Cassius, vetoed this, but their veto was over-ruled, and the *Senatus Consultum Ultimum* (p. 206) was passed. On the night of January 7th the two tribunes fled to Caesar, who had now the opportunity which he wanted; the sacred office had been violated, and he could advance as the defender of the constitution against unscrupulous oligarchs. The whole game had been played in the most masterly manner, with the result that Caesar, the innovator and the leader who was to overthrow Rome's old constitution, had the legal right on his side in the Civil War.

Outbreak of Civil War.—Caesar received at Ravenna the news brought by the fugitive tribunes, and at once resolved on action. He had with him but one legion, the 13th, and at the head of this, he crossed the Rubicon, the boundary stream between his province and Italy. By this act he placed himself in open defiance of the government

[1] The date of this meeting of the Senate is uncertain; Tyrrell puts it in October, but it seems more reasonable to suppose that it immediately preceded the outbreak of hostilities.

we need not accept as historical[1] the famous cry "the die is cast" (*Jacta alea est*), but it certainly expresses the situation. Caesar at once advanced and occupied Ariminum.

At first sight Caesar's act might appear one of madness. He had with him only one veteran legion and two of recruits, for the bulk of his army was far away in Gaul, although he had already summoned part of it to join him; and apart from his army he seemed to have nothing except the enthusiasm of the Transpadanes to support him. But he and his soldiers alike believed that they were invincible, and his whole force was under his own control; his generals had been trained under his eye in Gaul; certainly no commander, not even the great Napoleon, was ever so keen a discerner of merit, or so ready to encourage a subordinate, and they repaid him with absolute obedience. Caesar knew too that there was no enthusiasm for the Senate's rule in Italy, and that there were many who would welcome a change of government: for years past his agent, Balbus, had been busy with bribes in Rome, and had recruited for Caesar's party any man of ability who was in debt or difficulty.[2] Hence the invader knew he had only to win some successes, and his partisans everywhere would declare themselves.

The Strength of Pompey.—Pompey's strength, on the other hand, was less than it appeared. "*Stat nominis umbra*" is Lucan's famous description of him. He had his army in Spain, but it was far away; he had the recent levies of Italy, but these were recruits; he had on the spot only two veteran legions, and both of these were attached to Caesar rather than to himself.[3] Above all, he had, as subordinates, noble consulars and praetorians who looked upon themselves as his equals, many of whom disliked him personally, and who never dreamed of obeying orders.

[1] Caesar himself in his *Civil War* says nothing of it, but it is recorded by Plutarch, Appian, and Suetonius.

[2] Caesar's party was a regular "cave of Adullam." We may instance Sallust, the historian, expelled from the Senate in 50, and Pompey's old agent, Gabinius, condemned in 54 for provincial misgovernment.

[3] The Senate, in 51, had ordered Caesar and Pompey each to give up a legion for the Parthian war. Caesar did so, and Pompey gave a legion which he had lent to Caesar; hence the latter, in June 50, had been robbed of two legions.

Caesar's Rapid Successes.—One moment the issue seemed doubtful; for Labienus, Caesar's best and most successful subordinate, deserted, and men thought it was the beginning of the break-up of Caesar's army. Instead of this Labienus came alone, and Caesar contemptuously sent his baggage after him. He himself pushed on down the east coast with extraordinary energy, while Antony crossed the Apennines and occupied Arretium, thus securing the western approach to Rome. Everything there was panic, for men expected that Caesar, as the nephew of Marius, and the leader of Gauls, would combine the old Marian horrors of the proscriptions and of a barbarian invasion. On January 18th the Senate left Rome, calling on all good citizens to follow, and the Roman republic may be said to end. Henceforth there are magistrates, but no constitutional government; such government as exists is that of the great military leaders.

Pompey's Plans.—Pompey had intended to make a stand in Picenum, where his local influence was great, but Caesar was too quick for him, and he had to fall back into S. Italy. As he had the command of the sea, such a move, from a military point of view, had much in its favour; but Pompey had overlooked the moral effect of such a "strategic movement to the rear." And whatever chance it had of success was spoiled by the folly of his aristocratic subordinates. In defiance of Pompey's express orders to retire, Domitius Ahenobarbus held out in Corfinium till February 21st—not long enough to really delay Caesar, but long enough to surrender thirty cohorts, largely of veterans, which his commander-in-chief badly needed to mix with his recruits. Hence Pompey was compelled to evacuate Italy altogether, and sailed from Brundisium, in spite of Caesar's attempts to prevent him, on March 17th[1] (49).

Caesar Master of Rome.—Caesar, who had tried repeatedly to negotiate, had won Italy almost without a blow. He now showed that he could use his success wisely. To the surprise of all—friends almost as much as foes—there were no proscriptions; those who were taken in arms were released, and

[1] The dates in this chapter are given according to the Roman calendar, which was more than a month in advance of the real season of the year. (*Cf.* p. 286.)

non-combatants were left untouched. In this matter Caesar's action was as politic as it was honourable. He was the first Roman leader for a century who knew what mercy meant, and the result was that men readily submitted to him, while Pompey and his noble partisans alarmed and disgusted by their threats all who had not left Italy with them. They had the command of the sea, and they intended to use it to starve out Italy.

Aims of Caesar in 49.—To prevent this was one of the many duties which crowded upon Caesar. He had also to deal with Pompey's army in Spain, which was one of veterans like his own. With his usual energy he set himself to these tasks, after staying only a few days in Rome.

By his lieutenants he secured Sicily and Sardinia, two of the minor granaries of Rome; but Curio, who passed over from Sicily to Africa, fell in battle there against the Pompeian leader, and Juba, king of Numidia, who was Caesar's personal enemy. In Curio fell the most brilliant of Caesar's lieutenants, whose desertion from the Senate is made by Lucan the turning point of the struggle:

"*Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.*"

Caesar in Spain.—Caesar meanwhile had hurried to Spain, only stopping on the way to invest Massilia, which had joined the cause of the Senate, and received Domitius within its walls. He had no fear of Pompey's Eastern levies, but as he himself said, "he was going to attack an army which had no leader, and would then return to deal with a leader who had no army." The campaign in Hither Spain only lasted forty days, but it was full of changes of fortune. At one time Caesar was in an almost desperate position, for the floods of the river Sicoris cut him off from all supplies; but he contrived to send a detachment of his men across the river in coracles, and restored his communications. Afranius and Petreius, the Pompeian commanders, tried to retreat when it was too late, and found themselves compelled to surrender (August 2nd). In Further Spain Pompey's legate was Terentius Varro, the most learned of the Romans. He was preparing to resist when his soldiers deserted him, and Caesar found himself master of all Spain; everywhere he showed the same clemency as in Italy. On his return he

received the submission of Massilia, the siege of which had been continued by his lieutenants, D. Brutus and Trebonius. The Massiliots had treacherously broken a truce they had asked for; but Caesar gave them favourable terms. Here he heard that he had been named Dictator, to hold the consular elections for 48; and on his return to Rome, he presided at his own election as consul. He also dealt with the economic crisis, and extended the franchise to the Transpadanes. His laws on these points will be considered with the rest of his legislation in the next chapter. In one year he had made himself master of Rome and its government, and had crushed his enemies in the West. A mutiny of the 9th legion at Placentia was easily put down by him.

The Campaign of 48.—Pompey meantime had been, in a leisurely manner, raising the forces of the East. He had nine legions and 7,000 cavalry, and what was most formidable of all, his fleet, under Bibulus, Caesar's old colleague of 59, commanded the Adriatic. Caesar, however, with some 15,000 men, boldly put to sea on January 4th, and, escaping Bibulus, landed in Epirus. He gained some successes, but was hard pressed by Pompey's superior numbers; while the rest of his army was unable to cross, owing to the vigilance of Bibulus, who brutally murdered all Caesarians whom he captured. The Pompeian navy, however, also suffered severely, as Caesar's army held both coasts and prevented it from landing for water and provisions; Bibulus himself died. At last, at the end of March, Antony brought over the remaining troops to Caesar, who assumed the offensive. Pompey anticipated him by seizing Dyrrachium, but Caesar invested him there, and tried to starve him out (cf. Alesia, p. 267). It was a reckless policy, for the smaller army was blockading the larger and itself suffered terrible hardships from lack of supplies, but it nearly succeeded. Pompey, however, was able, by his fleet, to turn Caesar's entrenchments, and, in the fight which ensued, won a considerable victory. Caesar retired across the mountains into Thessaly, and drew Pompey after him by threatening Metellus Scipio, who was bringing up new forces from the East. Pompey wished to avoid a battle; he did not trust his army against Caesar's veterans, and he hoped, by his cavalry, to cut off Caesar's supplies.

The Battle of Pharsalus.—It was a wise policy, but it did not commend itself to Pompey's aristocratic lieutenants, who wanted to be back among the pleasures of Rome. They were confident of success, especially after the victory of Dyrrachium, and were already quarrelling among themselves as to the division of spoils which had not yet been won. Caesar's office as pontifex maximus was the prize which was most keenly disputed.

Pompey was compelled to give way to their impatience, and the battle which decided the fate of the world was fought on the plain of Pharsalus, in Thessaly (August 9th, 48). Pompey's forces were more than double those of Caesar, and his cavalry was seven times as numerous. To this arm he trusted for victory, which was to be won by the cavalry turning Caesar's right wing, and falling on his rear. But Caesar had foreseen this manœuvre, and had strengthened his weak cavalry by placing among them the most active of his infantry, in a fashion which he had learned from his barbarian foes. At the same time he placed a force of six cohorts in reserve. The result was an easy victory for Caesar; for the Pompeian cavalry, after overwhelming the opposing cavalry, suddenly came upon the unexpected resistance of the reserve cohorts and turned to flight; and the panic spread to the rest of the army. Pompey himself fled in hot haste; his camp was taken, and his army as a fighting force was annihilated. (See note at end of chapter.)

Effects of the Battle of Pharsalus.—Caesar now in part gave up his policy of mercy. He had ordered the lives of all Romans to be spared, but 15,000 Pompeians fell in the battle. No doubt the majority of these came from the Eastern provinces, but among them was Caesar's old enemy, Domitius. After the battle a certain number of senators were put to death, but most of the Roman citizens were spared; they were, however, as a natural measure of precaution, not allowed to return to Italy. Among those who were pardoned at this time were M. Brutus and C. Cassius, afterwards Caesar's murderers.

The Civil War was not over, for the defeated army was only scattered, and many of them retired to Africa, to resume the struggle there; but, as a result of victory, Caesar was


A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
PHARSALUS
Cæsar's Army
Pompey's Army
A Camp of Cæsar
B Camp of Pompey
• Cæsar o Pompey
C Cæsar's Legions
D Cæsar's Cavalry (1000)
E Six Cohorts in Reserve
F Pompey's Legions
G Pompey's Cavalry (6,000)
H Archers
I Hill where Pompey's troops finally surrendered

now the undisputed representative of Rome, while his beaten enemies became more and more unpatriotic, and leagued themselves with Parthians and with Numidians against their mother country.

End of the Pompeian Party and Death of Pompey.—Above all, the battle ended the Pompeian party; those who continued the struggle did it as aristocrats, but not as Pompeians; for their great leader, fleeing to the East to restore his shattered fortunes, was brutally murdered in Egypt. Pompey was a man of talent, who unfortunately believed himself to be a genius; hence he set himself the impossible task of reconciling the irreconcilable, autocracy and oligarchy, and inclining now to one alternative and now to the other, ruined his whole career by his own indecision.

Caesar in Egypt.—Caesar had followed in hot pursuit of Pompey; he had all along sought an interview with him, and was now anxious to secure his person, but he arrived in Egypt to find him dead. Caesar, however, remained nine months in this remote corner of the world, while Italy was almost torn to pieces by the quarrels of his subordinates (p. 278), and while the optimates were gathering strength in Africa.

The main cause of this extraordinary waste of time seems to have been an intrigue with Cleopatra, who was joint queen of Egypt with her brother Ptolemy. For her sake Caesar interfered in the affairs of Egypt, with the result that he was himself in great danger, being besieged by the Egyptian army in the Pharos, at the entrance of the harbour of Alexandria. Even when he was at last relieved by the arrival of reinforcements, and had mastered all opposition, he seems to have spent three months in leisurely settling the affairs of Egypt; he did not annex it, but he dissolved the old army which had made itself master of the reigning house, and left a new Roman garrison under the command of a freedman's son; the post was too important to be given to a man of high position. Cleopatra was again placed on the throne with another royal brother, for Ptolemy had fallen in the struggle.

Caesar in Asia.—At last Caesar tore himself away from Egypt and hurried into Asia, where Pharnaces, the son and

murderer of the great Mithradates, was building up a kingdom for himself. He thought the Romans were weakened by their quarrels, and might be treated with contempt, but he found his mistake. Caesar crushed him at Zela (Aug. 2nd, 47), and is said on this occasion to have sent his famous despatch, "*Veni, vidi, vici*," to Rome. He then rapidly settled the affairs of Asia, and hurried home to Italy.

Confusion in Italy during Caesar's Absence.—Here all had been confusion. M. Antony had been named master of the horse when Caesar was appointed dictator after Pharsalus; but he was too lawless in conduct himself to keep others in order, even had he been strong enough. To make matters worse, M. Caelius, one of the praetors of 48, deliberately set himself, by legislation, and by stirring up the people, to bring about a general bankruptcy. He was driven from Rome, and finally killed in Bruttium. Caesar meanwhile was out of reach, and unable to exercise the right which had been given him of nominating all magistrates; hence for the first nine months of the year 47, there were no officers in Rome except the master of the horse and the tribunes. One of these, Dolabella, Cicero's son-in-law, was taking up the policy of Caelius, while meantime the troops in Campania mutinied (August).

Caesar restores Order in Rome.—Caesar's return (in September), at once restored order; he brought his legions to their senses by simply addressing them as "citizens" (*quirites*), and so dismissing them from his army, to which, however, he consented to re-admit them; he pardoned Dolabella, dealt with the financial difficulties, and appointed magistrates for the rest of the year. Late in December, he sailed for Africa, where his enemies had now gathered a strong force.

The Campaign in Africa (46.)—All the members of the senatorial party who had escaped were there, and they were vigorously supported by Juba, the King of Numidia, who was to have the Roman possessions in Africa as his reward when the victory was won. The campaign lasted three months, and it was that of Pharsalus over again; Caesar's enemies were strong in cavalry, and for a time pressed him hard, by cutting off his provisions; but when he invested

Thapsus, they ventured to engage him (in April), and the natural result followed. Their huge army went down before his irresistible legionaries, and in spite of Caesar's orders to show mercy, 50,000 are said to have fallen. There was an especial slaughter among the leaders; Afranius, Petreius, King Juba, Scipio, and above all, M. Cato perished, the last of whom committed suicide at Utica, because he considered the Republic was hopeless, and he would not survive it. His name as that of an honest man, who had tried to do his duty, and who had preferred death to slavery, became the watchword of all Republicans for the next century. Caesar returned victorious to Rome, and celebrated a fourfold triumph—over Gaul, Egypt, Pontus, and Numidia; all reference to the Civil War was conspicuous by its absence.

The Campaign in Spain (45).—Caesar was now in Rome for six or seven months, but he had one more campaign, his last, and as he himself said, his hardest. His governor in Spain, Cassius, had made himself hated by his cruelty and avarice, and the fugitives of Thapsus found it easy to seize this country, in which the party of Pompey had always been strong. A large force was enrolled, and even runaway slaves were admitted to its ranks, for as the Civil War proceeded, the beaten party became more and more desperate. Caesar left Rome late in the autumn of 46, and the decisive battle took place at Munda (March 17th, 45). The struggle was terrible—quarter was neither given nor asked, and Caesar was at one time in great danger, but in the end he won the day. Labienus and Cn. Pompeius, the elder son of the triumvir, fell, and only Sextus Pompeius was left of all the leaders of his father's party. Caesar returned to Rome, and this time triumphed over his Roman fellow-countrymen. The first act of the Civil War was over, the second was very soon to begin, and it was to be even more cruel than the first.

Pompey's Mistakes at Pharsalus.—(1) He placed his best troops on his right wing, which rested on the Enipeus. They could not be attacked, but they also could not attack. Caesar, on the other hand, put his tenth legion on his right in the post of danger. (2) As Caesar points out (*B. C.* iii. 92), his men by attacking had their confidence increased. (3) Pompey gave up the struggle too soon.

CHAPTER XL.

THE WORK OF CAESAR AS MASTER OF ROME

Caesar's Position at Rome.—The career of Caesar during the Civil War is the transition from the Republic to the Empire. He begins the struggle as a proconsul, a struggle for his rights under the constitution ; he dies five years later invested with powers more arbitrary and more full than Augustus ever enjoyed; hence Suetonius rightly begins his lives of the "Twelve Caesars" with that of "Divus Julius." This rapid extension of power falls under four periods.

I. **In the year 49.**—When in the year 49, he had driven the Pompeians out of Italy, it was necessary for him still to observe Republican forms; he wished to be consul, but there was neither consul nor consular in Rome to preside at the elections, and even in the midst of revolution, Roman legality would have been shocked by the spectacle of a consul "created" by a praetor presiding in the assembly, for it would have been the lesser officer "creating" the greater; the succession of office, we may say, could only pass through equals. Hence, to obviate this difficulty, Caesar was made dictator to preside at his own election.

II. **After Pharsalus.**—But, when the battle of Pharsalus had decided that Caesar was master of the Roman world, the old Republican powers were concentrated in him, in a way quite unprecedented.

(1) He becomes consul for five years, and has the rights of tribune for life, while his dictatorship is renewed.

(2) He receives control of war and peace,

(3) And the right to nominate all officers of the state except the plebeian officers.

III. **After Thapsus.**—His victory at Thapsus was the signal for another grant of powers and honours. It is no

longer a question as before of republican powers without republican limitations: new titles and powers begin to appear, which go back to the regal period, *e.g.* Caesar received the right to appoint all magistrates, ordinary and extraordinary, and in virtue of this, when he started for the Spanish campaign, he delegated the government of Rome and Italy to eight *praefecti*. The very name implied that now the place of the "magistrate," elected by the people, was taken by the "officer," appointed by a superior. In fact Caesar's position was passing into that of king, as his soldiers recognized, and showed at his triumph in their rude jests; and the divine element appeared side by side with the regal, in the grant to him of a statue in the Capitol, with the inscription "to the demi-god."

IV. After Munda.—His victory in Spain was followed by a final outburst of servility. His power it was hardly possible to extend, but the Romans did what they could in this direction; he was made dictator for life, his right of nomination was extended to plebeian officers, so that it now included all the functionaries of the state, and the people voted that he should have sole command of the armies.

Even more remarkable was the increase of titles and honours; the old word "*Imperator*"[1] appears in the new sense which it has ever since borne, as the symbol of absolute power: and Caesar received the right to mark himself off from the rest of the citizens, by always wearing the laurel crown and the gold embroidered robe of a "*triumphator*." So too Mark Antony was appointed his priest (*flamen*), as if Caesar was really a god.

Meaning of these Honours.—This lavish grant of honours showed that the days of the Republic were over, morally as well as politically, and that henceforth men would vie with each other in servility to the monarch. Probably, however, there was a malicious intention in this extravagance of flattery; the

[1] "*Imperator*" in Republican times was the title of honour given to a victorious general by his own soldiers; in their enthusiasm, they hailed him as "a true general." Caesar now received it as a permanent title, and his successors were to inherit it. From being purely military, it became extended to be the symbol of absolute power generally; so the Greeks always translated it *αὐτοκράτωρ*. For another half century, however, it still continued to be used in its old sense, *i.e.* for victorious generals

Senate wished to reveal to all men that Caesar's position was regal, and so to make him unpopular.

Caesar's Intention for the Future Government of Rome.—If this was their wish, Caesar himself played into their hands. After his return from Munda, he threw aside all constitutional fictions: he was master of Rome, and he showed it by receiving the Senate sitting, and in other similar acts which offended Roman prejudice.

So too he seems to have really wished for the title of "king"; the Sibylline books were made to declare (late in the year 45) that the Parthians could only be conquered by a Roman "king," and Mark Antony, in the scene immortalized by Shakspere, pressed the crown on Caesar, at the festival of the Lupercalia (February 44), although the evident dislike of the people for the proposal caused it to be dropped for the time. There is no doubt that it was acts of this kind which, by wounding Roman sentiment, sharpened the daggers which killed Caesar. We can hardly suppose that Caesar failed to see this danger, or that, for a paltry title, he wilfully incurred so great a risk; probably his deliberate judgment was that, as the Republic was dead, so its titles and offices should be superseded by new ones, which fitted the new state of things.

Caesar's Treatment of the Senate.—The same policy is seen in his treatment of the Senate; he showed but little respect for its traditions, and let all men see that it was to play a purely subordinate part in the new government. He raised its numbers from about 600 to 900, and among the new members appointed by him were centurions from his army, and even Gauls; such nominations were an open defiance of the old position of the Senate as the centre of the influence of the *nobiles* and of Roman exclusiveness. So too, in the conduct of business, he paid no regard to its susceptibilities; all important matters were discussed in private with a few leading senators, or even with his own circle of personal friends, such as Balbus and Oppius. And Caesar seems to have used the Senate's name without even the form of consulting it; Cicero, at all events, tells his friend Paetus that he receives letters of thanks from barbarian kings, of whom he had never heard, for decrees

of the Senate nominally proposed by him, but really the work of Caesar, who thus, for his own purposes, made free with the prestige of the Senate and of its most famous orator.

Caesar's Treatment of the old Republican Offices.—So too in his treatment of the old Republican offices, Caesar showed that they were to play but a subordinate part in his scheme of government. He raised the number of praetors to fourteen, and of quaestors to forty; this increase was needed on account of the ever-widening sphere of Roman empire, and the growth of administrative duties, but it also tended to depreciate the honour of office by increasing the number of those who shared it. Caesar also showed almost a contempt for the old offices in the way in which he gave them; the nominal election by the people followed as a matter of course from his "commendation,"[1] and he did not scruple when one of the consuls for 45 died on the last day of that year, to appoint a successor for a few hours. In fact he showed in every possible way that the old officers of the state were to be his nominees, and that they were to be looked on in future as mere ornamental dignitaries, or as magistrates of the municipality of Rome, rather than as governors of the empire.

Caesar's Autocracy.—Caesar in fact established an autocracy; however much the old "liberty" of Rome had been nominal, and however great had been the mis-government of the Senate and people, yet his work must be condemned as having crushed once for all any possibility of free development in Rome, and as having led by a natural sequence to the unrestrained licence of his successors in the imperial power. Yet, on the other hand, it is hard to see how he could have done otherwise than he did; the task of governing the Roman world called for a strong hand, and none but an absolute monarch could give this; the old government of the city senate and the city assembly, was absolutely unsuited for the new task, and the very idea of

[1] This power grew out of the custom, which existed under the Republic, of influential men supporting candidates by commending them to the electors; but the "commendation" of Caesar was an irresistible command. (*Cf.* p. 205.)

popular representation never crossed the mind of the statesmen of the old world. It was reserved for the then despised barbarians of the North to develop this out of their vigorous local freedom.

The Problems of the Empire.—It is pleasanter to leave the faulty methods by which Caesar worked, and to turn to the results which he actually achieved.

The task before him was an enormous one. In Rome itself order had ceased to exist, and lawless bands of ruffians terrorized the streets. In Italy there was general unsettlement; land was going out of cultivation, and was depreciated in value, and all classes, both in Rome and in Italy, were either bankrupt or on the verge of bankruptcy; in fact, credit and order, the two essentials of a state, were disappearing. In the provinces he had to remedy the system of misgovernment, which was impoverishing the world for the benefit of a few nobles and capitalists at Rome.

Caesar's Dealings with the Economic Question.—Caesar had first to deal with the economic difficulties of Rome. Many, both of his own partisans and of the citizens in general, expected him to revive the policy of bankruptcy of the democratic party, and either reduce debts 75 per cent., as had been done by Valerius Flaccus in 86, or adopt the Catilinarian programme of "novae tabulae."

Caesar did neither. He passed two series of financial measures—at the end of 49, on his return from Spain; and at the end of 47, on his return from Asia. On the first occasion he

(1) Lowered the rate of interest, and deducted what had been already paid from the principal of the debt.

(2) He forbade hoarding, by making it illegal for any citizen to have more than 15,000 denarii in specie.

(3) He ordered that the creditors should be bound to take the property of the debtors at a valuation, which was to be fixed by arbitrators according to its worth before the Civil War broke out.

In this provision as to the "*cessio bonorum*" we may, perhaps, trace the beginning of the principle which is the basis of all modern bankruptcy law.

These measures may seem too drastic, but the creditors

might well be satisfied to get even part of their debts, and the bankrupt party, led by Caelius and Dolabella (p. 278), raised fresh commotions in his absence in the East. On his return, Caesar saw some further measures were necessary, and he not only pardoned Dolabella, but lowered all rents of smaller tenements by one-fourth, and endeavoured to promote the circulation of capital by requiring that part of it should be invested in Italian land.

Caesar's Treatment of Disorder in Rome.—But he also struck at the root of the economic difficulties by trying to check disorder in Rome. He had used Clodius and the mob as a tool against the government; but now that he was himself governor, he suppressed (by edict in 46) the collegia (p. 253), which had been perverted to such mischievous uses. And he endeavoured to limit the constant growth of the Roman proletariate by cutting down the number of recipients of free corn from 300,000 to 150,000, and by requiring proof of poverty before relief was given.

Caesar's Treatment of Italy.—Italy, as well as Rome, was, of course in part affected by Caesar's financial laws. Owing to slavery, its economic state was terrible, and even Caesar had not the power, even had he had the will, to deal with this evil. But the measures which he adopted in palliation of it were useful. He required that a third of the herdsmen employed should be free men, and he developed the road system of Italy. He also planned great works for draining the Pomptine marshes, and so reclaiming from malaria a great tract of country which had once been fertile, and for letting the waters of the Lacus Fucinus into the Liris.

Above all, he carried out on a great scale the old policy of the democratic party by agrarian distributions. His legionaries and the poorer citizens were distributed over Italy in allotments, which were not obtained by confiscation (as Sulla's had been), but strictly paid for. The distribution too was managed on a new principle, for the settlers were introduced into already existing communities, instead of being planted down in masses.

The Lex Julia Municipalis (45).—Caesar saw too that the government of Italy needed regulation as well as its economic state; and by his *Lex Municipalis* he endeavoured to provide

for its proper organization. This law has been preserved for us in one of the most important of Roman inscriptions; it summed up the development of the town community out of the *pagus*, which had been going on for a long time in Italy, especially since the Social War, and it provided that these Italian municipia should be independent in their local government of the Roman magistrates. Rome was now to be not the mistress, but only the first, of the municipia—to be only *prima inter pares*. This law had a wide-reaching influence, for the provincial towns also developed their self-government under it.

Caesar's Reform of the Calendar.—This then belongs also to Caesar's work in the provinces; but before describing this a change must be mentioned which has affected the whole civilized world, *i.e.* the reform of the Roman calendar. Hitherto the months had been lunar, and the year consisted of 355 days. The solar year consists of $365\frac{1}{4}$ days,[1] and the Roman astronomers had endeavoured to keep the year and the seasons together by the clumsy device of inserting, when needed, an "intercalary" month. But the combination of bad mathematics and of tampering with the calendar for political purposes, had brought things into hopeless confusion; and in 46 the spring festival of Flora was kept—not on April 28th, as it should have been, but on July 11th. Caesar employed the Greek mathematician, Sosigenes, to put things straight. Sixty-seven days were added to the year 46, and the next calendar begun on January 1st, 45; from that time to this the civilized world has begun its year on January 1st.[2] Henceforth matters were to be kept straight by making every fourth year a leap year (*annus bissextilis*).

Caesar's Work in the Provinces. Extension of Franchise.—But it is in the provinces that Caesar's work is most admirable. Roman "liberty" had been based on the inferiority of all outside Italy; now Italy and the provinces were to be subject to a common master. Of course it was impossible at once to put the two divisions of the empire on an

[1] The exact length is 365 days 5 hrs. 48 min. 48 secs.; Caesar's change therefore was too great. By the present Gregorian system (introduced into England in 1752) three leap years are omitted in 400 years.

[2] The Roman year had previously begun in March, as the names of our months, September to December, still show

equality; but Caesar showed what he intended by returning to the old tradition of Rome, and by extending the franchise freely wherever the provincials were ready for it. So in 49 the whole of the Transpadanes became citizens, and Gades received the same privilege, being the first provincial town which became a Roman *municipium.* (*Cf.* p. 82). Caesar afterwards promised the Latin franchise to Sicily, but he did not live to carry this out. Meantime individuals received the citizenship freely; as we have seen (p. 282), provincials were even admitted to the Senate.

Regulation of Taxation.—Caesar took measures also for the better organization of those provinces which were not yet ripe for full union with Rome. The provincial governors had their tenure of office shortened, and their powers limited by the strong central control; Caesar had no intention of allowing another to do with a provincial army what he himself had done. And the finances of the empire were to be put on a better footing by the carrying out of a general assessment, with a view to a fairer distribution of burdens. The worst abuse in the provinces was removed by the abolition of the tithe-farming system, which was ruining Asia. Caesar too showed that Italy must bear its share of burdens by reimposing the customs dues (*portoria*) in Italian ports, which had been abolished in 60.

The sign that in subjection to a common master the old jealousy of Rome and the provinces was to disappear, was the refounding of Carthage and of Corinth (under the name of Laus Julii); the crimes of the Republic were thus undone by the Empire.

When we remember that all this work was done in the intervals between the campaigns of the Civil War, admiration becomes absolute wonder. Of Caesar, more than any other man, it is true that he was born

> "To cast the kingdoms old
> Into another mould."

Organization of Frontier.—And Caesar knew that it was part of the task of Roman government not only to organize what it already had under its sway, but also to advance its

dominions, and to defend the empire against barbarism. He had, as proconsul, done the work on the northern frontier, and in 46 he had annexed Numidia. He was now proposing to move into the East to avenge the defeat of Crassus, and to give Rome a strong frontier there also.

Conspiracy against Caesar.—But this work was never to be accomplished by him. His measures for the better government of the world were as hateful to the Roman aristocracy as his autocracy itself. Caesar had done his best by pardoning and by promoting his beaten foes to the offices of State, to sink in oblivion all the bitterness of the Civil War; but he had offended too many to be allowed to complete his work in peace. The constitutionalists, like Cicero, mourned for the lost power of the Senate; Caesar's own officers, like Decimus Brutus, thought they had not had a sufficient share of the prize of empire; dreamy idealists, like Marcus Brutus, could not forget that the Republic was gone.

Out of these various elements a conspiracy was formed, led by M. Brutus, the favourite of Caesar, and C. Cassius, who had forgotten his pardon, and was angry because Caesar had put Brutus before him among the praetors; under them were united Caesarian officers and pardoned Pompeians; the only respectable and unselfish man among them was M. Brutus, who personally had everything to lose by the removal of Caesar.

The Murder of Caesar.—Caesar knew he was in danger, but declined to surround himself with a body guard. He had risked his life too often to be afraid now; besides, he was intending shortly to join his troops for the campaign in the East.

The murder was fixed for the meeting of the Senate on the "Ides of March" (Mar. 15); strange portents were seen in the sky and in the streets, but Caesar, refusing all warnings, went to his doom. The conspirators closed round him as if to do him honour, and then one of them struck him behind; he resisted desperately, single-handed and unarmed as he was, till he saw that M. Brutus was among the assassins. Then he gave up the struggle, and

died, pierced by twenty-three wounds, at the foot of the statue of his defeated rival Pompey.

His most fitting epitaph[1] is that which Shakspere puts into the mouth of Antony—

> "Thou art the ruins of the noblest man
> That ever lived in the tide of times."

Roman Literature anti-Caesarian.—Undoubtedly in Caesar's own day the men of letters were against him. He was bitterly assailed by the poet Catullus (87–54), although Catullus himself came from Verona, and Transpadane Gaul was strongly for Caesar. No doubt the poet reflects the tone of "smart" Roman society, of which the leader was the notorious Clodia, the sister of the tribune, and probably the "Lesbia" of Catullus. Caesar himself treated his assailant most kindly, and the reputation of Catullus as "the tenderest of Roman poets" is independent of his political views. But of course the greatest name in Roman literature at this period is that of Cicero; and it is Cicero, in his speeches and his letters, who has always furnished the main arguments to Caesar's opponents, and who therefore is so vigorously attacked by Mommsen as "a journalist in the worst sense of the term, abounding in words, poor beyond all conception in ideas." In spite of his modern critics, Cicero remains the greatest figure in Roman prose literature. His importance is greatest as an orator; but as a philosopher (cf. p. 293) also his influence has been very marked, as the adapter and expounder of Greek ideas; as a critic of oratory (cf. p. 256) he is one of our most important sources for the history of Roman literature; as a letter writer he ranks as a model of style, and is our best authority for the history of the period. Cicero also believed himself to be a poet, and celebrated his consulship in verses. The best known specimen is the famous line—

> "O fortunatam natam me consule Romam."

[1] Caesar's career is well summed up in the line of the hostile poet, Lucan (Phar. II. 657)

> "Nil actum credens dum quid superesset agendum."

The contrast between him and Pompey could not be better described than in the famous passage Phars. I. 121–157.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE CIVIL WARS (44-31)

The Results of Caesar's Murder.—The murder of Caesar was not only a crime, it was a blunder. When Cicero said that the conspirators (who had been afraid to ask him to join them) had acted "childishly, for they had left the heir to the kingdom," his words were more true than he meant; he thought that, had Antony been killed, the work would have been complete; as a matter of fact, the murder of Caesar had left all the causes which made a monarchy inevitable, and all the tools which Caesar had used to build it; the murderers had only removed the one hand that could really control these tools. The Roman empire was not due to the ambition of Caesar, and so could not perish with him; but had the conspirators done as the majority of them wished, and murdered Antony too, their work might have had a momentary success. Brutus, however, in his unpractical idealism, had shrunk from what he deemed unnecessary bloodshed, and Antony was spared to avenge his leader.

Events after the Death of Caesar.—For the moment after the death of Caesar all was confusion; the conspirators had expected the people of Rome to rally round them with enthusiasm, but no one joined them, and they took refuge in the Capitol. Antony meanwhile, who had concealed himself for the moment in fear, recovered his courage, and prepared to take measures to secure his position; he was consul, and so head of the State, and he received from Calpurnia, Caesar's wife (on the night of the 15th), the papers and the treasures of the late dictator.

Antony's Measures.—He set himself at once to secure Dolabella, his fellow-consul (although his election was disputed), and Lepidus, who, as Caesar's master of the horse, had command of the only troops in Rome. He succeeded with both, but he did not know how weak the conspirators were, and thought it necessary to temporize. At a meeting of the Senate, on March 17th, it was decided, on the proposal of Cicero, there should be a general "amnesty," that the conspirators should enjoy their honours and their offices, but that all Caesar's "acts" should be maintained. This compromise could not possibly last, and neither side meant to keep to it, but by assenting to it, the conspirators gave away their position; either Caesar's death was deserved, in which case his measures ought to have perished with him, or it was a brutal murder, and the actors in it deserved severe punishment.

Antony Strengthens his Position.—The Roman people soon showed which alternative of this dilemma they accepted; at Caesar's funeral it hardly needed Antony's eloquence, so familiar to us in the version of Shakspere, to lash the mob of Rome into fury, for Caesar had been popular with the people; and the veterans, both those still serving in the legions, and those who had received assignations of land, were resolved to have vengeance for their old commander. Hence the funeral of the dictator ended in a riot, and his assassins had to leave Rome. Antony, it is true, still temporized; he brought in a law abolishing the dictatorship for ever, and professed to treat the conspirators with all respect. He also put down the disorder in the streets with a strong hand, and executed the ringleader, Amatius, who pretended to be connected with Marius and Caesar; but he at the same time prevailed on the Senate to give him a body-guard.

Antony throws off the Mask.—He now felt himself strong enough to show his plans. He strengthened his body-guard till it became a large force, and, by means of Caesar's papers, proceeded to rule Rome as he pleased. But now, as always, Antony failed when the game was in his hand; both in politics and in the field he was admirable while he was in danger, but as soon as he began to succeed he

lost his head and behaved as if success were already won. He now squandered Caesar's treasures in reckless debauchery, and openly played the tyrant.

Octavian.—But a fresh competitor for power, Octavian, the great-nephew of Caesar, and his private heir, now appeared on the scene. He was not yet 19, and friends and foes looked on him as a boy who could be made a tool; but this boy displayed an ability and a self-control which enabled him to deceive the most skilful deceivers, and to secure his own ends by means of the very men who thought they were using him for theirs. He had a most difficult part to play, for he neither could nor would join the party of his uncle's murderers, and Antony had usurped the leadership of the Caesarian party, and even refused to give Octavian the private fortune of Caesar. The young man, however, accepted his position as his uncle's representative, and paid, out of his private fortune and the loans of his friends, the legacies to the people which Caesar had promised, and which Antony had squandered.

Antony claims Cisalpine Gaul.—Antony meanwhile was trying to secure for himself a provincial army. By vote of the people (June 1), he obtained Syria for Dolabella and Cisalpine Gaul for himself, each for six years, thus ignoring Caesar's limit of two years for a consular province. Gaul had been assigned by Caesar to Decimus Brutus, who had already taken possession of it. The conspirators saw there was no place for them in Italy (September 44), and M. Brutus and Cassius started for the East, leaving Antony master. But "the boy" Octavian, whom he had despised, began to prove formidable, and as it was evident there would be an appeal to arms, proceeded to raise (late in October), on his own authority, a force from among his uncle's veterans, while he induced two of Antony's legions (the Martian and the Fourth) to desert their leader.

Outbreak of Civil War.—Antony found that he could not rely on his troops against Octavian, and so hurried off to Cisalpine Gaul (end of November), to crush Decimus Brutus, who was entrenched at Mutina. The consuls of the year 43, Hirtius and Pansa, both members of Caesar's

party, were sent against Antony, and the Senate sanctioned the act of Octavian in raising troops (early in January, 43), and gave him the authority of propraetor. Thus civil war was once more raging, though the Senate declined to declare Antony a public enemy. There were at least three parties in the field, for Octavian was an enemy to Decimus Brutus as well as to Antony.

Cicero's Behaviour during the year 44.—Cicero, since he had returned to Italy after Pharsalus, had spent his time mainly in retirement, devoting himself to Philosophy,[1] as a consolation for his enforced political inactivity. Caesar treated him with marked kindness, and allowed him to intercede for his former comrades-in-arms, the Pompeians;[2] but, on the dictator's murder in 44, Cicero showed the greatest delight, and allowed himself to speak with outrageous bitterness of the great man who had so often befriended him. Towards the close of the year (44) Antony renewed his old hostility against Cicero, and one of the historic struggles of the world began. Cicero, in his first Philippic, treats Antony with respect, but in his second (published, though never delivered as a speech, in November, 44) he flings all prudence to the winds, and attacks Antony in an invective as furious as it was well-merited. After this, at intervals, appeared the other 12 Philippics, in which Cicero endeavoured to stir the Senate to vigorous action against Antony, and to animate the courage of the old constitutional party. Hopeless as this attempt was, yet the bravery of Cicero cannot be too highly commended. He came forward in defence of the political principles of his life, at an age when he might well have shrunk from further action, and exposed himself to the deadly enmity of an absolutely unscrupulous foe. In one point only Cicero's conduct must be condemned—he proposed to use Octavian as a tool to assist his uncle's murderers, and then to get rid of him; he thought Octavian could be cajoled into following his advice, and he was punished by finding, when it was too late, that Octavian had outwitted him.

[1] *E.g.* at this period he published the *De Finibus* in 45, the *Tusculan Disputations* early in 44, and, later in the same year, the *De Senectute*, the *De Amicitia*, and the *De Officiis*.

[2] *Cf.* his speeches *pro Ligario* and *pro Rege Deiotaro*.

The Campaign of 43.—The armies met in April. Antony was defeated, and compelled to raise the siege of Mutina, and flee headlong to Transalpine Gaul; but both the consuls fell in the fighting, and Octavian assumed the Command of their armies. He allowed Antony to escape, and refused to have anything to do with Decimus Brutus, who was pursuing his defeated foe. Brutus hoped to receive help from Lepidus and from Plancus, the governors in Gallia Narbonensis and in Further Gaul, but after long hesitation they both joined Antony, and the pursuer was compelled in his turn to retreat; his army broke up, and he, after many adventures, was killed by Antony (Sept. 43).

Meanwhile, in the East, M. Brutus had seized Macedonia, and Cassius had killed Dolabella and secured Syria; the Senate now openly showed itself favourable to them, and voted them supreme command over the provinces in the East.[1] It hoped that the victorious Eastern armies would come to its help, and now attempted to get rid of Octavian; but Brutus and Cassius did not come, and when Octavian demanded the consulship, the Senate, though it at first refused, had to yield. He was elected consul in August, and at the same time a special commission was set up for the trial of the assassins of Caesar.

The Triumvirate.—Octavian now moved north with his army, and met Antony and Lepidus not far from Bononia; between them they controlled forty-three legions, and they decided, instead of quarrelling, to unite to settle the affairs of the Roman world. Accordingly a tribune, P. Titius, proposed a measure by which the three generals were appointed, till January, 37, *tresviri reipublicae constituendae* with absolute power. This second triumvirate differs from the first (so-called) of 60, in that it was not merely a private arrangement between three powerful citizens, but was a

[1] This vote went even further than the famous grants of power to Pompey in the Gabinian and the Manilian Laws; he had received only the *imperium infinitum aequum*, while Brutus and Cassius receive the *imperium infinitum majus* in the East, *i.e.* authority superior to that of all the governors of the various provinces there. This is a direct anticipation of the position of the Emperor, and it is a precedent set by the Senate for the benefit of its own leaders.

definite office set up by the people of Rome for a special purpose.

The Proscriptions.—The triumvirs entered on their office in a terrible manner; they revived the proscriptions of Sulla, but in a form even more cruel. Each of the triumvirs was allowed to put down his own special enemies; and Lepidus gave up his brother, and Antony his uncle, to the hate of his colleagues. These two proposed victims escaped, but 300 senators and 2,000 equites are said to have been killed; many were proscribed merely for their wealth,[1] and the soldiers, in their lust for blood, broke away from all discipline. The most distinguished among those who perished were Cicero and his brother Quintus, who were sacrificed to the vengeance of Antony. The great orator met his fall bravely; his death was a sign that the reign of eloquence was over, and that it was the sword which henceforth was to rule in Rome. Nothing can excuse the cruelty of the triumvirs, but most of those who fell thoroughly deserved their fate; Caesar had shown them mercy, and they murdered him, or applauded his murderers; they found in his successors tyrants of a very different character.

The Campaign of Philippi.—But the work of vengeance for Caesar was only half done, for Brutus and Cassius, with large armies, held all the provinces east of the Adriatic; hence Antony and Octavian marched against them, leaving Lepidus to rule Italy. The campaign was that of Pharsalus over again, not only in the fact that the same parties were once more ranged against each other, but that the beaten side made the same mistakes. They had the larger force, but it was the less trustworthy; and as their fleet kept them well supplied with provisions, it was their obvious policy not to fight a decisive battle, but to exhaust the enemy. Cassius allowed himself, however, to be persuaded by Brutus into an engagement at Philippi; in the first encounter, success was divided, but Cassius, whose division had been defeated by Antony, killed himself. Brutus, who

[1] So Verres (p. 230), the plunderer of Sicily, met his death, because Antony coveted certain vases, which he had seized in his province thirty years before.

had been victorious over Octavian, was twenty days later compelled by his troops to fight against his better judgment, and being defeated, killed himself (late autumn of 42).

The End of the Republican Party.—The battle of Philippi ended the Republican party, as that of Pharsalus had ended the Pompeian. Those who had escaped the proscriptions and the slaughter, either submitted to the new order of things,[1] or joined Sextus Pompeius. He, after his escape from Munda, had contrived to get together a considerable force, and made himself master of Sicily, from which his fleets harassed the Roman corn ships. Octavian had attacked him without success early in the year 42, but he had remained inactive during the campaign of Philippi. Although he maintained himself as a formidable power for six years longer, yet he is always rather the pirate leader than the chief of a party. The legitimate authority of Rome was vested in the hands of Antony and Octavian, and the struggle between them was now to be renewed, a struggle which was to decide who was the real heir of the inheritance of Caesar.

The Division of the Roman World between Octavian and Antony.—It seemed as if all the chances were in Antony's favour; he was the darling of the soldiers, and it was to him belonged the credit of the victory of Philippi. He was too in the prime of manhood, while Octavian was only twenty-one, and was in very delicate health; but Antony now, as always, threw all his chances away by his reckless debauchery and extravagance. He and Octavian re-divided the world between them; Africa was given to Lepidus, but only conditionally. Antony was to reduce the East to order, while Octavian was to carry out the distributions of land in Italy to the veterans, and to carry on the war against Pompeius.

Octavian in Italy (41).—Antony had chosen for himself the easy task, while all the difficulties fell to his colleague; for Octavian had to reduce an enemy who was almost unassailable from his command of the sea, and to restore order in Italy, which was once more in absolute confusion. He had

[1] *E.g.* the poet Horace, who commanded a legion at Philippi, where, like Alcaeus, he threw away his shield and ran away. *Odes* II. 7. 9.

two kinds of discontent to face, that of the soldiers who looked on themselves as masters, and complained that they had not received a proper reward, and that of the Italian proprietors, who found themselves dispossessed to make room for the veterans.[1] Octavian's task was rendered harder by the intrigues of Antony's wife, Fulvia, and of his brother, Lucius, who finally took up arms. They were compelled to throw themselves into Perusia, a town on the borders of Etruria and Umbria, and surrendered, after a hard siege, early in the year 40. This was the last civil war in Italy for more than a century, and Octavian was now rapidly drawing to himself all that was best in Rome. Men saw that he was a statesman, while Antony was proving himself a reckless debauchee, and Sextus Pompeius was the chief of the organized sea-robbers, whom it had been his great father's most glorious achievement to crush. Foremost among Octavian's supporters was M. Vipsanius Agrippa, who, from this time onwards, becomes his right hand in all his operations, military and civil. Agrippa, who was born in the same year as Octavian, and who had been his friend from boyhood, was a man of low birth, but in vigour and character he was not unworthy to be ranked with the heroes of the old Republic.

Treaty of Brundisium (40).—For a moment it seemed as if a general civil war was about to blaze out again. Antony, after wasting the year 41 in extortion and excess in Greece and Asia, had now returned to champion his own interests, and was besieging Brundisium; he had also entered into communications with Sextus Pompeius. A treaty was, however, negotiated, by which Antony and Octavian once more divided the Roman world between them. Antony was to have the East, and to recover Asia Minor from the Parthians; while Octavian had the West and the task of crushing Sextus Pompeius. Lepidus was left in possession of Africa. The alliance was cemented by Antony's marriage (his wife Fulvia was just dead) with his rival's sister, Octavia

[1] The best known instance of this is the case of Virgil, who lost his farm near Mantua; unlike most of the dispossessed, he recovered it, thanks to his personal introduction to Octavian (*cf. Ecl.* i. 42–4). Horace and Propertius also suffered in the same confiscations.

She was too good for her worthless husband, but she seems really to have loved him, and while her influence lasted Antony was saved from ruining himself utterly.

Division of West and East.—By this treaty the old dualism between East and West was once more accentuated; the struggle which had been waged between Sulla and the Marians, between Pompey and Caesar, between Brutus and Cassius and the triumvirs, was to be fought out once more. Nine years, however, were to elapse before the decisive struggle, during which Octavian and Antony met twice only, at Misenum in 39, and at Tarentum in the year 37, when the triumvirate was renewed for five years more. It will be convenient to divide the events of the next nine years according to the division of empire which was now established. The work of Octavian must be taken first, for he was at once master of the capital and the representative of all the traditions of Roman government.

The work of Octavian. I. The Reduction of Sextus Pompeius.—Octavian's first duty was to restore peace to the sea, and to provide for the corn supply of Rome. In 39, a treaty was concluded with Sextus Pompeius, by which he was recognized as master of Sicily and Sardinia, and was promised Achaia for five years; but Octavian unscrupulously violated the treaty next year, by receiving the surrender of Sardinia from Sextus' treacherous freedman Menas. War was at once renewed, at first with disaster to Octavian; but in the decisive struggle of 36, he succeeded, after many changes of fortune, in seizing Sicily, while Agrippa defeated the pirate fleet at Mylae and at Naulochus (Sept. 36).

Sextus Pompeius fled to the East, where he was seized and put to death by Antony's lieutenants. He had been treated with gross treachery by Octavian, but he can hardly be said to have deserved success; he had alienated or assassinated the most respectable elements among his followers, and preferred to rely on freedmen and runaway slaves. Hence it was the right side triumphed, although Augustus, with good reason, in his own account of his own early career, passes very rapidly over his relations with Pompey.[1]

[1] *The Monumentum Ancyranum*, the most famous of all Latin inscriptions, is an account of the "*Res gestae*" of Augustus, which

At the same time Lepidus disappeared from the scene. He had given to Octavian but lukewarm support against Sextus Pompeius, and was now deprived of Africa; but he lived on as pontifex maximus in Rome till his death in the year 12. It was a curious irony of fate that exalted to being one of the three masters of the world a man who had ability as a subordinate, but who had but little character and no genius.

II. **The Settlement of Italy and Rome.**—Octavian carried out in 36, as he had done after Philippi, and as he did again after Actium, a large distribution of land among his veterans. The results of this must be described in the general account of his work. He also, through Agrippa, who became aedile in 33, began a thorough restoration of the public buildings of Italy. It was the beginning of the policy which, carried out under his principate, "found Rome brick, and left it marble." At the same time he sternly repressed brigandage in Italy, and established the first regular police force in Rome.

III. **Work in the Provinces.**—Still more important was his work in the provinces. He began that policy of organization and extension which afterwards brought the Roman empire into its final shape. For the present, it will be enough to mention that in 39 and 38 Agrippa settled affairs in Gaul, and transported a German tribe, the Ubii, to the left bank of the Rhine (among whom afterwards Colonia Agrippina, *i.e.*, Cologne, was founded).

The work of securing the Alpine passes into Italy was also begun, by the foundation of Augusta Praetoria (Aosta) in 35, and of colonies in Venetia.

But the extension of the Roman frontier on the N.E. was his hardest task. He carried the Roman arms over the Alps into the basin of the Danube (35), defeated the Pannonians, and captured their stronghold of Siscia on the Savus (Save). With the province of Pannonia, which was now in part formed, begins the establishment of the Danube frontier,

was set up by him in various parts of the empire. Only one copy, that at Ancyra in Galatia, has been preserved in anything like completeness. In this Augustus never mentions Sextus Pompeius by name, but simply speaks of a "*servile bellum*," and says, "*Mare pacavi a praedonibus.*"

although of course this work was not to be completed till the end of his principate, and then only after much hard fighting. Octavian was preparing for the final struggle for the empire of the world; but he too, like Julius Caesar, has the mark of genius. The expedients which he adopts as means to his great end are all themselves ends as well, and form parts of one great scheme of conquest and organization.

The Parthian Invasion.—The task assigned to Antony by the treaty of Brundisium was not so hard as that of Octavian, but it was serious enough; for, thanks to Roman divisions, the Roman empire in the East was lost, and had to be regained. Even Pompey himself had negotiated with the Parthians, and his successors had received definite help from them, and Parthian horsemen had fought on the Republican side at Philippi. The Parthians, taking advantage first of Antony's inactivity, and then of his return to Italy, now overran Syria, and crossed Mt. Taurus into Asia Minor, where they overran almost the whole of the mainland; they were led by Labienus, the son of Caesar's traitorous lieutenant, who actually assumed the name "Parthicus," for victories over his own countrymen.

Victories of Ventidius, 39 and 38.—Antony did not hurry to the war, even after the treaty of Brundisium. He, however, sent a capable representative in Ventidius Bassus, a man whose career is one of the romances of Roman history. He had been brought a slave to Rome during the Social war, but had obtained freedom and wealth; he attracted Caesar's notice during the Gallic War as a contractor for the transport of supplies, and was rapidly promoted by him. He had even attained the consulship in 43; and now, by his vigour and military skill, he accomplished the work which his chief was neglecting. Opening the campaign in the summer of 39, he drove the Parthians out of Asia Minor, and, following them into Syria, gained, on the very anniversary of Carrhae (38), a great victory at Gindarus. Ventidius was now relieved of the command by Antony, but he was allowed to have a triumph—the first won over Parthians.

Antony and Cleopatra.—Antony did not succeed in continuing his lieutenant's victories, and was compelled to raise the siege of Samosata. He was now coming completely under

that mischievous influence which was to ruin his career once and for all. He had met the Egyptian queen, Cleopatra, in Cilicia in 41, and had followed her to Egypt; for a time his interests in Italy and his marriage with Octavia had kept him from her, but he rejoined her in 37, and from this time onwards, she was his evil genius. Though still a good soldier in the field, his warlike operations were paralyzed by his unwillingness to leave her and his hurry to return to her.

Antony's Failure against the Parthians.—Antony was in the most favourable position to reduce the Parthians. He had an enormous force of eighteen legions, besides a large body of auxiliaries; moreover, by his alliance with Armenia, he was able to invade Parthia on its weakest side, marching down the valley of the Tigris into Mesopotamia. His enemies too were distracted by internal disunion, owing to the cruelty of Prahates, who had put the old king, Orodes, to death. All these advantages Antony threw away; he attacked the strong town of Gazaca in Media Atropatene to the north-east of Parthia, but he failed to take it, owing to the loss of his siege-train, which he left insufficiently guarded and which was surprised by the Parthians. He therefore retreated on Armenia, but his army suffered terribly from the attacks of the enemy and from the cold of winter, which was very severe among the mountains. Antony, however, was never so formidable, as when he was hard pressed and in difficulties; he displayed all his old energy, and saved his army from the fate of Crassus. But as soon as he had brought it into safety, his fatal infatuation for Cleopatra reasserted its hold over him, and though he reduced Armenia in 34, and treacherously put to death its king, Artavasdes, he secured no permanent result except the planting in the hearts of the Armenian people of a deep hatred and distrust of the Romans.

Antony as an Oriental Despot.—He himself spent his time at Alexandria, and behaved like an oriental despot. He distributed the Roman dominions in the East, as if they had been Persian satrapies, among dependent princes, and erected kingdoms for Cleopatra and her children; he seemed to intend to make Alexandria a capital of an Eastern empire, and

in his dress and behaviour, he did every thing to shock Roman feeling, so that one by one his old friends fell away from him.[1] All men knew that a struggle with Octavian was inevitable, and finally Antony broke his last link with his old colleague by divorcing Octavia (32). Octavian then declared war against Cleopatra; he was careful to enlist on his side all Roman feelings, and he claimed with some reason to be fighting for Roman religion, Roman family life, and even for the existence of Rome as a governing city, against an abandoned eastern queen.[2] It is remarkable, however, that in spite of all the follies of Antony, he still had partisans in Rome; both the two consuls of the year 32 went over to him.

The Battle of Actium.—The struggle for the empire of the world was fought out once more in the Greek peninsula, for the third time within twenty years; but this time it was decided by sea. Antony had intended to invade Italy, but he found his rival's fleet on the watch, and his own fleet therefore wintered in the Ambracian gulf, which is almost completely shut off from the sea by the promontory of Actium. The main force of his army too, some 100,000 legionaries and 12,000 cavalry, besides numerous Eastern auxiliaries, wintered here. His fleet consisted of some 500 galleys, while that of Octavian was only about one-half the size, and the vessels were much smaller than those of Antony, many of which had ten banks of oars; Octavian had about 80,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. But the genius of Agrippa fully compensated for the disparity in numbers, while Cleopatra's influence ruined everything in Antony's army. Hence when Octavian crossed the sea in the spring of 31, and united his forces near the port of Comarus (where later he founded Nicopolis), desertions from his rival became frequent, *e.g.* both Amyntas and Deiotarus, two of Antony's subject princes, came over. Antony, discouraged by this and feeling himself unable to

[1] *E.g.* Munatius Plancus, who had been a supporter of Antony since 43 (p. 294). Plancus' character for treachery, however, was notorious.

[2] For this we may *cf.* Hor. *Odes.* i. 35, where he celebrates the delivery of Rome from Cleopatra and her train. *Cf.* too Virg. *Aen.* viii. 679


AMBRACIA
BAY OF COMARUS
NICOPOLIS
C
A
E
Promontory of Actium
D
B
F
Temple of Apollo
ANACTORIUM
THYRIUM
LEUCAS
A. Army of Augustus
B. Army of Antony
C. Fleet of Augustus before battle
D. Fleet of Augustus at time of battle with its right a little drawn back
E. Fleet of Antony before battle
F Fleet of Antony at time of battle i.e. along coast

hold his position, impregnable though it was,[1] seems to have resolved to retreat to Egypt. It was to cover this retreat that the battle of Actium was fought (Sept. 2, 31). The ships of Antony sailed out from the gulf and for a time held their own by superior weight, but when Cleopatra gave the signal for retreat, whether from cowardice, or (as is more probable) by concerted arrangement, and when her squadron of sixty ships followed her, the Antonian fleet broke up; some fled, other fought on till the fireships of the enemy destroyed them. The land army surrendered about seven days later.

Deaths of Antony and Cleopatra. — Antony and Cleopatra fled to Egypt, and there once more gave themselves over to pleasure, till Octavian, who had wintered in Samos, followed up his success next year by invading their country (30). Antony attempted resistance, but was defeated, and killed himself, and Cleopatra followed his example, after vainly trying to charm Octavian, as she had charmed his great-uncle before him. Her death is the only noble event in her career, for her life might have been spared, had she been willing to submit to being led as a captive in triumph. The end of Antony was a fitting close to his life; there is no career in history so strange as his, for when he had the empire of the world in his hand, he deliberately threw it away for an ignoble passion, and he was no mere boy at the time, but a man of over fifty, who had played a prominent part in affairs for twenty years. It must be remembered, however, that this last great collapse on his part was only one of many; for alike as Caesar's subordinate in 48 and 47, as consul in 44, and as triumvir in 41, he had shown himself incapable of standing the intoxication of absolute power.

The result of the war was the immediate annexation of Egypt to the Roman empire; what was far more important, it was now decided that the Roman world should have one master, and that that master was to be Octavian.

[1] Antony's army was suffering from famine; he had tried to assume the offensive by land, transporting his infantry across the strait, and sending his cavalry round the Ambraciot Gulf; but the latter was defeated, and Octavian's infantry refused to be drawn into a fight.

CHAPTER XLII.

THE WORK OF AUGUSTUS IN ITALY

The Character of the Principate.—Historians date the formal establishment of the Empire from the year 27. Augustus, in his *Monumentum Ancyranum* (p. 298), says that in that year "he transferred the State from his own authority to the control of the Senate and people of Rome."[1]

In this seeming contradiction lies the explanation of the whole position of the Roman emperors. In theory, at any rate at first, they were but citizens among citizens, holding only such offices and titles as had been held by their great countrymen before them; in fact, they were absolute masters of the Roman world. Of course, the fact tended to become more and more clear as time went on, and the theory was more and more lost sight of; but it was as much the endeavour of Augustus and of Tiberius (at the beginning of his rule) to conceal their power as it had been the endeavour of Julius to assert it.

Effects of the Unacknowledged Character of the Principate.—The pretence that the *princeps* (*cf.* p. 306) was a mere citizen, when he was really an absolute ruler, had, like all other shams, very evil results. It rendered his rule insecure, for bold men tried to make the fiction of the Republic a reality by plotting to restore "liberty"; it prevented (except in the army) all growth of loyalty to the reigning house; it made the succession uncertain, and so, indirectly, caused the intrigues and the assassinations which disgrace the annals of the Julian and the Claudian Caesars; it hampered the emperors in their endeavours to reform the State, *e.g.* Roman

[1] "*Rempublicam ex mea potestate in Senatus populique Romani arbitrium transtuli.*"

Drawn by W. Hughes

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prejudice objected to rapid extension of the franchise to the provinces. But the pretence had this one justification: it alone made the monarchy possible, for, even after the terrible lessons of the Civil Wars, it is very doubtful whether the Roman people would have long submitted to the rule of one man, had not that rule been disguised. Hence, though the system of Augustus was full of faults, yet it had this virtue, that it was a system that worked; and this is the surpassing merit of Augustus as a statesman —he saw, not what was ideally best, but what was possible, and accomplished this.

The Powers of the Princeps. I. The Proconsulare Imperium.—We must now briefly describe the powers of the ruler, and at the head of these naturally comes the command of the armies of the Roman State, which was given him by the *proconsulare imperium*. This, which he received in the year 27 for ten years, and which was renewed from time to time, was the same power which had been given to Pompey by the Gabinian and the Manilian laws. It made him the equal everywhere of the provincial governors; but, as he was consul also, he was superior to each individual governor even in theory, while the fact that his *imperium* was unlimited made him their master. In the year 23 Augustus laid down the consulship, but at the same time his *proconsulare imperium* was extended by being made superior (*majus*) to that of all other governors. He was also permitted to retain it within the *pomoerium*—a thing unknown before. The *proconsulare imperium* was conferred by the Senate, as had been the case under the Republic.

II. The Tribunicia Potestas.—But the *proconsulare imperium* only gave him authority in the provinces. In Italy his authority rested on his *tribunicia potestas*, which was given him first in 36, and then in 23 in a modified form, which made it annual as well as perpetual. This power

(1) Connected the princeps with the special magistracy of the Roman plebs, and made his person sacred.

(2) Gave him the right of convening the Senate, and of proposing to it any measure that he pleased (*jus relationis*).

(3) Gave him the right of veto.

(4) And gave him the power of pardoning.

Hence, as being his chief power in Italy, it was used for two purposes:

(1) By its years are dated the years of the Emperor's reign (as may be seen on any imperial coin).

(2) It was used for marking out the successor to the principate. So Agrippa, and afterwards Tiberius, received it under Augustus.

III. Other Powers.—In addition, Augustus had, from time to time, other powers conferred on him which were in the end embodied in a "*lex regia*";[1] this was passed for each emperor on his accession. Such powers were the right of concluding treaties of issuing edicts, &c. (*cf.* p. 83).

The Emperor's Titles—Augustus and Princeps.—In addition to his powers, Octavian (in 27) received the title of Augustus. It conferred no new rights on him, but marked him out as the head of the State, while it also associated him with the gods, to whom it had hitherto been specially appropriated. Hence, from this time onwards, it became his special name, and the contrast between Octavian the triumvir and Augustus the princeps is all-important. It was assigned to his successors also, but with them it remained a title.

The Emperor's general position was expressed in his title *Princeps*. This was not formally voted to him, but was used in addressing him, just as it had been used of Pompey and other great Romans under the Republic. It implied that he was the first citizen, and not a ruler.[2]

The Emperor's Religious Position.—Other titles, such as that of *pater patriae*, and other powers, cannot be here discussed; but a word must be said of the Emperor's religious position. He was not only, as pontifex maximus, head of the Roman state religion; he was himself also a kind of god. Julius Caesar had received some divine honours in his lifetime, and after his death had been actually deified. Hence Augustus always spoke of himself as "*Divi filius*." Popular enthusiasm

[1] We have the lex passed for Vespasian preserved in a fragmentary form in an inscription. Mommsen, however, takes this lex as conferring the *tribunicia potestas*, not as granting any special powers.

[2] The title has nothing to do with that of Princeps Senatus, given to the senator whose name appeared at the head of the roll. The Emperor, however, also held this latter position. The young Caesars (p. 312) were called *principes iuventutis*.

in Italy went further, and Augustus was informally deified by it, *e.g.* at Pompeii. But in Rome and Italy he only allowed the worship of his *genius* to be joined to that of the *Lares* (*cf.* Horace, *Odes*, iv. 5). After death good emperors were officially deified, and their proper style was "*Divus*." In the provinces, however, the worship of "Rome and Augustus" spread rapidly. It represented loyalty to Rome and to her civilization, and was introduced by the emperors in order to drive out the national worships, which always tended to foster rebellions. In Italy and still more in the provinces the deification of emperors presented little difficulty to men's minds; the polytheism of the Old World was familiar with the idea of deified mortals. (See p. 323.)

Powers of the Senate.—The Senate in theory stood side by side with the Emperor, sharing with him the rule of the Roman world in a "Dyarchy," and their powers were parallel. They each appointed governors to their own provinces. The Senate could pass laws, while the Emperor could issue edicts, which practically had the force of laws. The Senate was the high court of justice in Rome, while the Emperor, too, could try important cases if he wished.[1] The Senate had under its control the old treasury of the State (*aerarium*), while the Emperor's finances were at first managed in the treasuries (*fisci*) of his various provinces, and, under Claudius, organized under one central imperial treasury (*fiscus*). Hence the Senate nominally had gained power since the times of the Republic, for both its legislative and its judicial functions were new; but while, under the Republic, it had, as a rule, been supreme over the magistrates, it was now quite subservient to the Emperor.

Reasons for the Senate's Subservience. — And there were abundant reasons for this subservience. The Republican magistrates had been numerous, and had held their offices for short periods only; the Emperor united all their powers in one hand, and held them for life. Hence he was really the master of the Senate, and not its servant. Again, in the division of the provinces the Emperor had kindly undertaken to govern all those which were on the frontier, and so were

[1] This jurisdiction of the Emperor was hardly used till the reign of Claudius.

likely to give trouble. The result was, that all the armies of the empire were under the command of his officers except in Africa, where one legion was stationed under a senatorial governor.

In the third place a large number of members of the Senate owed their position to the Emperor. Four of the praetors every year were his nominees (*cf.* p. 283), "commended" by him to the people, and elected as a matter of course. And over the elections generally he had influence by his power of *nominatio*, although this did not guarantee the candidate's success absolutely.

Again, the Emperor was in the habit of assisting, with presents of money, poor but deserving senators. The line of distinction between this and open corruption was very narrow. And all senators knew that the Emperor had the control of State patronage, and could make or mar their careers.

Augustus' Respect for the Senate.—But Augustus professed to treat the Senate with the utmost respect. Unlike Julius, he scrupulously observed its traditions; he reduced its numbers to 600, and carefully excluded all low-born or barbarian members. And he discontinued the publication of the *acta* of the Senate, which had been begun by Caesar in 59.

Position of the People.—The people of Rome nominally were in the same position as under the Republic, but really their power was a mere shadow. The comitia still met to elect the magistrates, but the Emperor's influence controlled these elections, and even the form of election (at any rate, so far as concerned the praetors) was transferred to the Senate at the beginning of the reign of Tiberius. The comitia,[1] it is true, conferred on the Emperor the tribunicia potestas; but even this was a mere form, and the preliminary vote of the Senate was all-important; and legislation by the people became more and more infrequent.

In fact, the people of Rome had lost all share in the government. The Emperor provided them with amusements

[1] Mommsen thinks the Comitia Centuriata, not the Tributa.

and with food, and so long as these were given regularly they were content. The number of recipients of the corn dole, which had been cut down by Caesar to 150,000, was raised to 200,000 by Augustus. So important was the task of providing the food of Rome that, in 22 B.C., owing to the great scarcity, Augustus himself undertook the *cura annonae*, and in the end he set up the special *praefectura annonae*, which was one of the most important offices in the imperial civil service.

Position of the Equites.—This office is a good instance of the way in which Augustus did his best to put an end to the old rivalry between the capitalists and the Senate. The breach between them had been already to some extent healed by the compromise as to the judicia (p. 230), and by Sulla's arrangement that the son of a senator became, as a matter of course, an eques. Augustus now gave the three *decuriae judicum* entirely to the equites, and added a fourth of men whose census was half the equestrian, *i.e.*, 200,000 sesterces and upwards; this class were therefore called *ducenarii*. At the same time he organized a career for the equites apart from that open to senators; while the senators furnished the governors of the provinces, both imperial and senatorial, the equites had the posts of the subordinate officers of the legions, and the whole range of imperial prefectures and procuratorships, such as that over the corn supply which has just been mentioned; these embraced duties of the most varied kind, from the management of the imperial estates to the governorship of Egypt, which was the Emperor's special property, or of minor provinces like Noricum; the most important of all the prefects were those who had the control of the praetorian guards and of the police of the city. Hence it was open for a man of ability to enter either on the old *cursus honorum*, or to choose the less showy but equally important duties more especially connected with the Emperor.

Restoration of Order. I. In Rome.—The powers thus concentrated in the hands of the emperor, he used with great effect for the restoration of order in Rome. He had as triumvir (p. 299) established a police system; as Emperor he organized the *cohortes urbanae* for the maintenance of

the peace of the city. These were under the command of the *praefectus urbi*, the only one of the imperial prefects who was a senator; this exception was necessary, as he might on occasion be called on to preside in the Senate.

So too Augustus organized the *cohortes vigilum*, to deal with the fires which were so frequent among the crowded houses of Rome. Under the Republic several magistrates were responsible for dealing with fires, and authority so subdivided had been, of course, quite ineffectual for its work. For the better management of the city, it was now divided into seven districts, and to each of these two *cohortes vigilum* were assigned. Other new departments of Imperial administration were the *cura aquarum* (set up 11 B.C.), and the repair of public buildings, etc.

II. In Italy.—In Italy the disorder to be coped with was not quite so serious, and hence the municipal magistrates were left to deal with it; the imperial division of Italy into eleven districts was not made for administrative purposes. But the Emperor undertook (B.C. 20) the care of the great roads of Italy, and he tried indirectly to remedy the evils of the slave system by organizing an inspection of the *ergastula*, or slave prisons, which under the Republic, had been centres of disorder, as well as of the most brutal cruelties.

Land Distributions in Italy.—So too the distributions of land among his veterans, which were made by him after each of his great victories (in 41, 36, and 30) served to make good some of the gaps in population caused by civil war, and seem to have resulted in planting settlements in some districts, chiefly in the north of Italy, which afterwards served as nurseries for the Roman armies. The great roads especially were secured by planting colonies of veterans on them. Such measures, and still more the restoration of peace and order in the empire, tended to restore prosperity to Italy. This was not universal, for the Maremma had already sunk into the deserted region, cursed with malaria, which it still remains; and in the south of Italy, especially in Bruttium, the land was given over to pasture and forest (*saltus*), which yielded a large revenue. Cisalpine Gaul, however, and the regions of

Umbria and Picenum, became very prosperous; in the former great manufactures of cloth made Patavium (Padua) the wealthiest town, next to Rome, in the Western world.

Restoration of Religion.—There was one task, however, which was beyond the power of Augustus or of any government. Roman religion and Roman morals had sunk into hopeless decay, in the century and a half which had passed since Cato had championed the good old times. The temples were many of them in ruins, and even outward respect to religion was ceasing to be paid. Augustus himself set the example of temple restoration, and all those who wished for his favour knew that expenditure on objects of this kind was a sure way to the goodwill of the Emperor. Outward order and even magnificence were restored. The court poet, Horace, celebrates the success of this reformation.[1]

Moral Decay of Italy.—But it was as superficial as all reformations imposed by authority must be. Augustus, like Louis XIV. of France, ordered that his people should be religious, and professed to set the example of decent and orderly life. But his own character, and still more the scandalous life of his daughter Julia, set a bad example in high places, which exactly corresponded to the character of the people over whom he ruled. It was useless for Virgil to describe, in his *Eclogues* and *Georgics*, the beauty of country life, when his own patron, Maecenas, lived in splendid extravagance at Rome. And there were in Roman society evils far more serious than luxury and extravagance; to the degradation of Roman morals, all writers, sacred and profane alike, bear witness. And this widespread vice had its natural result in decay of population; the very institution of the family was endangered by the unwillingness of Romans to marry. Augustus tried to remedy this by his own Lex Julia of 18 B.C., and by the Leges Papiae Poppaeae of 9 A.D. These not only attacked immorality by definite punishments, but endeavoured to promote good morals by an appeal to the pocket; the father of three legitimate children had special privileges given him in the way of exemption from

[1] Horace, *Odes* iv. 5.

certain taxes, while those who were unmarried (*coelebs*) were not allowed to receive legacies at all, except from their relatives, and those who had no children (*orbus*) could only receive half. The unclaimed legacies (*caduca*) lapsed to the treasury, and the legislation of Augustus produced a handsome revenue, as the result of these unclaimed bequests; but the legislation was not likely to succeed in making people marry, when the two consuls who proposed it were both bachelors.[1]

Misfortunes of Augustus' Family.—This failure to regulate the family life of the Romans corresponded to Augustus' misfortunes in his own family. By his second wife, Scribonia, he had one daughter, Julia, but he divorced her to marry Livia (38 B.C.), who was the mother of two sons, Tiberius and Drusus Nero, by her first husband. Augustus had also a nephew, Marcellus, the son of his beloved sister, Octavia, by her first husband. It was Augustus' earnest desire to have a successor of his own family; but Livia bore him no children, and Marcellus, who married Julia, died young (23 B.C.). Julia was then married to Agrippa, the old friend of Augustus, but he died in the year 12, and of his three sons, the first two, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, were cut off prematurely, just as Augustus was marking them out, by grants of special honours, as the heirs of his position and power; the third, Agrippa Postumus, was such a boor that he had to be banished.[2]

Nor were these all the private misfortunes of Augustus; he was compelled to banish his daughter Julia for her

[1] It is a mistake to say that Augustus assumed a censoria potestas. He held three *census* in B.C. 28 with M. Agrippa, in B.C. 8 and in A.D. 14 with Tiberius; these he held in virtue of his consulare imperium, assumed only on these occasions. (But he was consul in B.C. 5 and B.C. 2, to introduce his grandsons to public life.) The number of citizens on the last occasion was 4,097,000. The last ordinary censors, not of imperial family, were appointed in B.C. 22.

[2] Her daughter Agrippina married Germanicus, the son of Drusus Nero. Her pride, as the direct descendant of Augustus, caused great trouble to the Emperor Tiberius, and the ultimate ruin of her numerous children; of these the most important were Caius, the Emperor ("Caligula"), and Agrippina, second wife of the Emperor Claudius, her paternal uncle, and mother of the Emperor Nero.

scandalous immorality, and Drusus, the younger of his step-sons, whom he seems to have really cared for, died in the field (9 B.C.). Roman scandal attributed to the crimes of his second wife, Livia, the series of deaths which had left the house of Augustus desolate, but there is absolutely no proof of this charge.

The old man therefore in the latter part of his reign found himself left with no one to nominate as successor except his elder step-son Tiberius. This prince, whom Augustus disliked, succeeded him on his death (14 A.D.).

The Work of Augustus.—But though the reign of Augustus closed in failure and gloom, at home and abroad (p. 322) he had done good work for his country. He may not have been an original genius; he undoubtedly gained his power by means the most unscrupulous;[1] but he gave Rome and the Roman world rest for nearly fifty years, and he created a government which was to rule Rome for 500 years, and New Rome for 1000 more.[2]

[1] Seneca cruelly calls the mercy of Augustus "*lassa crudelitas.*" (*De Clem.* i. 11).

[2] Interesting light is thrown on the state of Italy at the accession of Augustus by the *De Re Rustica* of the learned Varro, the one work among his seventy-four which has come down to us entire. He wrote it in 37 B.C., in his eightieth year. He shows that it was still possible to farm in Italy for profit, but this could mainly be made by ministering to the luxury of Rome, and rearing birds and beasts (including snails and dormice) and fish for the Roman market. Most of the work on the farm is done by slaves; only the *villicus* (bailiff), his assistant, and the *promus* (steward) are to be free. There is little cruelty, but Varro warns his readers that to have too many slaves of one nationality is a cause of *offensiones domesticae.*

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE WORK OF AUGUSTUS OUTSIDE ITALY

State of the Empire in 31 B.C.—The work which Augustus had to do in the provinces was even more serious than the restoration of order in Italy. During the Civil Wars, there had seemed real danger that the Roman empire would perish; not only had the Parthians overrun Asia Minor, but every frontier had been violated. It is true that the success of Ventidius (p. 300) had saved Rome's Eastern provinces, but Antony's failures had obscured the effect of this.[1]

And quite apart from the protection of the Roman empire, there was the ever-recurring question of preventing provincial misgovernment. This had been checked by Julius, but had revived as badly as ever after his death, *e.g.* Asia had been plundered first by Brutus and Cassius and then by Antony. Here, too, the empire had to solve the problems left it by the Republic.

Three Periods in the Foreign Policy of Augustus.—The task, then, of Augustus abroad divides itself into three parts:

(1) The general organization of the provinces, to prevent misgovernment. The principles of this reform were laid down at the beginning of the principate.

(2) The vindication of the frontier, and the settlement of districts already conquered. This covers the first period of his rule—till 16 B.C.

(3) The extension of the frontier to the Danube, and the attempt to extend it to the Elbe. This gigantic scheme of conquest fills the last thirty years of his reign; it is, at first,

[1] Roman discouragement at the time is well seen in Horace, *e.g.* *Epodes* 16, or *Odes*, i. 2, and i. 14; these poems lose more than half their force if, because the dangers were surmounted, we imagine them to have been always poetic fancies.

brilliantly successful, and then ends in terrible disaster, which loses much of the ground that had been gained.

Provincial Government in General.—The great improvement in provincial administration under the principate was due not so much to any change of detail as to the change in the general spirit of government. The provinces had been oppressed, because the central authority in Rome was weak; the Senate could not enforce good government abroad, nor did it wish to do so, as it preferred the special interests of its own members to the general interests of the State. Now, on the contrary, the princeps was strong enough to make himself felt everywhere, and his interest was that no one should oppress the provinces except perhaps himself. Hence the central government had both the power and the will to secure justice to provincials.

Improvements in Detail.—But there were other special changes also, which aided to bring about a better state of things. The financial arrangements were improved; the old system of tithes in Asia was abolished, and a new assessment of the whole empire was carried out under the superintendence of Agrippa. Thus burdens were imposed on the provincials according to their ability to bear them.

Again, under the republican system, the provincial governor had been supposed to serve for nothing, as Roman office was in theory to be a source of honour, not of profit. The result, of course, was that the governors paid themselves by extortion. Augustus saw that it was impossible to expect men to undertake important duties away from Rome unless they were well rewarded for their work; hence, though in theory senators, as governors, were still unpaid, in practice their allowances were made so handsome that a man could look to his provincial government as a source of legitimate profit. It was the same change which Lord Clive carried out in India, assigning the salt-tax to provide adequate pay for the officers of the East India Company, who had been previously paid like clerks, and had therefore oppressed like Roman proconsuls. The rapid extension of the franchise to provincials also which went on, almost in spite of Augustus, tended to prevent arbitrary conduct in the governors. The prosperity of the provinces, further, was much increased by

the abolition of the vexatious restrictions on trade between province and province, and between one part of a province and another, which had been part of the selfish policy of the Republic.

Special Improvement in the Imperial Provinces.—But it was especially in the Emperor's own provinces that things improved. The imperial governors were no longer ex-magistrates, elected by the people of Rome; they were now definitely chosen for the purpose by a master who had every reason to encourage good service, and every means to reward it. And as the tenure of an imperial province depended on the emperor's pleasure, the provincials were spared[1] the rapid change of governors, which still was the rule in senatorial provinces.

Settlement of the Frontiers.—In speaking of the second part of Augustus' work—the settlement of the old frontiers and the organization of the provinces gained under the republic—it will be convenient to describe it geographically, beginning in the East, where, after his victory over Antony, he found himself compelled to first take up the work of settlement. He had a powerful army at his command, and many expected him to cross the Euphrates and avenge the defeats of Crassus and of Antony. But Augustus here, as everywhere, aimed at what was possible rather than at an ideal. He knew that the Parthians were not really formidable, and that in the desert and the Euphrates he had a natural frontier which was at once definite and defensible.

Diplomatic Relations with Parthia.—But though he abstained from an invasion, he interfered by diplomacy in the affairs of Parthia. In that empire, as in all countries where polygamy prevails, family feuds in the royal house were constant; and it was the policy of the Roman empire, formulated by Augustus, and maintained continuously, to support a pretender against the ruling sovereign, or the sovereign against a pretender. So in the very first period of Augustus' reign, the struggle of the Parthian king Prahates against his rival Tiridates, enabled Augustus to paralyse Parthia (20), and even to obtain the restoration of the lost standards of

[1] This was especially the case under the emperor Tiberius.

Crassus. This surrender of the symbols of victory was construed by the Romans as equivalent to the paying of homage. In another way too Augustus sought influence in Parthia; by keeping hostages of the royal house at his court, he sought to imbue them with the ideas of Western civilization; as might be expected, it was chiefly its vices which they learned.

Vassal States on the Eastern Frontier.—But, besides Parthia, the Roman provinces in the East were bounded by, or included, a number of semi-dependent kingdoms, which in most cases were at last absorbed in the empire proper; so Galatia became a province in 25 B.C., on the death of Amyntas, to whom it had been given successively by Antony and by Octavian. Of these states, the best known is Judaea, which, after the execution of the last of the Maccabees in 38, was given to Herod the Great. Though he bore the title of "king," he paid tribute to the Romans, and may be looked upon as a kind of royal procurator, and a legion was quartered at Jerusalem to support him. On his death, in B.C. 4, his son Archelaus succeeded him in Judaea, but was deposed after a rule of 10 years. Then Judaea was added to the Roman province of Syria, and governed by procurators, *e.g.* Pontius Pilate (A.D. 41). After 35 years, it was given to Herod Agrippa I.,[1] who finally re-united to it the whole domains of Herod the Great, which had included much more than Judaea. On his death, his son Herod Agrippa II. succeeded to part of his dominions, but Judaea proper was finally merged in the Roman empire, and again governed by procurators, *e.g.* Felix and Festus. These constant changes are unimportant in themselves, but typical of the constant alterations in the position of these vassal states. Others of the same type are Cappadocia, Commagene, and Chalcis. The Roman empire, however, gradually absorbed all these, as the English rule in India—down at any rate to 1857—steadily absorbed the vassal states of India.

[1] The Herod of Acts xii. 1, who put S. James to death. His son is the Herod of Acts xxv. and xxvi. I add these references as a reminder of the too-much-forgotten fact, that we have in the Acts a historical authority of great interest, which gives an account of life under the Roman empire from the point of view of a provincial.

Armenia.—One border state, however, was not absorbed, and is so important that it must be treated by itself. Armenia lay between Rome and Parthia, and the control of it seemed necessary to the safety of both those empires; for on its western frontier Armenia touched the Roman dominions, and on its southern frontier lay Mesopotamia, which was most easily invaded down the valley of the Tigris. In its civilization and religion,[1] Armenia was much more akin to Parthia than to Rome, and the Armenians never forgot Antony's treacherous execution of Artavasdes. Hence the history of this kingdom is the history of constant expeditions on the part of Rome to establish, in the Roman interest, kings whose power is always transitory. Three times in 40 years was the Roman heir-apparent sent on this fruitless errand—Tiberius in 20 B.C., C. Caesar (Augustus' grandson) in 1 A.D., and Germanicus in 17 A.D.

The position of Armenia as an uncertain "buffer state" between Rome and Parthia closely resembles that of Afghanistan between the empires of Russia and of England in Asia. We have even a parallel to Antony's treatment of Artavasdes in our own deposition of Dost Mahommed in 1839.

Southern Gaul.—Turning now to Augustus' work in the West, we must leave the organization of the Danube frontier till we come to speak of the period of conquest; but there were two great districts, Gaul and Spain, in which the work of conquest had been almost done under the Republic, and of which the organization was carried out by Augustus in the first period of his reign.

He set himself to improve the communication between Italy and Gaul, and reduced the tribes inhabiting the Maritime and the Cottian Alps, over the latter of which ran the Via Cottia from Augusta Taurinorum to Arelate (Turin to Arles). The latter town was one of four burgess colonies planted by Julius Caesar in southern Gaul. It is to be noticed that here in the old "province," now called Gallia Narbonensis, the Italian method of organization by towns was introduced, and the process of Romanization was very rapid. This province was assigned by Augustus to the Senate, in 23.

[1] *Cf.* Tac. *Ann.* II. 54, *Ambigua gens hominum ingeniis et situ terrarum.*

The "Three Gauls."—But in the part conquered by Caesar the organization was different. Here the old tribes were taken as the bases of organization, and thus the whole of "Celtic Gaul" was divided into 64 cantons (*pagi*), which represented the old tribes of the time of independence. This difference of organization has left an enduring mark in the town-names of modern France. In the south-east they are those of Roman municipia, *e.g.*, Arles and Nismes; in the rest of France they recall the older state of things, *e.g.*, Paris represents the Parisii, Rheims the Remi, etc.

Celtic Gaul was divided into three districts—Aquitania in the south-west, Belgica in the north-east, and Lugdunensis lying between the two, and extending to the extreme north-west. All these had their centre in Lugdunum (Lyons), which was the "capital of all three, yet not belonging to any."

This city was founded as a Roman colony by Plancus in 43, and was the only burgess-community in Celtic Gaul. Placed as it was at the confluence of the Rhone and the Saone, it was the centre of the river system of the country, and also of its road system. Here was posted the Roman garrison of 1200 men, which the Romans proudly boasted kept the whole of the vast country in order.[1]

This organization of Gaul was probably carried out by Augustus in 27, when he visited the country, as he did on three later occasions during his principate. The three provinces were all held by imperial legates, but were usually united in the time of Augustus under one general, who also had the command in the war against the Germans; this was the position of Drusus from 12 to 9 B.C., and of his brother Tiberius, who succeeded him.

Spain.—In Spain Augustus had more of the actual work of conquest to do. The mountain tribes of the north and north-west had never submitted, and there was constant fighting in the first 10 years of his reign, till at last Agrippa subdued the Cantabri (19), and removed them from their mountain fastnesses to the plains. Augustus changed the

[1] It must be remembered, however, that the armies on the Rhine served the double purpose of keeping out the Germans and of keeping down the Gauls.

old two-fold division of the country (p. 165) into a three-fold one (27). Lusitania (between the rivers Anas and Durius, *i.e.* the Guadiana and the Douro) was now separated from the "Further" province, the remainder of which henceforth was known as Baetica (the basin of the Guadalquivir); and Hither Spain, under the name of Tarraconensis, extended right across the country from the south-east to the north-west.

Romanization proceeded rapidly as Roman colonies[1] were planted, and the road system was developed, but only Baetica was considered a peaceful province, and handed over to the Senate. Three legions were still required to keep north-west Spain in order—their presence is witnessed by the name of the modern province of Leon (*e.g.*, *legio*). But the Roman town system was introduced everywhere, and Spain was a great field for Roman commercial and mining enterprize.

Reasons for Augustus' Forward Policy.—The year 16 marks, as has been said, the turning point in Augustus' reign, and the beginning of the "Forward Policy." Before this time Augustus had gained some extension of territory towards the middle Danube, and Moesia, on the lower Danube, had been made a province (29), but his main work had been that of settlement and organization. In this year the raid of the Sigambri across the Rhine, and the defeat of Lollius in Gaul, showed him that the best means for securing the Roman empire was a policy of advance. There were no doubt other reasons also. His position at Rome was now secure, and in his step-sons, Tiberius and Drusus, he had two young generals of merit who probably urged, as well as executed, his plans of conquest.

Frontier aimed at by Augustus. — The work, when once undertaken, was systematically carried out. Its aim was to make the Danube the frontier along all its middle and lower course, and to advance the Rhine frontier to the Elbe. A glance at the map of Europe will show at once the advantages of the Elbe-Danube frontier over the Rhine-Danube frontier; the former is shorter, although it protects

[1] *E.g.* Saragossa, *i.e.* Caesar Augusta, in Tarraconensis.

a far larger extent of territory, and it is free from the great wedge of independent barbarians, which, like the "salient angle" of a fortress, separated the legions of Germany from those in Pannonia.

Campaigns of 15.—The first step was to reduce the great mountain block of Central Europe, and Tiberius and Drusus in a single campaign crushed the Rhaeti and Vindelici (in East Switzerland and the Tyrol); probably Roman trade had opened the way for Roman arms, as we cannot otherwise understand how it was that so difficult a district was conquered so easily. Rhaetia and Noricum were made imperial provinces, but being small were governed by procurators, and not by praetorian legates.

Conquest in Pannonia.—Agrippa next took in hand the work of reducing Pannonia. On his death the war was carried on by Tiberius, and by B.C. 9 the northern frontier[1] of Illyricum was extended to the Danube. The work was only half done, however, and at a critical moment in the conquest of Germany (A.D. 6), all Pannonia rose in revolt, and was only crushed after three years' tremendous struggle. It was probably after this revolt that it was organized as a province separate from Illyricum. Here then Augustus' work was successful; the military skill of Tiberius secured the Danube frontier, as the genius of Julius Caesar had secured that of the Rhine.

Conquest of Germany.—Meantime, the work of conquering Germany seemed to be rapidly progressing. Drusus Nero, Augustus' younger stepson, overran North Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe, and gained great successes; but unluckily, in B.C. 9, he was killed by a fall from his horse. His brother Tiberius took up the work, and two more campaigns (8–7) reduced Germany to sullen submission. At this moment, however, owing to family divisions in the house of Augustus, the strong hand of the capable Tiberius was removed, and he went into retirement and disgrace at Rhodes.

[1] Probably the line on the east was marked by Carnuntum, Poetovio, and Siscia. It was not till much later that the whole of the territory bounded by the great south bend of the Danube was conquered.

Attempts to Romanize Germany. — Germany was now nominally a province, but the legions always wintered on the Gallic bank of the Rhine. Rome, however, was spreading her influence in her characteristic way; the most warlike of the tribes and of the chiefs were enrolled in her armies,[1] the leading men received grants of citizenship, the worship of Augustus was introduced, and noble Germans were made his priests; roads and bridges were constructed, and forts were raised. Finally, in A.D. 4, Tiberius was restored to the command, and in the winter of the next year (A.D. 5) the Roman armies wintered for the first time on the right bank of the Rhine. Only one part of Germany still remained to be subdued, the Marcomanni, in the mountain fortress of Bohemia (A.D. 6). Tiberius planned against them a combined movement of the armies of the Rhine and of the Danube, but at the moment when the campaign was about to begin, Pannonia broke into revolt, and he was recalled to avert the danger that was threatening Italy, and to crush the rebels.

Defeat of Varus (A.D. 9). — Unluckily, his successor in Germany, Quintilius Varus, was a lawyer, not a soldier. He harassed the Germans with his legal pedantry, and they soon saw and despised his military incapacity. A conspiracy was formed, headed by a German chief, Arminius, and Varus, disregarding all warnings, found himself and his army surrounded by a horde of enemies in the Teutobergensis saltus. Even now Roman discipline might have prevented absolute disaster; but the leader was incapable, his troops were demoralized, and leader and army perished together. Three legions were gone,[2] and what was far more serious, Roman prestige had received a fatal blow. Augustus saw that the Roman empire could not stand the strain of such wide conquests, and though Tiberius was sent again into Germany, and taught the rebels that Rome was still formidable, no serious effect was made to recover the lost ground.

[1] *E.g.* the Batavi. Both Arminius and his brother served also in the Roman armies.

[2] How deep was the impression on the Roman mind may be seen from the fact that the numbers (xvii., xviii., xix.) of the legions destroyed were never again used, but remained a blank in the Roman army list.

Augustus resolved to keep the Roman Empire in its present bounds, and left this as a counsel to his successors. In the provinces, as in Italy, his work lasted, and from him the Roman Empire may be said to have received its final shape.

[**The Worship of the Emperor in the Provinces.**—Augustus, in accepting worship in the provinces, was only following precedent; even proconsuls (*e.g.* Flamininus, pp. 148, 149) had had temples set up to them.

The first step was taken by the emperor when, in 29 B.C., he allowed temples to Rome and Augustus to be set up at Pergamum and at Nicaea, for the provinces of Asia and Bithynia.

A distinct step forward was made when, in B.C. 10, Drusus introduced the idea into the West, setting up the famous altar at Lugdunum for the "Three Gauls." The imperial worship was also introduced in Germany (Tacitus, *Ann.*, i. 57), and in other less civilized provinces.

After the death of Augustus his worship and that of Rome was introduced into *all* the provinces (Tacitus, *Ann.*, i. 78), with the one exception of Africa. Whatever the reason, Africa, more than any other province, held republican traditions. The post of flamen or priest of Augustus became the highest object of provincial ambition; and as politics and religion were inextricably mixed, it was the refusal to worship the emperor which marked the Christians out for persecution.]

CHAPTER XLIV.

THE WORK OF THE EMPIRE

Comparative Absence of further Conquests.—Rome's work in conquering the world was now done; it is true that several new provinces were added during the rest of the first century A.D., and that Trajan at the beginning of the next century ranks among the greatest of Roman conquerors; but his acquisitions were almost all given up by his successor, and such provinces as Thrace and Mauretania were the natural results of the policy of Augustus, who had brought them under Roman influence by diplomacy, though he had not carried his victorious arms into them. It may be said that Britain, the conquest of which was begun by Claudius, is the one new acquisition of importance which is made by the successors of Augustus.

Spread of Roman Civilization.—But though Rome ceased to conquer with her arms, her peaceful victories were never more remarkable. Her language and her civilization spread steadily over Gaul, over the Danube provinces, over Spain, over N. Africa; the languages of France, of Spain, of Portugal, are the most permanent memorial of her work. Almost as permanent are the great roads which were the instruments of her empire, and which have survived it as the lines of communication in modern Europe; while the material ruins of her civilization—the baths, the aqueducts, the amphitheatres—still remain to witness the wealth, the energy, and the munificence of her citizens. Even on Britain, which was won later and lost earlier than most of the provinces, the mark of Rome is indelibly left; but the remains of her empire among us are as nothing compared to those, not merely of Southern France or of Spain, but of N. Africa and of the Rhine valley.

Prosperity of the Roman World.—The prosperity of the Roman world during the first two centuries of the Christian era can hardly be exaggerated; war, except on the frontiers, was almost unknown, communication was easy and secure, the same language and the same coinage were used everywhere. And in spite of the frightful excesses of one or two emperors (*e.g.* of Caius and of Nero), from which the provinces suffered far less than Rome, government was, on the whole, just and equal.

Permanent Effects of this.—The result of this extraordinary success was the impression which Rome made on the world. Even when the Northern barbarians at last conquered her, they held her in awe, they used her law, they borrowed her titles, above all they received her religion. The authority of the Papacy was largely based on the widespread belief that Rome was the natural head of the world; and the "Holy Roman See" and the "Holy Roman Empire" continued right down into the Middle Ages to be the natural embodiments of authority in Church and in State.

Moral Weakness of Rome.—But along with all this greatness went terrible evils. The vices of Rome spread over Italy and over the world along with her civilization, and it is one of the saddest things in history that even Christianity failed to save the Roman world. Individuals it could re-create and raise to new life, but it was not given the power to create a new State out of the old materials; new blood had to be brought in to make modern Europe.

Economic Evils.—And along with the moral evils of Rome, the economic evils also spread. Roman capitalism ruined the provinces with its slave labour, as it had ruined Italy; and with the decay of honest work and of enterprise came a decay of prosperity, which rendered the burden of taxation too heavy to be borne.

And good as the Roman government was, it was yet in the end an evil, for its centralization destroyed the life and independence of its subjects. Town life flourished for a time, and even provincial life found a means of expressing itself in the assemblies for the worship of the Emperor, which attracted the wealthiest and the noblest of the provincial citizens;

but national life and patriotism were unknown in the world-wide state, governed by an endless number of officials, who took their orders from one man.

The Roman Empire is described in the Book of Daniel under the figure of the "image, whose legs were of iron, and his feet part of iron and part of clay."[1] The iron of the Roman system was its reverence for law, its attempts (too often failures) to secure justice, its power of organization, its stubborn persistence, above all the belief in Rome and her Fortune, which made her citizens ready to give up all, even life itself, for her. The clay was the ever-growing luxury, the selfish craving for individual advancement or wealth or amusement, the consequent relaxation of all ties, of the state, of the family, of religion. Rome's success, in spite of her many faults, was an illustration of the principle that "righteousness exalteth a nation," her fall was the slow but sure retribution that came upon her for her neglect of her own best principles; she said in her heart "I shall be a lady for ever," and the Lord God said unto her, as He did to Tyrus,[2] "Behold, therefore I will bring strangers upon thee, the terrible of the nations," and she fell. Yet even in her fall, she lived on, because the principles of law and of righteousness were still found in her Church.

[1] Daniel ii. 33. [2] Ezekiel xxviii. 7.

APPENDIX

I

CHIEF DATES OF ROMAN HISTORY

753 Romulus founds Rome.
616 Etruscan dynasty of the Tarquins.
510 The expulsion of the kings.
508 Porsena defeats the Romans.
496 Battle of Lake Regillus.
494 *First secession of the Plebeians; they obtain tribunes.*
493 *Sp. Cassius reforms Latin League.*
486 Sp. Cassius carries the first Agrarian Law.
471 Lex Publilia of Volero. Recognition of Concilium Plebis.
451–450 The First and the Second Decemvirates.
The Twelve Tables issued.
449 *Leges Valeriae Horatiae.* Formation of Comitia Tributa.
445 L. Canuleia de *conubio.*
Appointment of military tribunes in place of consuls, and of censors (443).
426 Capture of Fidenae.
396 Capture of Veii.
390 *Rome taken by the Gauls.*
381 Tusculum receives the franchise.
367 *Licinio-Sextian Rogations* carried after a ten years' struggle; L. Sextius first Plebeian Consul in 366.
358 Renewal of Latin League.
351 Caere is the first instance of a community with *civitas sine suffragio.*
343–1 First Samnite War.
340–338 *Great Latin War.*
339 Leges Publiliae extend powers of Plebs.
327–304 *Second Samnite War.*
326 First instance of proconsular power.

321 Roman defeat at Caudinae Furculae.
312 Censorship of Appius Claudius; he makes Via Appia, and tries to change position of freedmen.
310 Romans penetrate into N. Etruria.
298–290 Third Samnite War.
295 Battle of Sentinum.
287 *Lex Hortensia* establishes legislative independence of Plebs.
283 Defeat of the Gauls in the N. of Italy.
280–275 War with Pyrrhus.
264–241 *First Punic War.*
260 Romans build a fleet.
256 *War transferred to Africa* by Regulus. Roman naval victory at Ecnomus.
255 Defeat and capture of Regulus.
247 *Rise of Hamilcar Barca; birth of Hannibal.*
242 Naval victory at Aegates Insulae.
241 *Number of thirty-five tribes completed.*
Remodelling of Comitia Centuriata now (perhaps) takes place.
Sicily first Roman province.
232 Lex Flaminia agraria carried without consulting the Senate.
229 First Illyrian War brings Rome forward as champion of the Greeks.
225–222 Gallic War, in which
223 *The Romans cross the Po.*
218–204 *Second Punic War.*
216 *Roman defeat at Cannae; most of South Italy revolts.*
211 Recapture of Capua.
207 Battle of Metaurus.
205 Scipio *compels the Senate* to give him leave to
204 cross to Africa.
202 Battle of Zama.
200–194 *Second Macedonian War.*
200–191 Gallic War in N. Italy ends in full reduction of Valley of Po.
192–190 *War with Antiochus.*
189 Manlius Volso attacks Galatia on his own responsibility.
184 Censorship of M. Porcius Cato.
183 Death of Scipio and of Hannibal.
181 Lex Cornelia Baebia against bribery.
177 Lex Claudia de Sociis checks migration of allies to Rome.
171–168 Third Macedonian War.
168 Battle of Pydna; from this Polybius dates *the establishment of Roman Empire.* This leads to

167 *Abolition of Tributum* (*i.e.* of direct taxation) at Rome.
155 Cato urges that Greek philosophers be ordered to leave Rome.
149–146 *Third Punic War.*
146 *Destruction of Carthage and Corinth.*
Formation of Provinces of Macedonia (with Achaia) and Africa.
133 Numantia captured by Scipio Aemilianus.
Agrarian Law of Tiberius Gracchus begins Roman Revolution.
125 Revolt of Fregellae.
123–122 *Tribunates of C. Gracchus*, who overthrows for a time the power of the Senate.
112–105 Jugurthine War.
108 *The people appoint Marius to supersede Metellus.*
He recasts the Roman Army.
102–101 Marius saves Rome from Cimbri and Teutones.
100 Coalition of Marius and Saturninus.
91 Legislation of Livius Drusus, who is murdered.
90–88 Social War compels *the Romans to give allies the franchise.*
88 *Sulla marches on Rome with his army.*
88–84 First Mithradatic War.
83 Sulla returns to Italy, and in this and next year crushes the Marians.
81 *Dictatorship of Sulla.* He *introduces the Proscriptions*, and reforms the Constitution.
78 Death of Sulla.
74–63 *Third Mithradatic War.*
73–71 Slave War in Italy under Spartacus.
70 Pompey and Crassus as consuls break down the Sullan constitution.
67 Lex Gabinia *gives Pompey extraordinary command* against the pirates.
66 Lex Manilia gives him same against Mithradates.
63 *Consulship of Cicero;* he suppresses *conspiracy of Catiline.*
60 Coalition of Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus, called *the "First Triumvirate."*
59 Caesar's Consulship. *He receives Cisalpine Gaul from the people as his province.*
58–51 Caesar's wars in Gaul, which is conquered.
58 Tribunate of Clodius.
Exile of Cicero, who returns next year.
53 *Defeat and death of Crassus at Carrhae.*
52 Pompey sole consul; he becomes *estranged from Caesar.*
Decisive campaign against Vercingetorix in Gaul.

49 *Outbreak of Civil War.* Caesar drives Pompey from Italy, and defeats his army in Spain.
48 *Battle of Pharsalus ends Pompeian party.*
46 Battle of Thapsus.
45 Battle of Munda.
44 *Assassination of Caesar.*
43 Antony and Octavianus are reconciled by Lepidus. *Triumvirate is formed;* proscriptions at Rome.
42 *Battle of Philippi. End of the Roman Republican Party.*
41 Perusine War.
40 Treaty of Brundisium.
Parthians overrun Syria.
36 Defeat of Sextus Pompeius and of Lepidus.
The Triumvirate becomes a Duumvirate.
Antony's failure against the Parthians.
35 Caesar's successful campaign in Pannonia.
32 War between Antony and Octavian decided by
31 Battle of Actium.
27 Octavian lays down his power as triumvir. *Foundation of the Principate.*
15 Subjugation of Rhaeti, Vindelici, and Norici.
12 Conquest of Germany begun by Drusus, and that of Pannonia continued by Tiberius.

A.D. 5 Roman legions winter in Germany.
6 Revolt of Pannonia, which takes three years to suppress.
9 Defeat of Varus by Arminius.
14 Death of Augustus.

II

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE ORDERS

First Period

509 Lex Valeria de Provocatione. (This law is twice re-enacted, each time by a Valerius, in 449 and in 300.)
494 First Secession of the Plebeians, who obtain their own officers, Tribunes and Aediles.
486 The first Agrarian Law, that of Spurius Cassius.
471 Lex Publilia of Volero; the Plebeians obtain their own assembly (*Concilium Plebis*) with:

(*a*) The right of electing their own officers (previously elected by the Plebeians in the curiae).

(*b*) The right of passing Plebiscita.

462 C. Terentilius Harsa proposes the codification of the laws.

451–450 First and Second Decemvirates. Publication of the Twelve Tables.

449 Leges Valeriae Horatiae.

(*a*) Grant the right of provocatio again.

(*b*) Confirm the sacred character of the tribunes.

(*c*) Establish the Comitia Tributa.

(*d*) Give the Plebiscita the force of laws.

Summing up. In this period then the Plebs obtain:

(1) Personal protection from arbitrary judgments, 509 and 494.

(2) Their own officers, 494.

(3) Recognition of their right to the Ager Publicus, 486.

(4) Their own assembly, 471.

(5) The publication of the laws, 451–450.

(6) The right of legislating for the whole people, 449.

Second Period

445 Lex Canuleia granting *conubium* between the orders.

Institution of military tribunate with consular power in place of consulship; to this Plebeians are eligible.

(N.B.—On the other hand, a new patrician office, the censorship, is created.)

440–439 Agitation led by Spurius Maelius.

421 The Quaestorship thrown open to Plebeians.

409 First Plebeian Quaestor.

400 First Plebeian Military Tribune.

391 Tribunician Prosecution of Camillus and his banishment.

384 Agitation led by M. Manlius.

376–367 Struggle as to the Licinio-Sextian Rogations, which are at last carried.

(*a*) One of the consuls must be a Plebeian.

(*b*) Claims of the Plebs to the Ager Publicus are recognized.

(*c*) Debt is regulated.

(*d*) Sacred office—that of keepers of Sibylline Books—thrown open to people.

On the other hand, two new patrician offices are created, the praetorship and the curule aedileship.

366 First Plebeian Consul.

Summing up of the Second Period.

(1) The Plebeians are put on an equality with the patricians in private rights, 445.

(2) They make good their claim to share in highest command in the state:

(*a*) In theory, 445.

(*b*) In actual fact on a small scale, 400.

(*c*) Completely, 366.

FURTHER ADVANCES OF THE PLEBEIANS.

356 First Plebeian Dictator.

351 First Plebeian Censor.

339 Leges Publiliae.

(1) One of the censors must be a Plebeian.

(2) The *plebiscita* are to have the force of laws (re-enactment of Lex Valeria Horatia of 449).

(3) That the *patrum auctoritas* should be given before, and not after, a law was passed in the Comitia Centuriata.

336 First Plebeian Praetor.

300 Lex Ogulnia gives the Plebeians a full share in the sacred offices.

287 Lex Hortensia enacts once more that the Plebiscita should have the force of laws (cf. 449 and 339), and exempts them altogether from the *patrum auctoritas*.

III

ROME'S POWER IN ITALY

(All Latin Colonies marked 'L.')

FIRST PERIOD, 510-450, IS ONE OF DECAY

(1) Rome loses to the Etruscans her hold on S. Etruria. (Cf. Stories of Porsena).

(2) She loses for a time the headship of Latium. (Cf. Battle of Lake Regillus).

(3) She loses to Volsci her colonies in South of Latium. Velitrae is founded in 494, and Norba in 492, but they are not maintained.

Recovery begins with renewal of the Latin League, 493, which is joined by Hernicans in 486.

By this the country of the Plain is united against the surrounding mountaineers.

But on the whole the Romans sole ground.

(*a*) In 463 the Aequi and the Volsci are at the gates of Rome.

(*b*) The Aequians establish themselves on Mount Algidus,

(*c*) and occupy Labicum, between Rome and the Hernicans.

SECOND PERIOD, 450–390. STEADY ADVANCE OF ROME, BOTH NORTHWARD AND SOUTHWARD.

(1) Rome's advance in S. Latium marked by (L.) Ardea, 442.

(2) Rome recaptures, and perhaps sends a colony to Labicum, 418.

(3) Rome reduces S. Etruria—Fidenae in 426, Veii in 396, Falerii in 394, Sutrium in 390.

Result. Volsci and Aequi no longer assume the aggressive; (Aequi appear before Rome for last time in 446), but Rome is the aggressor, and recovers her lost ground, and begins to secure it by colonies.

THIRD PERIOD, 390–338. FINAL REDUCTION OF THE PLAIN COUNTRY.

(1) Rome, recovering rapidly from her capture by the Gauls, crushes Volsci and Aequi (389–388). (L.) Setia, 382.

(2) Recovers her hold on S. Etruria, where she forms four new tribes (389), and plants (L.) Sutrium and (L.) Nepete, 383.

(3) Crushes the rebellion of some of the Latin Towns, and gives the franchise to Tusculum (381).

(4) Renews the Latin League (358), and at the same time plants two new tribes in the S. of Latium.

(5) Once more conquers S. Etruria (356–351), and compels Caere to accept the *civitas sine suffragio*.

(6) Conquers (340–338) the Latins, and breaks up the old Latin League. — Antium, 338.

Two new tribes, 332.

(N.B.—In this period the advance of Rome is rapid, except for the twenty years from 380–360; during these she is hindered

(*a*) by the ten years' strife as to the Licinian Rogations,

(*b*) by Gallic inroads).

FOURTH PERIOD, 343–290. ROME'S STRUGGLE WITH THE SAMNITES *i.e.* THE MOUNTAINEERS OF CENTRAL ITALY, AND THEIR ALLIES.

(1) First Samnite War, 343–341, establishes Roman supremacy in Campania.

She prepares for the next struggle by planting — (L.) Cales, 334. Anxur, 329. (L.) Fregellae, 328.

(2) Second Samnite War, 327–304.

(*a*) Rome secures Campania, and plants there — Suessa, 313.

She enrols two new tribes in Latium and S. Campania, 318.

Cf. formation of Via Appia, 312.

(*b*) She guards herself against Samnium by — (L.) Saticula, 313. (L.) Interamna, 312. (L.) Sora, 303.

(*c*) She secures her hold in Apulia by — (L.) Luceria, 314.

(*d*) She crosses Ciminian Forest (310), and establishes her supremacy in N. Etruria.

(*e*) Establishes her supremacy in Umbria, and secures alliance of the Marsi and the neighbouring Sabellian tribes (304).

(*f*) She crushes Hernici and Aequi finally, enrols two new tribes among Aequi (299), and plants — (L.) Alba, 303, and (L.) Carsioli, 298.

(3) Third Samnite War, 298–290.

Confirms the results of the previous war.

Umbria is further secured by — (L.) Narnia, 299

Campania by — Minturnae, 296, and Sinuessa, 296.

Apulia by — (L.) Venusia, 291.

Result. This tremendous struggle for fifty years

(1) Confirms Rome's hold over the plains of Latium and Campania.

(2) Surrounds the central mountain block with a ring of fortresses.

(3) Extends Rome's alliances far beyond her immediate neighbours into all parts of Italy proper.

(4) Brings her to the front as the champion of Italy against the Gauls.

It is the real period of the conquest of Italy. II. and III. are mainly preparatory, while in V. the fruits are reaped.

FIFTH PERIOD. FINAL PERIOD OF THE CONQUEST OF ITALY, 290–264.

(1) Repulse of the Gauls. Rome begins to assume the aggressive against them, and crushes the Senones, 283. — (L.) Hatria, 289. Sena, 283. (L.) Ariminum, 268. (L.) Paestum, 273.

(2) Conquest of the Greeks.

War with Pyrrhus, 280–275. This involves a new conquest of S. Italy, confirmed by — (L.) Beneventum, 268. (L.) Aesernia, 263. (both in Samnium).

(3) Sabines and Picentines receive full Roman franchise, 268.

(4) Two more tribes added, making the final number thirty-five, 241.

SIXTH PERIOD. ROME EXTENDS HER DOMINIONS OVER THE VALLEY OF THE PO; ITALY RECEIVES THE ALPS AS BOUNDARY, IN FACT, THOUGH NOT YET IN NAME.

(1) Division of Ager Gallicus by Flaminius secures frontier against the Gauls, 232.

(2) Gallic War, 225–222.

(*a*) Gauls repulsed at Telamon, 225.

(*b*) Romans cross the Po, 223.

This is secured by Via Flaminia, 220, and by — (L.) Cremona and (L.) Placentia, 218.

(3) Gallic War, 201–191.

Results secured by Via Aemilia, 187, and by — (L.) Bononia, 189. Parma and Mutina, 183. (L.) Aquileia, 184.

(4) Ligurian War.

Ends in transportation of Apuani to Samnium (180), and planting of — Luna, 177.

Result. Though these conquests are not yet included in Italy, they become rapidly Romanized.

IV

GROWTH OF THE ROMAN PROVINCIAL SYSTEM

I. *Provinces taken for Defensive Purposes.*

(1) *Sicily* after the first Punic War.

(2) *Sardinia* } Annexed 238, while Carthage was occupied with the
Corsica } "Merciless War"; organized, 231.

These three islands are natural dependencies of Italy.

(3) *Cisalpine Gaul.* The Romans crossed the Po 223, but they did not establish themselves permanently beyond that river till after the Second Punic War. By 191 they had reduced everything up to the Alps; but this was not made into a "province" till 81 (probably), when Sulla organized it for the better protection of the Northern frontier of Italy.

(4) *Illyricum.* The Romans established themselves beyond the Adriatic to put down piracy in 219, but there was no "province" there till, at any rate, after the battle of Pydna; at some period between 168 and 59 (when Caesar received it with Cisalpine Gaul) Illyricum was organized.

(5, 6) *Hither and Further* Spain; organized, 197. The Romans went to Spain to drive out the Carthaginians. When once they were established there, advance was inevitable, for a civilized power always encroaches on one less civilized, till some natural boundary is reached; but at first the Roman hold was very weak.

[N.B.—Spain was afterwards divided by Augustus into three provinces—Tarraconensis (in N. and E.), Baetica (in S.), Lusitania (in W.)].

II. *Provinces taken as the result of Senatorial policy.*

Rome, from fear for Italy, fought Macedonia and Syria, and finally destroyed Carthage. Hence she was compelled to step into the place of the powers she crushed; but she was slow to annex.

(7) *Macedonia*, 146.

To this was added as a dependency *Achaia*, though Athens and other towns were nominally independent. Achaia was probably made a separate province by Augustus in 27.

(8) *Africa*, 146. The old territory of Carthage.

(9) *Asia*, 133. Pergamum, so long the tool of Rome against her powerful neighbours, was bequeathed to her by a very doubtful will.

III. *Results of Proconsular activity.*

(10) *Gallia* Narbonensis, *i.e.* S.E. and S. Gaul (cf. the modern "Provence," 120). Result of the victories of Fabius Maximus and Domitius, 121.

(11) *Cilicia* occupied as a measure against pirates in 102, definitely organized in 64 by Pompey, who also organized at the same time the three following.

(12) *Bithynia*, with part of *Pontus*. Bithynia was bequeathed in 75, and in the struggle for it Mithradates of Pontus lost his life and his ancestral kingdom. (Parts of Pontus, however, remained independent till the time of the Empire.)

(13) *Syria* taken from Tigranes, king of Armenia.

(14) *Crete* conquered by Metellus in 67.

(15) *Cyrenaica*, bequeathed in 96, was made a province in 74.

(16) *Cyprus* occupied in 58.

(17) *Gallia Comata*. Conquered by Julius Caesar 58–50; organized by Augustus, early in his Principate, into three divisions,

Aquitania the S.W.,
Belgica the N.E.,
Lugdunensis between these two.

These three were, however, under Augustus usually united under one governor.

(18) *Numidia*, 46. The dominions of Juba added to the old province of Africa, finally made a province in 25.

IV. *Augustus organized the frontier of the Empire scientifically*, in two ways; but first he completed the circle of the Mediterranean by annexing.

(19) *Egypt*, 30 B.C., which was never made a formal province, but remained the Emperor's private property.

(20) *Moesia*, conquered 29 B.C., was made a province before 6 A.D.

(*a*) *He surrounded the frontier of the Empire with a number of dependent states*, and gradually absorbed these into provinces; *e.g.*

(21) *Galatia* } Made provinces in 25 on the death of King
(22) *Pamphylia* } Amyntas.

(So, too, *Cappadocia* was absorbed in A.D. 17.)

(*b*) He aimed at making the frontier rest on *natural boundaries.*

(23) He first formed the two small provinces, governed by
(24) Procurators, of *Rhaetia* } 15.
Noricum }

(25) Then the frontier of Illyricum was extended nearly to the Danube, and this district was finally formed into a separate province, *Pannonia*, in A.D. 10.

(26, 27) The victories of Drusus and Tiberius in Germany led to the formation of the provinces of *Upper and Lower Germany*, but these, after the defeat of Varus (A.D. 9), remained merely as the names of the frontiers occupied by the legions on the Rhine.

After Augustus, hardly any advance is made till the time of Claudius (42–54 A.D.).

He annexes *Mauretania* (which forms two provinces),
Thrace,
Lycia,
and *Judaea*,
which had long been ripening for Roman rule,
and makes a fresh departure by crossing the Channel (43 A.D.), and beginning the Conquest of Britain. With Claudius the Roman Empire assumes practically its final form; later conquests were mainly temporary.

V

EXTENSION OF ROMAN PRIVILEGES

In Italy

During the first three centuries of the Republic, enfranchisement of allies and subjects goes on regularly; the last instance is Arpinum, which, with other towns, receives the full civitas in 188.

129 Scipio defends the Agrarian rights of the allies, and *perhaps* meditates an extension of the franchise.

125 Franchise proposals of the democratic Consul Fulvius Flaccus.

122 Franchise proposals of C. Gracchus; he alienates by them the mob of Rome, and they are vetoed.

101 Marius enfranchises a cohort of Umbrians in the battle-field.

100 Saturninus admits Italians to share with the full burgesses in his agrarian and colonial laws.

91 Franchise proposals of Livius Drusus.

The Civil War compels the Romans to make concessions.

(1) 90 Law of the Consul Caesar, giving the franchise to all who had not taken up arms against Rome.

(2) 89 Law of the tribunes, Plautius and Papirius, giving the franchise to all who applied for it within sixty days.

(3) 89 The law of the Consul Pompeius giving the Latin franchise to the Transpadanes.

The Romans, however, made these concessions nugatory by confining the new citizens to eight of the tribes, which voted last. Hence the agitation goes on.

88 Sulpicius puts new and old citizens on an equality.

This is set aside by Sulla, but restored by the democratic leaders, and in

86 Romans and Italians are finally put on a footing of equality; for Sulla, on his return in 83, recognizes the franchise of the new Italian citizens.

The Provinces

The question of extension of privilege is now shifted from Rome to the provinces. It is again the democratic leaders who urge it.

Previous steps in equalization of provinces and Italy.

(1) 206 Scipio plants his veterans in Spain at Italica. This is the *first settlement of Roman citizens outside Italy*, but it is not an organized community.

(2) 171 Latin colony at Carteia, in Spain—*the first outside Italy*.

(3) 123 C. Gracchus proposes a colony of burgesses, with full rights, at Junonia, on the site of Carthage. This fails, but

(4) 118 Colony of burgesses at Narbo—the *first outside Italy*.

55 Crassus tries as censor to give the full franchise to the Transpadanes, but is thwarted by his colleague, Catulus. Caesar had some years before (probably in 69) been inciting this province to demand this privilege.

59 Caesar sends a Latin colony to Novum Comum.

58–50 Caesar treats the Transpadanes as Roman citizens by enrolling them in his legions.

49 Caesar

(*a*) Gives full franchise to Transpadanes,

(*b*) And to Gades in Spain—the *first provincial town to receive it*.

46–5 Caesar as dictator

(*a*) Founds citizen colonies at Carthage and Corinth (Laus Julii) and elsewhere in provinces.

(*b*) Admits Gauls to the Senate.

(*c*) Proposes to give the Latin franchise to Sicily.

(*d*) Extends full franchise widely.

40 The Spaniard Balbus is the *first provincial consul.*

19 The Spaniard, the younger Balbus, is the *first provincial to triumph.*

A.D. 42–54 Reign of Claudius.

(*a*) Number of citizens raised by one half.

(*b*) Gauls admitted to Senate.

(*c*) Numerous Roman colonies in the provinces.

Vespasian gives the Latin franchise to Spain, *the first country outside Italy* to receive this privilege.

Caracalla admits all free men everywhere to Roman citizenship. (By this time what had been a privilege was becoming a burden, as the grant of citizenship brought those who received it under Roman taxation).

VI

DECAY OF SENATORIAL AUTHORITY

FIRST PERIOD. DEFINITE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION.

232 Flaminius carries Agrarian Law without consulting the Senate.

218 Lex Claudia prevents Senators from trading.

217–216 Flaminius and Varro elected consuls to carry on the war vigorously, in opposition to the Fabian policy which is favoured by the Senate.

(N.B.—The defeats of Trasimene and Cannae discredited the popular leaders, and confirmed the authority of the Senate).

SECOND PERIOD, 216–133. SENATORIAL ASCENDANCY ESTABLISHED: INDIVIDUALS, HOWEVER, OCCASIONALLY ATTACK IT.

205 Scipio, by *threatening* to appeal to the people, compels the Senate to allow him to carry the war into Africa.

189 Manlius Vulso attacks the Galatians without orders from the Senate.

THIRD PERIOD, 133–81. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATS AND THE SENATE ENDS IN CIVIL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION OF SULLA.

133 Tiberius Gracchus.

(1) As Flaminius had done, brings in his Agrarian Law against the wish of the Senate.

(2) Interferes in foreign policy by distributing the treasures of Attalus.

123–122 C. Gracchus supersedes the authority of the Senate.

(1) *In Legislation:* he brings his laws directly before the Comitia.

(2) *In Jurisdiction*

(*a*) He excludes the Senators from the *quaestiones*.

(*b*) He condemns those who had put to death citizens by a Senatorial commission, without appeal to the people.

(3) *In Administration*

(*a*) He limits Senatorial authority in the assignment of provinces.

(*b*) Acts in all matters "with a kind of monarchic power." (*Plut.*)

108 Marius appointed to the command in Africa *by the people*, in defiance of the Senate, which had given that province to Metellus.

100 Saturninus compels the Senate to swear to maintain his Agrarian Law.

FOURTH PERIOD, 81–59. SULLA ESTABLISHES THE SENATE IN ABSOLUTE POWER. THIS IS RAPIDLY LOST AGAIN

70 Laws of Pompey and Crassus.

(1) The Equites and the Tribuni Aerarii receive a share of the *judicia*.

(2) The tribunes recover their right of proposing legislation.

67, 66 In spite of the Senate, the people give *extraordinary provincia. commands* to Pompeius by the Gabinian and the Manilian laws.

59 Caesar sets the Senate aside in his consulship.

(*a*) He carries his Agrarian law without its consent.

(*b*) He receives his province for five years by the Lex Vatinia by direct vote of the people.

(*c*) He publishes the proceedings of the Senate.

VII

AUGUSTAN LITERATURE

Policy of Augustus to gain over the literary men who had so opposed Caesar. (Cf. p. 289.) He and his great minister Maecenas were its patrons. So great was his success that the "Augustan age" has become a proverb.

Chief Writers. Poets

(1) P. Vergilius Maro (70–19); born near Mantua, in Cisalpine Gaul. (Cf. p. 297.) Of his works only the Eclogues and the Georgics were published in his lifetime; he left the Aeneid unfinished after ten years' work at it.

(2) Q. Horatius Flaccus (65–8); born at Venusia, in Apulia; the son of a freedman. Fought on the Republican side at Philippi. (Cf. p. 296.) His earliest works were his Satires and Epodes; his latest the Epistles; Odes i.–iii. published between (B.C. 23).

(3) *Albius Tibullus* (54–19). The most tender of the Roman elegiac poets.

(4) Sextus Propertius (49–15). A native of Umbria. He, too, like Tibullus, imitates the Alexandrine elegiac poets, with less charm and clearness, but more vigour and originality. He, like Horace and Virgil, was a friend of Maecenas.

(5) P. Ovidius Naso (43 B.C.–17 A.D.). The most fertile of all Roman poets. His work is partly erotic, *e.g.* the *Amores*, partly mythological, *e.g.* the *Metamorphoses*, while his poems after his *relegatio* (A.D. 8) form a class by themselves, *e.g.* the *Tristia*. His verse is always clever, never really great.

The great prose writer of the time was T. Livius (59 B.C.–17 A.D.); born at Patavium (Padua). Of his great history of Rome, in 142 books, thirty-five survive. There is also a scanty epitome of the rest.

General Features of Augustan Literature

(1) Submission to authority, not discontent. All the poets praise Augustus or his ministers Maecenas, Messalla, etc.

(2) But there is no hostility to the Republic; as Augustus claimed to have restored it (p. 304), so the poets see the culmination of its glories in the Principate. Virgil and Horace praise the heroes of old Rome; Livy was allowed by Augustus to praise Pompey and Cicero.

(3) As the writers submit to the Principate, so also (unlike Lucretius) they are enthusiastic for the State religion. (Cf. p. 311.)

(4) And their admiration of the past extends to its life and its morals; agriculture, country life, and the joys of the family were the popular topics in corrupt Rome. (Cf. p. 311.)

As a result of this,

(5) Augustan literature, however brilliant, has not the genuineness and freedom of Lucretius and Catullus, except in two points:

(*a*) Virgil and Horace at any rate have a genuine delight in country life, now possible again owing to the restoration of order.

(*b*) The enthusiasm for Roman greatness is very real; the Aeneid is the glorification of Rome.

"Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem."

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(R. = Rome.)

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